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A B S T R A C T
Little has been written on deputy-leaders and the received wisdom, such as it is, is that 
deputy-leaders have little power and hence do not matter. A global survey of deputy- 
leaders found that 68 per cent of states had a deputy-leader. So, however powerful they 
may be, they are certainly a fairly common political phenomenon. To test whether or not 
deputy-leaders are politically powerful and thus matter, seven hypotheses were identified 
with nine observable implications. A comparative approach was adopted, examining the 
careers of 64 deputy-leaders in five states. The overall results of the tests were somewhat 
at odds with the perceived wisdom that deputy-leaders do not matter. Furthermore, the 
outcomes of the tests at the level of the individual states in this study found strong proof 
that deputy-leaders in the US can influence policy outcomes and there was some proof 
that British and Swedish deputy-leaders could do so as well.
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1 D E P U T Y -L E A D E R S  -  A  G L O B A L  O V E R V IE W
1.1 In tro d u c tio n
1.1.1 Introduction and chapter outline
There is a perception among journalists and political commentators that the current US 
Vice-President, Dick Cheney is a very powerful politician. In a profile for the Sunday 
Times, respected biographer William Shawcross, describes Cheney as ‘the heart and soul 
and brains of the show ... he’s the man with the map, quietly giving directions to the 
driver.’1 He goes on to call him ‘The most influential man in America ... perhaps the most 
powerful vice-president there has ever been.’2 He backs up these assertions by attributing 
changes in taxation, education and energy policy to Cheney. Shawcross is not alone in 
this view. A profile in the Washington Post describes him as ‘powerful’ with former 
Treasury Secretary, Paul O'Neill, being quoted as describing Cheney as ‘the center of 
power and influence in this White House.’4 Dan Coen5 argues that President Bush has 
given Cheney ‘the authority to make decisions.’ There seems to be no shortage of 
commentators who view Vice-President Cheney as having significant influence on US 
government policy.
1 Sunday Times Magazine, June 6 2003, p 44.
2 Sunday Times Magazine, June 6 2003, p 44.
3 Washington Post, January 18 2004, p DO 1.
4 Washington Post, January 18 2004, p D01.
5 Available from: http://www.vicepresidents.com/new page 15.htm [accessed 14 March 2002],
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What is the source of Cheney’s power? He has no major position within his party either 
as a politician with his own power-base or as spokesperson for a particular group or 
section within his party. He has no additional cabinet positions other than that of Vice- 
President. Indeed, he was no longer involved in active politics when he was chosen to be 
George W. Bush’s running mate and thus became US Vice-President. It would appear 
that it is his position as Vice-President through which he influences government policy.
Such a situation is very much at odds with the findings outlined in chapter two of this 
research. A review of the literature finds that little has been written on deputy-leaders and 
the received wisdom, such as it is, is that deputy-leaders (whether they be Vice- 
Presidents or Deputy-Prime Ministers) have little power and hence do not matter. How is 
this reconciled with the perception that Vice President Cheney is a very powerful 
politician? This apparent contradiction between the literature (insofar as it exists) and the 
policy impact of Cheney indicates that the role of deputy-leaders requires further 
research.
Moreover, this question raises more general issues about leadership and the functioning 
of government in general. If the perception that deputy-leaders do not matter (as they 
cannot influence policy) needs to be re-evaluated, then this may have significant 
implications for a number of areas of comparative politics where the perception that 
deputy-leaders do not matter has led to them being ignored. If deputy-leaders do matter 
(even if only in some cases), then existing research in areas such as that of coalitions, 
government and cabinets may need to be re-examined.
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Over the course of the following eight chapters this work will examine deputy-leaders 
with a view to determining whether or not they matter insofar as they can affect policy. In 
the first chapter the position of deputy-leader is defined. It also contains a global survey 
of deputy-leaders which provides the basis for an analysis of their role and functions, as 
well as the circumstances in which they are found. The second chapter focuses on the 
perception of deputy-leaders and as has been outlined above finds that they are perceived 
not to matter. The second half of this chapter will provide a framework for the testing of 
this perception. To test whether or not deputy-leaders are politically powerful and thus 
matter, seven hypotheses were identified with nine observable implications. The third 
chapter provides a background to deputy-leaders across five states who will provide the 
basis for testing these observable implications. The results of these tests are given in 
chapters four to seven. Chapter eight brings these results together in order to answer the 
question do deputy-leaders matter. The overall results of the tests were inconclusive, 
which is at odds with the perceived wisdom. It was also found that deputy-leaders in the 
US can influence policy outcomes and there were indications that British and Swedish 
deputy-leaders could do so as well.
1.1.2 This chapter
This chapter will provide a survey of deputy-leaders. At its core is a global database of 
deputy-leaders covering 192 states (the database itself is included as Appendix 1). The 
data gathered include: states with deputy leaders; their constitutional title; whether they
16
have a constitutionally-defined role and, if  so, what it is; w hether they are elected or 
appointed; whether they hold ministerial positions and the nature o f  government in those 
states (are they democratic? do they have single or multi-party government? and what are 
their leadership structures?) as well as the size o f each state. The data will then be 
analysed and a number o f conclusions regarding deputy-leaders reached.
1 .2  A s s u m p t io n s
The only assumption that is made in the gathering o f the data is that it was related to the 
situation at a specific point in time. In other words, the data on deputy-leaders gathered 
for this global overview relate to the state o f  affairs that existed during N ovem ber 2001. 
Some o f the items o f data gathered will be more prone to change than others over time. 
As governments change, the ministerial responsibilities o f deputy-leaders will change, as 
will the single- or multi-party composition o f government and possibly even the number 
o f deputy-leaders. Constitutional changes occur less frequently, so the constitutional role 
and the nature o f  the appointment o f deputy-leaders will rem ain relatively constant. In 
states where there is no constitutional requirement for a deputy-leader, some governments 
may have such a position and others may not. Thus, the point-in-time nature o f the data 
gathered m ust be borne in mind when conclusions are reached on the basis o f them.
This approach was adopted so as to render the gathering o f the data manageable. To 
gather data on deputy-leaders on a longitudinal basis (that is over time) would generate a 
large amount o f data, m uch o f which would not be comparable given that many states did 
not exist until recently. While longitudinal data would allow for some additional analysis,
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particularly regarding the changing role of deputy-leaders over time, it would not identify 
the reasons for such change. A more detailed analysis of the changing role of deputy- 
leaders will be carried out in chapters three to seven.
1 .3  D e f in it io n s
1.3.1 Introduction
Before any data can be gathered, a number of key concepts must be defined so as to 
guide the data search. Specifically, what, for the purposes of this research, is a state and 
what is a deputy-leader? As data are gathered on the nature of deputy-leaders, further 
concepts will need to be defined. What is meant by the statement that a deputy-leader in a 
specific country is elected rather than appointed? When a state is described as democratic 
or non-democratic, what is meant?
1.3.2 What is a state?
What sort of deputy-leaders will this research relate to? The simple answer is deputy- 
leaders of states. The definition of ‘state’ that is used will determine how broad an 
overview of deputy-leaders is provided. Article 1 of the Montevideo Convention6 defines 
a state as having: (a) a permanent population; (b) a defined territory; (c) government; and 
(d) capacity to enter into relations with other states. The term ‘state’ as it is used here 
should be distinguished from the political subdivision of such states which also carry the 
title ‘state’ in countries such as the United States, India and Australia.
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For the purposes of this research, the list of states that will be used will be based on those 
listed in the CIA Chiefs of State and Cabinet Members of Foreign Governments as at 
November 2001. This generates a list of 192 countries when we add the United States to 
it and remove the Cook Islands and the Netherlands Antilles which are overseas 
territories. Overseas territories are excluded from this database on the basis that they are 
off-shoots of states rather than states in themselves.
1.3.3 What is a micro-state?
Data will also be gathered on the size of states included in the database. Specifically, 
small states will be categorised as ‘micro-states’. There is ‘no clear-cut definition of 
what constitutes a small state’,7 as there are numerous proxy measures for smallness such 
as land area, population size and national income. None of these measures is perfect in 
the sense that they all fail to capture adequately the nature of what it is to be a ‘small’ 
state. These measures can also give conflicting results. For example, a country with a 
relatively small population could have a large land area, for example Australia, while a 
country with a large population could have a relatively small land area, for example 
Bangladesh. A state such as Liechtenstein may have a high per capita income, but it has a 
small land area and population.
In the current context, population size appears to be the most appropriate variable on 
which to base a definition of small states, given that the population feeds into both the
6 Available from: http://newtaiwan.virtualave.net/montevideoO 1 .htm [accessed 18 April 2002],
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size of the electorate and the pool of possible political candidates. A cut-off point on 
which to base a definition of smallness must also be chosen. This is not a precise science. 
The higher one sets the cut-off point, the more micro-states will result. For example in 
1998, there were 87 countries with a population under five million, 58 countries had a 
population under two and a half million and 35 had a population less than five hundred 
thousand.8 For the purposes of this research, the cut-off point shall be taken as a 
population of one million or less. The rationale for choosing this point is that the 
population of states is generally measured in units of millions (with the exception of 
China which has a population over a billion). Thus, the first step on that measurement 
ladder would be an appropriate cut-off point with those states whose population falls 
below it being considered ‘micro-states’. On this basis, 40 states (21 per cent of the states 
included in this study) are ‘micro-states’.
1.3.4 Democratic and non-democratic states
All the states examined are categorised as either democratic or non-democratic. In this 
overview, states have been categorised according to Freedom House’s9 assessment of the 
extent of democratic practice in each state. Freedom House make use of the following 
seven categories for their assessment:
1. Democracies: where political leaders are elected in ‘competitive multi-party and 
multi-candidate processes in which opposition parties have a legitimate chance of 
attaining power or participating in power’ (Freedom House, 2000, p.l). An example 
of such a democracy is the United States.
7 Available from (http://ase,tufts. edu/irconf/qa.htm) [accessed 24th May 2002],
8 Available from: http://ase.tufts.edu/irconfyQA.htm [accessed 24th May 2002],
9 Available from: www.freedomhouse.org [accessed 9 January 2002],
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2. Restricted Democratic Practices: where one party has sufficient control so as to 
preclude a meaningful electoral challenge to its position. Zimbabwe would be an 
example of such a state.
3. Monarchies: three types of monarchy are outlined, the first is constitutional 
monarchy where a constitution sets out the role of the monarch and some power is 
devolved to an elected assembly and traditional and absolute monarchies where the 
power of the monarch is absolute. All three types of monarchy are non-democratic, 
so, for example, Great Britain would not be considered a monarchy under this 
definition. Saudi Arabia is an example of a monarchy using this definition.
4. Authoritarian regimes: either one party states or military dictatorships where there 
are significant abuses of human rights. Pakistan is an example of such a regime.
5. Totalitarian regimes: one party states where control extends beyond the public sphere 
into the private lives of citizens. The Soviet Union was an example of a totalitarian 
regime.
6. Colonial and imperial dependencies: territories under the control of one of the 
imperial states. Most African states up to independence would have been defined as 
dependencies.
7. Protectorates: states that are either under the jurisdiction of the international 
community or of another state. Namibia after World War I was an example of a 
protectorate.
For the purposes of this study, these categories will be simplified. States falling into the
first category will be considered to be ‘democratic’ (of which there are 121), while states
falling into categories two to five will be considered ‘non-democratic’ (of which there are
21
71). This is on the basis that citizens of category two states do not have a real choice 
when voting, while citizens of states in categories three, four and five do not have a vote 
at all. States falling into the final two categories will be excluded from this study as they 
are not considered to be independent states.
1.3.5 Single and multi-party governments
A further series of distinctions will be made on the basis of the number of parties that 
make up the government of each state in the database. A state where one party makes up 
the government will be considered to have a ‘single-party’ government. Where one party 
is in power and has the support of a number of independents, this shall also be considered 
a ‘single-party’ government. A state where more than one party makes up the government 
will be considered as a ‘multi-party’ government. States where either no parties exist or 
where parties are banned will be considered to have a ‘non-party’ government. There are 
81 single-party governments, 87 multi-party governments and 24 non-party governments 
included in this study10.
1.3.6 What is a deputy-leader?
For the purposes of this project deputy-leaders are defined as follows:
1. They must be members of the cabinet.
2. They are the second ranking member of cabinet in that they deputise for the head of 
cabinet.
10 A va ilab le  from : h ttp ://w w w .e lec tio n w o rld .o rg /e lec tio n / [accessed 11 January 2 0 0 2 ].
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3. They must hold an office or title which explicitly recognises their deputising role or 
ranking.
The first criterion, specifying that deputy-leaders must be in the cabinet, narrows down 
the field of possible subjects. It was chosen to exclude heads of state where they are 
separate from the head of government. Where there is a President, but no Prime Minister, 
in other words where the head of state and head of government are one and the same, 
then the Vice-President will be the focus of this study. Where there is a President or King 
and a Prime Minister, and when the King or President are not members of the cabinet, it 
is the Deputy-Prime Minister that will be the focus of this study, rather than, for example, 
the second in line to the throne. An anomaly arises in cases where both the Prime 
Minister and King are members of cabinet (for example in Sweden the King can preside 
over special cabinet meetings and in Norway the King also attends cabinet meetings), 
where it would appear that under the second criterion, the second-ranking member of 
cabinet would be the Prime Minister. In this instance, the Deputy-Prime Minister shall be 
chosen for study on the basis that their secondary status is explicitly acknowledged which 
is the third criterion. Similarly, in cases where both the President and Prime Minister are 
members of cabinet, rather than choosing the Prime Minister as the second-ranking 
member of cabinet, the Deputy-Prime Minister will be chosen, again on their explicit 
secondary status.
The second criterion, that they must be the second ranking member in that they deputise 
for the head of the cabinet, was chosen so as to define what is meant by the ‘deputy’ in
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‘deputy-leader’. It also distinguishes between deputy-leaders of parties and deputy- 
leaders of states where both are in the cabinet. Where a party deputy-leader is in cabinet, 
they are only considered a deputy-leader for the purposes of this study if they are also the 
second-ranking member of cabinet. This generally only occurs in single-party 
governments.
The third criterion, which requires that the above ranking be explicitly recognised, was 
also necessary to ensure clarity, as it may be open to dispute as to who the second most 
powerful person in cabinet is. In order to avoid such pitfalls, the ranking of second 
member of cabinet based on an explicit role of deputy for the head of cabinet must be 
explicitly recognised either constitutionally, or if not mentioned in the constitution, then 
by title alone or on the basis of a protocol list which specifies the ranking of cabinet 
members. Thus, in countries where there is more than one Deputy-Prime Minister, it is 
the Deputy-Prime Minister with the title of ‘First-Deputy Prime Minister’ who will be 
studied. Where there are multiple Deputy-Prime Ministers but no clearly predominant 
one, all will be included in this study.
These three criteria make it possible to clarify who the relevant deputy-leader is for the 
purposes of this study. There may, however, be situations where a judgement call will 
have to be made as to which political office-holder will be included in this study. Such 
instances will be clearly identified and are sufficiently few in number so not to affect 
significantly the analysis.
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Once the area of study has been defined, the role of deputy-leaders can then be examined. 
The first question to be clarified is whether each deputy-leader is elected or appointed. 
While a distinction between these two concepts may initially seem clear-cut, this is not 
necessarily the case. Is the Deputy-Prime Minister who is chosen by the Prime Minister 
and ratified by parliament appointed (by the Prime Minister) or elected (by the 
parliament)? What about the case of the Vice-President selected by the Presidential 
candidate who is elected on the same ticket as the President in one ballot rather than two 
separate ones?
To provide clarity on this matter, a deputy-leader who is chosen by a direct ballot of the 
people will be defined as ‘elected separately’. Whereas a deputy-leader chosen on the 
basis of being jointly on a ballot paper with the head of government (in all such cases the 
head of government is a ‘President’) will be defined as ‘elected with the President’. In the 
case of the United States where the votes of the people decide the make-up of an electoral 
college which selects the President, the Vice-President will be deemed to be ‘elected with 
the President’ on the basis that voters make an explicit choice of whom they want for 
President and Vice-President when voting. In all other scenarios, whether chosen by the 
head of government or by parliament, the deputy-leader will be deemed to be ‘appointed’ 
on the basis that voters do not get an explicit say in the decision.
1.3.7 E le c te d  a n d  a p p o in te d  d e p u ty - le a d e r s
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When examining whether or not a deputy-leader had a ministerial position or not, the list 
of cabinet members in the November 2001 ‘Chiefs of State and Cabinet Members of 
Foreign Governments’ 11 was used. For the purposes of counting the number of states 
where deputy-leaders were ministers in cases of multiple deputy-leaders where one had a 
ministerial position while another did not, such states were considered to have deputy- 
leaders with ministerial responsibilities. At the point in time of gathering the data, there 
were six states where the deputy-leader position was vacant, these were excluded from 
the totals for calculations relating to ministers.
1 .4  S o u r c e s  o f  D a ta
Data for this study was gathered from a number of sources. Whether or not a state had a 
deputy-leader and the title, number and ministerial responsibilities of deputy-leaders were
gathered from the ‘Chiefs of State and Cabinet Members of Foreign Governments’
■ 12 directory prepared by the United States Central Intelligence Agency (CIA). Data on
whether deputy-leaders were elected or appointed were gathered from
Electionworld.org13 and The Political Reference Almanac.14 Whether or not deputy-
leaders had a constitutional basis and, if so, what role the constitution outlined for them
was gathered from the online database of the Political Studies Association of the UK.15
Whether each state had a single or multi-party government and its leadership structures
11 Available from www.cia.gov/cia/publications/chiefs/index.html [accessed 1 November 2001],
12 Ibid.
13 Available from: http://www.electionworld.org/election/ [accessed 11 January 2002],
14 Available from: http://www.polisci.com/almanac/nations.htm [accessed 11 January 2002],
15 Available from: http://www.psa.ac.uk/wwvv/constitutions.htm [accessed 11 January 2002],
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was ascertained from Electionworld.org. Data on population size, used to define states as 
micro-states, were taken from the CIA World Factbook.16
1 .5  A n a ly s is
1.5.1 Introduction
The deputy-leader database (see appendix 1) allows for a basic analysis of the 
office/position of deputy-leader. Some initial conclusions can be drawn about deputy 
leaders and some answers sought to such basic questions as what sort of government and 
what sort of state is more likely to have a deputy leader?
Table 1-lNumber of states with deputy-Ieaders
Global
States 192
States with deputy-Ieaders 
(percentage of total)
130
(68%)
(Source: Global Database)
Some observations can be made from the data gathered in Table 1.1. 130 states out of the 
192 (68 per cent) have deputy leaders. In terms of their title, 72 states have Deputy- 
Prime-Ministers, while 46 have Vice-Presidents as their deputy-leader. The remaining 12 
states with deputy-Ieaders have variations on the title of Deputy-Prime Minister such as 
Vice-Chancellor (Austria and Germany) or on the title of Vice-President such as Deputy 
Minister to the President (Cyprus).
16 Available from: www.cia.gov/cia/publlcations/factbook/fbhome.html [accessed 1 November 2001],
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There are significantly more deputy-leaders than states with deputy-leaders as some 
states have more than one -  there are in total 191 deputy-leaders (excluding Second- 
Deputy-Prime Ministers and Second Vice-Presidents) in 130 states.
Table 1-2 Number of democratic and non-democratic states with deputy-leaders
Democratic Non-democratic Total
States 121 71 192
States with deputy-leaders 82 48 130
(percentage of total) (68%) (68%) (68%)
(Source: Global Database)
Whether or not a state is democratic makes no difference to the likelihood of having a 
deputy-leader. From Table 1.2, it can be seen that in both democratic and non-democratic 
states there is a 68 per cent likelihood of having a deputy-leader.
Table 1-3 Number of micro and non-micro states with deputy-leaders
Micro Non-micro Total
States 40 152 192
States with deputy-leaders 23 107 130
(percentage of total) (57%) (70%) (68%)
(Source: Global Database)
The size of a state, however, makes a difference. From Table 1.3 it can be seen that 70 
per cent of non-micro-states have deputy-leaders compared to 57 per cent of micro-states, 
so the larger the state, the more likely there is to be a deputy-leader.
Table 1-4 Party-composition of Government and deputy-leaders
Multi-party Single-party Non-party Total
States 87 81 24 192
States with deputy-leaders 53 63 14 130
(percentage of total) (61%) (78%) (58%) (68%)
(Source: Global Database)
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The party composition of a government also has an impact on whether or not a state has a 
deputy-leader. The data in Table 1.4 shows that there is a significantly higher likelihood 
of having a deputy-leader in single-party governments at 78 per cent compared to both 
multi-party and non-party governments. This conclusion is in many respects counter­
intuitive, for one would expect that multi-party governments would be more likely to 
have a deputy-leader so as to give the leaders of each of the parties in government a 
formal leadership role.
Regarding the party composition of governments and their likelihood of having a deputy- 
leader, a related question is whether multi-party governments are more likely to produce 
multiple deputy-leaders? There are 28 governments with more than one deputy-leader, 
excluding those that have a second Deputy-Prime Minister or second Vice-President. Of 
these, 17 (or 61 per cent) are multi-party governments, so while the majority of multi­
party governments do not have multiple deputy-leaders, governments with more than one 
deputy-leader are more likely to be multi-party in composition.
Table 1-5 Number of deputy-leaders who are appointed and elected
Global
States with deputy-leaders 130
States with appointed deputy-leaders 108
(percentage of total) (83%)
States with deputy-leaders elected with 20
President (percentage of total) (15%)
States with deputy-leaders elected 2
separately (percentage of total) (2%)
(Source: Global Database)
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In terms o f how they attained their office, taking the total num ber o f 191 deputy-leaders, 
20 (10 per cent) were elected to their office on a single ballot w ith the President. Two 
(one per cent) were elected separately. The remaining 169 deputy-leaders (88 per cent) 
were appointed. W hen examined on a state-by-state basis, Table 1.5 shows that 108 
states (83 per cent o f  those with a deputy leader) appoint them  while 20 (15 per cent) 
elect them with their President and two (two per cent) elect them  separately.17 Deputy- 
leaders are thus far more likely to be appointed rather than elected.
Table 1-6 Number of deputy-leaders who are Ministers
Global
States with deputy-leaders 130
States with deputy-leaders who are 73
ministers (percentage of total) (56%)
States with deputy-leaders who are not 57
ministers (percentage of total) (44%)
(Source: Global Database)
As for whether or not they hold ministerial positions, leaving aside the six vacant deputy- 
leader positions, 102 (55 per cent) hold ministerial office, while 83 (45 per cent) have no 
ministerial responsibilities. Deputy-leaders are thus more likely to have a ministerial 
responsibility in addition to their deputy-leader role as not. Looking at it on a state-by- 
state basis, Table 1.6 shows that 56 per cent o f  states that have a deputy-leader give them 
ministerial responsibilities with 44 per cent not giving their deputy-leaders additional 
ministerial responsibilities. So an examination on a state-by-state basis rather than on a 
deputy-leader basis makes no difference as to the likelihood o f a deputy-leader having 
ministerial responsibilities.
17 C o lum bia and Palau.
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In some states deputy-leaders have more than one ministerial position: in Luxembourg, 
the Vice-Prime Minister is Minister of Civil Service and Administrative Reform and also 
Minister of Foreign Affairs and External Commerce; in Liechtenstein, the Deputy Head 
of Government has ministerial responsibility for the Education, Justice and Transport and 
Communication portfolios; and in Saint Vincent and the Grenadines, the Deputy-Prime 
Minister is Minister for Commerce and Trade and also Foreign Affairs. All three of these 
states are ‘micro-states’ which would seem to indicate that deputy-leaders in micro-states 
are more likely to have multiple ministerial responsibilities. An analysis of the 22 micro­
states with deputy-leaders shows that seven (32 per cent) hold more than one ministerial 
office. No deputy-leaders from non-micro-states have responsibility for more than one 
ministerial department. It can thus be clearly stated that deputy-leaders in micro-states are 
much more likely to hold more than one ministerial position.
There are also a number of states where some deputy-leaders have ministerial 
responsibilities and others do not. In Russia, three out of the five Deputy-Premiers have 
ministries while in the Czech Republic three out of four Deputy-Prime Ministers have a 
ministry.
As for what sort of ministry a deputy-leader is likely to hold, an examination shows that 
of the 102 with ministerial positions 19 per cent hold the position of Minister of Finance. 
This is almost twice as many as hold the next most popular ministerial portfolio which is 
Foreign Affairs (held by ten per cent of deputy-leaders). This is closely followed by
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Defence at eight per cent. Agriculture, Energy and Foreign Trade are each held by seven 
per cent of deputy-leaders. While we cannot say why deputy-leaders hold the position 
that they hold in cabinet given the nature of this global overview, it appears that when 
deputy-leaders have a ministerial role that it is a significant one.
Table 1-7 Most common ministerial positions of deputy-leaders
Position Number of deputy-leaders 
who hold position
Percentage of total
Finance 19 19
Foreign Affairs 10 10
Defence 8 8
Agriculture 7 7
Energy 7 7
Foreign Trade 7 7
Justice 6 6
Regional Development 5 5
TOTALS 69 69
(Source: Global Database)
The roles that deputy-leaders play in government are generally outlined in each state’s 
constitution. Of the 130 states with deputy-leaders, one had its constitution suspended 
(Burma), five have no constitution (Israel, New Zealand, Qatar, Swaziland and the United 
Kingdom), the constitution could not be found for three (Equatorial Guinea, Palau and 
Papua New Guinea), 15 states mention the deputy-leader but do not assign them a role in 
their constitution and 31 states have deputy-leaders with no constitutional basis. This 
leaves 75 states where the roles of their deputy-leaders are detailed in their constitutions.
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Table 1-8 Constitutional roles of deputy-leaders
Roles No of States where 
deputy-leaders have that 
role
Percentage of total No. of 
States with constitutional 
role for deputy-leaders.
Replace leader 59 79%
Functions delegated 
by leader
17 23%
Assist leader 15 20%
Chair cabinet if 
leader absent
14 19%
Parliamentary role 12 16%
Given ‘special 
missions’ by leader
5 7%
(Source: Global Database)
An examination of these 75 constitutions provides some detail on the roles and duties of 
their deputy-leaders. From Table 1.8, it can be seen that the most common role of deputy- 
leaders is to take over as leader in the event of either a temporary or permanent vacancy 
arising. Seventy-nine per cent of states where deputy-leaders had a constitutional role had 
such a function. Temporary vacancies arise if the leader leaves the country, is ill or 
temporarily incapacitated or under investigation. In these scenarios, the deputy-leader 
relinquishes the role of leader when the leader returns. Permanent vacancies arise if the 
leader dies, resigns, is disqualified, removed, incapable or performing their duties. In 
such cases, the deputy-leader may see out the term of the former-leader, may start a full 
term as leader, or may serve as leader for a predefined period until a new leader is 
selected.
The next most common constitutional role of deputy-leaders is the performance of 
functions delegated by the leader (23 per cent of deputy-leaders with constitutional roles 
have such a function). A variation on this role is the giving of ‘special missions’ to the
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deputy-leader (seven per cent of deputy-leaders with constitutional roles have such a 
function). Further roles allocated by their constitution to deputy-leaders include assisting 
the leader (20 per cent) and chairing cabinet meetings in the absence of the leader (19 per 
cent). Some also have a parliamentary role (16 per cent), with four (five per cent) 
chairing parliament (three of whom have a casting vote in the event of a tie) and five 
(seven per cent) having a liaison role between parliament and the executive.
While an examination of the constitutional roles and duties of deputy-leader gives an 
insight into their activity, it is not a complete picture by any means. Additional tasks not 
covered (and not precluded) by the constitution may be allocated to deputy-leaders. It 
will only be when the role of specific deputy-leaders are examined via case-studies in the 
following chapters that such roles can be clarified.
1.5.2 The likelihood of having a deputy-leader
Taking the analysis a level deeper and looking at combinations of factors such as state 
size, party composition of government and whether or not a state is democratic, which 
combinations have the greatest influence on the likelihood of a state having a deputy- 
leader?
Table 1-9 Impact of democracy and state size on having deputy-leaders
D e m o c ra tic
M ic ro -s ta te s
D e m o c ra tic
N o n -M ic ro -s ta te s
N o n - D e m o c ra tic  
M ic ro -s ta te s
N o n -D e m o c ra tic
N o n -M ic ro -s ta te s
G lo b a l
T o ta l no o f  states 31 90 9 62 192
S tates w ith  d ep u ty -le ad e rs 20 62 3 45 130
(percen tage  o f  to ta l) (65% ) (69% ) (33% ) (7 3% ) (68% )
(Source: Global Database)
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In Table 1.9, the impact of democracy and state size on whether or not a state has a 
deputy-leader can be seen. The only significant divergence from the global figures occurs 
in the case of non-democratic micro-states where the likelihood of having a deputy-leader 
is 33 per cent compared to 68 per cent globally. However, it must be noted that there are 
only nine countries in this category, so it is too small a base to draw any conclusions 
from.
Table 1-10 Impact of democracy and party-composition of government on deputy-leaders
D e m o c ra tic
M u lt i - p a r ty
N o n -
D e m o c ra tic
M u lt i - p a r tv
D e m o c ra tic
S in g le -p a r ty
N o n -
D e m o c ra tic
S in g le -p a r ty
D e m o c ra tic
N o n -p a r ty
N o n -
D e m o c ra tic
N o n -p a r ty
G lo b a l
T o ta l no o f  
states
64 23 51 30 6 18 192
States w ith 40 13 38 25 4 10 130
dep u ty -le ad e rs  
(percen tage  o f  
to ta l)
(62% ) (57% ) (75% ) (83% ) (67% ) (5 6% A) (68% )
(Source: G obal Database)
Looking at the impact of democracy and the party composition of government on 
whether or not states have deputy-leaders as outlined in Table 1.10, we find that it is the 
democratic and non-democratic single-party combinations which produce the greatest 
likelihood of having a deputy-leader, all the other combinations are in line with the global 
figures. This is in line with the earlier finding in Table 1.4, that single-party governments 
are most likely to have deputy-leaders.
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Table 1-11 Impact of state-size and pa rty-com position of government on whether or not states have 
deputy-leaders
M ic ro -
M u lt i - p a r tv
N o n -m ic ro
M u lt i - p a r tv
M ic r o  - 
S in g le -p a rtv
N o n -m ic ro
S in g le -p a r tv
M ic r o
N o n -p a r tv
N o n -m ic ro
N o n -p a r ty
G lo b a l
T o ta l no o f  
states
9 78 19 62 12 12 192
S tates w ith 5 48 13 50 5 9 130
dep u ty -le ad e rs  
(percen tage  o f 
to ta l)
(62% ) (6 1% ) (68% ) (81% ) (4 2% ) (75% ) (68% )
(Source: Global Database)
Similarly, when assessing the combined impact of state size and the party composition of 
governments on the likelihood of a state having a deputy-leader, it is a single-party 
scenario that has the highest likelihood of having a deputy-leader. It can also be noted 
that as Table 1.3 highlighted, the non-micro-state scenarios have a significantly higher 
likelihood of having deputy-leaders than the micro-state scenarios except in the case of 
the multi-party scenarios, where the micro and non-micro state scenarios have an almost 
equal likelihood.
Table 1-12 The impact of state-size, party-composition of government and democracy on whether or 
not states have deputy-leaders
Total no of 
states
States with deputy- 
leaders 
(percentage of total)
Democratic Micro-Multi-party 8 4 (50%)
Democratic Micro-Single-party 18 13 (72%)
Democratic Micro-Non-party 5 3( 60%)
Democratic Non-micro-Multi-party 56 36 (64%)
Democratic Non-micro - Single-party 33 25 (76%)
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Democratic Non-micro - Non-party 1 1 (100%)
Non-Democratic Micro Multi-party 1 1 (100%)
Non-Democratic Micro- Single-party 1 0 (0%)
Non-Democratic Micro- Non-party 7 2 (29%)
Non-Democratic Non-micro Multi-party 22 12 (55%)
Non-Democratie Non-micro Single-party 29 25 (86%)
Non-Democratic Non-micro Non-party 11 8 (73%)
Global 192 130 (68%)
(Source: Global Database)
When the impact of all three variables (state size, party-composition of government and 
democracy) in their various combinations as outlined in Table 1.12 is examined, a 
number of the categories have very small bases. Excluding these, there is only one 
significant divergence from the global figure for the likelihood of having a deputy-leader. 
This is in the case of non-democratic, single party governments in non-micro states where 
there is an 86 per cent likelihood of having a deputy-leader. This is in line with earlier 
findings on the likelihood of deputy-leader being found in non-micro states and single­
party governments.
1.5.3 Further analysis of deputy-leaders
Looking beyond the likelihood of whether or not a state has a deputy-leader and the 
factors that influence that likelihood, a number of further analyses can be conducted on 
the basis of the data in the global database.
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Table 1-13 Democratic and non-democratic states and whether deputy-leaders are appointed or 
elected
Democratic Non-democratic Global
States with deputy-leaders 82 48 130
States with appointed 61 47 108
deputy-leaders (74%) (98%) (83%)
(percentage of total)
States with elected 21 1 22
deputy-leaders (26%) (2%) (17%)
(percentage of total)
(Source: Global Database)
As there are only two states where deputy-leaders are elected separately from the leader 
and this is such a small base, the categories ‘elected with President’ and ‘elected 
separately’ have been combined to form a category ‘states with elected deputy-leaders’. 
Table 1.13 shows, that as one would expect, deputy-leaders are more likely to be 
appointed and less likely to be elected in non-democracies than in democracies.
Table 1-14 Democratic and non-democratic states and whether or not deputy-leaders are ministers
Democratic Non-democratic Global
States with deputy-leaders 82 48 130
States with deputy-leaders 44 29 73
who are ministers (54%) (60%) (56%)
(percentage of total)
States with deputy-leaders 38 19 57
who are not ministers (46%) (40%) (44%)
(percentage of total)
(Source: Global Database)
Table 1.14 shows that deputy-leaders in non-democratic states are slightly more likely to 
have a ministerial portfolio than deputy-leaders in democratic states.
38
Table 1-15 State size and whether deputy-leaders are appointed or elected
Micro Non-micro Global
States with deputy-leaders 23 107 130
States with appointed deputy- 21 87 108
leaders (percentage of total) (91%) (81%) (83%)
States with elected deputy-leaders 2 20 22
(percentage of total) (9%) (19%) (17%)
(Source: Global Database)
Table 1.15 shows that compared to the global figures, micro-states are more likely to 
have appointed deputy-leaders and less likely to have deputy-leaders who are elected. 
The non-micro-state figures are in line with the global figures.
Table 1-16 State size and whether deputy-leaders are ministers
Micro Non-micro Global
States with deputy-leaders 23 107 130
States with deputy-leaders who 
are ministers (percentage of total)
15
(65%)
58
(54%)
73
(56%)
States with deputy-leaders who 
are not ministers (percentage of 
total)
8
(35%)
49
(46%)
57
(44%)
(Source: Glo ?al Database)
As for the impact of state size on whether or not deputy-leaders have ministerial roles, 
Table 1.16 shows that there is a similar situation in that micro-states diverge from the 
global ones while the non-micro percentages are in line with the global ones. Deputy- 
leaders in micro-states are more likely to have a ministerial position than deputy-leaders 
in either non-micro-states or globally.
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Table 1-17 Impact of party-composition of Government on whether or not deputy-leaders are 
appointed or elected with President
Multi-party Single-party Non-party Global
States with deputy-leaders 53 63 14 130
States with appointed 42 53 13 108
deputy-leaders 
(percentage of total)
(79%) (84%) (93%) (83%)
States with elected 11 10 1 22
deputy-leaders 
(percentage of total)
(21%) (16%) (7%) (17%)
(Source: Global Database)
Table 1.17 examines the impact of the party composition of government on how deputy- 
leaders attain their position. The only divergence from the global figures is in non-party 
governments, where there is a higher likelihood of deputy-leaders being appointed and a 
lower likelihood of them being elected. The probabilities for both multi- and single- party 
governments are in line with the global probabilities. This is in contrast to the earlier 
analysis where it was found that it was single-party governments that diverged from the 
global figures on whether or not states had a deputy-leader.
Table 1-18 Impact of party-composition of Government on whether or not deputy-leaders are 
ministers
Multi-party Single-party Non-party Global
States with deputy-leaders 53 63 14 130
States with deputy-leaders 34 32 7 73
who are ministers 
(percentage of total)
(64%) (51%) (50%) (56%)
States with deputy-leaders 19 31 7 57
who are not ministers 
(percentage of total)
(36%) (49%) (50%) (44%)
(Source: Global Database)
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As for whether or not the party composition of government affects whether or not deputy- 
leaders have a ministerial role, Table 1.18 shows that both the non-party and multi-party 
percentages diverge from the global ones. In the case of the non-party governments, 
deputy-leaders are as likely to hold as not hold a separate ministerial position.
Table 1-19 Impact of democracy and state size on whether or not deputy-leaders are appointed or 
elected
D e m o c ra tic
M ic ro -s ta te s
D e m o c ra tic
N o n -M ic ro -s ta te s
N o n - D e m o c ra tic  
M ic ro -s ta te s
N o n -D e m o c ra tic
N o n -M ic ro -s ta te s
G lo b a l
States w ith  d e p u ty - 
leaders
20 62 3 45 130
States w ith 18 43 3 44 108
a p p o in te d  d e p u ty - 
leaders (percen tage  
o f  to ta l)
(90% ) (69% ) (100% ) (98% ) (83% )
States w ith  elected 2 19 0 1 22
dep u ty -le ad e rs  
(percen tage  o f  to ta l)
(10% ) (21% ) (0% ) (2% ) (17% )
(Source: Global Database)
Looking at the combined impact of state size and whether or not states are democratic on 
how deputy-leaders get their role as outlined in Table 1.19, the only significant 
divergences from the global figures occur in the non-democratic scenarios. As one would 
expect, deputy-leaders are significantly less likely to be elected and more likely to be 
appointed than in either the global or democratic scenarios.
Table 1-20 Impact of democracy and state size on whether or not deputy-leaders are ministers
D e m o c ra tic
M ic ro -s ta te s
D e m o c ra tic
N o n -M ic ro -s ta te s
N o n - D e m o c ra tic  
M ic ro -s ta te s
N o n -D e m o c ra tic
N o n -M ic ro -s ta te s
G lo b a l
States w ith  d e p u ty - 
leaders
20 62 3 45 130
States w ith  d e p u ty - 12 32 3 26 73
leaders w ho  a re  
m in is te rs
(percen tage  o f  to ta l)
(60% ) (52% ) (100% ) (58% ) (56% )
States w ith  d e p u ty - 8 30 0 19 57
leaders w h o  are  n o t 
m in is te rs
(percen tage  o f  to ta l)
(40% ) (48% ) (0% ) (42% ) (44% )
(Source: Global Database)
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Table 1.20 shows the combined impact of state size and whether or not states are 
democratic on whether or not deputy-leaders are ministers. The only divergence from the 
global figures occurs in non-democratic micro-states, however the base is so small (only 
3 states) as to render the result insignificant.
Table 1-21 Impact of democracy and party-composition of government on whether or not deputy- 
leaders are appointed or elected
D e m o c ra tic
M u lt i- p a r ty
N o n - 
D en i o c ra t ic  
M u lt i - p a r tv
D e m o c ra tic
S in g le -p a r ty
N o n - 
D em  o c ra tic  
S in g le -p a r ty
D e m o c ra tic
N o n -p a r ty
N o n -
D e m o c ra tic
N o n -p a r ty
G lo b a l
States w ith  
d epu ty -leade rs
40 13 38 25 4 10 130
States w ith 30 12 28 25 3 10 108
a pp o in ted  
d epu ty -leade rs  
(percen tage  o f  
to ta l)
(75% ) (92% ) (74% ) (100% ) (75% ) (100% ) (83% )
States w ith 10 1 10 0 1 0 22
elected d e p u ty - 
leaders
(percentage o f  
to ta l)
(25% ) (8 % ) (26% ) (0 % ) (25% ) (0 % A) (17% )
(Source: G obal Database)
Table 1.21 shows the combined impact of the party-composition of government and 
whether or not a state is democratic on whether deputy-leaders are elected or appointed. 
As one would assume, deputy-leaders are more likely to be elected in democratic 
governments.
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Table 1-22 Impact of democracy and party-composition of government on whether or not deputy- 
leaders are ministers
D e m o c ra tic
M u lt i- p a r ty
N o n -
D e m o c ra tic
M u lt i- p a r tv
D e m o c ra tic
S in g le -p a r ty
N o n -
D e m o c ra tic
S in g le -p a r ty
D e m o c ra tic
N o n -p a r ty
N o n -
D e m o c ra tic
N o n -p a r ty
G lo b a l
States w ith  
d epu ty -leade rs
40 13 38 25 4 10 130
States w ith 23 11 19 13 2 5 73
d epu ty -leade rs  
w ho  are 
m in is te rs  
(percen tage  o f 
to ta l)
(57% ) (85% ) (50% ) (52% ) (50% ) (50% ) (56% )
States w ith 17 2 19 12 2 5 57
depu ty-leade rs  
w ho  a re  n o t 
m in is te rs  
(percen tage  o f 
to ta l)
(43% ) (15% ) (50% ) (48% ) (50% ) (5 0% A) (44% )
(Source: Global Database)
In Table 1.22, the combined impact of the party-composition of government and whether 
or not a state is democratic on how deputy-leaders attain office is shown. The 
probabilities in all the scenarios are in line with the global figures except in the case of 
multi-party governments in non-democracies where there is an 85 per cent likelihood of 
deputy-leaders also having ministerial responsibilities. This is in line with Table 1.18, in 
which deputy-leaders of multi-party governments were show to have the highest 
likelihood of having a ministerial portfolio.
Table 1-23 Impact of state-size and party-composition of government on whether or not deputy- 
leaders are appointed or elected
M ic ro -
M u lt i - p a r ty
N o n -m ic ro
M u lt i- p a r ty
M ic ro  - 
S in g le -p a r tv
N o n -m ic ro
S in g le -p a r tv
M ic ro  
N o n -p a  r tv
N o n -m ic ro
N o n -p a r ty
G lo b a l
S tates w ith  
d epu ty -leade rs
5 48 13 50 5 9 130
States w ith 4 38 13 40 4 9 108
app o in ted  
d epu ty -leade rs  
(percen tage  o f  
to ta l)
(80% ) (79% ) (100% ) (80% ) (80% ) (100% ) (83% )
States w ith 1 10 0 10 1 0 22
elected d ep u ty - 
leaders
(percen tage  o f  
to ta l)
(20% ) (21% ) (0% ) (20% ) (20% ) (0 % A) (17% )
(Source: Global Database)
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Table 1.23 outlines how the size of states combined with the party composition of 
governments affects whether deputy-leaders are elected or appointed. The only 
divergence from the global probabilities occur in categories where the base is too small to 
render the result significant.
Table 1-24 Impact of state-size and party-composition of government on whether or not deputy- 
leaders are ministers
M ic ro -
M u lt i-p a r ty
N on-m ic ro
M u lt i-p a r ty
M ic ro  - 
S ing le -partv
N on -m ic ro
S ing le -party
M ic ro
N o n -p a rtv
N on-m ic ro
N on -pa rtv
G lobal
States w ith  
deputy-leaders
5 48 13 50 5 9 130
States w ith 4 30 8 24 3 4 73
deputy-leaders 
who are 
m inisters 
(percentage o f 
tota l)
(80%) (62%) (62%) (48%) (60%) (44%) (56%)
States w ith 1 18 5 26 2 5 57
deputy-leaders 
who are not 
m inisters 
(percentage o f 
tota l)
(20%) (38%) (38%) (52%) (40%) (56% A) (44%)
(Source: Global Database)
In the case of how state-size and party-composition of government impact on whether or 
not deputy-leaders are ministers, it can be seen from table 1.24 that there are no 
categories where there is a divergence from the global probabilities and where the base of 
states falling in the category is large enough to be significant.
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Table 1-25 The impact of state-size, party-composition of government and democracy on whether or
not deputy-Ieaders are appointed or elected
States
with
deputy-
Ieaders
States with 
appointed 
deputy- 
Ieaders 
(percentage of 
total)
States with 
elected 
deputy- 
Ieaders 
(percentage 
of total)
Democratic Micro-Multi-party 4 3 (75%) 1 (25%)
Democratic Micro-Single-party 13 13 (100%) 0 (0%)
Democratic Micro-Non-party 3 2 (67%) 1 (33%)
Democratic Non-micro-Multi-party 36 27 (75%) 9 (25%)
Democratic Non-micro - Single-party 25 15 (60%) 10(40%)
Democratic Non-micro - Non-party 1 1 (100%) 0 (0%)
Non-Democratic Micro Multi-party 1 1 (100%) 0 (0%)
Non-Democratic Micro- Single-party 0 0 (0%) 0 (0%)
Non-Democratic Micro- Non-party 2 2(100%) 0 (0%)
Non-Democratic Non-micro Multi-party 12 11 (92%) 1 (8%)
Non-Democratic Non-micro Single-party 25 25 (100%) 0 (0%)
Non-Democratic Non-micro Non-party 8 8 (100%) 0 (0%)
Global 130 108 (83%) 22(17%)
(Source: Global Database)
When assessing the combined impact of state-size, party-composition of government and 
democracy on whether or not deputy-Ieaders are appointed or elected, there are only three 
categories where the base is large enough to generate significant results. Of these, as one 
would expect where democracy is lacking, the non-democratic, non-micro-state, single­
party government category had no deputy-Ieaders elected. The democratic non-micro- 
state with multi-party governments category was broadly in line with the global figures in 
that three-quarters of their deputy-Ieaders were appointed rather than elected. The 
remaining significant category was democratic non-micro-state with single-party 
governments, where 40 per cent of the deputy-Ieaders were elected rather than appointed.
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Table 1-26 The impact of state-size, party-composition of government and democracy on whether or 
not deputy-Ieaders are ministers
States
with
deputy-
Ieaders
States with 
deputy- 
Ieaders who 
are ministers 
(percentage of 
total)
States with 
deputy- 
Ieaders who 
are not 
ministers 
(percentage 
of total)
Democratic Micro-Multi-party 4 3 (75%) 1 (25%)
Democratic Micro-Single-party 13 8 (62%) 5 (38%)
Democratic Micro-Non-party 3 1 (33%) 2 (67%)
Democratic Non-micro-Multi-party 36 20 (56%) 16 (44%)
Democratic Non-micro - Single-party 25 11 (44%) 14 (56%)
Democratic Non-micro - Non-party 1 1 (100%) 0 (0%)
Non-Democratic Micro Multi-party 1 1 (100%) 0 (0%)
Non-Democratic Micro- Single-party 0 0 (0%) 0 (0%)
Non-Democratic Micro- Non-party 2 2 (100%) 0 (0%)
Non-Democratic Non-micro Multi-party 12 10 (83%) 2 (17%)
Non-Democratic Non-micro Single-party 25 13(52%) 12 (48%)
Non-Democratic Non-micro Non-party 8 3 (38%) 5 (62%)
Global 130 73 (56%) 57 (44%)
(Source: Global Database)
In the case of the combined impact of state-size, party-composition of government and 
democracy on whether or not deputy-Ieaders are ministers, two of the three significant 
categories are in line with the global figures -  non-democratic, non-micro states with 
single-party governments and democratic non-micro states with multi-party governments. 
In the other significant category, democratic non-micro states with single-party 
governments, the likelihood of a deputy-leader decreases to 44 per cent. In democratic 
non-micro states, it appears that whether a government is single or multi-party impacts on 
whether or not a deputy-leader has a ministerial responsibility. In the multi-party
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category, 56 per cent of deputy-leaders have ministerial responsibilities while in the 
single-party category, only 44 per cent of deputy-leaders are ministers. This is in line 
with the findings from the multi-party and single-party categories in Table 1.18
1 .6  C o n c lu s io n
The completion of the global database on deputy-leaders allows for a cursory analysis of 
their role. The majority of states (68 per cent) were found to have deputy-leaders. Of the 
191 deputy-leaders in the database, most were appointed (168) rather than elected and 55 
per cent have ministerial responsibilities (102). Indeed some hold more than one 
ministerial position. Such ministerial positions are generally significant (19 per cent hold 
the Minister of Finance position for example). Whether a state is democratic or not has no 
impact on the likelihood of having a deputy-leader (both have a 68 per cent likelihood). 
Deputy-leaders are more likely to be found in single-party governments (78% have a 
deputy-leader) and in non-micro states (70% have a deputy-leader). Indeed, when 
categories of states with a small base are excluded, the greatest likelihood of finding a 
deputy-leader is among non-democratic non-micro-states with single party governments 
(86 per cent have a deputy-leader). On a state by state basis, the vast majority of deputy- 
leaders (83 per cent) are appointed rather than elected.
In terms of their role, an examination of the constitutional functions of deputy-leaders 
shows that the most common tasks allocated to deputy-leaders are to replace the leader in 
the event of temporary or permanent vacancies arising (80 per cent of states where 
deputy-leaders have a constitutional role have such a role); to perform functions
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delegated by the leader (23 per cent); to assist the leader (20 per cent) and to chair the 
cabinet if the leader is absent (19 per cent).
Given that so many states have deputy-leaders and that many also hold significant 
ministerial positions, one might think that deputy-leaders are important political figures. 
However, the aim of this study is not to explain why so many states have deputy-leaders. 
Nor is it to explain why some states have deputy-leaders and others do not. The aim is to 
determine whether or not deputy-leaders matter insofar as they can influence policy 
outcomes. In order to achieve this aim, the following chapters will take a more in-depth 
look at five specific states. Before that examination can take place, however, a structure 
and rationale for that examination must be outlined. That is the task of the next chapter.
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2  T H E  P E R C E P T I O N  O F  D E P U T Y - L E A D E R S
2.1 I n t r o d u c t io n
When one thinks of important or powerful political positions, Deputy-Prime Ministers or 
Vice Presidents rarely come to mind. Indeed, it is explicitly a second-ranking position. 
Nonetheless there appears to be a significant number of countries which possess deputy- 
leaders (the research in the previous chapter shows that 130 states have deputy-leaders), 
whether they be Vice-Presidents or Deputy-Prime Ministers. The significant number of 
deputy-leaders has not however led to any questioning of the perception that deputy- 
leaders do not matter (the case that this is the perception of deputy-leaders will be 
outlined later in this chapter). It is the objective of this research project to determine if 
this perception that deputy-leaders do not matter is correct. In order to do so, we must 
first clarify what is meant when we say that a particular position ‘matters’?
2.1.1 W hat d o e s  it m ean  to  ‘m a tte r’?
When it is said that a particular office ‘matters’, it is generally understood that it is an 
important position. Its importance derives from the power exercised by the holder of the 
office. Despite being ‘the most important single idea in political theory’ (Elster, 1976, p. 
249), power is a difficult concept to define. As Barnes (1993) observes, power is:
one of the most problematic and controversial of all they key concepts of social 
and political theory. Many social theorists offer wonderful insights into the nature
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and basis of power: Weber, Dahl, Arendt, Parsons, Lukes, Foucault and many 
others are indispensable reading on the subject. Yet all these writers are in radical 
disagreement with each other, about what power is, where it is, how we can tell 
what and where it is, what follows from its being what and where it is. (Barnes, 
1993, pp 197-198).
In the current context, power will be understood as the ability to influence policy; in other 
words that policy outcomes will substantively accord with the initial position of the office 
holder in question on the policy issue at hand. That includes scenarios where there is no 
change in policy, if the relevant deputy-leader is seeking the maintenance of the status 
quo, or where there has been a partial change in policy. As Light (1984) points out: 
‘Partial influence is still influence’ (Light, 1984, p. 620). It also must be noted that when 
we talk of ‘policy outcomes’, that policy can be influenced at any of a number of stages 
in the policy development process such as agenda setting, prioritising, funding and 
implementation. A deputy-leader may have little impact at one stage and significant 
impact at another.
It must also be clarified that ministerial power is not the focus of this research; insofar as 
to say a deputy-leader has power, the ability to affect policy must relate to policy beyond 
any ministerial brief they hold. A deputy-leader may influence health policy but if that 
person is Minister for Health then such influence is not indicative of any influence they 
have as deputy-leader. To matter, deputy-leaders must be able to influence policy outside 
of areas covered by their ministerial responsibilities. The one possible exception to this
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rule would be in the case of controversial policy measures which the deputy-leader is able 
to force through their own department against the wishes of either their department or 
fellow cabinet ministers. However, as it would be extremely difficult to determine 
whether success in forcing through such policies was due to the minister’s clout as 
deputy-leader or due to their being a strong minister. After all, many ministers who were 
not deputy-leaders have succeeded in pushing unpopular policies through their 
departments and cabinet.
A further refinement is required as we need to be able to distinguish policy outcomes 
favoured by the deputy-leader from outcomes favoured by the leader or other significant 
political actors. The initial position of both may accord in which case one will not be able 
to distinguish the policy influence of the deputy-leader. To do this, use will be made of 
Light’s (1984) definition of influence as being ‘the ability to change outcomes from what 
they would have been’ (Light, 1984, p. 620). In other words, we must be able to show 
that without the intervention of the deputy-leader a different policy outcome would have 
resulted. If it is found that the deputy-leaders in this study have influenced policy in areas 
beyond any additional cabinet responsibilities that they may have had, then the 
conclusion will not be that every deputy-leader matters but rather that deputy-leaders can 
matter.
51
2 .2  T h e  p e r c e p t i o n  o f  d e p u t y - l e a d e r s
2.2.1 In troduction
In order to assess the perception of deputy-leaders, a literature review was conducted not 
only to see what political scientists have to say regarding whether or not deputy-leaders 
matter, but also to see what the office holders themselves and their biographers have to 
say.
2.2.2 A limited litera tu re
At present there appears to be no specific book or article about the policy-making impact 
of deputy-leaders. Furthermore, there is neither a comparative literature on Vice- 
Presidents nor a comparative literature on Deputy-Prime Ministers. There also appears to 
be no literature on deputy-leaders in particular country areas such as the Commonwealth 
or Eastern Europe for example. It is only at the level of individual countries that a body 
of literature is to be found, particularly in the case of the United States Vice-President.
A number of books examine the role of US Vice-President. In fact, no fewer than 113 
books were identified on the subject of the US Vice-President. Of these, Turner (1982), 
Light (1984), Dorman (1968), Alotta (1981), Feinberg (1996), Goldstein (1982), 
Williams (1984), Kengor (2000) Relyea (2001) and Natoli (1985) examine the office. 
Nonetheless, Kengor (2000) describes the Vice President as a ‘neglected area of research 
within the fields of public policy and political science’ (Kengor, 2000, p. 5). Sixty-three
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biographies of US Vice-Presidents were also located,18 none of which are comparative in 
nature and all of which focus on the person rather than the role.
There are only a handful of journal articles on the US Vice-President. The most recent 
ones, by Romero (2001) Dudley and Rapaport (1989) and Sigelman and Wahlbeck 
(1997), examine the role of Vice-Presidential candidates in the Presidential election. 
Bilmes (2001) looks at the Vice-Presidential debates. Cohen (2001a and 2001b) examines 
the poll ratings of Vice-Presidents. Pomper (1966) has written on the nomination of 
Hubert Humphrey for Vice-President. A second subject of articles on the Vice-President 
is the succession as typified by articles by Schlesinger Jr. (1974), Brown and Silva 
(1949), Kallenbach (1947) and Brown (1928).
It is only Kengor (2000) and Light (1984) who examine the impact of the Vice-President 
on policy matters. Kengor (2000) examines how the interplay between Vice-President 
and Secretary of State impacts on foreign policy. Light (1984) looks specifically at the 
influence of Vice-Presidents Rockefeller and Mondale. He argues that they served as 
‘senior White House advisors’ (Light, 1984, p. 617) but only Mondale had influence and 
goes on to explore why Mondale had such influence. He argues though, that by the end of 
his term as Vice-President, his ability to influence policy was limited to defensive 
measures such as attempting to modify existing proposals rather than initiate policy.
18 Based on a search of: Amazon.com (available from www.amazon.com [accessed 11 August 2002]); 
Bowker’s Global Books in Print (available from www.globalbooksinprint.com [accessed 11 August 2002]) 
and The Library of Congress Online (available from http://catalog.loc.gov/ [accessed 11 August 2002]).
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There appears to be no literature in terms of either books or articles on the role of 
Deputy-Prime Ministers. There is however a significant biographical literature on a 
number of politicians who were deputy-leaders at some stage in their careers. Eight 
biographies of UK Deputy-Prime Ministers were found. Eight biographies on Australian 
Deputy-Prime Ministers were also located (six of these were on Paul Keating who went 
on to be Prime Minister), this compares with 42 on Australian Prime Ministers. In an 
Irish context twelve biographies of deputy-leaders were identified, seven of which were 
on Sean Lemass who went on to be Taoiseach (Irish Prime Minister). Four were found on 
Swedish Deputy-Prime Ministers (two of which were on Ingvar Carlsson who went on to 
be Prime Minister), this compares with 54 on Swedish Prime Ministers. Again, it should 
be stressed that this literature covers the entire political life of these Deputy-Prime 
Ministers and, as highlighted above, in many cases deals with the role of Deputy-Prime 
Minister in passing as most of the subjects went on to higher office. Again, none of these 
biographical treatments of Deputy-Prime Ministers are comparative in nature.
An examination of academic literature on areas where the Deputy-Prime Ministers would 
be expected to feature also reveals next to no focus on the role. Gallagher, Laver and 
Mair (2001) do not mention deputy-leaders in their book on European government. Laver 
and Schofield (1990) give a brief mention of Deputy-Prime Ministers in their 
examination of coalitions in Europe but no examination of their role. McLeay’s (1995) 
study of the role of the New Zealand cabinet describes the position of Deputy-Prime 
Minister as ‘a high post’ (McLeay, 1995, p. 68), however he does not examine the role. 
Mulgan’s (1997) book on New Zealand politics provides a brief outline of the role of the
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Deputy-Prime Minister’s office in coalition cabinet formation. Blondel and Muller- 
Rommel’s (1993) examination of Western European cabinets ignores the role of Deputy- 
Prime Ministers. Their 1997 examination of the same topic includes brief mentions of the 
Dutch, Belgian, Italian, Austrian and German Deputy-Prime Ministers and their role in 
ironing out differences within their governing coalitions. Only in the case of the Spanish 
Deputy-Prime Minister is there a brief discussion of their policy role. Blondel’s (1995) 
book on comparative government makes no mention of the role of deputy-leaders.
In conclusion, the limited literature that exists on deputy-leaders is not comparative in 
nature. It is confined to a number of books and articles on the US Vice-President and 
biographies of various politicians who were at one time or another deputy-leaders. 
Neither is there any significant exploration of the role of deputy-leaders in the academic 
examinations of topics such as government, coalition or cabinets, where one might expect 
to find some.
2.2.3 The received  w isdom  on d ep u ty -lead ers
Despite the fact that very little is written on deputy-leaders, the received wisdom, such as 
it is, is that deputy-leaders have little power. Indeed most of the literature that has been 
written on deputy-leaders is dismissive of the position. Looking at the position of the 
Vice-President of the United States, a number of holders of the office have disparaged its 
stature both in their comments and in their actions. The very first Vice-President, John 
Adams, wrote ‘I am Vice-President. In this I am nothing, but I may be everything’ 
(Dallek, 1998, p. 7). Thomas R Marshall (Woodrow Wilson’s Vice-President) described
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the Vice-Presidency as being ‘like a man in a cataleptic state. He cannot speak. He cannot 
move. He suffers no pain. And yet he is conscious of all that goes on around him.’ 
(Dallek, 1998, p. 7). He also told a humorous story of a woman who had two sons. One 
ran off to sea while the other became Vice-President. Neither were heard from again.19 In 
1872, Vice-President Henry Wilson occupied himself with writing a three-volume history 
of the United States, two volumes of which were published before he died after two years 
in office20 Lyndon Johnson described his time as Vice-President as ‘filled with trips 
around the world, chauffeurs, men saluting, people clapping, chairmanships of councils, 
but in the end it is nothing. I detested every minute of it.’ (Dallek, 1998, p. 44). Nelson 
Rockefeller described the office as ‘standby equipment’.21 Lyndon Johnson’s biographer, 
Robert Dalleck, observed that up to 1960 ‘There had been no notable achievements by a 
Vice-President’ (Dallek, 1998, p. 7). After three years as Vice-President, Dallek 
described Vice-President Johnson as ‘largely a forgotten man in the country’ (Dallek, 
1998, p. 44). More recently, Spiro Agnew has said that the office has ‘no real power to do 
anything.’ (Cronin and Genovese, 1998, p. 315). George Bush has said of the office that 
‘it doesn’t lend itself to high profile and decision making’ (Duffy and Goodgame, 1992, 
p. 40).
Their superiors -  the Presidents - thought similarly. Abraham Lincoln managed the Civil 
War without involving or consulting his Vice-President, Hannibal Hamlin, who spent
19 Felzenberg, Alvin, 2001. ‘The Vice Presidency Grows Up.’ Available from: http://www.policy 
review.org/feb01/felzenberg_print.html [accessed 14 March 2002],
20 Coen, Dan, 2001. ‘The evolving role of the Vice Presidency.’ Available from: 
http://www.vicepresidents.com/new page 15.htm [accessed 14 March 2002],
21 Felzenberg, Alvin, 2001. ‘The Vice Presidency Grows Up.’ Available from: http://www.policy 
review.org/feb01/felzenberg_print.html [accessed 14 March 2002],
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• • ♦ • 99 •most of his term of office in his home state of Maine. Franklin D Roosevelt managed 
the Depression and World War Two with minimal involvement from his three Vice- 
Presidents (although he did use the services of his first Vice-President -  John Nance
Garner, a former speaker of the House - to help get his legislation passed). Truman, his
■11
final Vice-President, was not even briefed on the Manhattan Project.
In terms of journal articles that provide an overview of the role of the Vice-President, 
they all date from the 1960s and earlier: David (1967), Wilmerding (1953), Rossiter 
(1948), Paullin (1924) and Learned (1912). David (1967) observes that ‘The office of 
Vice-President of the United States is presumably the most important “second man” 
position in the world, but it is still a “second man position,” with characteristics of 
ambiguity, personal self denial, and psychological insecurity that are inherent in some 
degree in all such positions’ (David, 1967, p. 722). Rossiter (1948) describes the Vice- 
Presidency as ‘a hollow shell of an office, an impotent and uncomfortable heir apparency 
sought by no one we would like to see as President’ (Rossiter, 1948, p. 383). Wilmerding 
(1953) takes such arguments regarding the uselessness of the office to its logical 
conclusion and recommends its abolition. Indeed Learned (1912) quotes Charles Francis 
Adams who observed ‘No high position in the government of the Unites States could now 
be so easily lopped off without missing it as that of the Vice-President’ (Learned, 1912, 
p. 162).
22 Coen, Dan, 2001. ‘The evolving role of the Vice Presidency.’ Available from: 
http://www.vicepresidents.com/new page 15.htm [accessed 14 March 2002].
23 Coen, Dan, 2001. ‘The evolving role of the Vice Presidency.’ Available from: 
http://www.vicepresidents.com/new page 15.htm [accessed 14 March 2002].
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This apparent view of deputy-leaders in the United States as unimportant is also 
seemingly the view elsewhere. In terms of Deputy-Prime Ministers in the UK, Rawnsley 
(2000) described the position as being ‘a grand title, but it did not come with 
commensurate power’ (Rawnsley, 2000, p. 296). While Michael Heseltine - a former 
Deputy-Prime Minister - describes the position as ‘at the heart of the government, in the 
number two position in the cabinet’ (Heseltine, 2000, p. 483), he goes on to observe that 
‘to make the job work, I had to act with his [the Prime Minister’s] authority’ (Heseltine, 
2000, p. 485). He also makes the point that ‘modem technology may have greatly 
diminished the traditional role of a deputy prime minister ... Prime Ministers today may 
be out of the country but they are never out of touch ... although the deputy is nominally 
in charge while the Prime Minister is away, it is very rare that the substance of this 
transfer of responsibility ever mattered in the conduct of policy.’ (Heseltine, 2000, p. 
498). Kavanagh (1990) in looking at the experience of the various holders of the position, 
describes its as ‘a non-job... a dead end... a consolation prize’.24
In Ireland the role of the deputy-leader (Tanaiste) is ‘a limited one’ (Connolly & 
O’Halpin, 1999, p. 260). Hussey (1993), herself a former minister, observes the addition 
of a small number of staff by Dick Spring in 1993 made the position ‘for the first time in 
Ireland... more than just a title’ (Hussey, 1993, p. 31). Most of the biographies of holders 
of the office while mentioning the office, give it little if any attention such as Collins’ 
(1993) biography of Spring, while O’Sullivan (1994) describes Lemass’ move to Tanaiste 
as ‘another step up the political ladder’ (O’Sullivan, 1994, p. 106), this is in the context
24 The Guardian, November 3, 1990.
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of the move making him next in line to lead Fianna Fail rather than any significance in 
the position itself A similar reading can be made of Horgan’s (1997) description of the 
position of Tanaiste as ‘an important vacancy to fill’ (Horgan, 1997, p .125) when talking 
of Lemass’ move.
The Canadian Parliament’s website describes the position of Deputy-Prime Minister of 
Canada as ‘an honorary title ... It has no standing in law, and does not carry any formal 
duties or tasks.’25 Willy Brandt in his autobiography writes of becoming the first post-war 
German Social Democratic Deputy-Chancellor, however it was his ministry which was 
the focus of attention: ‘in the inner circle of the party leadership there was strong feeling 
that the Party Chairman (Brandt) should hold the “second most important” post in the 
Government, the most classic of all classic ministries, the Foreign Ministry.’ (Brandt, 
1992, p. 246). De Winter (1991) has a paragraph on the role of Deputy Prime Ministers in 
coalition governments: ‘In coalition governments, deputy prime ministers are often party 
“watchdogs”; they are the main spokesmen for their party with respect to general cabinet 
policy’ (De Winter, 1991, p. 62). This is hardly a description of an office that matters.
2.2.4 C onclusion
So, political scientists have written little on the office and even biographers of the office 
holders pass over it in near silence. What little that has been written is far from positive,
25 Library of Parliament, 2002. ‘Deputy Prime Minister of Canada -  1977 to Date.’ Available from: 
h(ti)://www.parl.i’c.ca.information/about/people/kev/DepPrimeMin.asp?Lant’uage=E&Hist=N [accessed 6 
August 2002],
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even when it is written by former deputy-leaders themselves. These reactions indicate 
that the office is perceived as being sufficiently unimportant as to not matter.
2 .3  D e p u ty - l e a d e r s  a n d  P o l i t ic a l  S c i e n c e
While the office of deputy-leader may be perceived as not to matter, this view is based on 
very little research. Further study of deputy-leaders may support this perception, but it 
may also add to the knowledge base of political science in a number of areas. The 
primary area where it may add to understanding is that of political leadership. While 
there is no agreed working definition of political leadership (Elgie, 1995), this has not 
prevented a significant amount of research from being conducted into various aspects of 
political leadership. For example, much has been written on the role of Presidents and 
Prime-Ministers on a stand-alone and comparative basis with Jones (1991), Rose (1990) 
and Weller (1985) focusing on Prime-Ministers and Elgie (1999a), Hayward (1993), 
Neustadt (1980), Rose (1984) and Rossiter (1960) looking at Presidents. The study of 
deputy-leaders will not only open up a new aspect to leadership in that to date little has 
been written on Vice-Presidents or Deputy-Prime Ministers, it will also add an additional 
layer on to existing studies of leadership. For example how do Deputy-Prime Ministers 
interact with Prime-Ministers and what impact has each office on the ability of the other 
to provide political leadership? While the impact of deputy-leaders on leaders’ ability to 
lead is likely to be greater if deputy-leaders can influence policy, even if deputy-leaders 
are found not to be able to influence policy that is not to say that deputy-leaders have no 
impact on leaders. Given that 130 states were found to have deputy-leaders and that they
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were found in diverse circumstances, there is a rich field of potential research that 
remains untapped within the study of political leadership.
Other areas of political science which could benefit from a greater understanding of the 
role of deputy-leaders include the areas highlighted in the previous section where an 
analysis of the role of deputy-leaders could be expected but currently does not exist. Such 
areas include coalition government, cabinets (how they are formed and how they 
function) and the functioning of government in general. If it is found that deputy-leaders 
do have policy influence then their roles in these areas may also be significant and will 
warrant further research. If the role of significant political players has been ignored, then 
the findings of current research in these areas are undermined.
In short, the study of deputy-leaders is linked to a number of broader issues within 
political research. Any re-evaluation of the role and importance of deputy-leaders may 
have significant implications for a number of areas of comparative politics where the 
uncontested (and untested) perception that deputy-leaders do not matter has led to them 
being ignored. The identification of a new factor that must be taken into account means 
that existing research in the areas of coalitions, government and cabinets may need to be 
re-examined. This will only arise if deputy-leaders are found to matter. In that sense, this 
research may have significant implications for political science research beyond the 
narrow remit of deputy-leaders.
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2 .4  M e th o d o lo g y
2.4.1 In troduction
The objective of this project is to determine if the perception that deputy-leaders do not 
matter is correct. In this section, the means by which this objective will be achieved will 
be outlined and justified. In the previous section, the case was made that the academic 
perception is that deputy-leaders do not matter. A simple description of the role and 
activities of deputy-leaders in itself is unlikely to successfully challenge this perception. 
How is it to be known that the description is correct? ‘Description is far from mechanical 
or unproblematic since it involves selection from the infinite number of facts that could 
be recorded.’ (King, Keohane, and Verba, 1994, p. 34).
In order to challenge the current perception, there is a need to go beyond description and 
use inference. Inference is ‘the process of using the facts we know to learn about facts 
we do not know’ (King, Keohane, and Verba, 1994, p. 46). There are two types of 
inference -  descriptive inference and causal inference. The former is defined as ‘the 
process of understanding an unobserved phenomenon on the basis of a set of 
observations.’ (King, Keohane, and Verba, 1994, p. 55), while the latter seeks to explain 
a phenomenon on the basis of a set of observations. It is the difference between inferring 
the ‘what’ of a phenomenon and the ‘why’. In this case descriptive inference will be used 
to determine if deputy-leaders matter rather than why they matter. Given that deputy- 
leaders are perceived not to matter, the first task must be to show that they do in fact
62
matter. If this can be proven, then one can legitimately ask the question why do they 
matter. The current research is focussed on the first task.
The specific tools that will be used to go from observed phenomena to unobserved 
phenomena are hypotheses and observable implications. It is not known if  deputy-leaders 
matter. What can be done is develop a number of hypotheses assuming that it is true that 
deputy-leaders matter. From these a number of implications can be derived which it 
should be possible to observe. A search for these observable implications can then be 
carried out. If they cannot be found, then the hypotheses must be called into question. On 
the other hand if it is found that the observable implications do actually occur, the 
likelihood of the hypotheses being correct increases and, by inference, the likelihood of 
our original unobserved phenomena existing increases. What this approach seeks to do is 
to ‘bring as much information to bear on our hypothesis as possible ... [so that we can] 
increase the confidence that the theory is correct’ (King, Keohane, and Verba, 1994, pp 
48-49). The more observable implications actually found occurring, the greater the 
likelihood of the hypotheses being correct and the underlying theory being correct. The 
validity of the hypotheses and underlying theory are being inferred from the fact that the 
observable implications do exist.
2.4.2 Why c a s e  s tu d ie s ?
The observable implications derived from the hypotheses in a later section of this chapter 
will be tested by means of case studies. A case study involves ‘the collection and 
presentation of detailed information about a particular participant or small group,
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frequently including the accounts of subjects themselves. A form of qualitative 
descriptive research, the case study looks intensely at an individual or small participant 
pool, drawing conclusions only about that participant or group and only in that specific 
context ... emphasis is placed on exploration and description.’26 Why choose to adopt 
such a method in this instance? This project is descriptive in nature and as King, 
Keohane, and Verba point out ‘Case studies are essential for description’ (King, 
Keohane, and Verba, 1994, p. 44).
2.4.3 S tru c tu re  of c a s e  s tu d ie s  -  by them e o r s ta te ?
The case studies will be comparative in nature insofar as they compare the policy role of 
deputy-leaders in a small number of states. As for how the case studies are structured, 
there are two possibilities: by theme or by state. In this instance they will be structured by 
theme.
The reason for adopting this structure is that it allows the greatest degree of comparison 
between the states being studied. Adopting a state-by-state testing of the observable 
implications would minimise the comparative aspect of the study. While a state-by-state 
approach may generate a more in-depth knowledge of the policy role of deputy-leaders in 
individual states, it is in the comparison between states, each with their own individual 
circumstances, that an understanding of whether deputy-leaders truly matter can be 
gained. This is, after all, a comparative study of deputy-leaders rather than a study of a 
specific deputy-leader in a specific state. Given that the number of hypotheses,
26 Colorado State University, 2002. ‘Case Studies.’ Available from:
64
observable implications and states in this study are fixed, whether the case-studies are 
organised by theme or on a state by state basis is in many respects a matter of 
presentation. Having said that, if each hypothesis is tested against all the states in the 
study together rather than separately, then such a presentation of results is more 
comparative and facilitates the drawing of conclusions regarding the deputy-leader across 
the states studied.
The case studies will be based upon primary documentation where available and 
secondary sources such as biographies and histories. In terms of testing the observable 
implications, both qualitative and quantitative methods will be used. Obviously, there 
will be practical limits in some instances; for example, there are no parliamentary 
questions in the US system of government, so it will not be possible to use them as a 
means of assessing US deputy-leaders policy related activity in parliament.
2.4.4 W hich s ta te s  an d  w h at tim e fram e?
Given the constraints of this research, it is not possible to conduct an in-depth study of 
every state that has a position of deputy-leader. A narrower focus is required. The first 
step is to decide on which states shall be the subjects of the case studies. In order to 
obtain a good spread of different but comparable states a ‘most similar’ and then ‘most 
different’ basis will be used for state selection. This approach has been adopted from 
Collier and Collier (1991). This approach ensures that like is being compared with like, 
that ‘the contexts of analysis are analytically equivalent, at least to a significant degree’
http://writmg.colostate.edu/references/researcb/casestudv/ [accessed 27 August 2002].
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(Collier, 1997, p. 40), while at the same time the ‘most different’ criteria ‘places parallel 
processes of change in sharp relief because they are operating in settings that are very 
different in many respects.’ (Collier, 1997, p. 40). In other words, the diverse 
circumstances should enable the researcher to more easily identify the appropriate 
explanatory factors.
The criteria for ‘most similar’ are that:
1. They must be democracies, so as to ensure that like is being compared with like.
2. They must be also long-standing democracies so as to generate a long enough track 
record to provide a proper understanding of the role of their deputy leaders and the 
greatest possible testing of the observable implications.
Using these two criteria, the list of potential subject states is narrowed down from an 
initial 192 states to 36.27 This was based on Lijphart’s (1999) list of long-standing 
democracies. He based his list on those states which had been democratic for at least 19 
years. He has ‘somewhat arbitrarily’ (Lijphart, 1999, p. 53) picked twenty years as his 
minimum cut-off point, but relaxed it by one year to include India, Papua New Guinea 
and Spain.
Lijphart’s (1999) categories of majoritarian and consensual democracies will be used as 
the ‘most different’ basis. He defines ‘majoritarian’ democracy as government by simple
27 The 36 are: Australia Austria, Bahamas, Barbados, Belgium, Botswana, Canada, Colombia, Costa Rica, 
Denmark, Finland, France, Germany, Greece, Iceland, India, Ireland, Israel, Italy, Jamaica, Japan, 
Luxembourg, Malta, Mauritius, Netherlands, New Zealand, Norway, Papua New Guinea, Portugal, Spain, 
Sweden, Switzerland, Trinidad and Tobago, United Kingdom, United States and Venezuela.
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majority, while ‘consensual’ democracy seeks to maximise the decision-making majority: 
‘its rules and institutions aim at broad participation in government and broad agreement 
on the policies that government should pursue.’ (Lijphart, 1999, p. 2). The contrast 
between the two types of democracy goes further: ‘the majoritarian model of democracy 
is exclusive, competitive, and adversarial, whereas the consensus model is characterised 
by inclusiveness, bargaining and compromise’ (Lijphart, 1999, p. 2).
He then identifies ten differences between majoritarian and consensual democracies with 
regard to institutions and rules:
1. In majoritarian democracies executive power is concentrated in single-party majority 
cabinets while in consensual democracies there is executive power sharing in multi­
party coalitions.
2. The executive is dominant in its relations with the legislature in majoritarian 
democracies while there is a balance of power between the two in consensual 
democracies.
3. Two-party systems in majoritarian democracies contrast with multi-party systems in 
consensual democracies.
4. Majoritarian democracies have disproportional electoral systems while consensual 
democracies have proportional representation.
5. Free-for-all competition among interest groups in majoritarian democracies contrasts 
with ‘corporatist’ interest group systems in consensual democracies.
6. Governments in majoritarian democracies are unitary and centralised while federal 
and decentralised government is the norm in consensual democracies.
67
7. Legislative power is concentrated in a unicameral legislature in majoritarian 
democracies while it is divided between two equally strong houses of parliament in 
consensual democracies.
8. Flexible constitutions that are amended by simple majorities are the norm in 
majoritarian democracies while rigid constitutions that require extraordinary 
majorities are generally found in consensual democracies.
9. The legislature has final say on the constitutionality of legislation in majoritarian 
democracies in contrast to consensual democracies where legislation is subject to 
constitutional review either by a supreme court or a constitutional court.
10. Central banks are responsible to the executive in majoritarian democracies but 
independent in consensual democracies.
It should also be pointed out that no state neatly falls on one side or the other of the 
divide created by these ten differences. Lijphart divides these ten differences into two 
groups. The first five are grouped under a heading of ‘executives-parties’, while the 
second five are grouped under a heading of ‘federal-unitary’. He then plots the position 
of each of his 36 states using these two sets of five variables giving a two dimensional 
representation of their positioning between majoritarian and consensual democracy. The 
average of each state’s ‘executives-parties’ values is plotted on the horizontal axis and 
average of their ‘federal-unitary’ values is on the vertical axis. Each unit on the graph 
measures one standard deviation. The states are positioned as follows:
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Graph 2-1 Lijphart’s two dimensional conceptual map of democracy
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(Source: Lijphart, 1999, p. 248)
Given that high values indicate majoritarianism and low values indicate consensus, a 
state’s positioning within the four quadrants indicates whether it is:
• majoritarian ‘executives-parties’ and consensual ‘federal-unitary’ (bottom right):
• majoritarian ‘executives-parties’ and majoritarian ‘federal-unitary’ (top right);
• consensual ‘executives-parties’ and consensual ‘federal-unitary’ (bottom left);
• consensual ‘executives-parties’ and majoritarian ‘federal-unitary’ (top left).
He then develops a dynamic version of this table showing how each state’s positioning 
has changed between the period 1945 to 1970 and 1971 to the middle of 1996. This could
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only be done for 26 states as some were not democracies during the initial period. The 
shifts are plotted in Graph 2.2 below.
Graph 2-2 Lijphart’s two dimensional conceptual map of shifts in democratic styles of 26 states
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From this table we can identify five state types: the four state-types where states stayed in 
their respective quadrant and a fifth state type where a state crossed quadrants between 
the two periods measured. While these measures contain an element of randomness 
insofar as the selecting of different periods or a grouping of different variables may have 
produced different shifts, they constitute a useful categorisation on which to base our 
selection of ‘most different’ states.
28 The ten states lost in this process are: Bahamas; Botswana; Barbados; Greece; India; Malta; Mauritius; 
Papua New Guinea; Portugal and Spain.
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Excluding the six states among the 26 that do not have deputy-leaders (Finland, France, 
Iceland, Japan, Norway and Trinidad and Tobago), 20 states are now left. These state 
groupings can now be examined with a view to selecting one per category for the case 
studies.
In the top-left quadrant, Sweden, Italy, Denmark, Luxembourg and Israel remain. Given 
that Finland and Norway were also in this quadrant (but have no deputy-leader), a 
Scandinavian state would seem most representative. On that basis Sweden will be 
selected as a case study subject as the archetypal Scandinavian state.
The states in the top-right quadrant are those which are nearest being majoritarian 
democracies. The states remaining in this segment are New Zealand, the United 
Kingdom, Columbia, Costa Rica and Jamaica. Given that three of these states are in the 
Commonwealth and modeled on the ‘Westminister system’ of government, one of these 
states would be most representative of this grouping. For that reason, the United 
Kingdom, as the original ‘majoritarian democracy’ will be selected as a case study 
subject from this quadrant.
In the bottom left quadrant, the states with the greatest degree of consensual democracy 
are to be found: the Netherlands, Switzerland, Germany and Austria. Given the peculiar 
political arrangements in Switzerland where the leader and deputy-leader positions are 
rotated annually, Switzerland will be excluded as a potential case study subject. The 
Netherlands has consistently had multi-party coalition governments, while Germany and
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Austria have had either grand-coalition governments, coalitions involving a large and 
small party or single party governments. On that basis, the Netherlands will be selected 
so as to include in the study a state where there has consistently been multi-party 
governments.
The bottom right quadrant contains the United States, Canada and Australia. The United 
States will be chosen from this group as we already have a number of states with Deputy- 
Prime Ministers included as case study subjects and none with a Vice-President.
The fifth group contains those states which cross quadrants over the time periods in 
question. There are three such states: Ireland, Venezuela and Belgium. Venezuela will be 
excluded on the basis that a state with a Presidential system of government has already 
been included. Given that a number of the states already selected have monarchs and that 
a Benelux state has already been included in the study (the Netherlands), Ireland will be 
chosen over Belgium from this group.
Having selected five states, four with Deputy-Prime Ministers and one with a Vice- 
President, we must explain why more states with the former type of deputy-leader were 
selected. The simple answer is that this reflects the global situation where 72 states have 
Deputy-Prime-Ministers, while 46 have Vice-Presidents as their deputy-leader. In terms 
of the 20 states from which the five were selected, 15 have Deputy-Prime Ministers and 
five have Vice-Presidents. While selecting only one Vice-President for the five case 
studies under-represents Vice-Presidents according to this measure, increasing the
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number to two out of five would significantly over-represent them. In the end, it was 
decided to select only one Vice-President. Given that five of the original 36 democracies 
are Presidential democracies, selecting one for inclusion in the study appears to be a fair 
representation of the type. So, on balance selecting one Vice-President adequately 
represents them by most measures and to select more than one would over-represent them 
according to all the measures.
As one would expect given their different positioning on Lijphart’s two dimensional 
graph of democracy, the five states selected - the Netherlands, Sweden the United States, 
Ireland and the United Kingdom - provide a good cross section of states under a number 
of headings. Government in the Netherlands is multi-party based, in the US and UK it is 
one-party based, while in Ireland and Sweden it has alternated between being multi-party 
and one-party based (although Ireland has since 1989 moved to having solely multi-party 
governments). The Netherlands, Sweden and UK have Monarchs while Ireland and the 
US both have Presidents. In terms of the interest group system in each state, using 
Lijphart’s categorisation, Sweden and the Netherlands score at the corporatist end of the 
scale while the US and UK are at the opposite end where there is more of an interest- 
group free-for-all. Ireland is positioned midway between these extremes (although given 
its status as a state that crosses quadrants in Graph 1.2, it should come as no surprise that 
Ireland has since the late 1980s become more corporatist with the instigation of national 
pay agreements).
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Now that the subjects of the case studies have been selected, the remaining issue is to 
decide on the timeframe of the case studies. Two guiding principles were applied in 
determining the timeframe. Firstly, the timeframe should be as long as possible so as to 
allow the greatest opportunity to examine the role of deputy-leaders in each state under 
examination. Secondly, to ensure that like is being compared with like, the timeframe 
must be the same across all five states. Given these criteria, it is possible to go as far back 
as when the last of the five states became democratic or when the most recent disruption 
of democratic rule in these states came to an end (whichever event was most recent of 
these two). In this case democracy was most recently disrupted in the Netherlands during 
World War II. The first postwar elections took place in the Netherlands in 1946. 
Democracy has prevailed uninterrupted in the other four states since before this period. 
So as to ensure a comparable situation across each of the five states, the case studies shall 
examine the role of deputy-leaders in each state from 1946 to January 2002.
2.4.5 H yp o th eses  and  o b se rv ab le  im plications
Having identified the states that will be focused on in this study, the hypotheses can now 
be established with which to determine whether or not deputy-leaders matter. It should be 
remembered that ‘mattering’ in this context has been defined in terms of the ability of 
deputy-leaders to influence policy outside their specific departmental responsibilities. 
Knowing the states that will be studied in advance of determining the hypotheses and 
observable implications ensures that the observable implications can actually be tested. 
For example, having both presidential and parliamentary systems of government 
represented among the five states selected means that the observable implications must be
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as flexible as possible so as to cover both such systems. In some cases that will not be 
possible. However, as long as most cases allow comparison across all five states, then the 
observable implications are workable.
The hypotheses and resulting observable implications will be grouped into three sets, 
each one corresponding to a stage in the political life-cycle of a deputy-leader: the 
attainment of office; the term of office and the stepping down from office. At each stage 
if deputy-leaders can influence policy then the hypotheses and implications should stand 
up to the facts.
There are two elements to the hypotheses. Some are more concerned with the motivation 
of deputy-leaders. These hypotheses do not say that deputy-leaders can influence policy, 
but, rather, that they are people who want to influence policy. If the deputy-leader wants 
to influence policy, then it is reasonable to assume that in office they will at least try to 
do so. Hypotheses one, two, three and seven fall into this category. The remaining three 
hypotheses deal more directly with the capacity of deputy-leaders to influence policy.
2.4.5.1 S tag e  1: A ttaining office
The first series of hypotheses relate to the circumstances surrounding the attainment of 
the position of deputy-leader.
Hypothesis 1: If deputy-leaders matter, then individuals appointed to the 
position will have held a significant policy-related post beforehand.
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If the position of deputy-leader is one where the deputy-leader can affect policy outcomes 
beyond their specific ministerial responsibilities, then it is unlikely to be filled by a 
political newcomer. In other words, an important position is unlikely to be given to a 
political novice. Equally, a ceremonial position is unlikely to be given to a political 
heavyweight, except perhaps at the end of a career. A position with policy-influencing 
powers would not be handed over lightly to one who has little or no previous experience 
of policy formulation and implementation. Such experience can only be gained from 
having previously held high political office such as a cabinet position. It is possible that 
in some cases a party has been excluded from power for a long period and so will lack 
politicians with previous cabinet experience. In such circumstances, one would expect 
that the party involved would select a member who has experience in a policy-related 
post at a national level such as a senior opposition spokesperson covering a major cabinet 
position or someone who served on a major legislative committee, or had previous policy 
experience at a sub-national state level.
In terms of the observable implications, we can examine the previous positions held by 
those who went on to be deputy-leaders and determine if such positions were significant. 
The positions that will be considered ‘significant’ include: a cabinet post; being primary 
opposition spokesperson or membership of a policy-influencing legislative committee, or 
prominent elected office (by this is meant an office with a national profile as distinct 
from being elected on to a local residents committee for example). This information 
should be relatively easy to obtain and straightforward to analyse.
It may be argued that the holding of one such position in itself does not indicate an 
interest in policy, and that in the case of some positions (eg legislative committees) all 
members of parliament may hold them. Nonetheless, the holding of a number of these
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positions over a political career would indicate that the holder is likely to have an interest 
in policy. It should also be noted that in terms of assessing the motivation of deputy- 
leaders the accumulated results from the testing of a number of observable implications 
will be taken into account. An interest in policy will not be identified on the basis of the 
results from the testing of one observable implication but rather from the results of the 
testing of observable implications drawn from four hypotheses that examine proxy 
measures for policy interest over the course of deputy-leaders’ political career.
Hypothesis 2: If deputy-leaders matter, then those in the office will have had 
a strong policy focus prior to coming to office.
If deputy-leaders can influence policy, then people with an interest in policy will seek the 
office. That is not to say that deputy-leaders will influence policy when in office, but 
merely that those who seek the position will be motivated by policy concerns.
How do we measure a strong policy focus? We can take it that a person who has a strong 
interest in policy will produce policy documents, give speeches on policy proposals, 
contribute to policy debates in the media and in a legislative context, propose legislation. 
All of these actions are in the public domain and therefore easily identified. While it may 
be argued that any senior politician is likely to give policy-related speeches, significant 
examples of such activity will be sought from both inside and outside parliament. In other 
words, an example of a policy document produced will be taken before an example of a 
policy-related speech. While there are difficulties in measuring motivation, it must also 
be pointed out that it is in the accumulation of evidence over the course of testing a 
number of hypotheses related to policy interest that will determine whether or not those 
who were deputy-leaders displayed a genuine interest in policy over the course of their 
political careers.
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While the first two hypotheses appear quite similar, they are different in that the first one 
examines positions held prior to becoming deputy-leader, while the second focuses on the 
actions of those who went on to become deputy-leader.
2.4.5.2 S tag e  2: The term  in office
The second series of hypotheses relates to the actions of deputy-leaders during their term 
as deputy-leader.
Hypothesis 3: If deputy-leaders matter, then they will focus on policy while in 
the office.
If deputy-leaders influence policy, then those who hold the office will show an interest in 
policy. This hypothesis allows for the scenario where someone who has no interest in 
policy attains the office. If the office has policy implementation possibilities then one 
would expect holders of the office to show at least some interest in policy while they are 
in the office. That is not to say that deputy-leaders will focus exclusively on policy while 
in the office, merely that there should be examples of interest in policy.
An interest in policy will be measured by the following proxies: the generation of a 
number of policy documents, giving lengthy policy speeches and proposing legislation. 
Such proxies will be sought from outside any additional cabinet portfolios held by the 
deputy-leader so as to be able to distinguish between any policy influence arising from 
their having additional cabinet responsibilities and any policy influence due to their being 
deputy-leader.
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Hypothesis 4: If deputy-leaders matter, then they will have policy 
development and implementation resources available to them.
The hypotheses to date have tested the motivation of deputy-leaders. This hypothesis 
looks at the capacity of the office holders to influence policy. It must be borne in mind 
that while a deputy-leader may have the motivation to influence policy, they cannot 
implement it by themselves. They will require staff to set policy priorities (within their 
department and across departments), to draft legislation, to follow it through the 
legislative process and to ensure its implementation and possibly to monitor its 
effectiveness. If the office is purely ceremonial in nature, then we would expect it to be 
backed up by a small secretariat. On the other hand, if it has policy influence, then it 
should have attached to it a number of civil service staff and political appointees whose 
role will be policy orientated. Their policy focus would reach beyond any ministerial 
brief held by the deputy-leader. Both the size of the staff available to the deputy-leader 
and their role will be examined. The departmental budget can be compared to other 
policy-making departments and to that of the leader’s office and other non-ministerial 
officers. Additionally, on a qualitative level, it can be determined whether or not support 
staff have a policy role. If they do, then this would indicate that the office that they are 
supporting is policy orientated.
Hypothesis 5: I f deputy-leaders matter, then they will influence policies that 
they believe to be important while in the office.
Generally, policies are implemented on the basis of an agreement of the parties to a 
coalition and/or the cabinet in a single-party government. However, each minister will 
have their own specific policy priorities which may not always form part of such
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agreements. In the case of the deputy-leader, we would expect that they would seek to 
implement some policies that they consider important. This influence may range from the 
broad strokes of the general direction of government policy to more specific ‘pet 
projects’ such as a project in their constituency. In terms of negative influence, while 
deputy-leaders may not be able to undermine every proposal they disagree with, if they 
have influence over policy outcomes we should expect to see some instances where 
proposals that they disagree with are changed, deprioritised, delayed or abandoned. If, on 
the other hand, they do not have influence over policy, they will be unable to stop 
policies they disagree with.
What observable implications arise from this hypothesis? In the case of ‘pet projects’ we 
are seeking to identify policy proposals that find favour with the deputy-leader, but which 
are not a priority of the government as a whole or indeed of any of the parties that make 
up the government. We are looking for policy proposals that the deputy-leader in 
question has spoken in favour of but which were not among the government’s policy 
priorities at that point in time. Such projects will not relate to matters covered by any 
ministerial brief held by the deputy-leader, except where it can be show that it was due to 
their being deputy-leader that such policies were implemented, as in the case of 
controversial policies for example. Generally, each deputy-leader will have a small 
number of such ‘pet projects’. Again, it is not expected that all such projects will be 
implemented, but if deputy-leaders have influence over policy outcomes we should 
expect to see some instances where their ‘pet projects’ are implemented. If they have no 
influence over policy outcomes then we would expect that none of their ‘pet projects’ are 
implemented.
In the case of a broader policy influence, we can seek to identify the policy committees 
that the deputy-leader chairs. Such committees should examine policy issues beyond the
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deputy leader’s narrow departmental responsibilities. The more policy committees that 
they chair, the greater their likely influence on policy.
The ability of deputy-leaders to undermine policies that they disagree with can be 
verified by identifying proposals that deputy-leaders have disagreed with in public 
statements and then tracking the progress of those proposals. Even if they are halted, we 
need to verify that it was as a result of the deputy-leader’s actions. It must be borne in 
mind however that in some cases the deputy-leader may claim undeserved credit for the 
derailment of the policy. Alternatively, those involved in the policy process but not 
aligned with the deputy-leader may seek to underplay the influence of the deputy-leader. 
Observations of the outcomes of disputes over policy between the deputy-leader and the 
leader and fellow ministers will also be made so as to determine whether the deputy- 
leader was able to undermine policies that they disagreed with. In many such instances 
we can expect such disagreements and their outcomes to be highlighted in the media.
2.4.5.3 S tag e  3: Leaving office
The third series of hypotheses relate to the circumstances under which deputy-leaders end 
their term as deputy-leader.
Hypothesis 6: If deputy-leaders matter then, where they are involved in 
significant policy disagreement outside the area of any additional cabinet 
portfolio that they hold, their removal from office will be sought.
If deputy leaders matter, then if there are major policy conflicts or disagreements one 
would expect the removal the deputy-leader from that position of influence to be sought
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on occasion. On the other hand, if they had no policy influence, a disagreement on policy 
would not be expected to undermine their position.
How do we verify this hypothesis? Firstly, it needs to be noted that a component of this 
hypothesis strictly cannot be tested in the United States because the deputy-leader there, 
the Vice-President, cannot be removed by his party. In fact, they can only be removed 
from Office ‘on Impeachment for and Conviction of, Treason, Bribery, or other high
• • • 90Crimes and Misdemeanors’ (US Constitution, Article II, Section 4). However, it can be 
tested insofar as a Vice-President who is out of line with their party or the public on a 
major policy issue may have difficulties in being re-nominated to contest the following 
election for Vice-President or they may resign. In order to verify this hypothesis in all 
five states it will be a matter of isolating those cases where deputy-leaders were forced 
from office (i.e. either resigned, were sacked or moved to a different office) and 
identifying the reason for their removal from the office of deputy-leader. Resignation 
letters, media reports and analyses and academic research into the issue will provide a 
basis for assessing what was the reason for the removal from office. This scenario is not 
one that we can expect to occur very often, but if we do find instances where it occurs 
then we will have found support for the hypothesis. Again, policy disagreements or 
conflicts beyond any ministerial brief of a deputy-leader removed from office will be 
sought so as to ensure that the removal is due to their being deputy-leader rather than 
having any additional cabinet responsibilities.
29 Available from: http://caselaw.lp.fmdlaw.com/data/constitution/articles.html/ [accessed 10 October
2001],
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While the absolute number of deputy-leaders removed from office may be small that is 
not to say it is insignificant. Such a measure will not include failed attempts to remove 
deputy-leaders from office which are more difficult to identify. Furthermore, deputy- 
leaders may not be involved in major policy differences during their term as deputy- 
leader. It will be sufficient for current purposes to compare the number of deputy-leaders 
who left office early due to policy differences with the total number of deputy-leaders 
who left office early. If a high proportion of those who left office early did so due to 
policy differences, then it can be taken as offering strong support for the hypothesis in 
question.
Hypothesis 7: If deputy-leaders matter, then after their term of office as 
deputy-leader they will go on to hold another significant political office.
The rationale for this hypothesis is that if deputy-leaders can influence policy, then the 
position is not a retirement home for politicians. If that were the case, then once they step 
down from the position of deputy-leader, it would be to leave politics altogether or move 
to another minor or ceremonial political position. On the other hand, if it is a position that 
matters and where policy is affected, then those who have held the position will have 
done so at the height of their political careers or they will use it as a stepping stone to 
higher political office. On that basis, it is reasonable to assume that any subsequent office 
they hold will also be significant. Of course, there will be cases where a deputy-leader 
fully retires from political life immediately after stepping down as deputy-leader or semi­
retires by subsequently taking up a ceremonial role. There is also the possibility that the 
deputy-leader will be demoted in the event that they have not done a good job as deputy-
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leader. Such instances are easily identifiable. However in most cases, if  it is a significant 
political office, then they will go on to hold other significant positions. While Prime- 
Ministers generally do not go on to hold further significant policy-influencing offices, the 
office of Prime Minister is clearly recognized as the height of a politician’s career and so 
it is reasonable to expect them to retire from politics after holding such a position. In the 
case of deputy-leaders, it may be the height of some politicians’ careers. However, it is 
not being argued here that it is the most important office a politician could hold. 
Therefore, one would generally expect holders of it to continue to be active in politics 
after they have left the position of deputy-leader. The opposite example of the holder of 
an insignificant office then going on to hold a significant office also occurs and could be 
seen to question the validity of this hypothesis. This does not undermine the rationale of 
the current hypothesis as the positions that will be sought are sufficiently high level that 
one would not reasonably assume that anyone could attain them having immediately 
previously held an insignificant position. In the current context where we have defined 
‘mattering’ in terms of policy influence, then we can say that if deputy-leaders matter, 
then they will generally go on to other high level political positions where they can 
influence policy such as ministers, chairs of parliamentary committees and directors of 
international governmental bodies. It must also be borne in mind that what is being 
sought here is an accumulation of evidence over a number of hypotheses that might 
indicate an interest in policy over a political lifetime, before, during and after a 
politician’s time as deputy-leader.
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2.4.5.4 Sum m ary
Seven hypotheses were derived from the assumption that deputy-leaders can influence 
policy outcomes. Two of the hypotheses relate to gaining office, three of them are to do 
with their actions in office and two relate to leaving office. Table 2.1 below summarises 
the hypotheses and their observable implications:
Table 2-1 Hypotheses and observable implications
Hypotheses Observable implications
1. If deputy-leaders matter, then 
individuals appointed to the position 
will have held a significant policy- 
related post beforehand.
Deputy-leaders will previously have been 
a cabinet member; a primary opposition 
spokesperson; member of a policy- 
influencing legislative committee or a 
holder of a prominent elected office.
2. If deputy-leaders matter, then those in 
the office will have had a strong 
policy focus prior to coming to 
office.
Deputy-leaders will have previously 
produced policy documents, given 
speeches on policy proposals, contributed 
to policy debates in the media or in a 
legislative context, proposed legislation.
3. If deputy-leaders matter, then they 
will focus on policy while in the 
office.
Deputy-leaders while in office will 
produce a number of policy documents, 
give lengthy speeches and propose 
legislation outside the area of any 
additional cabinet responsibilities that 
they hold.
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4. If deputy-leaders matter, then they 
will have policy development and 
implementation resources available to 
them.
The deputy-leader’s office will have a 
total budget in line with other policy- 
developing departments and areas.
The responsibility of a number of staff of 
the deputy-leader will be policy 
orientated.
5. If deputy-leaders matter, then they 
will influence policies that they 
believe to be important while in the 
office.
‘Pet projects’ outside the area of any 
ministerial portfolio that deputy-leaders 
hold and that have the strong support of 
the deputy-leader will be promoted by 
them or policies which deputy-leaders 
have publicly disagreed with will be 
changed, deprioritised, delayed or 
abandoned
The deputy-leader will chair a number of 
committees with policy roles beyond 
their departmental responsibilities.
6. If deputy-leaders matter then, where 
they are involved in significant policy 
disagreement outside the area of any 
additional cabinet portfolio that they 
hold, their removal from office will
Policy disputes outside the area of any 
ministerial portfolio that deputy-leaders 
hold will be a major reason for the 
removal from office of deputy-leaders.
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be sought.
7. If deputy-leaders matter, then after 
their term of office as deputy-leader 
they will go on to hold another 
significant political office.
Deputy-leaders will generally go on to 
other political positions where they can 
influence policy.
Having outlined the hypotheses and their observable implications, they will put to the test 
in the following chapters, but first a methodological issue that arises in relation to testing 
the hypotheses must be addressed.
2.4.6 T esting  th e  h y p o th e se s
A difficulty that arises in relation to the testing of the hypotheses is how to disentangle 
the role and influence of deputy-leader from party-leader and from holder of a cabinet 
portfolio. For example if a Deputy-Prime Minister who was leader of their party in a 
multi-party government and also Minister for Health was able to achieve a particular 
policy outcome in the health area, how can we say that this was the result of the person 
being Deputy-Prime Minister, Minister for Health or party-leader? There is no general 
answer to this dilemma, each instance may have a different answer. All that can be done 
is to try to isolate the independent effect of each variable on the deputy-leader’s 
influence.
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Deputy-leaders who are party-leaders can be separated out from those who are not. Of the 
64 deputy-leaders in this study; nine of the 14 Irish deputy-leaders were not party-leaders 
at the time; ten of the 24 Dutch deputy-leaders were not party-leaders at the time; four of 
the seven Swedish deputy-leaders were not party leaders at the time; none of the US 
deputy-leaders were party-leaders at the time; and none of the seven UK deputy-leaders 
were party leaders at the time. In total 42 out of the 64 deputy-leaders (65 per cent) in this 
study were not party-leaders at the same time and a majority of the deputy-leaders in four 
of the five states were not party-leaders at the same time (in the case of the fifth state -  
the Netherlands, 42 per cent of the deputy-leaders were not simultaneously party- 
leaders). In other words the number of deputy-leaders who were not simultaneously 
party-leaders is sufficiently large so as to enable meaningful breakdown of the findings of 
the observable implications between those deputy-leaders who were party-leaders and 
those deputy-leaders who were not. This will enable the role of deputy-leaders to be 
isolated from that of party-leaders.
Furthermore, it will not be necessary to make this separation of party-leader role from 
deputy-leader role in the case of all the hypotheses. Hypotheses one, two, three and seven 
look at the motivation of the individuals involved and so the distinction between party- 
leaders and deputy-leaders is not relevant to them. In the case of the fourth hypothesis 
looking at the resources of the deputy-leader, the distinction may be useful in assessing if 
party-leadership has an impact on the policy-related resources made available to deputy- 
leaders. Similarly with the fifth hypothesis relating to the influence of deputy-leaders on 
policy, a breakdown of the results in terms of deputy-leaders who are also party leaders
and deputy-leaders who are not party-leaders will help clarify the influence of deputy- 
leaders. In the case of the sixth hypothesis, the results of the testing of the observable 
implication associated with it also need to be given in terms of whether or not the deputy- 
leaders are also party-leaders. So, for five out of the nine observable implications being 
tested, the results will need to be broken down in terms of deputy-leaders who are also 
party leaders and deputy-leaders who are not party-leaders. With the results of these 
breakdowns it should be possible to separate out the influence of deputy-leaders from that 
of party-leaders.
Similarly, deputy-leaders who have an additional cabinet portfolio can be separated out 
from those who do not. However, all of the Irish, Dutch, Swedish or UK deputy-leaders 
held a cabinet portfolio at the same time as being deputy-leader. It is only in the case of 
US deputy-leaders that one finds that they did not simultaneously hold additional cabinet 
portfolios (in all 12 cases). A difficulty thus arises in that only a small number of deputy- 
leaders in this study did not also hold an additional cabinet portfolio at the same time. 
Furthermore all instances of this occur in the US, making it difficult to draw any 
conclusions regarding deputy-leaders who do not have additional cabinet responsibilities 
that can be extrapolated to the other four states in this study. However, the difficulty in 
disentangling the effects of deputy-leadership from cabinet membership does not apply to 
all the hypotheses. The issue does not arise with the first two hypotheses, which deal with 
policy focus prior to holding office. In the case of the third hypothesis, there is an issue of 
disentangling the effects of deputy-leadership from cabinet membership. It must 
however be borne in mind that what is being tested for is an interest in policy and so it
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does not matter whether a focus on policy expresses itself through a cabinet position or 
the deputy-Ieader position as it is sufficient to be able to show that the holder of the office 
of deputy-Ieader expresses an interest in policy irrespective of the means by which that 
interest is expressed. With the fourth hypothesis relating to policy resources, it is possible 
to distinguish between policy resources allocated to deputy-leaders in their role as 
deputy-Ieader and resources allocated to them for their cabinet responsibilities as the 
separate budgets are generally specified. As for the fifth hypothesis, while it may not be 
possible to separate out the role of deputy-Ieader from cabinet member in terms of 
advancing or halting projects, it will be possible to do so for the second observable 
implication relating to committee membership beyond their departmental responsibilities. 
However projects beyond the ministerial portfolio of deputy-leaders that they halted or 
promoted can be sought. With the sixth hypothesis, the base of deputy-leaders who were 
removed from office is likely to be so small as to render any breakout in terms of cabinet 
membership statistically meaningless. In the case of the final hypothesis which relates to 
the career of deputy-leaders after they have stepped down as deputy-Ieader, it may also 
be difficult to state categorically that they went on to other political positions where they 
could influence policy because they held the post of deputy-Ieader rather than because 
they held a cabinet position. However in this instance, the hypotheses relates to the 
motivation of the individual involved and so it does not matter whether they were 
employed because they had been deputy-Ieader or because they were a member of 
cabinet. What matters is that they displayed an interest in policy. So, while it may not be 
possible to separate out the influence arising from an individual being deputy-Ieader from 
an individual being a cabinet member in the case of those who are both deputy-leaders
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and cabinet members, this difficulty affects only two of the nine observable implications. 
In those instances it will be clearly stated that such a difficulty arises. However, in the 
case of the remaining seven observable implications, it will be possible to associate an 
outcome solely with an individual’s status as deputy-leader.
Even though it is possible to devise a research strategy that maximizes the capacity to 
distinguish between the independent effect of the deputy-leader, the party leader and the 
minister, the problem goes deeper in many respects that just disentangling the influence 
of deputy-leaders. It applies to the entire study of the concept of leadership in political 
science and beyond. As MacGregor Burns (1977) observes in relation to the study of 
leadership, ‘the state of the art is primitive ... Political leadership is one of the most 
widely noted and reported and least understood phenomena in modem politics’ 
(MacGregor Burns, 1977, p. 266). This is a view shared by most political scientists who 
have explored the subject, including Elgie (1995), who describes leadership as ‘the 
unidentifiable in pursuit of the indefinable ... it is a concept whose meaning is socially 
constructed. Individuals have their own preferred definition of leadership. At best there 
may be common agreement that one definition of leadership is better than all the others. 
Whatever the case, “leadership” is an essentially contested concept.’ (Elgie, 1995, p. 2). 
There appear to be as many definitions of political leadership as there have been studies 
of it (see Elgie, 1995, p.3). No single definition of political leadership captures the 
different types of leadership and the different contexts in which it is exercised and the 
fact that a leader may change from one type to another and from one context to another. 
Nonetheless, some generalization is possible. It is possible to identify and describe
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particular styles of leadership and how they are suited to particular contexts. It is also 
possible to identify how particular contexts affect the ability to lead in terms of the 
constraints placed on political actors and resources available to them. While the nature of 
leadership appears to inhibit broad and in-depth understanding of the concept, productive 
research is possible but its limitations must be borne in mind.
As befits a concept with numerous definitions, the study of political leadership has taken 
many approaches. A number of broad approaches can be identified. An institutional 
approach examines leadership from the perspective of the political office rather than the 
office-holder, leadership is exercised through political institutions and the constraints and 
resources made available through those institutions. An alternative approach is 
behavioural in that it focuses on aspects of the behaviour of leaders, such as the 
relationship between leaders and followers. It is argued that often those who lead may not 
be in a formal leadership position or institution and that an institutional approach may 
miss this aspect of leadership. Between these two extremes, a more integrated and 
complex approach has been adopted. As described by Sheffer: ‘Most people still believe 
that leadership qualities are connected to personal attributes, and hence that leadership is 
a very individualistic phenomenon. But most scholars in this area agree that in addition to 
personal attributes, leadership is intimately related to the fabric of the leader’s relevant 
societies, to social and political organizations, to established institutions, and to leaders’ 
relations with smaller and larger groups of followers’ (Sheffer, 1993, p. vii). This more 
rounded approach to the study of political leadership captures ‘the personal and systemic 
aspects of the leadership process. It implies that political leaders operate within an
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environment which will both structure their behaviour and constrain their freedom of 
action. At the same time, it also implies that political leaders do have the opportunity to 
shape the environment in which they operate’ (Elgie, 1995, p. 8).
While this approach overcomes many of the objections to the single perspectives of 
behaviourist and institutional approaches, approaches to the study of political leadership 
must still grapple with the difficulty of determining the precise role of individual factors 
in contributing to the effectiveness of individual leaders and indeed individual acts of 
leadership. The study of leadership must ‘be part of a more general theory of social and 
historical causation’ (MacGregor Bums, 1977, p. 266). How can a particular outcome be 
attributed to specific characteristics of specific political actors given the potentially 
infinite number of variables involved? In attempting to address this issue, a number of 
wider debates within political science are touched upon, such as the role of the individual 
versus the institution and the nature of power. These are significant debates within 
themselves, none of which have come to any definitive conclusion.
It must also be borne in mind that in reality there are numerous factors that determine the 
level of influence of a politician on policy, such as their reputation, their experience, their 
standing in their party, how important their support is, their popularity and so on and that 
it is not possible to account for every factor in every instance. That is not to conclude that 
nothing can be done to move this research forward, particularly given that the purpose of 
this study is not to determine what those factors are or the relative importance of various 
factors, but rather to determine whether or not deputy-leaders can influence policy
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outcomes and thus be said to ‘matter’. By testing seven hypotheses on 64 deputy-leaders 
drawn from five states over 56 years, there should be a broad enough range of factors 
captured so as to ensure that any problem with individual cases are cancelled out. In other 
words, the study includes deputy-leaders with experience and those without experience, 
deputy-leaders with significant reputations and those without, deputy-leaders with strong 
standing in their parties and deputy-leaders who do not have such standing and so on. If 
there is a difficulty in terms of an instance where influence or the lack of it cannot be 
disentangled from deputy-leadership and some other factor(s), this will be clearly stated.
2 .5  C o n c lu s io n
Having reviewed the current literature on deputy-leaders, there now is a basis in fact for 
arguing that they are perceived not to matter. It has also been outlined how to set about 
challenging this perception. Before embarking upon the case studies of the selected 
states, the following chapter will briefly examine the role of deputy-leaders in the specific 
states which will form the basis for this study.
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3  A  S U R V E Y  O F  D E P U T Y  L E A D E R S  IN  T H E  F IV E  
S T A T E S  U N D E R  I N V E S T IG A T I O N
3.1 I n t r o d u c t io n
Before setting out to test the hypotheses outlined in the previous chapter, this chapter will 
provide a survey of deputy-leaders in the five states under examination. At its core is a 
database of deputy-leaders in those five states. Unlike the database in Chapter One, this 
survey will include data on deputy-leaders in the five states over time rather than at a 
specific point in time. The data gathered follow the format of Chapter One. For the period 
1946 to 2002, it includes: who the deputy leaders have been; their term of office; their 
title; whether they have a constitutionally-defined role and, if so, what it is; whether they 
were elected or appointed; whether they held ministerial positions; their party affiliation; 
and the nature of government in those states (do they have single or multi-party 
government? and what are their leadership structures?). The data will then be analysed 
and a number of conclusions will be reached regarding deputy-leaders in the five states.
This analysis will provide a proper context for the investigations that will be conducted in 
the following four chapters (each chapter focusing on the hypotheses and observable 
implications from one of the three stages in the life-cycle of a deputy-leader) and will 
thus facilitate our understanding of the role of deputy-leaders.
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3 .2  T h e  I r is h  T a n a i s t e
3.2.1 In troduction
In the Republic of Ireland, the Tanaiste is the equivalent of a Deputy-Prime Minister. 
They are a member of cabinet and the Irish constitution states that they act ‘for all 
purposes in the place of the Taoiseach if the Taoiseach should die, or become 
permanently incapacitated’ Thus, the Tanaiste meets the first two criteria for deputy- 
leaders. Tanaiste is an old Irish language word which means ‘second in rank’31 and, thus, 
would be considered to be a deputy-leader on the basis of the third criterion outlined 
earlier regarding a title that recognises their second-ranking and deputising role. Indeed, 
some of the original proposals for what would become the 1937 Constitution used the 
English language term ‘Deputy-Prime Minister’ to describe the position and the original 
translation of this into Irish was as ‘Leas-Phriomh Aire’.
The Irish Constitution specifically states that there can only be one holder of the office at 
any one point in time. Article 28, Section Six states that ‘The Taoiseach shall nominate a 
member of the Government to be the Tanaiste. In the time period under examination 
there have been 14 people who have held the position of Tanaiste (see Table 3.3).
30 Available from: www.gov.ie/taoiseach/publication/constitution/english/government.htm [accessed 10 
October 2001].
31 Smith, 1995, p. 182.
32 Smith, 1995, p. 179.
33 Available from: www.gov.ie/taoiseach/publication/constitution/english/govemment.htm [accessed 10 
October 2001]
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The maximum length of a single term of office for a Tanaiste is not specifically 
addressed in either the Irish Constitution or legislation. However, a maximum term length 
of approximately seven years is implied on the basis of the maximum time set down 
between General Elections. Article 16, Section Five of the Irish Constitution states that 
‘The same Dail Eireann shall not continue for a longer period than seven years from the 
date of its first meeting: a shorter period may be fixed by law.’34 This maximum length 
for a single term of office has been shortened by legislation, Section Ten of the Electoral 
Act 1963 states that ‘The same Dail shall not continue for a longer period than five years 
from the date of its first meeting.’35 This can be extended to up to seven years (the 
constitutional limit) by amending the legislation. It should also be noted that a Tanaiste 
may serve for a slightly longer term than the maximum duration in the event that a Dail 
runs for five years and an election then takes place (within 30 days of the dissolution of 
the Dail according to Article 16.3 of the Constitution)36 followed by negotiations to form 
a new government. In this instance, the Tanaiste continues in a caretaker capacity until a 
new government is formed (Article 28.11) and, on the basis of the present legislation, can 
actually serve a term slightly longer than five years. No term limit in the American sense 
of the phrase applies to the office in the sense that there is no maximum number of terms 
of office that a Tanaiste can serve.
Of the 14 Tanaiste in question, only one (Sean MacEntee) served a continuous term that 
ran in excess of five years. In terms of total time in the office, the longest-serving
34 Available from: www.gov.ie/taoiseach/publication/constitution/english/govemment.htm [accessed 10 
October 2001]
35 Available from www.gov.ie [accessed 11 November 2002],
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Tanaiste during the period under examination was Dick Spring who served in the position 
for eight years and six months. He is followed by Sean Lemass who spent seven years 
and 4 months in the office and William Norton (six years and one month). The shortest 
serving Tanaiste was Peter Barry who only held the position for two months in a minority 
Fine Gael government in 1987. The average length of a single term for a Tanaiste over 
the period in question has been just over three years and one month. None of the holders 
of the office died while in office.
As for how Tanaiste attain the office, Article 28.6.1 of the Irish Constitution states that 
‘The Taoiseach shall nominate a member of the Government to be Tanaiste.’ The only 
condition imposed on who can be nominated is in Article 28.7.1 which requires that the
TO . , ,
Tanaiste be a member of the Dail. Once nominated, the cabinet is approved by a vote of 
the Dail (there is no individual vote). While there is no clear constitutional direction on 
what happens if the office falls vacant within the term of the office holder, in practice it is 
filled on the basis of a new nomination by the Taoiseach and vote of the Dail. Sean T. 0  
Ceallaigh resigned to become President in June 1945 and was replaced by Sean Lemass; 
Sean MacEntee gave way to Frank Aiken who in turn gave way to Erskine Childers. 
When Labour resigned from government in 1987, Peter Barry replaced Dick Spring, 
while Brian Lenihan was sacked by the Taoiseach in 1990 and replaced by John Wilson.
36 Available from: www.gov.ie/taoiseach/publication/constitution/english/government.htm [accessed 10 
October 2001],
37 Available from: www.gov.ie/taoiseach/publication/constitution/english/government.htm [accessed 10 
October 2001].
38 Available from: www.gov.ie/taoiseach/publication/constitution/english/government.htm [accessed 10 
October 2001].
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Over the course of the period under investigation, there have been Tanaiste from all the 
major parties (Fianna Fail, Fine Gael, Labour and the Progressive Democrats). Fianna 
Fail held the office on 10 occasions, Labour on six occasions and Fine Gael and the 
Progressive Democrats on one occasion each. In terms of length of time in the office, 
Table 3.2 shows that Fianna Fail have held it for 31 years and eight months (57 per cent 
of the time); Labour have held it for 19 years and eight months (35 per cent of the time); 
Fine Gael held it for two months (0.3 per cent of the time) and the Progressive Democrats 
for four years and six months (eight per cent of the time). When looking at this data, it 
must be borne in mind that the percentage of time the parties were in office exceeds 100 
per cent as a number of parties were in coalition governments together at the same time. 
When this data is compared with the length of time each party has been in Government 
over the time period in question, a major anomaly appears in the case of Fine Gael. They 
only held the office of Tanaiste for two months despite being in government for 17 years 
and 11 months during the period in question. This is accounted for by the fact that in all 
Fine Gael coalition governments they gave up the position of Tanaiste to their minor 
partner -  the Labour Party. Indeed, Fine Gael only gained the position when Labour 
walked out of government leaving Fine Gael in a minority government for two months in 
1987. The discrepancy between the Progressive Democrats length of time in government 
and length of time that they held the position of Tanaiste is accounted for by the fact that 
they were in coalition with Fianna Fail between July 1989 and January 1993 but did not 
hold the position of Tanaiste. The office has not been vacant for any considerable length 
of time during the period in question.
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Table 3-1 Length of Time in Office of Irish Tdnaiste 1946-2002
Length of time party in 
government (% of time 
period)
Length of time party held 
position of Tanaiste (% of 
time period)
Fianna Fail 38 years & 1 months (68%) 31 years & 8 months (57%)
Fine Gael 17 years & 11 months (32%) 2 months (0.3%)
Labour 19 years & 8 months (35%) 19 years & 8 months (35%)
Progressive Democrats 7 Years & 1 month (13%) 4 years & 6 months (8%)
In the case of single-party governments, the position has been filled by the deputy-leader 
of the party. In the case of coalition governments, it has been filled by the leader of the 
second largest party - the one exception to this latter rule was the Fianna Fail-Progressive 
Democrat coalition of 1989 to 1992, when the position was held by the deputy-leader of 
Fianna Fail rather than the leader of the Progressive Democrats.
All 14 Tanaiste have had additional cabinet responsibilities (the position of Tanaiste was 
held by William Norton and Dick Spring twice and Sean Lemass three times). Six have 
held the Ministry of Industry and Commerce (Lemass held it during his three separate 
terms as Tanaiste); three have held the Foreign Affairs portfolio; three have held Energy; 
two have held Health, two have held Social Welfare; two have held Finance and one each 
has held the Defence, Marine, Transport, Public Services and the Environment portfolios. 
The excess of ministerial portfolios over Tanaiste is accounted for by the fact that some 
Tanaiste changed ministerial portfolios during their terms (George Colley and Brain 
Lenihan) and that some had more than one portfolio (Brendan Corish, for example, had
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both Health and Social Welfare). This latter finding conflicts with the analysis of current 
deputy-leaders in Chapter One which showed that deputy-leaders with multiple portfolios 
are currently only to be found in micro-states. However, given that the population of 
Ireland is approximately four million, the finding that deputy-leaders with multiple 
ministerial portfolios are found in small states remains intact. It should also be noted that 
the title of some portfolios changed over the course of the period in question (Industry 
and Commerce became Enterprise, and External Affairs became Foreign Affairs).
It is also worth noting here that the Tanaiste generally has not had a supporting ministry 
in that holders of the title have relied on the resources associated with their additional 
cabinet portfolio. There has been no Department or Office of the Tanaiste except for the 
1993-1997 period. The role of the office was set out by the Taoiseach in answer to a Dail 
question in 1993:
The role and functions of the Office will encompass briefing and advising the 
Tanaiste generally on all Government policy matters; representing the Government 
on the new National Economic and Social Forum and thereby ensuring direct 
liaison through the Tanaiste between the forum and the Government; joint 
responsibility, together with the Minister of State and Chief Whip attached to my 
Department, for the implementation of the provisions under the heading 
“Broadening our Democracy” which are contained in our Programme for a 
Partnership Government, 1993-97; representing the Tanaiste on a committee of 
programme managers to monitor the implementation of the programme for
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Government; representing the Tanaiste on the Central Review Committee under the 
Programme for Economic and Social Progress, any successor to that committee 
under any further such programme and representing the Tanaiste on the 
Interdepartmental Committee on the Co-ordination of EC Affairs. (Dail Debates, 
Volume 426, 17 February, 1993).
This separate office was abolished by the incoming government in 1997.
As for which ministries deputy-leaders tend to hold, Table 1.7 showed that at a global 
level, the Finance, Foreign Affairs, Defence, Agriculture, Energy and Foreign Trade were 
the most popular portfolios amongst deputy-leaders. The ministerial responsibilities of 
the Tanaiste are to a limited extent in line with these findings, with Finance, Defence, 
Energy and Foreign Affairs also being popular portfolios among Tanaiste. The most 
popular portfolio among Tanaiste is Industry and Commerce. This portfolio does not 
feature among the most popular with deputy-leaders globally. This divergence is partially 
explained by the fact that on three out of the six occasions it was held by a Tanaiste, it 
was the same person who held it (Lemass). The Health and Social Welfare portfolios are 
two that have been held by Tanaiste that do not figure highly in the global figures. It 
needs to be borne in mind that we are not comparing like with like here insofar as the 
global figures are from a specific point in time and cross-sectional in nature while the 
Irish data looks at deputy-leaders over time.
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Table 3-2Irish Tânaiste 1946-2002
Title of 
Deputy- 
Leader
No. of 
Deputy- 
Leaders
Deputy-
Leader
Term
of
Office39
Duration 
of Term 
(to nearest 
month)
Elected or 
appointed
Party Additional
Cabinet
Positions4”
Notes41
1. Tânaiste 1 SeAn
Lemass
1945-
1948
2 years & 1 
month
Appointed Fianna Fail Industry & 
Commerce
Assumed 
position 
14 June 
1945.
2. Tânaiste 1 William
Norton
1948-
1951
3 years & 4 
months
Appointed Labour Social
Welfare
3. Tânaiste 1 SeAn
Lemass
1951-
1954
3 years Appointed Fianna Fâil Industry & 
Commerce
4. Tânaiste 1 William
Norton
1954-
1957
2 years & 9 
months
Appointed Labour Industry & 
Commerce
5. Tânaiste 1 Seim
Lemass
1957-
1959
2 years & 3 
months
Appointed Fianna Fâil Industry & 
Commerce
6. Tânaiste 1 Se&n
MacEntee
1959-
1965
5 years & 
10 months
Appointed Fianna Fâil Health Lemass
became
Taoiseach
on 23
June
1959.
7. Tânaiste 1 Frank
Aiken
1965-
1969
4 years & 3 
months
Appointed Fianna Fail External
Affairs
Assumed 
position 
on 21 
April 
1965.
8. Tânaiste 1 Erskine
Childers
1969-
1973
3 years & 8 
months
Appointed Fianna Fâil Transport & 
Power
Assumed 
position 
on 2 July 
1969.
9. Tânaiste 1 Brendan
Corish
1973-
1977
4 years & 4 
months
Appointed Labour Health &
Social
Welfare
10. Tânaiste 1 George
Colley
1977-
1981
3 years & 
11 months
Appointed Fianna Fail Finance & 
Public 
Services/ 
Energy
11. Tânaiste 1 Michael
O’Leary
1981-
1982
9 months Appointed Labour Industry & 
Energy
12. Tânaiste 1 Ray
MacSharry
1982 9 months Appointed Fianna Fâil Finance
13. Tânaiste 1 Dick
Spring
1982-
1987
4 years & 1 
month
Appointed Labour Environment
Energy.
14. Tânaiste 1 Peter Barry 1987 2 months Appointed Fine Gael Foreign
Affairs
Assumed 
position 
20 Jan 
1987 as 
FG left in 
minority 
Govt,
IS. Tânaiste 1 Brian
Lenihan
1987-
1990
3 years & 8 
months
Appointed Fianna Fail Foreign
Affairs/
Defence
16. T ânaiste 1 John
Wilson
1990-
1993
2 years & 2 
months
Appointed Fianna Fâil Marine
17. Tânaiste 1 Dick
Spring
1993-
1997
4 years & 5 
months
Appointed Labour Min for 
Foreign 
Affairs
18. T ânaiste 1 Mary
Harney
1997-
2002
4 years & 6 
months
Appointed Progressive
Democrat
Min. for 
Enterprise
39 Coakley & Gallagher, 1999.
40 Horgan, 1997; Collins, 2000 and Jones, 2001.
41 Coakley & Gallagher, 1999.
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The role of the Tânaiste is elaborated on in the Irish Constitution. Article 28.6 states that 
the Tânaiste: must be nominated by the Taoiseach (the Irish Prime-Minister); ‘shall act 
for all purposes in the place of the Taoiseach if the Taoiseach should die, or become 
permanently incapacitated, until a new Taoiseach shall have been appointed’;42 replaces 
the Taoiseach in their temporary absence; must be a member of the Dâil and can be asked 
to resign by the Taoiseach. Article 31 also grants the Tânaiste ex-officio membership of 
the ‘Council of State’43 which is a body that advises the President on the exercise of 
his/her role.
A number of observations can be made on these powers. Firstly the Tânaiste does not see 
out the term of the Taoiseach if they fill a vacancy in the position. They only serve as 
Taoiseach until a new one in appointed. This is in contrast with the United States, for 
example, where the Vice-President sees out the remainder of the term of the President 
he/she replaces in the event of a vacancy arising. Further contrasts arise in that the 
Tânaiste must be a member of the Dâil and can be sacked by the Taoiseach. Neither of 
these conditions applies in the case of the US. There is a constitutional means of 
circumventing the requirement that cabinet members must be elected to parliament in that 
up to two members of the cabinet can be from the Senate (Article 28.2) and the Taoiseach 
nominates 11 members of the Senate (Article 18.1 and 18.3). However Article 28.7 of the 
Constitution specifically requires that the Tânaiste (and the Taoiseach and Minister for
42 Available from: www.gov.ie/taoiseach/publication/constitution/english/govemment.htm [accessed 10 
October 2001],
43 Available from: www.gov.ie/taoiseach/publication/constitution/english/govemment.htm [accessed 10 
October 2001].
3.2.2 The form al role and  pow ers of the  T ânaiste
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Finance) must be members of Dail Eireann, all the members of which must be directly 
elected (Article 16.5), with the possible exception of the Speaker of the House.44
The only occasion during the period in question when the Tanaiste had to replace the 
Taoiseach for any length of time was when Eamon de Valera had to travel to the 
Netherlands for treatment for his failing eyesight and was absent from office for four and 
a half months.45 The then Tanaiste, Sean Lemass, took on the duties of the Taoiseach 
until de Valera’s return. During this period Lemass continued to fulfill his ministerial 
responsibilities.
None of this constitutional detail says very much about the day-to-day activities and role 
of the Tanaiste. They stand in for the Taoiseach at the discussion of the Order of Business 
in the Dail and at question time and also travel abroad representing the State. However, in 
practice, most of their time is spent attending to their ministerial responsibilities. In short, 
the Tanaiste is rarely called upon to fulfill the specific tasks assigned to them in the 
constitution.
3 .3  T h e  D e p u ty - P r im e  M in is te r  o f  t h e  N e t h e r l a n d s
3.3.1 In troduction
In the case of the Netherlands, the Deputy-Prime Minister appears to meet the criteria for 
deputy-leaders outlined in Chapter One. He/she is a member of the cabinet and so meets
44 Available from: www.gov.ie/taoiseach/publication/constitution/english/govemment.htm [accessed 10
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the first criterion. In terms o f  m eeting the second and third criteria, a difficulty arises in 
that the position o f  Deputy-Prime Minister has no basis in the Dutch constitution. 
Andeweg (1997) explains that informal arrangements for dealing with the illness or 
absence o f  the Prime Minister gained a degree o f  formality when ‘a status-conscious 
substitute chairperson had stationery printed calling h im self “V ice M inister President”. 
The title stuck and eventually found its way into the Standing Orders.’ (Andeweg, 1997, 
p. 57) . 46 Insofar as they are the de facto substitute chairperson and their title recognises 
this, then the “V ice M inister President” o f  the Netherlands can be considered a deputy- 
leader for the purposes o f  this study.
Over the course o f  the period under study, there have been seven occasions on which the 
Netherlands has had more than one Deputy-Prime Minister. On each o f  these occasions 
there were two Deputy-Prime Ministers. During the period from 1946 to 2002, there have 
been 24 Deputy-Prime Ministers. The longest serving Deputy-Prime Minister was Wim  
Kok, who held the office for four years and nine months. The shortest serving Deputy- 
Prime Minister was W ilhelm  de Gaay Fortman, who held the office for three months in 
1977. The average length o f  time that an individual has held the office is two years and 
three months. None o f  the holders died while in office.
The office is attained not on the basis o f  appointment by the Prime Minister, but, rather, 
formal appointments are made by the Monarch follow ing negotiations between the 
parties in government. Article 43 o f  the Dutch Constitution states that ‘The Prime
45 C o llins , 2000, p. 150.
October 2001].
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Minister and the other Ministers shall be appointed and dism issed by Royal D ecree . ’ 47 
Thus, the Prime Minister can neither appoint nor remove a minister. However, ‘Royal 
Decrees appointing or dism issing Ministers and State Secretaries shall be countersigned 
by the Prime M inister’ (Article 48).48 Thus the Prime M inister has a say in appointments 
and dismissals, even i f  formally they cannot carry them  out unilaterally without the 
consent o f  the Monarch.
The Deputy-Prime Ministers have been drawn from four parties: KVP (Catholic Party); 
VVD (Conservative Liberals); ARP (Protestant Party); PvdA (Social Democrats) and 
D 6 6  (Progressive Liberals). O f the 24 Deputy-Prime M inisters, seven have been drawn 
from the KVP (29 per cent o f  the total), eight from V V D  (33 per cent o f  the total), three 
from PvdA (13 per cent o f  the total), three from D 6 6  (13 per cent o f  the total) and three 
from ARP (13 per cent o f  the total).
In terms o f  the length o f  time each party has occupied the office, the KVP have held it for 
20 years and four months (36 per cent), the V V D  have held it for 30 years and five 
months (54 per cent), the ARP for eight years & 3 months (15 per cent), PvdA have held 
it for seven years (13 per cent) and D 6 6  held it for eight years and seven months (15 per 
cent). The position was vacant for two years and seven months (five per cent o f  the time) 
between 1946 and 1948. The percentage figures total more than 100 as the office was 
held by more than one person on seven occasions.
46 The Prim e M in is te r ’ s t it le  is ‘ M in is te r P resident’ .
47 G overnm ent o f  the N etherlands, 2003. ‘ Netherlands C o n s titu tio n .’ A v a ila b le  from :
h ttp ://w w w .o e fre .u n ib e .ch /la w /ic l/n l0 0 0 0 0 _ .h tm l [assessed 8 A p r i l  2003 ].
48 Ibid.
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The length o f  tim e each party was in the office can now  be compared to the length o f  
time each party was in government over the period in question. Table 3.8 reveals that the 
VVD were in government for 35 years and three months, the KVP for 33 years and 11 
months, PvdA for 29 years and nine months, ARP for 27 years and three months and the 
D 6 6  for 13 years and two months. What is striking from these figures is the significant 
amount o f time most parties have spent in government, especially considering the ARP 
and KVP ceased to exist as separate parties in 1980. The party with the least amount o f  
time in government (D 6 6 ) was only formed in 1966, twenty years into the period under 
examination. The reason why m ost parties have spent significant time in government is 
that Dutch governments are often multi-party coalitions and have tended to include more 
parties than are strictly required for a majority, particularly in the period between 1946 
and 1967.49 Looking at how  long parties were allocated the position o f  Deputy-Prime 
Minister compared to how  long they were in government reveals that there was a V V D  
Deputy-Prime Minister for 8 6  per cent o f  the time that the party was in government; there 
was a KVP Deputy-Prime Minister for 60 per cent o f  the time the party was in 
government; there was a D 6 6  Deputy-Prime Minister for 65 per cent o f  the time the party 
was in government; there was a ARP Deputy-Prime Minister for 31 per cent o f  the time 
the party was in government and a PvdA Deputy-Prime M inister for 23 per cent o f  the 
time the party was in government. Generally, the smaller parties in a coalition will hold 
the office o f  Deputy-Prime Minister, while the large party holds the post o f  Prime 
Minister. Thus, 21 out o f  the 24 Prime Ministers over the period under study have been 
drawn from the PvdA and KVP (and its successor party the CD A). The m ost clear-cut
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cases where a second Deputy-Prime Minister position was created were where there were 
only three parties in the coalition (the 1965-1966, 1981, 1981-1982, 1994-1998 and 
1998-2002 governments). The other cases arose were in a two-party coalition where the 
bigger party took Prime Minister and one o f  two Deputy-Prime M inister posts (1966- 
1967) and in coalitions o f  four and five parties. In two instances o f  four/five member 
coalitions, the largest party took the Prime Minister slot and one o f  the two Deputy-Prime 
Minister positions (1971-1972 and 1972-1973) and in one the second and third largest 
parties each held the post o f  Deputy-Prime Minister (1967-1971).50
T a b le  3-3 L e n g th  o f  T im e  in  O ff ic e  o f  D u tc h  D e p u ty -P r im e  M in is te r  1946-2002
Length of time party in 
government (% of time 
period)
Length of time party held 
position of Deputy-Prime 
Minister (% of time 
period)
VVD 35 years & 3 months (63%) 30 years & 5 months (54%)
KVP 33 years & 1 1  months (60%) 20 years & 4 months (36%)
D66 13 years & 2 months (23%) 8  years & 7 months (15%)
ARP 27 years & 3 months (48%) 8  years & 3 months (15%)
PvdA 29 years & 9 months (53%) 7 years (12%)
The 24 Dutch Deputy-Prime Ministers have all had additional cabinet responsibilities. 
Seven have been M inister for the Interior; five have been Minister for Public Works; 
Four were Minister for Econom ic Affairs; four have been Minister for Finance and three
49 A ndew eg 1997, p. 66.
50 W oldendorp , Kem an &  B udge, 1993, pp 87-89.
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were Minister for Justice. The Labour and Social Affairs, Agriculture, Welfare, Health 
and Sport, and Foreign Affairs portfolios have each been held once by a Deputy-Prime 
Minister. The excess o f  portfolios over Deputy-Prime M inisters is accounted for by the 
fact that some held more than one ministerial portfolio at a particular point in time and 
some changed portfolio during their term as Deputy-Prime Minister.
These ministries are to a limited extent in line with global figures in that Finance, Foreign 
Affairs, Agriculture are comm on to both Dutch Deputy-Prime Ministers and Deputy- 
Prime Ministers globally. The Defence, Energy and Foreign Trade portfolios are popular 
at a global level, but have not been taken up by Dutch Deputy-Prime Ministers. W hile the 
Interior, Public Works, Econom ic Affairs and Justice portfolios are popular among Dutch 
deputy-1 eaders but not among global ones.
T a b le  3 -4  D u tc h  D e p u ty -P r im e  M in is te rs  1946-2002
Title of 
Deputy- 
Leader
No. of 
Deputy- 
Leaders
Deputy-
Leader51
Term
of
Office
Duration 
of Term 
(to 
nearest 
month)
Elected or 
appointed
Party Additional
Cabinet
Positions
Notes
Vacancy 0 Vacancy 1946-
1948
2 years & 
7 months
N/A N/A N/A
1. Vice
Minister
President
1 J. Schaik 1948-
1951
2 years & 
7 months
Appointed KVP Public
Works
(1948) &
Interior
(1948-1951).
2. Vice
Minister
President
1 F. Teulings 1951-
1952
1 year & 6 
months.
Appointed KVP Interior
3. Vice
Minister
President
1 L. Beel 1952-
1956
4 years & 
1 month.
Appointed KVP Interior
4. Vice
Minister
President
1 A.
Struycken
1956-
1959
3 years & 
7 months.
Appointed KVP Interior 
(1956-58) 
Interior & 
Justice 
(1958-59)
5. Vice 1 H. Kortlials 1959- 4 years & Appointed VVD Public
51 W oldendorp, Kem an &  Budge, 1993, pp 87-89 and ‘ H is to rische  o n tw ik k e lin g  K ab in e tte n .’ A va ila b le  
from  w w w .parlem ent.com  [accessed 8 A p r i l  2003 ],
110
Minister
President
1963 2 months Works
6. Vice
Minister
President
1 (1963-
65)
2(1965-
67)
B.
Biesheuvel
1963-
1967
3 years & 
9 months.
Appointed ARP Agriculture
7. Vice
Minister
President
2 A.
Vondeling
1965-
1966
1 year & 7 
months
Appointed PvdA Finance
8. Vice
Minister
President
2 J. de Quay 1966-
1967
5 months Appointed KVP Public
Works
9. Vice
Minister
President
2 H.
Witteveen
1967-
1971
4 years & 
3 months
Appointed VVD Finance
10. Vice
Minister
President
2 J. Bakker 1967-
1971
4 years & 
3 months
Appointed ARP Public
Works
11. Vice
Minister
President
2 R. Nelissen 1971-
1973
2 years & 
10 months
Appointed KVP Finance
12. Vice
Minister
President
2 W
Geertsema
1971-
1973
2 years & 
10 months
Appointed VVD Interior
13. Vice
Minister
President
1 A. van Agt 1973-
1977
4 years & 
4 months
Appointed KVP Justice
14. Vice
Minister
President
1 W. De
Gaay
Fortman
1977 3 months Appointed ARP Justice
15. Vice
Minister
President
1 H. Wiegel 1977-
1981
3 years & 
9 months
Appointed VVD Interior
16. Vice
Minister
President
2 J. den Uyl 1981-
1982
8 months Appointed PvdA Labour &
Social
Affairs
17. Vice
Minister
President
2 J. Terlouw 1981-
1982
14 months Appointed D66 Economic
Affairs
18. Vice
Minister
President
1 G. van 
Aardenne
1982-
1986
3 years & 
8 months
Appointed VVD Economic
Affairs
19. Vice
Minister
President
1 R de Körte 1986-
1989
3 years &
4 months
Appointed VVD Economic
Affairs
20. Vice
Minister
President
1 W. Kok 1989-
1994«
4 years & 
9 months
Appointed PvdA Finance
21. Vice
Minister
President
2 H. Van 
Mierlo
1994-
199853
4 years Appointed D66 Foreign
Affairs
22. Vice
Minister
President
2 H. Dijkstal 1994-
199854
4 years Appointed VVD Interior
23. Vice
Minister
President
2 A.
Jorritsma-
Lebbink
1998 -  
2002
3 years & 
5 months.
Appointed VVD Economic
Affairs
24. Vice
Minister
President
2 E. Borst- 
Eilers
1998 -  
2002
3 years & 
5 months.
Appointed D66 Welfare, 
Health & 
Sport.
52 A va ila b le  from : h ttp ://asem .in te r.ne t.th /asem -in fo /nethe rlands/leader.h tm l [accessed 24 M arch  2003 ]
53 A va ila b le  from : h ttp ://w  w w .m inaz . n l/m  in isteraad/m  in isters staat/ht m l/cvs/m  ic r lo .h tin l [assessed 26 
M arch 2003],
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As discussed earlier, the post o f  Dutch Deputy-Prime Minister has no constitutional basis. 
That is not however to say that there is nothing o f  relevance to the post in the Dutch 
constitution. Article 57 states that Ministers cannot be members o f  parliament. They must 
give up their seat in parliament unless they have offered to tender their resignation as 
Minister . 55 Article 69 gives Ministers the right to attend sittings o f  parliament and to 
participate in parliamentary ‘deliberations’ even though they are not members o f  it . 56 
Article 6 8  states that ‘Ministers and State Secretaries shall provide orally or in writing the 
Chambers either separately or in joint session, with any information requested by one or 
more members, provided that the provision o f  such information does not conflict with the 
interests o f  the State . ’ 57
Beyond the constitution, the Deputy-Prime Minister attends the ‘turret m eeting’, a 
weekly lunch attended by the Prime Minister, Deputy-Prime M inister(s) and the 
parliamentary party leaders o f  the parties in government to ensure that government 
business flow s sm oothly (Andew eg , 1997).
3 .3 .2  T h e  f o r m a l  r o l e  a n d  p o w e r s  o f  t h e  D u tc h  D e p u ty - P r im e  M in i s t e r
54 A va ila b le  from : h ttp ://w w w .m m az.n l/m in is te ra ad /m in is te rs  s taa t/h tm l/cvs /m ie rlo .h tm l [assessed 26 
M arch 2003],
55 G overnm ent o f  the N etherlands, 2003. ‘Netherlands C o n s titu tio n .’ A v a ila b le  from : 
http ://w w w .oefre .un ibe.ch /law /ic l/n lO O O O O _.htm l [assessed 8 A p r i l  2003 ].
56 Ib id .
57 Ib id .
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3 .4  T h e  S w e d i s h  D e p u t y - P r i m e  M in i s t e r
3 .4 .1  In tro d u ctio n
The Swedish Deputy-Prime Minister m eets the criteria for deputy-leaders outlined in 
Chapter One. H e/she is a member o f  the Swedish Cabinet. They are the second-ranking 
member o f  the cabinet insofar as they carry out activities carried out by the Prime- 
Minister in their absence such as chairing cabinet meetings. The Sw edish Constitution 
explicitly recognises this when it states in Chapter Seven, Article Eight that ‘The Prime 
Minister may nominate one o f  the other Ministers to deputize for him in the event that he 
is unavoidably prevented from carrying out his duties h im self . ’ 58
The position was first filled after the election o f  September 1976 (Woldendrop, Keman & 
Budge, 1993) follow ing the adoption o f  a new  ‘Instrument o f  Government’ which had 
constitutional status on January 1st 1975. This document replaced one dating back to 1809 
(Swedish Institute, 2002, p. 1).
This constitution specifically limits the number o f  Deputy-Prime Ministers to one at any 
one point in time. Chapter Seven, Article Eight states that: ‘The Prime Minister may 
nominate one o f  the other Ministers to deputize for him in the event that he is 
unavoidably prevented from carrying out his duties h im self . ’ 59 I f  the Prime-Minister 
resigns or dies, the Government is discharged.
58 G overnm ent o f  Sweden, 2001. ‘ The C o ns titu tio n  o f  Sweden.’ A v a ila b le  at:
h ttp ://w w w .oe fre .un ibe .ch /law /ic l/sw 0Q 000  .h tm l [accessed D ecem ber 15 2002 ].
113
During the period from 1946 to 2002, Sweden has had only seven Deputy-Prime 
Ministers, however the position has only existed since 1976. The maximum length o f  a 
single term o f  office on the basis o f  the maximum time between General Elections set 
down in Chapter Three, Article Three o f  the Swedish Constitution is four years . 60 Prior to 
1994, it was three years. The longest serving Deputy-Prime Minister was Ingvar 
Carlsson, who held the office for three years and four months. H e was in his second term 
o f office as Deputy-Prime Minister, when he was nominated as Prime Minister following  
the assassination o f  O lof Palme in February 1986. The shortest serving Deputy-Prime 
Minister was M ona Sahlin who held the office for one year. Her term was cut short as she 
resigned follow ing a scandal involving inappropriate use o f  a Parliamentary credit card. 
The average length o f  time that an individual has held the office for is two years and five 
months. None o f  the holders died while in office. However, as mentioned earlier, Mona 
Sahlin resigned from the office in 1995.
In terms o f  how  the office is attained, the holder is appointed by the Prime Minister. 
According to Chapter Six, Article Two o f  the Swedish constitution, the parliament 
(Riksdag) votes on a proposal o f  the Speaker regarding who should be Prime-Minister. 
Once a Prime Minister has not been rejected by a simple-majority vote, he/she is deemed 
elected and then informs the parliament o f  whom  s/he appoints to the cabinet (Chapter 
Six, Article Four) . 61
59 A va ila b le  at: h ttp://w ww.oefre.unibe.ch/law /icl/sw O O O O O  .h tm l [accessed D ecem ber 15 2002],
60 A va ila b le  at: h ttp ://w w w .o e fre .u n ib e .ch /la w /ic l/sw 0 0 0 0 0  .h tm l [accessed D ecem ber 15 2002].
61 A va ila b le  at: h ttp ://w w w .o e fre .u m b e .ch /la w /ic l/sw 0 0 0 0 0  .h tm l [accessed D ecem ber 15 2002].
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All the Deputy-Prime Ministers during the period under investigation have com e from the 
Social Democratic Party and the Liberals (People’s Party). Three Deputy-Prime Ministers 
have been from the Liberals (43 per cent) and four from the Social Democrats (57 per 
cent). Since the office was first filled in September 1976, the Liberals have held it for 
eight years (32 per cent o f  the time), the Social Democrats have held it for 9 years and 3 
months (37 per cent o f  the time) and the office has been vacant for eight years (31 per 
cent o f  the time). Since it was created the position has been vacant for almost as long as it 
has been held by either o f  the parties that held it. Vacancies have arisen on three 
occasions: during the minority Liberal government o f  1978-1979; when Ingvar Carlsson 
was nominated as Prime Minister follow ing the assassination o f  O lof Palme in February 
1986, the position was not filled until the cabinet changes in 1990; and, when Mona 
Sahlin resigned in 1995, the position was not filled until after the 1998 General Election. 
The vacancies arose because the constitution only stipulates that the Prime Minister 
‘may’ (Chapter Seven, Article Eight) nominate a Deputy-Prime M inister, thus the Prime 
Minister is under no obligation to do so.
Since 1976, when the length o f  time each party held the office o f  Deputy-Prime Minister 
is compared to how  long they spent in government, Table 3.6 shows that the Social 
Democrats were in office for 16 years and two months (67 per cent o f  the time period) 
compared to nine years (37 per cent o f  the time period) for the Liberals. Thus, there was a 
Social Democratic Deputy-Prime Minister for 57 per cent o f  the time that the Social 
Democrats were in office while there was a Liberal Deputy-Prime M inister for 89 per 
cent o f  the time they were in office. This difference appears to be related to the fact that
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the Social Democrats formed single-party governments, while the Liberals only gained 
the position o f  Deputy-Prime M inister when they entered multi-party governments. In 
other words, the position o f  Swedish Deputy-Prime Minister is more likely to be filled in 
multi-party governments. This is borne out by the fact that the only time the Liberals 
were in government during the period in question and did not hold the position o f  
Deputy-Prime Minister was when they formed a minority single-party government in 
1978 and 1979. Similarly, the Social Democrats were in single-party governments on the 
two occasions on which they did not hold the office o f  Deputy-Prime Minister.
T a b le  3 -5  L e n g th  o f  T im e  in  O ff ic e  o f  S w edish D e p u ty -P r im e  M in is te r  1976-2002
Length of time party in 
government (% of time 
period position in existence)
Length of time party held 
position of Deputy-Prime 
Minister (% of time 
period position in 
existence)
Social Democrats 16 years & 2 months (67%) 9 years & 3 months (38%)
Liberals 9 years (31% ) 8  years (33%)
The seven Swedish Deputy-Prime Ministers have all had additional cabinet 
responsibilities. Three have held full ministries o f  significance -  Foreign Affairs, Health 
and Social Affairs and Labour, while three have effectively been deputy-ministers with 
specific responsibilities for Justice, Equality, the Environment and Research (Ingvar 
Carlsson swapped portfolios during his term as Deputy-Prime M inister). Only Odd Erik 
Engstrom did not hold an additional ministry during his term as Deputy-Prime Minister.
Compared to the global trend in terms o f  the portfolios held by Deputy-Leaders, there are 
again similarities and differences. The Foreign Affairs and Justice ministries are both 
popular portfolios for Deputy-Leaders in Sweden and globally. However, Equality, the 
Environment and Research are portfolios that do not feature am ongst Deputy-Leaders at a 
global level, yet do in Sweden.
T a b le  3 -6  Sw edish D e p u ty -P r im e  M in is te rs  1946-2002
Title of 
Deputy- 
Leader
No. of 
Deputy- 
Leaders
Deputy-
Leader“
Term
of
Office
Duration 
of Term 
(to 
nearest 
month)
Elected or 
appointed
Party Additional
Cabinet
Positions“
Notes
Vacancy 0 Vacancy 1946-
1976
30 years 
& 8 
months
N/A N/A N/A
1. Deputy-
Prime
Minister
1 Per
Ahlmark
1976-
1978
2 years Appointed Liberals Labour
Vacancy 0 Vacancy 1978-
1979
1 year N/A N/A N/A
2. Deputy-
Prime
Minister
1 Ola Ullsten 1979-
1982
3 years. Appointed Liberals Foreign
Affairs.
3. Deputy-
Prime
Minister
1 Ingvar
Carlsson
1982-
1986
3 years &
4 months.
Appointed Social
Democrats
Minister
without
Portfolio -
Research
(82-85)
Environment
(85-86)
Assumed
the
position 
of Prime- 
Minister 
after death 
of Olof 
Palme. In 
Feb 1986
Vacancy 0 Vacancy 1986-
1990
N/A N/A N/A Feb. 86 -  
Feb. 90
4. Deputy-
Prime
Minister
1 Odd Erik 
EngstrOm
1990-
1991
1 year & 8 
months
Appointed Social
Democrats
Minister
without
Portfolio
S. Deputy-
Prime
Minister
1 Bengt Carl 
Westerberg
1991-
1994
3 years Appointed Liberals Health &
Social
Affairs
6. Deputy-
Prime
Minister
1 Mona
Ingeborg
Sahlin
1994-
1995
1 year Appointed Social
Democrats
Minister 
without 
Portfolio-  
Equality
Resigned
Vacancy 0 Vacancy 1995-
1998
3 years N/A N/A N/A
7. Deputy-
Prime
Minister
1 Lena
Hjelm-
Walldn
1998-
2002
3 years & 
3 months.
Appointed Social
Democrats
Minister 
without 
Portfolio-  
Justice
62 W oldendorp , Kem an &  Budge, 1993, pp 98-100.
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The Swedish Constitution adopted on January 1st 1975 was where the role o f  Swedish  
Deputy-Prime Minister w as first outlined. Chapter Seven, Article Eight states that ‘The 
Prime Minister may nominate one o f  the other Ministers to deputize for him in the event 
that he is unavoidably prevented from carrying out his duties h im self . ’ 64 W hile the phrase 
‘unavoidably prevented’ is som ewhat ambiguous, Chapter Six, Article Seven states that i f  
the Prime Minister resigns or dies, the government is discharged . 65 The Speaker o f  
Parliament w ill then consult with the parties to propose a new Prime-Minister, or in the 
event o f  failure to select a new  Prime-Minister after four attempts new  elections will 
result. Thus the effect o f  Chapter Seven, Article Eight is that the Deputy-Prime Minister 
steps in for the Prime-Minister in his temporary absence. H owever, it is not entirely clear 
what happens i f  the Prime M inister becom es permanently incapacitated. It would appear 
that Chapter Seven, Article Eight relating to the Prime M inister being unavoidably 
prevented from carrying out their duties applies and so the Deputy-Prime Minister 
deputises. In practice the Deputy-Prime Minister chairs cabinet m eetings in the absence 
o f  the Prime M inister . 66 However the Prime Minister is free to nominate a minister other 
than the Deputy-Prime Minister to deputise for him. In 2002, the Prime Minister Goran 
Persson, appointed three substitutes to chair cabinet m eetings for a set period each while 
he was on his summer holidays . 67 W hile the Deputy-Prime Minister was one o f  the 
substitutes, the other two were not Deputy-Prime Ministers. Further mention o f  the
63 A va ila b le  from : h ttp ://w w w .as iaw ide .o r.ip /iac /b iog raph v /ca rlsso n .h tm  [accessed 15 Decem ber 2002 ] and 
h ttp ://w w w .a lexne t.nu/eng/govem m ent/s ta tsrad_a-o .sh tm l [accessed 15 D ecem ber 2002 ],
64 G overnm ent o f  Sweden, 2001. ‘ T he  C o nstitu tion  o f  Sweden.’ A v a ila b le  at: 
h ttp ://w w w .oe fre .un ibe .ch /law /ic l/sw 0Q 000  .h tm l [accessed D ecem ber 15 2002 ].
65 Ib id .
66 Larsson, 1997. P. 241.
67 The F inanca il T im es, Ju ly  18, 2002, p. 11.
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deputizing role o f  the Deputy-Prime Minister is given in the 2001 Sw edish Government 
Yearbook. It states that ‘the Deputy Prime Minister relieves the Prime M inister o f  certain 
tasks and is responsible for constitutional issues relating to the Instrument o f  
Government’ (Swedish Government, 2001, p. 19), no further details o f  what these tasks 
or constitutional issues are given. So even the deputizing role o f  the Swedish Deputy- 
Prime Minister is in practice not reserved solely for the Deputy-Prime Minister.
The only other direct mention o f  the Deputy-Prime Minister in the constitution states that 
in the event o f  the Deputy-Prime Minister being unable to take up the reins as Prime 
Minister, then ‘these duties shall be assumed by that M inister among those in office who 
has been a member o f  the Government longest’ (Chapter Seven, Article Eight). As 
discussed already, this Article also makes clear that the Prime-M inister is under no 
obligation to select a Deputy-Prime Minister as it only states he ‘m ay’ nominate a 
Deputy-Prime Minister and goes on to deal with the situation where ‘a deputy has not 
been nominated by the Prime M inister ’ . 68
There are a number o f  other clauses o f  the Constitution that are applicable to the Deputy- 
Prime Minister. That the Deputy-Prime Minister must be a minister before they are 
nominated at Deputy-Prime Minister means that the criteria o f  Chapter Six, Article Nine 
relating to the eligibility requirements to be a minister apply: ‘(1) Only a person who has 
been a Swedish citizen for not less than ten years may be a Minister. (2) A  Minister may 
not undertake any public or private employment, nor may he undertake any comm ission
68 G overnm ent o f  Sweden, 2001. ‘ The C o ns titu tio n  o f  Sweden.’ A v a ila b le  at: 
h ttp ://w w w .oe fre .u n ibe .ch /law /ic l/sw 000 00  .h tm l [accessed D ecem ber 15 2002 ].
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or perform any function which is liable to impair public confidence in him . ’ 69 There is no 
requirement that ministers be drawn from the Riksdag (parliament) and indeed a number 
o f  ministers have been appointed who were not members o f  parliament. However, when a 
member o f  parliament becom es a Minister, ‘a substitute takes over the duties o f  an MP 
when he or she is appointed a government minister and continues to occupy that position  
for as long as the regular member remains in the Government. In other words, 
Government Ministers have to abstain from the right to vote in the Riksdag.’ (Swedish  
Institute, 2002, p. 2). They can, however, participate in parliamentary debates. Chapter 
Four Article N ine o f  the Sw edish Constitution states that, ‘W hile a member o f  the 
Parliament is acting as Speaker o f  the Parliament or is a member o f  the Government, his
70
mandate as a member o f  the Parliament shall be exercised by an alternate member.’ 
Chapter Six, Article Six gives the Prime Minister the power to discharge any Minister 
(including the Deputy-Prime Minister) . 71
While the Deputy-Prime Minister is a minister and member o f  cabinet, they work within 
the office o f  the Prime Minister. The Swedish Government Yearbook 2001 describes 
Lena Hjelm-W allen’s ministerial position as ‘Minister, Prime M inister’s O ffice and 
Deputy Prime Minister since 1998’ (Swedish Government, 2001, p. 64).
69 G overnm ent o f  Sweden, 2001. ‘ The  C onstitu tion  o f  Sweden.’ A v a ila b le  at: 
h ttp ://w w w .oe fre .u n ibe .c li/law /ic l/sw 0Q 00 0  .h ttn l [accessed D ecem ber 15 2002 ].
70 Ib id
71 Ib id
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3 .5  T h e  D e p u t y - P r i m e  M in i s t e r  o f  t h e  U n i t e d  K i n g d o m
3.5.1  In tro d u ctio n
In the case o f  the United Kingdom, the Deputy-Prime M inister is the most likely 
candidate to meet the criteria outlined in Chapter One to define deputy-leaders. The 
Deputy-Prime Minister is a member o f  cabinet. Thus, they m eet the first criterion. 
However, there is ambiguity as to whether or not they are the second-ranking member o f  
cabinet. The lack o f  a codified constitution in the United Kingdom  makes issues o f  
definition more difficult. For example, according to the H ouse o f  Parliament website, 
‘The position o f  Prime M inister does not constitutionally exist -  the Prime M inister’s 
actual title is First Lord o f  the Treasury ’ 72 and it was only with the Ministers o f  the 
Crown Act 1937 that the position o f  Prime Minister gained official recognition. There is 
a position o f  ‘Second Lord o f  the Treasury’. However, this is not the Deputy-Prime 
Minister, but the Chancellor o f  the Exchequer. D oes this make him/her the second 
ranking minister and thus Deputy-Prime Minister? D efinitely not, because while a 
denominated position o f  Deputy-Prime Minister has existed only sporadically and that o f  
Chancellor o f  the Exchequer has existed on a continuous basis during the period in 
question, when the positions existed contemporaneously they were held by different 
people. Thus there is a distinction between the post o f  Deputy-Prime Minister and 
Chancellor o f  the Exchequer. Secondly given the British tendency to give Ministers their 
full title (including those titles that are not in com m on usage), one would expect that if  
the Chancellor o f  the Exchequer was Deputy-Prime Minister that they would be given  
that title in the ‘List o f  Ministerial Responsibilities’. They are not and we can, thus,
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conclude with som e certainty that the Chancellor o f  the Exchequer is not the de jure 
Deputy-Prime Minister. However, the possibility remains that the Chancellor o f  the 
Exchequer may be de facto Deputy-Prime Minister. W hen both positions exist and are 
held separately, this cannot be the case. What o f  the case where there is no explicitly  
titled Deputy-Prime Minister? In practice, it is difficult to tell without a concrete example 
o f when the second-ranking member o f  cabinet was required to act as such. However, the 
third criterion used to define deputy-leaders requires that the second-ranking member 
within the cabinet be explicitly recognised as such. This precludes the Chancellor o f  the 
Exchequer from being considered as Deputy-Prime M inister for the purpose o f  this study. 
The only situations where the ranking o f  second member o f  cabinet is explicitly  
recognised either constitutionally, by title or on the basis o f  a protocol list which specifies 
the ranking o f  cabinet members all relate to the Deputy-Prime Minister. Thus w e can 
conclude that the Deputy-Prime Minister o f  the United Kingdom  is consistent with the 
post o f  deputy-leader as defined for the purposes o f  this study.
The position was first created during the cross-party cabinet that held office during World 
War II for the leader o f  the Labour Party -  Clement Atlee. In practice there has not been 
more than one Deputy-Prime Minister at any one point in time. During the period from 
1946 to 2002, there have been only seven Deputy-Prime Ministers. The longest serving 
Deputy-Prime Minister was W illiam Whitelaw, who held the office for eight years and 
eight months. The shortest serving Deputy-Prime Minister was ‘Rab’ Butler who held the 
office for one year and three months. The average length o f  time that an individual has 
held the office for is three years and nine months. None o f  the holders died w hile in
72 A va ilab le  from : h ttp ://w w w .exp lo re .pa rlian ie n t.iik /sea rch /da ta .a sp7F 21 6  [accessed 12 Decem ber 2002],
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office. However, Geoffrey H ow e resigned from the office in 1990 over the then Prime- 
Minister’s attitude to Europe. In terms o f  how  the office is attained, the holder is 
appointed by the Prime Minister and approved by a vote o f  the H ouse o f  Commons.
All the Deputy-Prime Ministers during the period under investigation have com e from the 
Conservative and Labour parties. This reflects the fact that they are the only two parties 
that have been in power during this time and that they formed single-party governments. 
The Conservatives have held the office on five occasions and Labour on two. In terms o f  
the length o f  time each party has held the office, the Conservatives have held it for 16 
years and seven months (30 per cent o f  the tim e), w hile the Labour party held the office  
for nine years and eight months (17 per cent o f  the time). For the remaining 29 years and 
nine months (53 per cent o f  the time), the office has been vacant. In other words the 
office has been vacant more often than it has been filled during the period in question.
When the length o f  time each party held the office o f  Deputy-Prime Minister is compared 
to how long they spent in office, Table 3.4 shows that the Conservatives were in office  
for over 34 years (62 per cent o f  the time period) compared to 21 (38 per cent o f  the time 
period) for Labour. Thus the Conservatives appointed som eone to the position for 48 per 
cent o f  their time in office while Labour appointed som eone to the position for 45 per 
cent o f  their time in office. For the remainder o f  their time in office, the position was 
vacant. So, both parties left the position vacant for the majority o f  their time in office  
over the period in question. Furthermore, the position was almost equally likely to be
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taken up by both the Conservatives and Labour when in office. In other words the 
position o f  Deputy-Prime Minister is not favoured by one particular party.
T a b le  3-7 L e n g th  o f  T im e  in  O ff ic e  o f  U K  D e p u ty -P r im e  M in is te r  1946-2002
Length of time party in 
government (% of time 
period)
Length of time party held 
position of Deputy-Prime 
Minister (% of time 
period)
Conservatives 34 years & 10 months (62%) 16 years & 7 months (30%)
Labour 2 1  years & 2  months (38%) 9 years & 8  months (17%)
All the Deputy-Prime M inisters have had additional cabinet responsibilities, although the 
level o f  that responsibility has varied significantly. Two were Leaders o f  the House o f  
Commons; two were First Secretary o f  State; one was Leader o f  the H ouse o f  Lords; one 
was Foreign Secretary; one was Home Secretary; one was M inister in charge o f  the 
Central African Office; one was Minister in charge o f  the Cabinet O ffice and one had 
responsibility for the M inistries o f  Environment, Transport and the Regions. Again, an 
excess number o f  ministerial portfolios over Deputy-Prime Ministers is accounted for by 
the fact that some Deputy-Prime Ministers held more than one portfolio and some also 
changed portfolio during their term as Deputy-Prime Minister.
In comparison with the global database, there are a number o f  portfolios which do not 
figure among those o f  UK  Deputy-Prime Ministers. Specifically, the Finance, Defence, 
Agriculture, Energy and Foreign Trade ministries were not held by any UK  Deputy-
Prime Minister during the period in question. This can in many respects be accounted for 
by the fact that the office was vacant for so much o f  the time. From a global perspective, 
while some deputy-leaders have an ex-officio parliamentary role (such as holding the 
casting vote in the event o f  a tie), the UK  appears unique in that three deputy-leaders over 
the period in question were given the additional responsibility o f  leadership o f  the first or 
second House o f  Parliament.
T a b le  3-8 U K  D e p u ty -P r im e  M in is te rs  1946-2002
Tide of 
Deputy- 
Leader
No. of 
Deputy-
Leaders
Deputy-
Leader
Term
of
Office73
Duration of 
Term (to 
nearest 
month)
Elected or 
appointed
Party Additional
Cabinet
Positions74
Notes'5
1. Deputy-
Prime
Minister
1 Herbert
Morrison
1946-
1951
5 years & 
1 month.
Appointed Labour Leader House 
of Commons.
Assumed 
position 
on 26 July 
1945.
Vacancy 0 Vacancy 1951-
1951
8 months N/A N/A N/A
2. Deputy-
Prime
Minister
1 Anthony
Eden
1951-
1955
3 years & 6 
months.
Appointed Conservative Foreign
Secretary.
Vacancy 0 Vacancy 1955-
1962
7 years & 3 
months
N/A N/A N/A
3. Deputy-
Prime
Minister
1 Richard
(Rab)
Butler
1962-
1963
1 year & 3 
months.
Appointed Conservative First Secretary 
of
State/Central
African
Office.
Vacancy 0 Vacancy 1963-
1979
15 years & 
7 months.
N/A N/A N/A
4. Deputy-
Prime
Minister
1 William
Whitelaw
1979-
1988
8 years & 8 
months.
Appointed Conservative Home 
Secretary/ 
Leader House 
of Lords.
Created a 
Viscount 
11 June 
1983
Vacancy 0 Vacancy 1988-
1989
1 year & 6 
months.
N/A N/A N/A
5. Deputy-
Prime
Minister
I Geoffrey
Howe
1989-
1990
1 year & 4 
months.
Appointed Conservative Leader House 
of Commons.
Resigned 
1 Nov 
1990.
Vacancy 0 Vacancy 1990-
1995
4 years & 8 
months.
N/A N/A N/A
6. Deputy-
Prime
Minister
1 Michael
Heseltine
1995-
1997
1 year & 10 
months.
Appointed Conservative Cabinet Office 
(office of 
Public Service)
7. Deputy-
Prime
Minister
1 John
Prescott
1997-
2002
4 years & 7 
Months
Appointed Labour Environment, 
Transport* 
The Regions/ 
First Secretary 
of State.
73 B utle r &  B u tle r, 1994.
74 B u tle r &  B u tle r, 1994; H eseltine, 2000 and Rawnsley, 2001.
75 B u tle r &  B u tle r, 1994.
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3 .5 .2  T h e fo rm a l r o le  a n d  p o w e r s  o f  th e  D e p u ty -P r im e  M in ister  o f  th e  
U n ited  K in g d o m
Unlike the states that have been examined already, there is no formal written constitution 
in the United Kingdom and so details o f  the role o f  the Deputy-Prime M inister must be 
sought elsewhere. However, there is no one central repository o f  guidelines that forms an 
alternative to a constitution. This creates a number o f  difficulties. A s M ackintosh (1981) 
states regarding the U K ’s alternative to a constitution:
‘a great number o f  these rules are written and embodied in A cts o f  Parliament ... 
Other aspects o f  the system  which are not law s but are established practices (such 
as the convention that the Queen asks the leader o f  the majority party after an 
election to form a government) are written down in many books on British 
politics ... Again, there is another category o f  practices, exam ples being the way  
the Cabinet is organised ... which are neither law  nor established conventions but 
are simply convenient methods o f  procedure ... The difficulty in producing an 
accurate and comprehensive account o f  these laws, conventions and practices is 
partly that they are scattered over the history o f  the country .. .  In part, the 
difficulty is that situations which call for the application o f  certain conventions 
may be few  and far betw een.’ (Mackintosh, 1982, p i 1).
• 76Looking at the ‘List o f  Ministerial Responsibilities’ issued by the Cabinet O ffice, as 
recently as 1997 the Deputy-Prime Minister was listed, but only his/her ministerial 
responsibilities are detailed. It is only since the 2001 edition that the Deputy-Prime
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Ministers responsibilities have been given. There is, however, still som e ambiguity 
regarding the Deputy-Prime Minister as the document states that in his capacity ‘A s First 
Secretary o f  State [he] deputises for the Prime Minister as required.’ (Cabinet Office, 
2001, p. 8 ). This im plies that the position o f  First Secretary o f  State and Deputy-Prime 
Minister are either one and the same or equivalent in some way. H owever, only two 
Deputy-Prime Ministers have been First Secretary o f  State and Deputy-Prim e Minister at 
the same time ( ‘Rab’ Butler and John Prescott). There have also been a number o f  
holders o f  one office who did not simultaneously hold the other office (for example 
William W hitelaw and G eoffrey H ow e were both Deputy-Prime M inister but neither was 
First Secretary o f  State).
In May 2002, the Prime Minister separated the office o f  Deputy-Prime M inister from the 
Cabinet Office (which focuses on supporting the cabinet and public service reform) and 
made it a department in its own right.77 The role o f  the Deputy-Prime Minister as outlined 
included the follow ing responsibilities: deputising for the Prime M inister ‘across the 
range o f  his responsibilities at hom e and abroad’; dealing with issues as requested by the 
Prime-Minister; representing the Prime-Minister at home and abroad; acting as the 
Prime-Minister’s emissary on certain areas o f  policy; chairing certain cabinet committees 
as well as responsibility for specific cross-departmental policy areas such as social 
exclusion and regional policy . 78 This clarified matters to a great extent in terms o f  the 
role and responsibilities o f  the Deputy-Prime Minister.
76 Cabinet O ffice , 1997.
77 w w w .o d p m , go v .uk /new s/0205 /0001 .htm  [accessed 29 N o vem b er 2002],
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3 .6  T h e  U n i t e d  S t a t e s ’ V i c e - P r e s i d e n t
3.6 .1  In tro d u ctio n
In the United States, the Vice-President would be considered to be the deputy-leader on 
the basis that the office meets the definition given in Chapter One. In terms o f  the first 
criterion -  that they must be a member o f  cabinet -  there has been som e debate as to 
whether or not the Vice-President is a member o f  cabinet. The Vice-President is the 
President o f  the Senate. Thus it is reasonable to assume that they are part o f  the 
legislative branch o f  Government. However, they are also m entioned in Article Two o f  
the US Constitution which deals with the executive branch o f  government. According to 
Cronin and G enovese (1998), Vice-President Mondale view ed the position as a ‘hybrid, 
half-legislative and half executive. He adopted the view  that the vice president is the only 
office o f  national government that breaches the separation o f  pow ers’ (Croinin and 
Genovese, 1998, p. 331). In fact, Article Two states that ‘The executive power shall be
7Q •
vested in a President o f  the United States o f  Am erica.’ In short, the executive comprises 
the President only. The Vice-President only becom es a member o f  the executive if  they 
assume the Presidency, in which case they cannot continue as President o f  the Senate, 
thereby resolving any apparent overlap o f  executive and legislative powers. This 
interpretation places the Vice-President firmly in the legislative branch o f  government. 
Indeed Cronin and G enovese (1998) observe that ‘Until about 1940 m ost presidents and 
most Americans view ed the Vice-Presidency almost exclusively as a legislative jo b ’ 
(Cronin and G enovese, 1998, p. 319). Given the separation o f  executive, legal and
78 A va ila b le  from : w w w .odp m .go  v. uk/ne w s/02 05 /0 001 .htm  [accessed 29 N o ve m b e r 2002],
79 A va ila b le  from : h ttp ://ca se la w .lp .fin d la w .com /da ta /co ns titu tio n /a rtic les .h tm l [accessed 10 O ctober 2001],
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judicial powers, an issue arises as to whether or not the Vice-President can be considered 
a member o f  cabinet? Prior to President Harding inviting V ice-President Coolidge to 
regularly attend cabinet m eetings in 1921, the only occasions when Vice-Presidents 
attended cabinet m eetings were when they were asked by the President to do so in his 
absence . 80 This only occurred on a handful o f  occasions. Vice-President Jefferson 
actually refused to attend cabinet meetings: ‘I consider m y office as constitutionally 
confined to legislative functions, and that I could not take any part whatever in executive 
consultations, even were it proposed’ (Paullin, 1924, p. 497). Cronin and Genovese 
(1998) point out that it was only ‘since 1943 [that] Vice-Presidents have, however, been 
invited to cabinet m eetings and related policy councils with som e regularity’ (Cronin and 
Genovese, 1998, p. 323). Since then, Vice-President N ixon  presided over cabinet 
meetings during Eisenhower’s illnesses and the concept o f  the Vice-President as a 
member o f  cabinet is now  generally accepted . 81 Today, the W hite H ouse website lists
• 09 , _
Vice-President Cheney as a ‘cabinet-rank m em ber’ o f  cabinet. Furthermore, i f  the 
executive comprises only the office o f  the President, then there is no contradiction 
between the Vice-President being a member o f  the legislature and a member o f  cabinet. 
Thus, even though there is som e ambiguity, it is reasonable to conclude that the Vice- 
President meets the first criterion for a deputy-leader.
As for the second criterion -  that they are the second-ranking member o f  cabinet in that 
they deputise for the head o f  cabinet -  the US Vice-President also m eets this criterion. 
Their constitutional role includes replacing the President on a temporary and permanent
80 See P au llin , 1924, pp496-500 fo r  a discussion o f  th is  subject.
81 C ron in  and Genovese, 1998, p 323.
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basis as the powers o f  the President ‘devolve on the V ice P resid en t , 8 3  in the event o f  the 
President’s removal, death or resignation. Thus the US Vice-President can be considered 
the second ranking member o f  the cabinet and their title recognises their deputising role, 
thus meeting the third criterion.
Unlike some o f  the other states that w ill be examined in this study, the US Constitution 
specifically limits the number o f  office holders to one at any given time, Article Two,
84
Section One speaks o f  ‘the’ Vice-President. In other words there cannot be more than 
one US Vice-President at any one time. In the time period 1946 to 2002, there have been  
12 US Vice-Presidents (see Table 3.1).
The term o f  office for a Vice-President is four years, beginning on the 20th January o f  the 
year following their election and ending on the 20th January four years afterwards. It is 
worthy o f  note that, w hile no term-limit applies to the Vice-Presidency, none o f  those 
who held the office during the period in question has served longer than two terms. 
Indeed, o f  the 12 Vice-Presidents in question, only three have served two full terms and 
five have served one full term. In other words, only two thirds o f  Vice-Presidents have 
seen out a full term during the period in question. The average length o f  time that an 
individual Vice-President held the office over the period in question has been three years 
and eight months. O f the four Vice-Presidents who have not served out a full term, two 
assumed the Presidency (Johnson and Ford) and one was appointed a quarter way
82 A va ila b le  from : h ttp ://w w w .w h iteho use .g ov /go vem m e n t/ca b in e t.h tm l [accessed 21 O ctober 2002 ],
83 A va ila b le  from : h ttp ://ca se la w .lp .fin d la w .com /da ta /co ns titu tio n /a rtic les .h tm l [accessed 10 O ctober 2001],
84 A va ila b le  from : h ttp ://ca se la w .lp .fm d law .com /d a ta /con s titu tion /a rtic les .h tm l [accessed 10 O ctobe r 2001],
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through the full term (Rockefeller) and the current holder (Cheney) is seeing out his first 
term o f  office. There is also the case o f  Spiro A gnew  who served one term o f  office, but 
resigned after only nine months o f  his second term to face charges on non-declaration o f  
income to the revenue authorities. On a more optimistic note, none have died in office.
As for how  Vice-Presidents attain the office, each candidate for the office o f  US V ice- 
President runs on a ticket with a Presidential candidate and so is elected with the 
President. However, if  the office falls vacant within the term o f  the office holder, it is 
filled on the basis o f  a Presidential nomination which must be approved by a simple 
majority o f  both Houses o f  Congress (Section Two o f  the 25th Am endm ent85). Over the 
course o f  the time period under study, 10 o f  the Vice-Presidents were elected to the office  
with the President, while two came to the office as a result o f  a Presidential nomination 
and approval by the Houses o f  Congress.
In terms o f  their party allegiances, all the Vice-Presidents during the period in question 
have either been Democrats or Republicans. This should com e as no surprise given the 
two-party nature o f  American politics. Five have been Democrats (42 per cent) and seven  
Republicans (58 per cent). However, out o f  the 56 years being examined, Democrats 
were only in the office for 22 years and 10 months (41 per cent o f  the time), while 
Republicans were in office for 28 years and 6  months (51 per cent o f  the time). During 
the remaining four years and eight months (eight per cent o f  the tim e) there was no V ice- 
President. This situation arose on four separate occasions during the period in question:
85 A va ila b le  from : h ttp ://case la w .lp .fm d law .com /d a ta /con s titu tion /a rtic les .h tm l [accessed 10 O ctober 2001 ],
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when Truman assumed the Presidency on the death o f  President R oosevelt in April 1945 
until January 1949; when Johnson assumed the Presidency on the death o f  President 
Kennedy in Novem ber 1963 until January 1965; when Spiro A gnew  resigned in October 
1973; and when Ford assumed the Presidency on the resignation o f  President N ixon in 
August 1974 until January 1977. As there was no automatic replacement for the Vice- 
President, there was a tim e-lag between the Vice-President leaving the position and a 
replacement being nominated and confirmed. In total, since the position o f  Vice- 
President was created, it has been vacant for a total o f  approximately 37 years . 86
In contrast to deputy-leaders in many other states, none o f  the U S Vice-Presidents have 
held additional cabinet positions. However, as w e shall see in Chapter Five, they have 
chaired a number o f  ad hoc comm ittees set up to address pressing issues o f  the day.
T a b le  3-9U S  V ice -P re s id e n ts  1946-2002
Title of 
Deputy- 
Leader
No. of 
Deputy- 
Leaders
Deputy-
Lcader
Term
of
Office
87
Duration 
of Term
(to nearest 
month)
Elected or 
appointed
Party Additional
Cabinet
Positions
Notes"”
Vacany 0 Vacancy 1946-
1949
3 years N/A N/A N/A Vice-
President
Truman
assumed
Presidency
on death of
Roosevelt
on 12 April
1945.
1. Vicc-
President
1 Alben W 
Barkley
1949-
1953
4 years Elected
with
President.
Democrat None.
2. Vice-
President
1 Richard M.
Nixon
1953-
1961
8 years Elected
with
President.
Republican None.
3. Vice-
President
1 Lyndon
Johnson
1961-
1963
2 years & 
10 months
Elected
with
President.
Democrat None. Assumed 
Presidency 
on death of 
Kennedy 
22 Nov
86 h ttp ://u i.g ro lie r.com /p res iden ts /ea /vp /vm isa .h tm l [accessed 29 O ctobe r 2002 ].
87 Source: w w w .teTra .es/persona l2 /m onolith /usa.litm  [accessed 14 O ctobe r 2002 ],
88 Source: h ttp ://g i.g ro lie r.co m /p res id en ts /ea /vp /vp rock .h tm l [accessed 29 O ctobe r 2002 ],
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1963
Vacany 0 Vacancy N/A 1 year & 2 
months
N/A N/A N/A
4. Vice-
President
1 Hubert H, 
Humphrey
1965-
1969
4 years Elected
with
President,
Democrat None.
5. Vice-
President
1 Spiro T. 
Agnew
1969-
1973
4 years & 9 
months
Elected
with
President.
Republican None. Resigned 
10 Oct 
1973
Vacancy 0 Vacancy N/A 2 months N/A N/A N/A
6. Vice-
President
1 Gerald
Ford
1973-
1974
8 months Nominated
by
President &
appointed
by
Congress
Republican None. Assumed
Vice-
Presidency 
on 6 Dec
1973. 
Assumed 
Presidency 
on
resignation 
ofNixon on 
9 Aug
1974.
Vacany 0 Vacany N/A 4 months N/A N/A N/A
7. Vice-
President
1 Nelson
Rockefeller
1974-
1977
2 years & 1 
month
Nominated
by
President & 
appointed
by
Congress
Republican None. Nominated
in Aug 74.
Assumed
Vice-
Presidency
on 19 Dec
1974.
8. Vice-
President
1 Walter F. 
Mondale
1977-
1981
4 years Elected
with
President.
Democrat None.
9. Vice-
President
1 George H. 
Bush
1981-
1989
8 years Elected
with
President.
Republican None.
10. Vice-
President
I J. Danforth 
Quayle
1989-
1993
4 years Elected
with
President.
Republican None.
11. Vice-
President
1 Albert A.
Gore
1993-
2001
8 years Elected
with
President.
Democrat None.
12. Vice-
President
1 Richard B 
Cheney
2001-
2002
1 year Elected
with
President.
Republican None.
3 .6 .2  T h e  fo rm al r o le  a n d  p o w e r s  o f  th e  U n ited  S t a t e s ’ V ic e -P r e s id e n t
The point o f  first call in terms o f  understanding the role and powers o f  the US V ice- 
President is the US Constitution. Article One states that the Vice-President shall be the 
president o f  the Senate with the casting vote. Article Two gives their term o f  office as 
four years and outlines how  they are elected. Originally, this section stated that the V ice- 
President chaired a joint m eeting o f  the Senate and House o f  Representatives, where the 
results o f  ballots in each state among ‘electors’ w ill be counted and the candidate with the
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highest total and a majority o f  the votes shall be deemed elected President. I f  none had a 
majority, the matter was to be decided by the members o f  the H ouse o f  Representatives 
with each state having one vote. The candidate with the second highest number o f  votes 
was elected Vice-President. This Article also outlined how  the Vice-President could 
assume the Presidency:
‘In Case o f  the Rem oval o f  the President from O ffice, or o f  his Death, 
Resignation, or Inability to discharge the Powers and Duties o f  the said Office, 
the Same shall devolve on the V ice President, and the Congress may by Law  
provide for the Case o f  Removal, Death, Resignation or Inability, both o f  the 
President and V ice President, declaring what Officer shall then act as President, 
and such Officer shall act accordingly, until the D isability be removed, or a
OQ
President shall be elected .’
Section Four o f  this article goes on to state that the Vice-President m ay be removed from 
office ‘on impeachment for, and conviction of, treason, bribery, or other high crimes and 
misdemeanors . ’ 90 So, all the constitution had to say was how  they were elected and 
removed from office, the length o f  their term in office, that they were President o f  the 
Senate with casting vote and that they replaced the President on a temporary or 
permanent basis under certain circumstances.
Over time, a number o f  amendments were made to the constitution which affected the 
Vice-President. The 12th Amendment o f  1804 introduced a separate ballot o f  the electors
89 A va ila b le  from : h ttp ://ca se la w .lp .fin d la w .com /da ta /co ns titu tio n /a rtic les .h tm l [accessed 10 O ctober 2001],
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for Vice-President. If a President could not be elected after a tie and vote o f  the House o f  
Representatives by March 4th o f  that year, then the Vice-President acted as President. If 
no one had a majority o f  the electors votes cast in the election for Vice-President, then 
the Senate would elect the Vice-President from among the two candidates with the
highest votes. This Amendment also stated that anyone ineligible to be President could
th
not seek the Vice-Presidency. The 14 Amendment specified that a citizen who
committed insurrection or rebellion or who gave comfort to the enem ies o f  the state could
neither be an elector nor hold any civil office o f  the United States. The 20 th Amendment
o f  1933 stated that the terms o f  office o f  both the President and Vice-President end at 
th
noon on the 20 o f  January in the year in which their term ends. More importantly, this 
Amendment also stated that i f  the President-elect died before taking up office, then the 
Vice-President-elect would becom e President for their term. It also stated that i f  a 
President had not been chosen by the date set for the start o f  their term or i f  they failed to 
‘qualify’ for the office, then the Vice-President elect would act as President until the 
matter was resolved. If neither the President-elect nor Vice-President-elect qualified for 
office, then Congress was to resolve the situation via legislation. The 23rd Amendment o f  
1961 gave the District o f  Columbia electors for the Presidential and Vice-Presidential 
elections on the same basis as if  it were a state. The last Amendment o f  relevance to the 
Vice-Presidency was the 25th which was passed in 1967 and dealt with Presidential 
succession. It addressed the issue o f  replacing the Vice-President when the existing Vice- 
President assumed the Presidency. The new President would nominate a replacement 
Vice-President who would take office when ratified by both H ouses o f  Congress. It also
90 A va ila b le  from : h ttp ://ca se la w .lp .fin d la w .com /da ta /co ns titu tio n /a rtic les .h tm l [accessed 10 O ctobe r 2001 ].
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clarified what happened i f  the President was temporarily unable to discharge his duties as 
President:
‘Section 3. W henever the President transmits to the President pro tempore o f  the 
Senate and the Speaker o f  the House o f  Representatives his written declaration 
that he is unable to discharge the powers and duties o f  his office, and until he 
transmits to them a written declaration to the contrary, such powers and duties 
shall be discharged by the Vice-President as Acting-President.
Section 4. Whenever the Vice-President and a majority o f  either the principal 
officers o f  the executive departments or o f  such other body as Congress may by 
law provide, transmit to the President pro tempore o f  the Senate and the Speaker 
o f  the House o f  Representatives their written declaration that the President is 
unable to discharge the powers and duties o f  his office, the Vice-President shall 
immediately assume the powers and duties o f  the office as Acting-President . ’ 91
A ll o f  these Am endm ents deal with the matters o f  election and succession. The 
Constitution and Amendments to it give little insight into the day-to-day role o f  the Vice- 
President. Over and above the role outlined in the US Constitution, the Vice-Presidency  
has over time taken on a number o f  additional non-constitutional responsibilities. In 
terms o f  national policy committee membership, the first significant m ove to grant the 
Vice-President statutory membership o f  such a comm ittee was the 1949 amendment to 
the National Security A ct which gave the Vice-President a statutory membership o f  the
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National Security Council. Since then, as w e shall see in Chapter Five, individual V ice- 
Presidents have also been given the task o f  chairing short-term national policy
• • 09
committees that addressed pressing issues o f  the day. For exam ple, Vice-President 
Cheney chaired the National Energy Policy Developm ent Group . 93
The Vice-President has also taken on a diplomatic role as a touring representative o f  the 
American government. This started with President R oosevelt who sent his Vice- 
Presidents to foreign events as his representative . 94 This practice has continued to the 
present day with G eorge Bush traveling over a m illion m iles during his two terms as 
Vice-President. 95
In conclusion, the role o f  the US Vice-President involves: acting as President o f  the US  
Senate with casting vote; taking over as President i f  the President is permanently or 
temporarily unable to discharge their duties; membership o f  cabinet; representing the 
President abroad and sitting on a number o f  policy comm ittees. W hile the constitutional 
role o f  the Vice-President is limited, the position has over time been allocated additional 
responsibilities purely on the basis that they have becom e the traditional activities o f  a 
Vice-President.
91 A va ila b le  fro m : h ttp ://ca se la w .lp .fin d la w .com /da ta /co ns titu tio n /a rtic les .h tm l [accessed 10 O ctober 2001].
92 D av id , 1967.
93 A va ila b le  from : h ttp ://w w w .w h iteho use .g ov /v ice p res ide n t/ [accessed 8 N o ve m b e r 2002],
94 C ronin and Genovese, 1998, p. 323.
95 C ron in  and Genovese, 1998, p. 323.
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Having conducted a brief analysis o f  deputy-leaders in the five states under examination, 
the diversity o f  the role and powers o f  deputy-leaders becom es clear. Over a 56-year time 
period, the Netherlands has had 24 deputy-leaders, Ireland has had 18 (but only 14 
different people), the United States has had 12 and the United Kingdom  has had only 
seven. Sweden has also had seven even though the post was only created in 1976. The 
US, Ireland and Sweden can only have one deputy-leader at a tim e, w hile no such 
limitation applies in the case o f  the Netherlands. The situation is unclear in the United 
Kingdom where there is no constitution. However, in practice there has never been more 
than one Deputy-Prime Minister at a time in the UK. The US deputy-leader is not given  
additional cabinet responsibilities, while deputy-leaders in the other four states have 
tended to have additional cabinet positions. The Swedish and Dutch deputy-leaders have 
a similar average length o f  time in office at two years and five months and two years and 
three months respectively. The U S, UK  and Irish deputy-leaders average term o f  office 
are all similar at three years and eight months, three years and nine months and three 
years and one month respectively.
In terms o f  the basis for the powers o f  deputy-leaders, the US, Sw edish and Irish deputy- 
leaders have a constitutional basis while the Dutch and British ones do not. The states 
take different approaches to the relationship between the deputy-leader and the 
parliament. In the case o f  Ireland, the deputy-leader must be a member o f  parliament, 
while in Sweden and the Netherlands, deputy-leaders must give up their seat in 
parliament upon becom ing members o f  the cabinet. They do however retain the right to
3 . 7  C o n c l u s i o n
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speak to parliament. In contrast, in the US the Vice-President gains a place in the 
legislature in that they are President o f  the Senate and have the casting vote in the event 
o f  a tie. Again, the U K  situation is unclear due to the lack o f  a written constitution, 
however in practice all the Deputy-Prime Ministers have sat in parliament.
While the deputy-leaders in the five states all have deputizing roles, there are different 
approaches to the issue o f  deputising for the leader. In the U S, the Vice-President would 
see out the term o f  the President in the event that they were unable to, whereas in Sweden 
the Government would fall i f  the Prime Minister was unable to com plete their term. In 
Ireland the Tänaiste replaces the Taoiseach until a new  one is appointed. In the UK and 
the Netherlands the deputy-leader only replaces the leader in their temporary absence. In 
some respects it would be more accurate to describe these positions as deputizing-leaders 
rather than deputy-leaders, insofar as a deputy-leader is second in command.
In conclusion, this examination has highlighted the fact that even in a cross-section o f  
Western democracies, there are divergences in the role and powers o f  deputy-leaders. 
Whether or not the deputy-leaders can influence policy outcom es given these divergences 
will be the subject o f  the follow ing four chapters.
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4  H Y P O T H E S E S  A N D  Q U A N T I T A T I V E  O B S E R V A B L E  
I M P L I C A T I O N S  R E L A T I N G  T O  D E P U T Y - L E A D E R S
A T T A I N I N G  O F F I C E
4 .1  I n t r o d u c t i o n
In the previous chapter 64 deputy-leaders were identified in the five states under 
consideration in the period 1946-2002. In Chapter Two seven hypotheses and nine 
observable implications were identified. Given that all nine observable implications can 
be applied to all 64 deputy-leaders, this means that in theory there are 576 tests o f  the 
observable implications. It is not feasible to conduct such a large number o f  tests within 
the confines o f  this study for a number o f  reasons. Firstly, there are sim ply too many tests 
to be conducted to allow  for a detailed examination o f  all 576 o f  them given the space 
constraints o f  this research. This difficulty is exacerbated by the nature o f  the data 
required for many o f  the tests, for example a detailed analysis o f  the speeches o f  deputy- 
leaders across five states and 56 years would constitute a significant research project in 
itself. Secondly, all the data on deputy-leaders necessary to test the observable 
implications is unlikely to be available. For example exact copies o f  all the speeches 
delivered (including extemporaneous additions) or policy documents from the late 1940s 
from various deputy-leaders may not be available, even in archives. Bearing these 
practical limitations in mind, sufficient information should still be available for it to be 
possible to provide a reasonable test o f  the observable implications. Where data cannot be
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found this will be clearly stated. However, this study w ill not be exhaustive in that there 
are practical limits to the extent to which the 576 observable implications can be tested.
A second issue that arises in relation to the testing o f  the hypotheses is the uneven 
distribution o f  deputy-leaders across the five states under examination. W hile a common 
time-period is used, out o f  the 64 deputy-leaders in the study, 24 are Dutch (37 per cent 
o f  the total), 14 are Irish (22 per cent o f  the total), 12 are Am erican (19 per cent o f  the 
total), seven are Swedish and seven are British (11 per cent each). Given that an even  
distribution o f  deputy-leaders over tim e and across the five states would have resulted in 
just under 13 deputy-leaders per state, it can be seen that Dutch deputy-leaders are over­
represented in the study, w hile Swedish and British deputy-leaders are under-represented. 
To offset any imbalance that may occur as a result o f  this uneven distribution o f  deputy- 
leaders across the five states, the average o f  the averages w ill be calculated in each 
instance.
The first two hypotheses relate to the attaining o f  the office o f  deputy-leader. They focus 
on the motivation o f  those who seek the office. To be more specific, they seek to 
determine if  those who seek the office o f  deputy-leader want to influence policy. Each 
hypothesis has one observable implication. The background o f  the deputy-leaders in each 
o f  the five states will be examined so as to see i f  they demonstrated a desire to influence 
policy before they attained the office o f  deputy-leader.
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4 . 2  H y p o t h e s i s  o n e
4 .2 .1  In tro d u ctio n
The first hypothesis states that:
If deputy-leaders matter, then individuals appointed to the position will have 
held a significant policy-related post beforehand.
The observable implication that allow s this hypothesis to be tested indicates that deputy- 
leaders will previously have: held a prominent elected office; been a member o f  a policy- 
influencing legislative committee; been a primary opposition spokesperson or held 
cabinet office. This observable implication w ill be tested comparatively. The background 
o f  deputy-leaders prior to their becom ing deputy-leader w ill be examined to clarify if  
they held any o f  these significant policy-related posts beforehand. Each element o f  the 
observable implication w ill be tested in turn starting with any prominent elected office  
the deputy-leaders may have held and m oving on to the more senior positions they may 
have held.
4 .2 .2  D e p u ty - le a d e r s  a n d  p r e v io u s ly  h e ld  p r o m in e n t  e le c t e d  o f f ic e
In this section the careers o f  the 64 deputy-leaders under examination w ill be studied so 
as to identify i f  they held any prominent elected office prior to becom ing deputy-leader. 
In this instance ‘prominent elected office’ w ill be taken as membership o f  a national 
parliament, Mayor o f  a large city o f  Governor o f  a U S state.
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It should also be noted that in many respects like is not being compared with like. For 
example a member o f  the US Senate would have far more influence than a member o f  the 
Irish Senate or a member o f  the House o f  Lords or the Dutch Senate. However the key 
point is that those who held prominent elected office can be said to have displayed a 
desire to influence policy. The extent o f  such a desire and indeed whether or not they 
availed o f  the opportunity to exercise it is not relevant, for the purposes o f  this study it is 
sufficient that such a desire can be shown to have existed.
T a b le  4-1 N u m b e r o f  d e p u ty - le a d e rs  w h o  p re v io u s ly  he ld  p ro m in e n t e lec ted o ff ic e
Number of 
deputy-leaders 
(1946-2002)
Number of deputy-leaders who 
previously held prominent elected office 
(percentage of total number of deputy- 
leaders)
Ireland 14 14(100% )
Netherlands 24 23 (96%)
Sweden 7 7(100% )
United Kingdom 7 7(100% )
United States 1 2 1 2  ( 1 0 0 %)
TOTAL 64 63 (98%)
Average of the 
Averages
99.2%
Table 4.1 provides a summary o f  the examination o f  the careers o f  the deputy-leaders 
included in this study. Full details o f  the prominent elected offices held by the deputy- 
leaders prior to becom ing deputy-leaders are given in Appendix 2. From Table 4.1 it can 
be seen that all o f  the deputy-leaders bar one held prominent elected office prior to 
becoming deputy-leaders. In the case o f  the one deputy-leader who did not previously 
hold prominent elected office (Anton Struycken) -  he had been Governor o f  the
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Netherlands Antilles prior to becoming a deputy-leader and so held a policy-related post 
prior to becoming deputy-leader albeit an unelected one.
4 .2 .3  D e p u ty - le a d e r s  a n d  p r e v io u s  m e m b e r s h ip  o f  p o lic y - in f lu e n c in g  
le g is la t iv e  c o m m it t e e s
The second aspect o f  the observable implication is that deputy-leaders would previously 
have been members o f  policy-influencing legislative comm ittees. Again, like is not being 
compared with like in that each o f  the states under examination has a different committee 
system. In the United States all Senators and Congressmen are members o f  committees 
which determine which bills are progressed. M any o f  these com m ittees date back to the 
19th Century. 96 In Ireland, parliamentary committees are a relatively recent phenomenon, 
mostly dating back to the 1980s, not all members o f  parliament are members o f  them and 
they generally lack power (they cannot block progress o f  bills for exam ple ) . 97 In the 
United Kingdom, comm ittees are relatively weak in terms o f  amending legislation (they 
cannot accept amendments i f  the relevant Minister rejects them) and not all British MPs 
are on com m ittees .98 In the Netherlands, committees scrutinize proposed legislation and 
can make amendments but not all parliamentarians are on com m ittees . 99 Swedish 
parliamentary comm ittees on the other hand can initiate legislation and rewrite bills they 
are examining . 100 In summary parliamentary comm ittees vary in their power across the 
five states. However, the key point from the perspective o f  this study is that they all have
96 w w w .sena te .gov /rc fe rence /resources /pd f/com in itteeh is to ries .pd fraccessed 5 June 2003 ].
97 G allagher, 1999.
98 M attson and Strom , 1995.
99 M attson and Strom , 1995.
100 M attson and Strom , 1995.
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a legislative role and thus membership o f  such comm ittees indicates an interest in policy. 
The hypothesis is not a test o f  committee strength or actual influence o f  deputy-leaders 
prior to taking office. It is a test o f  their motivation.
T a b le  4-2 N u m b e r o f  d e p u ty - le a d e rs  w h o  p re v io u s ly  m e m b e rs h ip  o f  p o lic y - in f lu e n c in g  le g is la tiv e  
com m ittees
Number of 
deputy-leaders 
(1946-2002)
Number of deputy-leaders who 
previously held membership of policy- 
influencing legislative committees 
(percentage of total number of deputy- 
leaders)
Ireland 14 13 (93%)
Netherlands 24 16(67% )
Sweden 7 6  (8 6 %)
United Kingdom 7 7(100% )
United States 1 2 10(83% )
TOTAL 64 52 (83%)
Average of the 
Averages
85.8%
Table 4.2 summarises the number o f  deputy-leaders who were on policy-influencing 
legislative committees prior to becom ing deputy-leaders. Full details are given in 
Appendix 2. From this table it can be seen that the vast majority o f  deputy-leaders in this 
study were previously members o f  policy-influencing legislative comm ittees. In the case 
o f  Ireland, the one deputy-leader who was not, Brendan Corish, was a member o f  a 
legislative committee (Procedures and Privileges). The low est level o f  committee 
involvement by deputy-leaders was in the Netherlands but, even in this instance, almost 
70 per cent o f  the deputy-leaders had been on such comm ittees prior to becom ing deputy- 
leader. All the UK Deputy-leaders were on comm ittees, while only one Swedish deputy- 
leader was not. In the case o f  the two United States Vice-Presidents who were not on 
legislative committees, it was because neither was a member o f  a legislative body.
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However, one o f  the two (N elson Rockefeller) chaired a presidential advisory committee 
on government organisation, which resulted in the establishment o f  the Department o f  
Health, Education and W elfare . 101 Thus, the approach that has been taken in some 
respects underestimates the involvem ent o f  future deputy-leaders in policy developing  
committees. N onetheless, the level o f  participation in legislative com m ittees by those 
who went on to becom e deputy-leaders is very high at 83 per cent. U sing the average o f  
the averages, the level o f  participation o f  the deputy-leaders in this study in legislative 
committees rises to just under 8 6  per cent.
4 .2 .4  D e p u ty - le a d e r s  a n d  p r e v io u s  o p p o s it io n  s p o k e s p e r s o n s h ip s
Another significant policy-related post that deputy-leaders may have held prior to 
becoming deputy-leader is an opposition spokespersonship. The holder o f  such a position 
is their party’s main spokesperson on a particular policy area and generally has de-facto 
responsibility for developing party policy in that area. Leaders and deputy-leaders o f  the 
party groupings in the legislature have also been considered opposition spokespersons for 
the purposes o f  this study as they are the primary spokesperson for their party. In the case 
o f the United States, oppositions spokespersonships do not exist so the nearest equivalent 
positions -  those o f  Minority and Majority Leaders and Whips and their assistants have 
been included. In general, the main parties would have no more than twenty 
spokespersons each. The figure may be lower i f  the party has fewer members o f  
parliament. In the case o f  the US, the two main parties would have five positions each (a 
leader and whip/assistant each in the Senate and a leader, assistant and whip in the House
101 http,7/gi.m ~olier.com /presidents/ea/vpconts.htm l [accessed 14 O ctober 2002 ].
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o f  Representatives). W hile the positions in the US are less comparable to the other four 
states, the positions are the only ones that can be compared with spokespersonships in the 
other four states. For consistency, the position o f  whip w ill also be included with 
spokespersonships for all five states.
T ab le  4-3 N u m b e r o f  d e p u ty -Ie a d e rs  w ith  p re v io u s  o p p o s it io n  spokespersonsh ips
Number of 
deputy-Ieaders 
(1946-2002)
Number of deputy-Ieaders who 
previously held opposition 
spokespersonships(percentage of total 
number of deputy-Ieaders)
Ireland 14 14 (100%)
Netherlands 24 20 (83%)
Sweden 7 7(100% )
United Kingdom 7 6  (8 6 %)
United States 1 2 5 (42%)
TOTAL 64 52(81% )
Average of the 
Averages
82.2%
Just over four out o f  every five deputy-Ieaders in this study held an opposition 
spokespersonship prior to becoming deputy-leader. However, the percentage o f  deputy- 
Ieaders with previous opposition spokespersonship experience differs from state to state. 
From Table 4.3 it can be seen that 100 per cent o f  Irish and Swedish deputy-Ieaders 
previously held opposition spokespersonships and that 83 per cent o f  Dutch deputy- 
Ieaders held a spokespersonship before they became deputy-Ieaders. Furthermore, three 
out o f  the four Dutch deputy-Ieaders who did not hold a spokespersonhip position, Beel, 
Struychen and Bakker, did so because they becam e Ministers either on or before they 
became members o f  the legislature. Six out o f  the seven UK  Deputy-Prime Ministers held 
a shadow cabinet post. H owever only five out o f  the 12 U S Vice-Presidents held a
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parliamentary leadership position. Using the average o f  the averages calculation, 82 per 
cent o f  deputy-leaders in this study were previously spokespersons.
4 .2 .5  D e p u ty - le a d e r s  a n d  p r e v io u s  c a b in e t  e x p e r ie n c e
Probably the most significant policy-related post that deputy-leaders may have held prior 
to becoming deputy-leader is a cabinet position. Junior ministers w ill be excluded from  
this study as they are not members o f  cabinet in m ost states. W hile som e cabinet 
positions may have more policy influence than others and the power o f  cabinet members 
may differ across states, it remains the case that a member o f  cabinet has relatively more 
influence over policy than most other political positions. Therefore, it is a good test o f  the 
policy-related m otivation o f  deputy-leaders. For the purposes o f  this study it is sufficient 
to assume that cabinet membership involves some policy influence.
T a b le  4-4 N u m b e r o f  d e p u ty - le a d e rs  w ith  p re v io u s  c a b in e t exp e rience
Number of 
deputy-leaders 
(1946-2002)
Number of deputy-leaders with previous 
cabinet experience (percentage of total 
number of deputy-leaders)
Ireland 14 11 (79%)
Netherlands 24 17 (71%)
Sweden 7 6  (8 6 %)
United Kingdom 7 6  (8 6 %)
United States 1 2 1 (8 %)
TOTAL 64 41 (64%)
Average of the 
Averages
6 6 %
From Table 4.4 it can be seen that the majority o f  deputy-leaders (64 per cent) in this 
study previously held cabinet office. H owever there is significant variation across the five
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states. In the case o f  Ireland, all the Tanaiste except Norton, Spring and Harney had 
previous ministerial experience before they became Tanaiste. It should be noted that 
Norton’s party had not been in government prior to him becom ing Tanaiste so it was 
impossible for him to have had ministerial experience. Furthermore, both Spring and 
Harney had been junior ministers prior to becom ing Tanaiste. A gain the narrow 
definition o f  ministerial experience is giving a lower result than an alternative and wider 
definition might give. In both Sweden and the UK, six out o f  seven deputy-leaders had 
previous cabinet experience. W hile in the Netherlands, seven V ice M inister Presidents 
had no previous cabinet experience, but it is still the case that 71 per cent o f  V ice  
Minister Presidents did. It is in the United States that the greatest divergence from this 
trend occurs in that only one out o f  the 12 Vice-Presidents (eight per cent) had previous 
cabinet experience (although another one, Rockefeller was an under-secretary). This may 
be accounted for by the fact that the cabinet is less influential in the U S system o f  
government. Nonetheless, even with the low  level o f  previous cabinet experience among 
US deputy-leaders, it is still that case that m ost deputy-leaders in this study had previous 
cabinet experience. U sing the average o f  the averages calculation increases the level o f  
deputy-leaders with previous cabinet experience to 6 6  per cent.
4 .2 .6  C o n c lu s io n
Having examined the background o f  those who went on to becom e deputy-leaders, it can 
be concluded that the majority o f  them held a number o f  policy-related posts. Prior to 
being deputy-leaders, it was found that o f  those deputy-leaders in this study: 98 per cent 
held prominent elected office; 83 per cent were members o f  legislative committees; 81
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per cent were opposition spokespersons and 64 per cent held cabinet positions. W hile US 
deputy-leaders diverged from these figures in both the case o f  opposition 
spokespersonships (42 per cent) and cabinet positions (17 per cent), they were in line 
with the global figures on the remaining two measures. U sing the average o f  the averages 
calculation to address the issue o f  an imbalance in the distribution o f  deputy-leaders 
across the five states under investigation shows that: 99 per cent held prominent elected 
office; 8 6  per cent were members o f  legislative committees; 82 per cent were opposition 
spokespersons and 6 6  per cent held cabinet positions. Thus it can be concluded from 
these findings that the majority o f  deputy-leaders across all five states under examination 
displayed an interest in policy in terms o f  the positions they held prior to becoming  
deputy-leaders.
4 .3  H y p o t h e s i s  t w o
4 .3 .1  In tro d u ctio n
The second hypothesis states that:
If deputy-leaders matter, then those in the office will have had a strong policy 
focus prior to coming to office.
While still concerned with the motivation o f  those who becom e deputy-leaders, this 
hypothesis contrasts with the first hypothesis in that it focuses on policy-related actions, 
while the former focuses on policy-related positions. In order to test this hypothesis, the
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actions o f  future deputy-leaders w ill be divided into those taken inside and outside 
parliament. Actions outside o f  parliament to be identified include: policy documents that 
were produced by the future deputy-leaders; speeches that they made on policy proposals 
and contributions they made to policy debates in the media. In terms o f  actions taken in 
parliament, these w ill include: legislation that was proposed by those who went on to 
become deputy-leaders and speeches that they made on legislation. Again these two 
elements o f  this observable implication w ill be tested in turn on a comparative basis. It 
should also be noted that the significance o f  the speeches, policy  proposals, contributions 
or legislation is not being tested as it is sufficient for the purposes o f  this study to show  
that the future deputy-leaders made speeches, prepared policy proposals, made 
contributions to debates, or proposed legislation. The taking o f  such actions in itself 
indicates an interest in policy, which is what is being tested for. Furthermore, the 
successful implementation o f  policy, proposals or legislation is also irrelevant insofar as 
the mere proposing o f  such measures is sufficient to display an interest in policy.
4 .3 .2  P o lic y -r e la te d  a c t io n s  o f  fu tu re  d e p u ty - le a d e r s  o u t s id e  p a r lia m e n t
In terms o f  policy-related actions taken outside o f  parliament prior to becom ing deputy- 
leader, policy-docum ents, speeches on policy or contributions to policy debates in the 
media were sought.
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Table 4-5 Number of deputy-leaders who took policy-related actions outside parliament prior to
becoming deputy-leader
Number of 
deputy-leaders 
(1946-2002)
Number of deputy-leaders who took 
policy-related actions outside parliament 
prior to becoming deputy-leader 
(percentage of total number of deputy- 
leaders)
Ireland 14 14 (100% )
Netherlands 14 14(100% )
Sweden 7 7(100% )
United Kingdom 7 7(100% )
United States 1 2 1 2  ( 1 0 0 %)
TOTAL 54 54(100% )
Average of the 
Averages
1 0 0 %
Table 4.5 provides a summary o f  the number o f  deputy-leaders who were found to have 
been involved in policy development or articulation prior to taking up office as deputy- 
leader. Full details are given in Appendix 3. It was not possible to determine whether or 
not ten o f  the Dutch deputy-leaders took policy-related actions outside o f  parliament prior 
to becoming deputy-leader due to a lack o f  data sources. For this reason they have been 
excluded from this table. From Table 4.5 it can be seen that all the deputy-leaders whose 
careers prior to becom ing deputy-leaders were examined were found to have engaged 
with policy issues in one form or another outside o f  parliament.
4 .3 .3  P o lic y -r e la te d  a c t io n s  o f  fu tu re  d e p u ty - le a d e r s  in s id e  p a r lia m en t
In order to assess i f  the deputy-leaders in this study engaged in policy-related actions in 
parliament prior to becom ing deputy-leader, legislation and speeches on legislation and 
policy m otions were sought.
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Table 4-6 Number of deputy-leaders who took policy-related actions in parliament prior to becoming
deputy-leader
Number of 
deputy-leaders 
(1946-2002)
Number of deputy-leaders who took 
policy-related actions in parliament 
prior to becoming deputy-leader 
(percentage of total number of deputy- 
leaders)
Ireland 14 14(100% )
Netherlands 23 23 (100%)
Sweden 7 7 (100% )
United Kingdom 7 7(100% )
United States 1 2 10 (83%)
TOTAL 63 61 (97%)
Average of the 
Averages
97%
Tables 4.6 shows the results o f  the search to find policy-related parliamentary actions 
taken by future deputy-leaders. It was not possible to determine whether or not one o f  the 
Dutch deputy-leaders took policy-related actions in parliament prior to becom ing deputy- 
leader due to a lack o f  data sources. For this reason he was excluded from this table. The 
majority o f  deputy-leaders in this study were found to have taken som e such action. In 
the cases o f  the Irish, Dutch, Swedish and British deputy-leaders for whom  data was 
available, it was found that they all engaged in policy-related activity within parliament. 
In the case o f  the United States where 10 out o f  12 deputy-leaders (83 per cent) engaged 
in policy-related parliamentary activity, it should be noted that the two future deputy- 
leaders who did not do so (A gnew  and Rockefeller), were not in parliament and thus 
never had the opportunity to do so.
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4 .3 .4  C o n c lu s io n
Having examined the activities both inside and outside o f  parliament o f  those who went 
on to become deputy-leaders, it can be concluded that the vast majority o f  them engaged 
in policy-related activity prior to becom ing deputy-leaders.
Prior to being deputy-leaders, it was found that o f  those deputy-leaders in this study 100 
per cent engaged in policy-related activity outside o f  parliament and 97 per cent engaged 
in such activity in parliament. W hen the average o f  the averages is calculated, 100 per 
cent engaged in policy-related activity outside o f  parliament and 97 per cent were active 
in the policy area while in parliament.
4 . 4  C o n c l u s i o n
The observable implications arising from the first two hypotheses have now  been tested. 
These hypotheses seek to determine i f  deputy-leaders are likely to want to influence 
policy. Having examined the background o f  the deputy-leaders in each o f  the five states, 
it was demonstrated that the future deputy-leaders would appear to display a desire to 
influence policy insofar as the vast majority o f  them held policy-related posts and took 
policy-related actions both inside and outside o f  parliament. The average o f  the average 
figures show that 99 per cent held prominent elected office, 8 6  per cent were members o f  
legislative comm ittees, 82 per cent were opposition spokespersons, 6 6  per cent held 
cabinet positions, 1 0 0  per cent engaged in policy-related activity outside o f  parliament, 
and 97 per cent were active in the policy area while in parliament prior to being deputy- 
leaders. This strongly indicates that those who went on to becom e deputy-leaders
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displayed an interest in policy matters in terms o f  both the positions they held and the 
actions they took.
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5  H Y P O T H E S E S  A N D  Q U A N T A T I T I V E  O B S E R V A B L E  
I M P L I C A T I O N S  R E L A T I N G  T O  D E P U T Y - L E A D E R S  IN
O F F I C E
5 .1  I n t r o d u c t i o n
This chapter w ill focus on the activities o f  deputy-leaders during their term(s) in office. It 
will involve the testing o f  hypotheses three to five via four quantitative observable 
implications. A  qualitative observable implication relating to hypothesis five w ill be 
examined in a separate chapter. Hypothesis three is concerned with the motivation o f  the 
deputy-leaders while hypotheses four and five deal with the capacity o f  deputy-leaders to 
influence policy.
5 .2  H y p o t h e s i s  t h r e e
5 .2 .1  In tro d u ctio n
The third hypothesis states that:
If deputy-leaders matter, then they will focus on policy while in the office.
If the office o f  deputy-leader has policy implementation possibilities, one would expect 
those who attain the office to show  some interest in policy once in the position. This will 
be tested by seeking policy documents, policy speeches or legislation that the deputy- 
leaders proposed while in office. These policy-related actions must relate to areas beyond
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any ministerial role that the deputy-leader held so as to ensure that the policy focus is due 
to their being deputy-leader rather than any additional cabinet responsibilities that they 
had. Once again, the significance and success o f  the policy, speeches or legislation will 
not be examined as the delivery o f  speeches, policy proposals and/or legislation is 
sufficient to indicate an interest in policy, which is what is being tested for. Similarly 
when it is stated that the deputy-leaders in question w ill focus on policy, it is not meant 
that policy w ill be their sole focus.
5 .2 .2  P o lic y -r e la te d  a c t io n s  o f  d e p u ty - le a d e r s  in o f f ic e
In order to determine i f  deputy-leaders had an interest in policy w hile holding the office  
o f  deputy-leader, policy proposals, legislation or speeches on legislation that they were 
involved with while in the office beyond any ministerial role that the deputy-leader held 
were sought. Sources used in this search include: biographies, newspapers o f  record (for 
example Irish Times, the Times, The Washington P ost) and news m agazines such as the 
Economist, as w ell as the records o f  parliamentary debates and questions (Online 
databases are available in the Irish and Swedish cases w hile copies o f  the UK  
parliamentary records were also consulted).
T a b le  5-1 N u m b e r o f  d e p u ty - le a d e rs  w h o  issued p o lic y  docum e n ts , speeches o r  le g is la tio n  beyond 
th e ir  m in is te r ia l ro le  w h ile  d e p u ty - le a d e rs .
Number of 
deputy-leaders 
(1946-2002)
Number of deputy-leaders who issued 
policy documents, speeches or legislation 
while deputy-leaders (percentage of total 
number of deputy-leaders)
Ireland 14 1 2  (8 6 %)
Netherlands 24 19(79% )
Sweden 7 7 (100%)
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United Kingdom 7 6 (86%)
United States 12 11 (92%)
TOTAL 64 55 (86%)
Average of the 
Averages
89%
Tables 5.1 shows the results o f  the search to find policy-related actions taken by deputy- 
leaders. Full details are given in Appendix 4. All bar nine o f  the deputy-leaders in this 
study were found to have taken some such action. In the case o f  the Irish, tw elve out o f  
fourteen had taken policy-related actions. W hile nineteen out o f  twenty-four Dutch 
deputy-leaders engaged in policy-related activity beyond their ministerial role. A ll the 
Swedish deputy-leaders did so while six out o f  seven British deputy-leaders engaged in 
policy-related activity w ithin parliament. In the case o f  the United States, eleven out o f  
twelve deputy-leaders engaged in policy-related activity beyond their ministerial brief 
while they were in office. In this case it is only one Vice-President (Gerald Ford) who 
appears not to have had a policy role during his V ice-presidency as a search o f  
biographies revealed no activities in the area. However, it must be borne in mind that he 
only held the office for eight months before he went on to assume the Presidency and that 
during those eight months the issue that dominated his agenda was the possible removal 
from office o f President N ixon  and how he as Vice-President would deal with that issue.
5 .2 .3  C o n c lu s io n
Having examined the activities o f  the 64 deputy-leaders in this study while they were in 
office, it has been found that 55 o f  them had engaged in som e form o f  policy-related 
activity while they were in office. W hile this indicates a focus on policy while they were
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in office, it does not indicate that they were soley focused on policy w hile they were 
deputy-leaders. N onetheless, such a strong result indicates that almost all o f  the deputy- 
leaders in this study had an interest in policy.
5 .3  H y p o t h e s i s  f o u r
5 .3 .1  In tro d u ctio n
The fourth hypothesis states that:
If deputy-leaders matter, then they will have policy development and 
implementation resources available to them.
In order to influence policy, deputy-leaders w ill require staff to research policy  
options, to draft legislation and see it through to implementation. If  the office o f  
deputy-leader is purely ceremonial in nature, then it is likely to be backed up by a 
small secretariat and would not have significant staff resources available to it. I f  
however it has a policy role, then the office would em ploy a number o f  civil service 
staff and political appointees with policy-related job  specifications. Both the size o f  
the staff available to the deputy-leader and their role w ill be examined.
This will be tested via two observable implications. Firstly, i f  the deputy-leader’s 
office has a policy-related role, then it w ill have a total budget in line with other 
policy-developing departments and areas. Secondly, a number o f  staff o f  the deputy- 
leader will have policy-orientated job  specifications or roles. In this instance it is not 
the number o f  staff with such a role that matters, but merely that there are staff with
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policy responsibilities in the office o f  the deputy-leader as distinct from being staff in 
an office dealing with any additional cabinet responsibilities o f  the deputy-leader.
5 .3 .2  P o lic y -r e la te d  r e s o u r c e s  o f  d e p u ty - le a d e r s
Given the difficulty o f  accessing historical data on departmental budgets, only most 
recently available budget allocations w ill be examined, which w ill be the 2002/2003  
figures. A ll budgets w ill be for 2002, except in the case o f  the UK where the office o f  
Deputy Prime Minister was only established in its own right in M ay 2002. The currencies 
are all converted to euros based on the exchange rate as it stood on December 12 2003.
A further issue that arises in relation to this observable implication is with whom  the 
budget o f  the deputy-leaders office should be compared? M ost government departments 
would have broad areas o f  responsibility and are thus likely to have a large staff o f  civil 
servants and thus a large budget. The m ost appropriate department would appear to be 
that o f  the Prime Minister/President, which would be the m ost similar department to that 
o f  the Deputy-Leader.
A third issue is the possible overlap o f  ministerial responsibilities and deputy-leader 
responsibilities and the resulting difficulty o f  disentangling the separate budgets for each 
role. In this instance, only the budget allocations for the deputy-leader w ill be included in 
this study. So where a deputy-leader has additional ministerial responsibilities, only the 
budget for their deputy-leader activities will be included, while the budget for their other 
cabinet portfolio w ill be excluded. The situation with regard to the budget o f  the O ffice o f
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Deputy Prime Minister in the U K  requires clarification in this context. In M ay 2002, the 
Office o f  Deputy Prime Minister was established in its own right (prior to this it was part 
o f  the Cabinet O ffice) and has responsibility for a number o f  areas such as housing, 
regional policy and the fire service that would normally fall within the remit o f  a ministry 
such as Housing or the Environment. This gives the O ffice o f  Deputy Prime Minister a 
very large budget which is included in its entirety in this study because the office-holder 
is not simultaneously a Minister. Therefore the w hole o f  the budget accrues to the 
deputy-leader per se.
T ab le  5-2 P o lic y -re la te d  resources o f  d e pu ty -lead e rs .
Budget of deputy- 
leader’s office
Budget of 
leader’s office
Staff with policy- 
related role (Y/N)
Ireland N on e 102 N /A No
Netherlands N on e 10 J N /A No
Sweden N /A € 6 . 1 m 1U4 Yes
United Kingdom €8.9 b illion 103 €204m 1Ub Yes
United States €4 .1m lu/ €277m lUÿ Yes
Table 5.2 summarises the policy-related resources o f  deputy-leaders in the five states 
under examination in 2002/2003. Irish, Dutch, Swedish and U S data is for 2002, while 
the UK data is for fiscal year 2002/2003 (as the office was only created in 2002).
102 A va ila b le  from : h ttp ://w w w .en tem p.ie /depart.h tm  [accessed 22 O ctober 2003 ],
103 In fo rm a tion  supp lied  b y  R o ya l N etherlands Em bassy, D u b lin .
104 Swedish G overnm en t Y ea rbo ok  2002, p. 70. Data is fo r  2002. F igu re  in Swedish K ro n e  is 55,853,000 
SEK.
105 Data on U K  D e pu ty -P rim e  M in is te r ava ilab le  from : h ttp ://w w w .h m -
ireasurv.tiov.uk/p re  budget report/prebud pbr02 /report/p rebud pbr02 repannexb2.cfm  [accessed 20 
N ovem ber 2002 ], U K  figu res  are fo r  budget year 2002/2003. F igu re  in  S te rling  is £6.2 b illio n .
106 A va ila b le  from : h ttp ://w w w .hm -trea su ry .go v .U k /m e d ia //6 8E D 8 /4 1 .pd f [accessed 15 N ovem ber 2003], 
F igure is fo r  C abinet O ff ic e  budget 2001. F igure in S te rling  is £142m .
107 A va ila b le  from : htt p ://w w w . w h ite  house, go v /o  i nb /bud g e i/fv 2 0 04/pd f/ap pe n d i x /E O  P. p d f  [accessed 11 
N ovem ber 2003 ], U S  figu res  are fo r  budget year 2002. F igu re  in  U S  do lla rs  is $5m .
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From Table 5.2, it is clear that there is significant variation in the budget o f  deputy- 
leaders across the states under investigation. In the case o f  Ireland, the Tanaiste has no 
department separate and distinct from their ministerial office, thus strictly speaking the 
Tanaiste has no budget. The Dutch Vice-M inister President (or Deputy Prime Minister) is 
in a similar situation in that while the post exists there is no department to support it and 
the holder o f  the post is basically a Minister in charge o f  a department with the additional 
title and responsibilities o f  deputy-leader and so has no separate budget as deputy-leader. 
The US Vice-President has a budget o f  €4.1 m illion. However, when the resources 
available to the U S President and Vice-President are compared, there is a significant 
discrepancy. From Table 5.2 it can be seen that the budget o f  the Executive O ffice o f  the 
President is just over 67 tim es that o f  the Vice-President. H owever, the Vice-President 
has significant resources available to him compared to the Irish and Dutch deputy- 
leaders. Nonetheless, all these figures are dwarfed by the budget o f  the UK  Deputy-Prime 
Minister which stands at €8.9  billion. This budget far exceeds that o f  the UK  Prime 
Minister and all other deputy-leaders in this study. The U K  O ffice o f  Deputy Prime 
Minister has policy responsibility for housing, hom elessness, planning, the fire service, 
devolution and local and regional government, hence the large budget. 109
If we widen out this line o f  inquiry, it appears that there is also significant variation over 
time in the budgets o f  deputy-leaders in the states in this study. In the case o f  Ireland,
108 This figu re  is de rived  fro m  a to ta l budget o f  €342 m inus V ice -P res id en t’ s budget o f€ 5 m . A v a ila b le  
from : h ttp ://w w w .w liiteh ou se .gov /o m b/bud ge t/iy2 00 4 /ag enc ies .h tm l [accessed 10 N ovem ber 2003 ], F igure 
in US dollars is $337m .
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while there was no office for the Tanaiste in 2002, a separate office o f  the Tanaiste had 
been created in 1993 and was retained follow ing the change o f  government in 1994.
However while the post o f  Tanaiste continued to exist, the office o f  the Tanaiste was 
abolished when the rainbow government lost office in 1997.110 In 1993, when it was set 
up, the budget for this office was set at €1 m illion . 111 This budget disappeared with the 
abolition o f  the office in 1997. Similarly in the U K  and Sweden, the office has not existed 
for long periods, therefore there was no budget associated with it. In the case o f  the UK, 
the Office o f  the Deputy Prime Minister was only created as an office in its own right in 
May 2002 . 112 In 2002/2003, the budget for the office o f  Deputy-Prime Minister stood at 
€8.9 billion which was a significant increase on the already high figure for the previous 
year which was € 6 . 6  billion , 113 and this figure for 2 0 0 1 / 2 0 0 2  includes not only the 
Deputy Prime M inister’s budget but also the budget o f  his additional cabinet 
responsibilities. In the Netherlands there has been a degree o f  consistency insofar as there 
has been no separate budget for the deputy-leader. The U S V ice-President’s budget has 
steadily increased over tim e . 114 During the 1990s, it stayed within the three to €3.2
109 A va ila b le  from :
h ttp ://w w w .odpm .gov .uk /s te llcn t/g roups /odpm  about/docum ents/page/odpm  about 025336 .n d f [accessed 
7 N ovem ber 2003].
110 Irish  T im es, June 21st, 1997, p. 6.
111 Irish  punt equ iva len t is £800,000 (based on euro convers ion rate o f  1 euro equals 0.787564 punt). Data 
from : D a il E ireann V o l 426, 23 February, 1993. A va ila b le  fro m  h ttp ://w w w .o ireach tas-deba tes.gov.ie / 
[accessed 16 June 2002 ].
112 A va ila b le  from :
h ttp ://w w w .odpm .gov .uk /s te llen t/g roups /odpm  about/docum ents/Dage/odpm  about 02 53 36 .p d f [accessed 
7 N ovem ber 2003],
113 A va ila b le  from  h ttp ://w w w .h m -
treasurv.£O v.uk/p ie budget re po rt/p  re bud pbr02 /report/p rebud pbr02 repannexb2.cfm  [accessed 20 
N ovem ber 2002 ], F igures in  s te rling  are £6.2 b i l l io n  and £4.6 b i l l io n  respective ly .
114 In fo rm a tion  taken fro m : h ttp ://w w w .w h itehouse .gov /om b /budge t/fv2004 /shee ts /ou tlavs .x ls  [accessed 24 
N ovem ber 2003 ]. A l l  figu res are based on 1996 prices.
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million [$4m] range, however between 1988 and 1995 it grew from €1.4  m illion to 
€2.6m illion.115
From Table 5.2 it can be seen that the policy-staffing situation o f  deputy-leaders also 
differs across the five states under study. In Ireland and the Netherlands, the deputy- 
leader has no staff specifically assigned to them in their role as deputy-leader. Once 
again, this is a consequence o f  the position o f  deputy-leader being a title without a 
supporting office. On the other hand, Swedish, U K  and US deputy-leaders have staff with 
policy responsibilities to assist them in their deputy-leader role.
Furthermore, the situation in relation to staff with policy responsibilities who are 
assigned to the deputy-leaders office varies over time in most o f  the states under study. 
While the Irish Tanaiste has no staff in 2002, there was a staff between 1993 and 1997. In 
answer to a Dail question in February 1993, the then Tanaiste, D ick Spring, stated that 
the newly formed office o f  the Tanaiste would have ‘a small number o f  additional staff 
... for research and policy advice purposes’.116 W hen the Tanaiste’s office was abolished 
with the change o f  government in 1997, staff were no longer assigned to assist the 
Tanaiste in the policy area. In the case o f  Sweden, there is also much variation in the role 
and resources o f  the Deputy-Prime Minister from government to government. ‘There is 
no set structure for a deputy PM. It is ... up to the PM to decide whether there should be 
a deputy [Prime Minister] or not. It is also up to the PM to decide whether the deputy 
should have a portfolio or not, and a staff working with issues in that portfolio.’
115 In  US  do lla rs th is  is a rise  fro m  $1.7 m il l io n  to  $3.1 m illio n .
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(Response to query from Jan Larrson -  Head o f  Press Department, Prime Minister’s 
Office 12 Novem ber 2003).
Variation in the staffing levels in the O ffice o f  the U K  Deputy Prime M inister are more
I 1 7
extreme, reaching a peak level o f  6,500 staff in 2002, however this is a result o f  the
significant responsibilities o f  the office as it was then configured. W hile the staffing
figures associated with previous holders o f  the office were not found, G eoffrey Howe
who held the position between 1989 and 1990 as w ell as being Leader o f  the House o f
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Commons had a budget o f  one and a half m illion pounds w hich suggests that he had 
significantly less staff than Prescott (who had a budget o f  6.2 billion pounds) whose 
responsibilities as Deputy-Prime Minister included housing, the regions and the fire 
service across the UK. Given that some o f  H ow e’s budget would be for staff to deal with 
his responsibilities as Leader o f  the House o f  Commons, the staff required to assist with 
his Deputy-Prime Minister role are likely to have been even less than the figure o f  one 
and a half m illion pounds suggests. Moreover, it is im possible to separate out the deputy- 
leader’s proportion o f  the budget. In short, in the UK , the responsibilities o f  the deputy- 
leader have varied from holder to holder and thus so have the staffing requirements.
It is only in the U S and the Netherlands that there has been som e degree o f  consistency  
regarding the numbers o f  staff with policy responsibilities allotted to the office o f  the 
deputy-leader. In the case o f  the Netherlands, the position o f  Vice-M inister President is
116 D a il E ireann V o l 426, 16 February, 1993. A v a ila b le  from  h ttp ://w w w .o ireach tas-deba tes.gov.ie / 
[accessed 16 June 2002 ],
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similar to that o f  Tanaiste insofar as it is a title without an accompanying office to 
support it. Dutch deputy-leaders rely on the staff in whatever additional cabinet portfolio 
they have been given for support. On the other hand the US Vice-President has staff with 
a policy role and this has been consistently the case. W hile policy responsibilities may 
vary from Vice-President to Vice-President, they have all had staff with policy  
responsibilities. However the number o f  staff has increased significantly over time: 
‘From fewer than 20 staff members at the end o f  N ixon ’s vice-presidency, the number 
increased to 60 during the 1970s, with the addition o f  not only political and support staff 
but advisors on dom estic policy and national security.’ 19 Vice-President Q uayle’s staff 
was larger than those o f  Bush or M ondale.120 According to Hatfield (1997), Mondale had
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a Vice-Presidential staff that ‘ranged from fifty-five to sixty m em bers’ So, while the 
US Vice-President has consistently had policy focused staff attached to the office, their 
number have varied from Vice-President to Vice-President but are trending upwards over 
time.
In terms o f  whether party-leadership or additional cabinet responsibilities have a greater 
impact on the allocation o f  policy-resources than deputy-leadership, the limited nature o f  
the data gathered severely curtails the possibility o f  a detailed examination. In particular 
in the case o f  Sweden, there is insufficient information available on the budget o f  the
117 A va ila b le  from :
http :// vvw vv.odpin.uov.uk/ste llen t/g roups/odpm  about/docum ents/page/odpm  about 025336.pd f  [accessed 
7 N ovem ber 2003],
118 The Independent, M a rch  4 1990, p. 21.
119 A va ila b le  from : h ttp ://w w w .sen a te .K O v/a rta nd h is to rv /h is to rv /co in n io n /b rie fiiia /V ice  President.Inm  
[accessed 3 June 2003 ].
120 A va ila b le  from : h ttp ://w w vv.sena te .H ov/a rtandh is to rv /h is to rv /com m on/b rie fin iz /V ice  President.htm  
[accessed 3 June 2003].
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deputy-leader for any conclusions to be drawn. That is not to say that nothing can be said 
on the matter in the case o f  the other four states. In Ireland and the Netherlands, there 
have been deputy-leaders who have been party-leaders and deputy-leaders who were not 
party-leaders, yet the staffing and budgetary situations have remained the same (i.e. no 
specific staff or budget) with one exception in the Irish case. In the UK, none o f  the 
deputy-leaders in this study were party-leaders and they all had additional cabinet 
responsibilities, yet the policy-resources available to the deputy-leader fluctuated 
significantly over the time-period covered by this study. It is on ly in the case o f  the US, 
that a steady increase in the policy resources o f  the deputy-leader is found. N one o f  the 
US deputy-leaders were party leaders and none o f  them had additional cabinet 
responsibilities. Overall, it is difficult to attribute the fluctuation in policy resources 
available to deputy-leaders to their status as deputy-leader or party-leader or their 
additional cabinet responsibilities.
5 .3 .3  C o n c lu s io n
Having examined the policy-related resources o f  deputy-leaders in terms o f  their budgets 
and their staff, it can be concluded that there is significant variation in terms o f  resources 
available to the deputy-leaders in this study, not just across states but also over time 
within states. It is only in the case o f  the US Vice-President that staff with policy  
responsibilities and budgetary resources have consistently been available to the office­
holder. However, even in this instance, the budgetary resources have varied over time. 
The Dutch Vice-M inister President is in the opposite situation in that they have
121 A va ila b le  from : h i lp : / /w w w .sena te .izov /a fland iiis to rv /h ¡s to ry /co in m on /b rie fin ti/V ice  President.h im
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consistently lacked staff with policy responsibilities and an office budget to accompany 
their deputy-leader title. In the case of the Swedish and UK deputy-leaders the situation 
has varied significantly depending on what role the deputy-leader has been given. In 
Ireland, with the exception of the years 1993-1997, the Tanaiste has not had either staff 
or a budget available to them in their capacity as deputy-leader. In other words, it would 
appear that deputy-leaders in three of the five states under investigation have only on 
some occasions had policy-related resources made available to them. In the case of the 
fourth state (the Netherlands), they have not had the resources made available to them at 
all and it is only in the case of the United States that such resources have been 
consistently available.
5 .4  H y p o th e s i s  f iv e
5.4.1 Introduction
The fifth hypothesis states that:
If deputy-leaders matter, then they will influence policies that they believe to 
be important while in the office.
This gives rise to two observable implications. The first observable implication is that if 
deputy-leaders can shape policy, then one would expect that they will push for the 
implementation of policies that they strongly believe in and that they will also seek to 
undermine polices which they strongly disagree with. These policies will ideally be 
outside the area of any additional cabinet responsibilities that they have so as to ensure
[accessed 3 June 2003].
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that any influence is due to their being deputy-leaders as distinct from ministers. The only 
exception to this will be in the case where they are able to push through or thwart a policy 
within the area of their cabinet responsibility which they were unable to do so prior to 
becoming deputy-leader. This will be tested in the following chapter which deals with the 
qualitative analysis of the hypotheses.
A second observable implication arising from this hypothesis is that deputy-leaders will 
chair a number of committees with policy roles beyond their departmental responsibilities 
as this is one of the key ways of influencing policy while in office. Furthermore, while it 
may be difficult to determine whether or not a deputy-leader did influence policy as those 
involved may have different perspectives on the issue, whether or not a deputy-leader 
chaired a policy committee while in office is clear-cut and a matter of public record. 
Mere membership of such committees will not be checked as its is a weaker measure of 
policy influence than chairing such committees.
5.4.2 Deputy-leader’s chairing of policy-related committees while in office
If deputy-leaders seek to influence policy then they can be expected to chair policy 
committees while in office. Committees chaired by a deputy-leader will be sought as 
chairmanship indicates greater policy influence. Such committees should examine policy 
issues beyond the deputy-leader’s narrow departmental responsibilities. As was pointed 
out in section 4.2.3, the power and role of legislative committees varies across the five 
states under examination. An added difference arises in the case of ministers. 
Constitutionally, ministers must give up their seats in parliament in the Netherlands and
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Sweden. While in the US, the Vice-President chairs meetings of the Senate but is not 
drawn from among its elected members. In Ireland and the UK, ministers must be drawn 
from amongst the members of parliament and remain so after their appointment as 
ministers. To ensure comparison of like with like, given these differences, deputy- 
leaders’ membership of legislative committees will not be included in this study.
Looking at cabinet committees, there are also some differences to be borne in mind. In 
the case of the Netherlands, all the permanent cabinet committees are presided over by 
the Prime Minister who ‘chairs all meetings of the cabinet and its committees’ (Andeweg 
& Irwin, 2002, p. 113). In other words the Dutch deputy-leaders do not chair cabinet 
committees. In the case of the United Kingdom, there has been a ‘long-standing practice 
of refusing to disclose any details of the Cabinet committee system’ (Dunleavy, 1994, p. 
359). It is only since May 1992 that a full list of the names of members of cabinet 
committees and sub-committees has been made public. Details of cabinet committees 
prior to this date have emerged as once secret files are made public. In the case of British 
cabinet committees, their chairing is spread across the cabinet and deputy-leaders have 
chaired a number of such committees as is shown in the figures given below. In the 
United States, the Vice-President has historically been given a role in chairing policy 
committees. While many of these committees may not strictly speaking be cabinet- 
committees, they are close approximations in that they input into government policy. In 
the case of Ireland, it ‘lacks an institutionalised system of cabinet committees comparable 
to European practice’ (Connolly & O’Halpin, 1999, p. 257). While Irish cabinet 
committees exist, they tend to be informal, ad-hoc and shortlived (with some notable
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exceptions). Furthermore, the resources that they draw on are provided by the ministers 
that serve on them rather than having resources of their own. So cabinet committee 
chairing is not a useful measure in an Irish context. Sweden does not make use of cabinet 
committees as ‘Swedish ministers have limited powers to make independent decisions. 
All government decisions are taken collectively by the Government as a whole.’1 2 
Cabinet committees are ‘an unknown concept’ (Larsson, 1997, p.237) in the Swedish 
context.
So, while cabinet committees do not exist in all the states in this study, where they do 
exist the role of deputy-leaders in cabinet committees can still be examined. In the case of 
Ireland and Sweden, where there are few or no such committees, there is one less means 
of assessing the influence of deputy-leaders on policy while in office.
Table 5-3 Number of deputy-leaders who chaired policy-related committees while in office.
Number of 
deputy-leaders 
(1946-2002)
Number of deputy-leaders who chaired 
policy-related committees while in office, 
(percentage of total number of deputy- 
leaders)
Ireland 14 N/A
Netherlands 24 0 (0%)
Sweden 7 N/A
United Kingdom 7 5 (72%)
United States123 11 11 (100%)
TOTAL 63 16(25%)
Average of the 
Averages
57%11/4
122 Available from: http://www.sweden.gov.se/svstemofgov/svstem govandriks.htm [accessed March 13 
2003],
123 Alban Barkley has been excluded from this table reducing the number of US Vice-Presidents to 11 as
i. data on his policy committee memberships could not be found.
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Tables 5.3 shows the results of the search to find policy-related committees that were 
chaired by deputy-leaders. Full details are given in Appendix 5. The total percentage of 
deputy-leaders in this study who chaired policy committees while in office is low at 25 
per cent. However, taking into account that none of the Dutch deputy-leaders served as 
cabinet committees chairs and the large number of Dutch deputy-leaders in the study, the 
average of the averages total rises to 57 per cent. This is due to the fact that all the US 
and 72 per cent of the UK deputy-leaders in this study for whom data was available were 
found to have chaired some policy-related committees in contrast with the Netherlands 
where none did. In the case of Ireland and Sweden, neither state has cabinet committees.
Examining the results to determine the influence of party-leadership or possession of a 
ministerial position as distinct from the influence of deputy-leadership is not very useful 
in this instance. This is because none of the US Vice-Presidents were party leaders or 
held additional cabinet positions at the same time as they were deputy-leader and 
similarly none of the UK Deputy-Prime Ministers were party leaders at the same time as 
they were deputy-leader, however they all held additional cabinet positions at the same 
time as they were deputy-leader.
5.4.3 Conclusion
Having examined the quantitative observable implication relating to the hypothesis that if 
deputy-leaders matter, then they will seek to influence policies that they believe to be 
important while in the office, it can be concluded that in most of the states under
124 The average of the average in this instance relates only to the data from the Netherlands, the UK and the
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investigation where cabinet committees exist the majority of deputy-leaders chair such 
committees indicating a capability to influence policy. It is only in the case of the 
Netherlands that cabinet committees were found to exist, but were not chaired by deputy- 
leaders.
5 .5  C o n c lu s io n
In this chapter, the quantitative observable implications arising from three hypotheses 
relating to the policy-related motivation and capabilities of deputy-leaders while in office 
were examined. In the case of hypothesis three, it was found that over four-fifths of the 
deputy-leaders in the five states under investigation had a policy focus while in office 
insofar as they produced policy proposals, legislation or speeches on legislation beyond 
their ministerial roles. The fourth hypothesis examined the policy-related resources of 
deputy-leaders in terms of their budgets and their staff. It found that while there is 
significant variation in terms of resources available to the deputy-leaders in this study, 
not just across states but also over time within states, deputy-leaders in three out of the 
five states had staff with policy roles attached to their office and half of the deputy- 
leaders for whom data was available had significant budgets for their office. The fifth 
hypothesis stated that deputy-leaders would seek to influence policies that they believe to 
be important while in the office. The quantitative data relating to this hypothesis 
examined whether or not deputy-leaders chaired policy committees while in office. It was 
found that in two out of the three states where cabinet committees exist and where data 
was available that the majority of deputy-leaders chaired such committees.
US as data was not available from Sweden and Ireland.
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The findings arising from the testing of the quantitative observable implications resulting 
from the three hypotheses indicate that, while in office, deputy-leaders have both the 
motivation and interest (as shown in the testing of hypothesis three) and in some states 
the capability (as shown in the testing of hypothesis four and five) to influence policy. 
While these are strong results, they are not conclusive in terms of showing that deputy- 
leaders can influence policy. This will require an examination of the findings relating to 
the testing of all the hypotheses.
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6  H Y P O T H E S E S  A N D  Q U A L IT A T IV E  O B S E R V A B L E  
I M P L I C A T I O N S  R E L A T I N G  T O  D E P U T Y - L E A D E R S  IN
O F F I C E
6.1 I n t r o d u c t io n
This chapter will focus on the activities of deputy-leaders while in office from a 
qualitative perspective. It will involve the testing of an observable implication arising 
from hypothesis five. Hypothesis five deals with the capacity of deputy-leaders to 
influence policy rather than their motivation or interest in policy.
The fifth hypothesis states that:
If deputy-leaders matter, then they will influence policies that they believe to 
be important while in the office.
The quantitative observable implication arising from this hypothesis was dealt with in the 
previous chapter. The qualitative observable implication is that if deputy-leaders can 
shape policy, then one would expect that they will push for the implementation of 
policies that they strongly believe in and that they will also seek to undermine polices 
with which they strongly disagree. It is unlikely that they will be capable of 
implementing all the policies that would like to and of halting all policies with which 
they disagree. However, what can be said is that if they have no influence then they will 
be unable to implement any of the policies they agree with and unable to halt the
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implementation of any of the policies with which they disagree. In order to show that 
they have policy influence, all that is required is evidence to show that they were able to 
implement some policy with which they agreed with or halted some policy with which 
they disagreed. These policies should be in an area outside any additional cabinet 
responsibilities of the deputy-leaders so as to ensure that any influence identified can be 
attributed to their being deputy-leader rather than a member of cabinet. The one 
exception to this is the scenario where it can be shown that a minister was able to push 
through or stifle a policy within the area of their additional cabinet responsibilities when 
they were deputy-leader that they were unable to before they were deputy-leader.
6 .2  D e p u t y - l e a d e r s ’ a b i l i ty  t o  in f lu e n c e  p o l ic y  w h i le  in  o f f ic e
6.2.1 Introduction
A number of practical issues arise in seeking to identify instances where deputy-leaders 
were able to either implement policies that they favoured or stifle policies that they 
opposed. Firstly, given the time and space limits of this research, it will not be possible to 
conduct an in-depth study examining in detail a number of policy outcomes for each of 
the 64 deputy-leaders under investigation. In order to progress the research, it is 
proposed that case-studies be conducted on a detailed examination of the policy influence 
of one deputy-leader per state in relation to particular policy measures. Strictly speaking, 
in order to show that deputy-leaders can matter, it is only necessary to identify one 
instance where they did have an influence over policy.
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Secondly, as Light (1984) points out, in terms of policy influence ‘it is almost impossible 
to give exact measures of success’ (Light, 1984, p. 620). While it may be possible to state 
that a policy was implemented or halted, who can claim credit for that outcome is 
difficult to determine. Many will claim responsibility for policy successes, while few will 
claim ownership of policy failures. For this reason, the subjects of the case-studies will be 
deputy-leaders on whom there exists an extensive literature on their time as deputy- 
leaders. The more perspectives that are available on a deputy-leader’s time in office, the 
more likely it is that an objective assessment can be made as to their ability to influence 
policy outcomes while in office.
Thirdly, in selecting the subjects for the case studies, there is a need to avoid ‘cherry 
picking’; in other words, avoiding the selection of case-study subjects that bias the 
outcomes of the case studies. It may be argued that selecting subjects for the case studies 
on the basis of a pre-existing extensive literature biases the studies in favour of influential 
deputy-leaders in that it is likely that such a literature would only exist in the cases of 
influential deputy-leaders. However, it should be pointed out that there may be many 
reasons for there being an extensive literature on a political figure. Such an extensive 
literature on a political figure may exist not because they were an influential deputy- 
leader, but may be based on the impact of their entire political careers or their impact in a 
role other than deputy-leader. For example, much of the literature on Sean Lemass 
focuses on his time as Taoiseach rather than on his three terms as Tanaiste. Indeed, the 
view that what literature exists on deputy-leaders is due to their policy-influence is at 
odds with the earlier finding that the received wisdom on deputy-leaders is that they do
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not matter, in that they are perceived not to have policy influence. Additionally, to rely on 
a less than extensive literature for the case studies increases the likelihood of a bias being 
imported from a literature with a limited perspective on a deputy-leader. Nonetheless, 
there is a trade-off being made in terms of the basis for the selection of the case-studies in 
that greater objectivity of the assessment of the policy-effectiveness of the selected 
deputy-leaders is being chosen with an acceptance that this may entail the introduction of 
an alternative bias, namely the risk that the selection of case-study subjects may favour 
deputy-leaders who were successful policy implementers. It must also be borne in mind 
that the case-studies are not being used in isolation to determine whether or not deputy- 
leaders matter. The findings of the case studies will be taken in conjunction with the 
findings regarding the eight other observable implications to arrive at a conclusion 
regarding whether or not it is correct to say that deputy-leaders do not matter. As has 
already been pointed out, to disprove the generally held view that deputy-leaders do not 
matter it is only necessary to show once that in certain circumstances they did matter, and 
this will be based on the findings of this entire research project rather than an individual 
aspect of it.
Fourthly, as mentioned in Chapter Two, to identify policy-implementing deputy-leaders 
is one thing, to be able to attribute that policy implementation to their being deputy- 
leader is another. Where a deputy-leader influences policy, how can that influence be 
attributed solely to their being deputy-leader rather than party-leader or holder of a 
cabinet portfolio? This is not an issue with US Vice-Presidents as they are not party- 
leaders nor do they hold additional cabinet portfolios. In the case of deputy-leaders in the
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other four states under investigation, two of the four deputy-leaders selected to be the 
subject of case studies were not party leaders when they were deputy-leaders. In the case 
of the remaining two, examples of policy influence which was not due to their leadership 
of their party will be sought, in other words, cases where the deputy-leaders sought the 
implementation of a policy which did not have the support of their party. In such cases, if 
the deputy-leader influences policy outcomes, then it cannot be attributed to their party 
role as they did not have the support of their party As for their cabinet responsibilities, 
all four deputy-leaders had additional cabinet responsibilities. Again, cases where their 
influence (if they had influence) was not due to their additional cabinet responsibilities 
will be sought. For example, where they had influence on policies in areas beyond their 
cabinet briefs.
Fifthly, it must also be stated that an exception fallacy is not being committed with these 
case-studies. The exception fallacy is defined as ‘when you reach a group conclusion on 
the basis of exceptional cases’.125 So, for example, in the case of this chapter general 
conclusions about the role of the Tanaiste are not being made on the basis of the study of 
an individual Tanaiste - Dick Spring. What this study is seeking to determine is if the 
individual deputy-leaders examined in the case-studies had policy influence as deputy- 
leaders and thus all that can be concluded if it is found that these individual deputy- 
leaders did have such policy influence is that deputy-leaders can matter.
Having addressed these practical issues, the case-study subjects can be selected. On the 
basis of selecting one deputy-leader per state where an extensive literature on that
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deputy-leader exists, in the case of the Irish deputy-leaders, the most likely case-study 
subject is Sean Lemass who is the subject of seven biographies. However none of these 
biographies deal in great detail on his time as Tanaiste. This is in contrast to the case of 
Dick Spring. While there are only two biographies of him, they provide significant detail 
on his time as Tanaiste. Further detail on his time as Tanaiste is provided by Finlay 
(1998), Desmond (2000) and Kavanagh (2001) with Hussey (1990) and FitzGerald
(1991) and (2004) giving some perspective on his time as Tanaiste from the view of his 
coalition partners. Therefore, given the extent of the available literature, Dick Spring will 
be the Irish case-study subject. In the case of US Vice-Presidents, Light (1984) has 
written on the influence of Mondale drawing on interviews with aides of both Mondale 
and Carter (who was President at the time) and there is a comprehensive biography by 
Lewis (1984). Hatfield (1997), Cronin and Genovese (1998) and Felzenberg (2001) also 
spend time on Mondale’s Vice-Presidency as part of their wider studies of the position. 
Therefore, Walter Mondale will be the American case-study subject. As for UK Deputy- 
Prime Ministers, Eden is the most widely written about with seven biographies covering 
his political career and articles by Wight (1960), Young (1985), Adamthwaite (1988) and 
Ruane (1994) on policy aspects of this period of his political career. In the case of Dutch 
and Swedish Deputy-Prime Ministers, very little biographical material is available in 
English. As a result, the deputy-leaders selected from these two states will be more recent 
holders of the office who have been the subjects of extensive media coverage. On this 
basis, the Dutch deputy-leader selected for a case study will be Else Borst-Eilers and in 
the case of Sweden it will be Bengt Carl Westerberg.
125 Available from: http://www.socialresearchmethods.net/kb/fallacy.htm [accessed 28 February 2005].
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Else Borst-Eilers was Minister for Health, Welfare and Sports between 1994 and 1998. 
She became Dutch Deputy-Leader (Vice-Minister President) in 1998, a post she held 
until 2002. During this term she remained Minister for Health, Welfare and Sports. Prior 
to this term of office she was also leader of the D66 party from February to May 1998 
and leader of the D66 parliamentary party in the Tweede Kamer during May 1998. 
This creates an issue insofar as it will be difficult to separate out whether her influence on 
policy derived from her role as deputy-leader, her role as Minister or her strong position 
within her party (D66) . As Minister for Health, Welfare and Sports for eight years, she 
introduced a significant number of policy changes in areas as diverse as health insurance, 
drugs policy, alcohol policy and medical research. For the purposes of this research the 
focus will be on her second term as Minister for Health, Welfare and Sports when she 
was also deputy-leader. During this term she reformed the Dutch health insurance system 
with her ‘Renewal of the Health Service’ policy of 2001. 127 Her 2002 Tobacco Act 
restricted the sale of tobacco products to those over 18 years of age and placed controls 
on tobacco advertising, while her Alcohol Policy of 2000 also increased the age at which 
alcohol could be bought to 18.128 In 2000, together with the Minister for Justice, she 
introduced legislation that effectively legalized euthanasia -  the ‘Termination of Life on 
Request and Assisted Suicide (Review Procedures) Act’.129 She also introduced changes 
to the regulations applying to the use of foetal tissue and embryos, as well as introducing 
measures to deal with hospital waiting lists. In 1999, she found herself at the centre of a
126 Available from www.parlement.com [accessed 8 April 2003].
127 Available from www.parlement.com [accessed 8 April 2003],
128 Available from www.parlement.com [accessed 8 April 2003].
129 Available from: www.intemationaltaskforce.org/holbors.htm [accessed 1 November 2004]
6 .2 .2  The N eth er la n d s -  E lse  B orst-E ilers
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controversy over her handling of the crashing of an El A1 Boeing aircraft into apartments 
in the suburb of Bijlmermeer in 1992. A parliamentary investigative committee criticized 
her handling of the crisis for not taking the health concerns of the affected residents 
seriously and not fully briefing parliament on the matter. Arising from the report of the
committee a motion of no confidence in her was rejected in June 1999 after an 18-hour
• • 1 debate, even though it was supported by some dissident members of her own party. All
of these matters were within her brief as Minister for Health, Welfare and Sports and as
such their implementation cannot be attributed to any influence she had as Dutch deputy-
leader.
That is not to say that policies implemented during her second term as Minister for 
Health, Welfare and Sports cannot be attributed to her role as deputy-leader. It could be 
argued that the implementation of policies within her brief as Minister for Health, 
Welfare and Sports during her second term in that post required the additional influence 
derived from her role as deputy-leader to be implemented (otherwise they would have 
been introduced in her first term when she was Minister only). Even if this were the case, 
a further complication arises in that it may not be possible to determine if she was able to 
introduce policies as a result of her influence arising from being a major figure in her 
party or from being Dutch deputy-leader. If, for example, these policies were in her 
party’s manifesto for the 1998 general election then their introduction can be attributed to 
her influence within her party. However their absence from the manifesto does not imply 
that they cannot be attributed to her position of influence within D66. For example, Borst
130 Available from www.parleinent.com [accessed 8 April 2003] and Lucardie and Voerman, 2000, p. 467.
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Eilers’ D66 party had been at the center of the cabinet crisis over the issue of amending 
the constitution to allow national referenda. Having passed an initial vote in the Lower 
House in 1997 (when Borst-Eilers was not deputy-leader) and the Upper House in 1998, 
but requiring a second vote with a two-thirds majority, the proposal did not get the 
required vote in the Upper House in 1999. As a result the D66 ministers tendered their 
resignations from the cabinet and the rest of the cabinet followed suit. However, 
agreement on the matter was reached between the governing parties and the resignation
i o  i . . .
of the cabinet was withdrawn. This was a key policy objective for the D66 party and as 
such cannot be taken as a measure of the policy influence of Borst-Eilers as deputy-leader 
the issue was not only driven by her party but had been raised (and partially 
implemented) before she became deputy-leader.
The background to the introduction of the most controversial policy implemented during 
her second term as Minister for Health, Welfare and Sports will now be examined to 
assess if it is possible to determine whether her influence as deputy-leader had a role in 
its introduction. In 2001, Minister Borst-Eilers in co-operation with the Minister for 
Justice, introduced the Termination of Life on Request and Assisted Suicide (Review 
Procedures) Act that when passed, effectively legalized euthanasia by outlining 
conditions, which, if followed, would give doctors immunity from prosecution for mercy 
killing and assisted suicides. Two previous attempts had been made by her party to 
introduce such legislation in 1984 and during the early 1990s.132 Government support for 
such a bill was made a condition of entry into coalition by the D66 party in 1998. Borst
131 Lucardie and Voerman, 2000, p. 468.
132 Available from: www.internationaltaskforce.org/holbors.htm [accessed 1 November 2004],
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Eilers herself stated in an newspaper interview that the policy was introduced ‘thanks to 
the efforts of the D66 political party’.133 So, it would appear that this policy was a pet 
project not of Borst-Eilers, but rather of her party. However, during her tenure as Vice- 
Chairperson of the Health Council (an advisory body to the government and parliament 
in the field of public health), she was a member of the Remmelink Commission in 1991 
which examined the issue of euthanasia in the Netherlands. It found that many incidents 
of euthanasia were not being reported and that the government needed to address the 
issue. Prior to that, she was a member of the Netherlands Association for Voluntary 
Euthanasia.134 She had also dealt with the issue as a medical practitioner as far back as
1983.135 So while her party had historically taken the political lead in pushing for 
euthanasia to be legalized, this was an issue that Borst-Eilers had also championed. It 
could thus be argued that the legislation was not implemented until Borst-Eilers pushed 
for it. Even so, it is difficult to separate whether the influence she was able to bring to 
bear on getting the measure implemented was due to her influence within her party or 
arising from being Vice-Minister President. In terms of her party influence, it can be 
argued that it was in decline insofar as she had been replaced as party-leader. While she 
had been designated as party-leader by her predecessor, Hans Van Mierlo, Thom De 
Graf, who had earlier won a ballot of party members on the issue, succeeded her in
1998.136 Furthermore, it could be argued that as she was seen as a future party-leader 
during her first term as Minister for Health, that if her party influence and Ministerial 
position were sufficiently strong, then the legislation on euthanasia could have been
133 Available from: www.inteniatioiialtaskforce.org/holbors.htm [accessed 1 November 2004],
134 Available from: www.internationaltaskforce.org/holbors.htrn [accessed 1 November 2004],
135 Available from: www.intemationaitaskfcrce.om/holbors.htm [accessed 1 November 2004],
136 Available from: littp:users.skynet.be/herman.beun/page9.html [accessed 22 August 2003],
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implemented during her first term as Minister for Health. Certainly, she was no longer 
party-leader when she implemented the euthanasia legislation and her remaining major 
position of influence was as Vice-Minister President. So, there are arguments to discount 
her party role and her additional cabinet responsibilities as having a major influence on 
her ability to implement the euthanasia legislation, leaving her position as Vice-Minister 
President as the most influential factor. However, it is not possible to say that this 
legislation was only introduced due to Borst-Eilers being Vice-Minister President.
6.2.3 Republic of Ireland -  Dick Spring
Dick Spring held the position of Tanaiste on two occasions. During his first term (1982 to 
1987) he was also Minister for the Environment and then Minister for Energy, while he 
was Minister for Foreign Affairs during his second term (1993 to 1997) as Tanaiste. 
FitzGerald (1991), Ryan (1993), Collins (1993) and Desmond (2000) cover Spring’s first 
term as Tanaiste, while Finlay (1998) and Kavanagh (2001) cover his second term in 
detail. Spring became Tanaiste soon after being elected leader of his party and was faced 
with a party that was split on the issue of whether or not to be in government. At a 
meeting of the party’s ruling Administrative Council earlier in 1982, the casting vote of 
the chair, Michael D. Higgins, had to be used to decide that the Labour Party should not 
join a coalition government. As Spring himself describes it -  ‘The internecine strife and 
the bitterness in Labour was terrible ... It was so divided; the Parliamentary Party and the 
AC were just nightmare stuff during the previous Government and it was still that way’ 
(Collins, 1993, pp. 91-92). This siege mentality within the party did, however, foster a
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bond between the Labour ministers, as described by Finlay (1999): ‘the continuing strong 
strain of anti-coalition sentiment within the party, often had the paradoxical of forcing 
Labour Ministers to find their greatest solidarity in the cabinet room’ (Finlay, 1998, p. 
26). Paradoxically, it may also have strengthened Spring’s hand when dealing with his 
coalition partners in that a demanding internal opposition had to be satisfied if Spring was 
to keep his own party in government. For example, Ryan (1993) points outs that in 1986, 
‘threats by Labour Party dissidents not to support the Government saw climb downs on a 
number of issues including a directive on equality legislation’ (Ryan, 1993, p. 81).
In office as deputy-leader, Spring also faced a coalition partner, Fine Gael, with whom 
his party were frequently at odds on the issue of how to tackle the financial crisis that 
faced the country with high unemployment and a large and growing national debt. As 
described by FitzGerald (2004), ‘No previous Irish government since the outbreak of the 
Civil War had ever faced a financial crisis of this magnitude ... this issue necessarily 
imposed great strains on Cabinet decision making in that coalition, and required almost 
endless negotiations, in order to avoid a breakdown’ (FitzGerald, 2004, p. 69). The 
coalition parties were divided as to how to address this crisis in that Fine Gael favoured 
significant cuts in public spending to reduce the public borrowing requirement, while 
Labour wanted to protect its constituency (the less well-off) from the worst of those cuts 
and favoured increased taxes on Fine Gael’s constituency (the better-off). Furthermore, at 
Cabinet, Spring frequently found himself at odds with two strong Fine Gael personalities 
-  Alan Dukes and John Bruton. Ryan (1993) observes that the tension between Fine Gael 
and Labour ‘was almost always between Dick Spring and either Alan Dukes or John
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Bruton’ (Ryan, 1993, p. 65). As a consequence, during his first term as Tanaiste, ‘Spring 
had never had the time to develop a platform of change. And his first experience of 
government was one where he was entirely on the defensive, where everyday generated a 
fresh crisis’ (Finlay, 1998, p. 14).
During his first term within his own department, Spring found himself having to deal 
with the consequences of the financial crisis, having to rush through legislation to 
introduce local service charges. He also introduced the Local Government (Planning and 
Development) Bill, 1983, which amended the existing law in relation to planning appeal 
procedures. As Minister for Energy, he introduced legislation dealing with the powers of 
the Electricity Supply Board, dealt with the restoration of the Whiddy Island oil terminal 
and nationalization of Dublin Gas. Beyond his narrow cabinet responsibilities, as a party- 
leader in coalition Spring had to deal with controversial policies such as a referendum to 
ban abortion, a referendum to introduce divorce and legislation to liberalise the 
availability of contraception. He also inputted into work on the New Ireland Forum to 
discuss the future of Northern Ireland (at which Spring led the Labour Party delegation) 
and the signing of the Anglo Irish Agreement on Northern Ireland. While these 
contentious issues created difficulties within the coalition parties as individual TDs and 
senators objected to aspects of the policies (for example nine Labour TDs voted against 
the Fine Gael wording for a referendum on abortion)138, there was broad agreement 
between the coalition parties as to how to address them.
138 Ryan, 1993, p. 64.
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Against this background, it is possible to find instances during his first term in office as 
Tanaiste when, in responding to the crises, Spring was able to exert influence beyond his 
cabinet brief. A few months into office, in the middle of a budgetary crisis, Spring stated 
that cuts in the budget would be on the basis of government agreement rather than on the 
basis of what the Minister for Finance decided.139 As described by Collins (1993), the 
incident arose as a result of a Spring’s economic advisor warning him that he ‘must take 
an instant stand against unilateral pronouncements by Ministers in advance of 
Government decisions’ (Collins, 1993, p. 106). Spring did so immediately after the 
Minister for Finance issued a press statement on the budget deficit necessitating greater 
cuts in public spending and after the Minister for Transport made comments about the 
need for salary cuts in CIE (the public transport company). According to the Irish Times, 
‘a strong protest about the solo line being taken by some Fine Gael ministers was made to 
the Taoiseach’ by the Tanaiste.140 The Taoiseach sided with the Tanaiste on this issue and 
a statement was subsequently issued by Cabinet to the effect that decisions on budgetary 
matters had yet to be made by the cabinet.141 The Minister for Transport subsequently 
retracted his earlier statement on salary cuts. While this example shows that Spring 
exercised influence outside his ministerial portfolio, it is unclear if this influence can be 
attributed solely to Spring being Tanaiste or his position of being leader of a party in 
coalition. It appears that there was no consultation within the formal structures of the 
Labour Party on Spring’s reaction as he responded straight away to the statements from 
the Ministers, it is hard to imagine his party reacting differently. Indeed, media reports 
describe the statements as causing ‘alarm among the Labour Party and its supporters’ and
139 Finlay, 1998, p. 12.
140 Irish Times, January 11th, 1983, p. 1.
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that Labour Ministers were ‘displeased’ with the behaviour of the two Fine Gael 
Ministers.142 So, even though Spring acted without consulting his party, his influence 
may have been derived from the perception that his party would take a similar position. 
Finlay (1998) makes the point that if Spring had not objected to the statement from the 
Minister for Finance, ‘he would never had the authority in his own ranks to keep that 
government alive’ (Finlay, 1998, p .13).
Furthermore, the issue can be seen as one of the Tanaiste and Taoiseach both facing 
down the Minister for Finance, rather than just the Tanaiste doing so. FitzGerald, who 
was Taoiseach at the time, makes clear in his autobiography that he was unhappy with the 
unilateral action of the Minister for Finance and had the Minister’s figures independently 
verified and supported the Tanaiste on the issue. Indeed, according to Collins (1993), ‘the 
Taoiseach sided with the Tanaiste against his own Minister for Finance, so the ultimate 
responsibility for the budgetary strategy of 1983 rested with FitzGerald’ (Collins, 1993, 
p. 106). While, on the one hand, this indicates that it was the Taoiseach who made the 
critical intervention on this issue, it is also possible to read the event as a case where the 
Tanaiste acted in a Taoiseach-like manner insofar as Spring was enforcing collective 
cabinet responsibility and reigning in ministers from making policy solo runs. Even so, 
whether or not this influence was due to his being Tanaiste or the leader of a party in a 
coalition government, or indeed due to the support of the Taoiseach is open to dispute 
with no clear and definitive answer. So, while Spring achieved his goal, his influence on
141 FitzGerald, 1991, p. 435.
142 Irish Times, January 11th, 1983, p. 1.
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the matter cannot solely be attributed to his role as Tanaiste, nor can the outcome solely 
be attributed to Spring.
Also during his first term as Tanaiste, Spring found himself on occasions in dispute with 
the Taoiseach. There was a dispute over the appointment of a new Attorney General in 
1984. As Collins (1993) describes it, ‘Dick Spring wanted his friend and advisor, John 
Rogers, for the job, Garret [FitzGerald] fought tooth and nail against this’ (Collins, 1993, 
p. 132). It had previously been agreed between the two coalition parties that Fine Gael 
would fill the vacant European Commissioner position, while a Labour nominee would 
become Attorney General. While another party member, Mary Robinson, wanted the 
position of Attorney General, Spring rejected her for the post in favour of Rogers. There 
were mixed feelings within the Labour Party on the matter -  ‘while Spring’s colleagues 
were at one with him in rejecting the candidature of Robinson, they were taken aback at 
the proposal of his best friend, John Rogers’ (Collins, 1993, p. 133). Spring insisted and 
‘his [Labour] colleagues didn’t oppose his choice’ (Collins, 1993, p. 133). However, the 
Taoiseach was a different matter, and he tried to persuade Spring to change his mind -  
‘Garrett [FitzGerald] balked, and did everything he could to try to prevent John’s 
appointment’ (Finlay, 1998, p. 30). Spring threatened not to support the Fine Gael 
nominee for the position of European Commissioner if FitzGerald did not support Rogers 
for the position of Attorney General. While Spring got his way, whether this was a result 
of his being Tanaiste or his being leader of a party in government is difficult to 
determine. Certainly, Rogers was nominated as he was an ally of Spring and there were
143 Financial Times, August 24th, 1985, p. 3.
144 Finlay, 1998, p. 22.
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opponents of the move within the Labour Party whom Spring over-ruled. However, the 
critical act in ensuring Rogers nomination - the threat not to support the Fine Gael 
nominee for European Commissioner -  could only be credible if  Spring was speaking on 
behalf of his party and if his party’s TDs were not willing to support the Fine Gael 
nominee for European Commissioner in the event that Spring’s nominee for Attorney 
General was not supported by Fine Gael.. So, it would appear that it was Spring’s 
position as Party Leader that ensured that he got his way on the appointment of the 
Attorney General.
There were further disagreements within the coalition involving the Tanaiste over the 
future of the state-owned Irish Steel company. The Minister for Industry and Commerce 
(John Bruton) had decided to close down the Irish Steel company as it was losing money 
and trade unions had rejected a rescue package involving restructuring. Bruton issued a 
public statement stating that unless the proposals were accepted the government would 
shut the plant.145 Spring was opposed to the closure. The Taoiseach had left it to Spring 
and Bruton to resolve the issue.146 After intense argument, the two Ministers agreed to 
save the company and it received government support in exchange for a rationalization 
programme. So, on an issue outside his cabinet brief, Spring was able to reverse a 
decision of another Minister. Again, whether this influence was due his being Tanaiste or 
Labour Party leader or other more personal factors such as his being willing to face down 
John Bruton on the matter is virtually impossible to clarify with certainty. That there had 
already been a number of significant job losses in the area where the plant was located
145 Financial Times, August 24th, 1985, p. 3.
146 Finlay, 1998, p. 22.
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was also probably a factor in determining the outcome of the discussion between the two 
Ministers on the plant’s future.147
While Spring was involved in further disputes during the lifetime of the government (the 
future of the Dublin Gas company in 1983, the dispute over the cut in food subsidies in 
the 1984 budget, the Radio Bill of 1985, the National Development Corporation in 1985 
and the cabinet reshuffle in 1986), these were disputes between the coalition parties and 
any positive outcome could not be attributed to Spring’s role as Tanaiste as distinct from 
Party Leader. As discussed by Finlay (1998) and Ryan (1993), there were clear Labour 
Party positions at stake on these issues and Spring was battling for these positions on 
behalf of his party rather than as Tanaiste. While these disputes were resolved, 
eventually, failure to resolve differences over the budget for 1987 led to the coalition 
breaking up with the Labour Ministers resigning from government and Fine Gael 
continuing in a caretaker capacity.
Spring faced a different situation by the time he entered government as Tanaiste again in
1993 in coalition with Fianna Fail. His party had healed its divisions and, having been 
given the credit for his party’s electoral success in the preceding general election and the 
Presidential election of 1990, Spring’s standing within his own party was at a high. While 
this would not last, as new internal disputes arose during the course of the government 
(such as over the selection of the party’s Dublin European election candidate), these 
disputes were not of the same intensity as the disputes during the 1980s. Furthermore, the
147 Financial Times, August 24th, 1985, p. 3.
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new government was not under the strain of having to deal with a financial crisis (apart 
from having to deal with the issue of devaluing the punt immediately after taking office) 
and, at least initially, there were none of the personality clashes that plagued Spring’s 
first term as Tanaiste.
As Foreign Minister, Spring found himself caught up in the developing Northern Ireland 
peace process and with EU matters, such as ensuring the Structural Fund allocation that 
Ireland had been promised, all of which involved significantly more travel outside the 
country than during his previous term as Tanaiste. While there were some disputes 
between the Taoiseach and Tanaiste at various stages in the development of the peace 
process, these could be considered to fall within the area of responsibility of Spring’s 
brief as Minister for Foreign Affairs and cannot be considered to indicate influence on the 
part of the Tanaiste. There was also legislation to decriminalize homosexuality, reform of 
the legal system and the Oireachtas as well as ethics in government legislation, all 
introduced as part of the agreed Programme for Government. For the first time, an office 
of Tanaiste with a small staff was set up, the primary focus of which was to monitor
14Rimplementation of the Programme for Government (see Chapter Three).
That is not to say that Spring’s second term as Tanaiste was all smooth sailing. A major 
policy dispute arose at the start of Spring’s second term as Tanaiste in 1993 when a 
proposal came before Cabinet for a tax amnesty. It was proposed that tax evaders who
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came clean to the Revenue Commissioners could, in exchange for paying a proportion of 
their back-taxes and penalties, be exempted from prosecution. It would raise tax revenue 
at a time when the budgetary situation was still fairly tight. The proposal was opposed by 
the Department of Finance and the Minister for Finance. Within Labour, there was some 
ambiguity about the measure, for while ‘most of the Ministers and their closest advisors 
were uneasy about the amnesty’ (Finlay, 1993, p. 170), they ‘were very anxious to get 
their hands on the money to spend on things like social services’ (Kavanagh, 2001, p. 
136). The Labour Party Chairman, Jim Kemmy, was in favour of such a amnesty as a 
means of raising funds and spoke in favour of it at the Party Conference in April.149 
Nonetheless, according to media reports, the majority of the Labour Ministers were 
opposed to the proposal.150 Crucially, the Taoiseach was a strong supporter of the 
proposed amnesty. This created an opportunity for Spring to exert influence on the issue. 
‘The Taoiseach and his Minister for Finance, both members of the same party, were on 
opposite sides of the argument. If Dick [Spring] took sides with one of them, that would 
end the argument - whoever he sided with would win.’ (Finlay, 1993, p. 171). However, 
Spring decided not to take sides. To confront the Taoiseach would create tensions in the 
new government which could be avoided as the measure appeared to be unpopular within 
the cabinet and was unlikely to be accepted. In the event, opposition was not raised at the 
cabinet meeting and the bill was pushed through by the Taoiseach. It could be argued that 
this example indicates that the Tanaiste has little influence insofar as if the Taoiseach 
were in a similar position, they would have to make a decision, while the Tanaiste could 
not afford to make a decision in this instance. On the other hand the Irish Steel example
148 Ryan, 1993, p. 183 and p. 186.
149 Irish Times, April 5th, 1993, p. 16.
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discussed earlier highlights the opposite case where the Taoiseach did not make a 
decision and left the matter up to the Tanaiste and relevant Minister to resolve. What can 
be said is that this was in theory at least an occasion when the Tanaiste could have 
exerted influence over policy beyond his Cabinet brief, but he choose not to. Nonetheless, 
the ability of the Tanaiste to influence policy beyond his cabinet brief was not tested.
Further issues arose in relation to taxation policy in 1994 when the Taoiseach proposed 
amendments to the Finance Bill that would have eased the restrictions on wealthy Irish 
expatriates claiming non-residency for tax purposes and put an upper limit on payments 
of capital acquisitions tax. Spring revealed details of the proposed changes to capital 
acquisitions tax in the Dail in 1997151 while Finlay (1998) details the background to the 
proposal on non-residency. The effect of these two proposals would have been to reduce 
the tax liability of wealthy individuals. The Tanaiste opposed the proposals and ‘made it 
clear right from the beginning that these changes were unnecessary and unacceptable. In 
letters to the Taoiseach and Minister for Finance, he set out his opposition unequivocally’ 
(Finlay, 1993, p. 215). However, the Taoiseach did not accept these objections. 
Following weeks of tense discussions, the Taoiseach eventually backed down and the 
matter did not make it onto the agenda of the relevant Cabinet meeting. As for whether
this was a stand-off between the parties in the coalition, rather than the Taoiseach and the
Tanaiste, Finlay (1993) indicates that there were discussions between Spring and his 
close advisers, but not within the parliamentary party or broader party. While subsequent
150 Irish Times, May 26th, 1993, p. 1.
151 Irish Times, June 28th, 1997, p. 6.
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media reports indicated that ‘Spring threatened to resign from government if the
1Taoiseach proceeded with such an amendment’, Finlay (1998) states that Spring ‘had 
come to the conclusion that the government would be over’ (Finlay 1998, p. 215) if the 
measure was passed at cabinet. In other words, not only would Spring resign from the 
government, but the Labour Party would withdraw from government. According to 
Finlay, the Minister for Finance also disagreed with the proposals but had been unable to 
persuade the Taoiseach to change his mind. So, from the evidence, it would appear that 
the opposition to the measure from the Tanaiste was the main reason for the abandonment 
of the proposal. However, it is unlikely that if Spring had resigned as Tanaiste over the 
proposal that the Labour Party would have remained in government. The threat of pulling 
his party out of government (whether implicit or explicit) was a key factor in persuading 
the Taoiseach to abandon the proposal. So, once again it is difficult to attribute influence 
by the Tanaiste on policy areas outside his cabinet responsibilities solely to his being 
Tanaiste as distinct from his being Party-Leader in a coalition government. A position in 
which the threat of withdrawal of his party from government would give him 
considerable influence over the government’s policy agenda.
The coalition ultimately fell as a result of a further face-off between the Tanaiste and the 
Taoiseach, this time over the appointment of the President of the High Court. The 
Taoiseach wanted to appoint the Attorney General (Harry Whelehan) to the position. 
However, the Tanaiste did not and the matter was taken off the cabinet agenda while 
discussions took place. When the Tanaiste was out of the country, stories that the
152 Irish Times, June 28*, 1997, p. 6.
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Taoiseach’s preferred appointee was about to fill the post appeared in the media and the 
matter was re-instated on the cabinet agenda (a meeting the Tanaiste would miss as he 
was still out of the country). After further discussions prior to the cabinet meeting the 
issue was again deferred. Matters dragged on for a number of weeks while Labour 
Ministers and backbenchers became exasperated at the possible fall of the government 
over the matter -  ‘eight Labour TDs went on RTE to say that in their view, the 
appointment of Harry Whelehan should not be cause for breaking up the government’ 
(Finlay, 1998, p. 251). So, Spring was pushing this issue without significant support from 
his own party. Matters took a turn when it emerged that the Attorney General’s office had 
been tardy in dealing with an extradition warrant for a paedophile priest. While this issue 
was still being examined, the Taoiseach pushed to appoint the Attorney General as the 
President of the High Court. Following a cabinet meeting at which the Fianna Fail 
ministers approved the appointment, the Labour Ministers walked out. While Spring now 
had the support of his party on the issue, at a subsequent parliamentary party meeting he 
stated that the decision as to whether Labour remained in Government was ultimately 
his.153 As Kavanagh (2001) comments ‘it was decided not to have a special PLP meeting 
to evaluate Albert Reynolds response; this was left up to Dick Spring ... leaving the fate 
of the government in his hands and taking all responsibility away from elected 
parliamentarians’ (Kavanagh, 2001, p. 161). Following confusion regarding when the 
Taoiseach was made aware of another controversial case involving the Attorney 
General’s office, the Labour Ministers resigned from the government, which ultimately 
fell. Whelehan subsequently resigned as President of the High Court. So, while Spring 
was initially unable to influence policy on this occasion, his persistence combined with
153 Finlay, 1998, p. 256.
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fortuitous circumstances to see the newly appointed President of the High Court and the 
Taoiseach resign but at the expense of the fall of the government.
While the coalition fell, this did not end Spring’s term as Tanaiste. A new government 
was formed with Labour in coalition with Fine Gael and Democratic Left. While one 
might have expected a repeat of the tension that existed between Spring and Bruton 
during their previous time in government especially as Bruton was now leader of Fine 
Gael and Taoiseach, this was not the case. As Finlay (1998) observed ‘All of us who had 
worked for the 1983-1987 government had strong memories of someone who could best 
be described as an intellectual bully... I was wrong - or else he had changed quite a bit 
...I found John Bruton open, honest and always willing to listen’ (Finlay, 1998, p. 277). 
A media profile described how Bruton’s change in attitude contributed to smooth 
relations between the three government parties: ‘Prominent people within the three 
Government parties agree that things are going well and that Mr. Bruton has contributed 
significantly to good relations. From the position where he was the Labour Party’s bete 
noire in the 1982-1987 coalition government, the Taoiseach is a man transformed, 
facilitating and encouraging Labour and Democratic Left in what he intends to be a true 
partnership government.’154
As the new programme for government was implemented, Spring as party leader was 
involved in the passing of a number of potentially divisive legislative measures that led to
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a referendum to allow divorce, introduced a freedom of information bill, that legalised 
abortion information, abolished third-level fees and introduced a series of public ethics 
measures including new mechanisms on state funding of political parties. These were 
passed with little division between the coalition partners. As Foreign Minister, Spring 
was involved in a detailed review of foreign policy that culminated in a White Paper on 
Foreign Policy in 1996 and also hosted the EU Presidency in 1996. He also had a more 
hands-on involvement in the Northern Ireland peace process where his role changed as he 
became the liaison with the Northern nationalists (a role performed by Fianna Fail 
Ministers in the previous government) as distinct from the member of the government 
who liaised with Unionists during the previous government. As Finlay (1998) describes 
it: ‘Over the previous two years, he [Spring] had frequently found himself in the position 
of urging caution on Albert Reynolds, and of putting forward a Unionist perspective in 
government discussions. Now in the interests of identical policy objectives, he was the 
one who frequently urged the harder line’ (Finlay, 1998, p. 278).
Despite the heavy ministerial workload and smooth relations between the new 
government partners, that is not to say that there were not disagreements within the 
government. However, they did not create crises in the government in the way 
disagreements in the previous coalition had. An argument over when the state-owned 
telecoms company would be opened up to competition between the Fine Gael Minister 
with responsibility for the area and the Tanaiste led to discussion of the matter being
154 Irish Times, March 25th, 1995, p. 7.
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deferred by the cabinet with a compromise subsequently being worked out.155 While the 
Tanaiste had an influence on the policy outcome, this could be taken as the Tanaiste 
pushing Labour policy rather than a personal preference and therefore the outcome can be 
seen as the result of pressure from the Labour Party rather than Tanaiste.
As in the early days of the 1982-1987 coalition, the Tanaiste also found himself having to 
publicly rebuff a Fine Gael minister over public announcements on policy initiatives prior 
to the matter being discussed by the cabinet. The Minister for Justice announced her 
intention to introduce measures to tackle drug smuggling prior to them being discussed 
by the cabinet. While there was unease at the actions of the Minister, it was at her leaking 
of the proposals rather than at the content of the proposals and as a result the measures 
were agreed by the cabinet.
Overall, during his tenure as Tanaiste, while there were instances when Spring was 
unable to change government policy (the tax amnesty), in this instance he was opposed 
by the Taoiseach. Nonetheless, it is still possible to identify an instance when he was 
able to influence policy beyond his Ministerial brief despite opposition from the 
Taoiseach (the shelving of changes to capital gains tax and non-residency status for tax 
purposes). There are also a number of instances during both his terms as Tanaiste where 
he influenced government policy beyond his Ministerial brief (the budget crisis of 1983, 
the appointment of the Attorney General in 1984 and saving Irish Steel in 1985), however
155 Irish Times, A u g u st^ , 1995, p. 12.
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it is difficult to take this influence as arising from Spring’s position as Tanaiste rather 
than as leader of a party in a coalition government where the threat of withdrawal from 
government could be used to gain leverage over policy decisions. So while Spring the 
politician influenced policy beyond the policy remit of his cabinet portfolios, it cannot be 
definitively stated that this was due to him holding the position of Tanaiste.
6.2.4 Sweden -  Bengt Carl Westerberg
Bengt Carl Westerberg held the position of Deputy-Prime Minister on one occasion.156 
During his term, he was also Minister for Health and Social Affairs. He was Deputy- 
Prime Minister in a four-party coalition and leader of the Liberal Party and was described 
as ‘a crucial figure in the new coalition as the joint author of its economic strategy -  New
1 c n
Start for Sweden, drawn up with Mr Bildt’s Moderate party’. The new government 
planned to remove restrictions on foreign ownership of Swedish companies, privatize a
1 co
number of state-owned companies, cut taxes and cut government spending. During its 
term of office, the government found itself facing a deep recession, rising budget deficit, 
high levels of unemployment, a currency crisis sparked by speculation of a Krona 
devaluation as well as a crisis in the banking sector. An added difficulty was that, despite 
having four parties in government, the coalition did not command a majority in 
parliament. As a result, it had to rely on the support of the newly formed populist New 
Democracy party whom Westerberg walked out o f a TV discussion with on election night
156 1991 to 1994.
157 Financial Times, October 23rd, 1991, p. 2.
158 Financial Times, November 13th, 1991, p. 2.
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due to its right wing policies on immigration and proposals to cut foreign aid.159 Despite 
these difficulties, the coalition managed to govern for three years. As Minister for Health 
and Social Affairs, Westerberg introduced measures to encourage fathers to take parental 
leave, legislation on disability and pension reform.160 He was also a vocal supporter of 
the moves towards Swedish membership of the European Union (his party held a 
congress in late 1993 adopting a pro-EU stance). While this issue did cause splits in 
Swedish politics, the various party elites were united in being pro-EU, with very little 
dissent within the government on the matter. Indeed the government declared that full EU 
membership was one if its primary objectives.161
Westerberg found himself in dispute with his government partners on a number of issues. 
In early 1992, he diverged from his coalition partners on the issue of tax cuts, arguing in
a television interview that he had changed his mind on the need to reduce taxes and that
♦ • 162 • he did not think cuts in government spending were possible or necessary. Cuts in tax
levels funded by cuts in government spending were a central component of the
government’s agenda. While planned tax cuts were cancelled, this had more to do with
163the decline in Swedish economic fortunes rather than pressure from Westerberg. The 
recession had worsened during the course of the government’s term in office with 
unemployment climbing to 10 per cent by 1993 and in the three years of the coalition the 
national debt doubled. This decline in the economic situation required dramatic action by
159 The Economist, September 21st, 1991, p. 60.
160 The Guardian, November 13th, 1993, p. 39 and
http://www.folparliet.se/templales/SimnlePage 7 186.asox [accessed March 2nd 2005].
161 Miles & Widfeldt, 1995, pp.' 1514-1515.
162 The Financial Times, January 21st, 1992, p. 3.
163 Hadenius, 1997, p. 153.
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the government and rendered many of its planned initiatives unfeasible. 164 Furthermore 
to get a policy response to the economic crisis through parliament, the minority 
government required the support of one of the opposition parties. A number of crisis 
agreements were reached with the opposition Social Democrats in an attempt to tackle 
the economic crisis and the cancellation of tax cuts were part of these agreements.165 So 
while this issue was potentially a situation where the ability of the deputy-leader to 
influence government policy could be tested, it would appear that the economic situation 
and minority status of the government were the key factors in bringing the government 
into line with the thinking of the deputy-leader.
As Minister for Health and Social Affairs, Westerberg found himself at odds with his 
cabinet colleagues on family policy, specifically on the issue of a proposed care 
allowance that would enable a parent to stay at home beyond the duration of the existing 
parental leave.166 It was a means of returning childcare to the home and giving parents 
choice over the care of their children. The Centre, Moderate and Christian Democratic 
parties all supported this proposal, while Westerberg’s Liberal Party ultimately went 
along with the proposal in exchange for other changes in childcare law. The proposal 
was passed by parliament and came into effect in July 1994. The Liberal Party had up to 
this point supported childcare institutions and an equal sharing of care responsibilities 
between parents (the care allowance would it was argued result in more women staying at 
home to look after their children). Westerberg, in particular, did not believe that the care 
allowance should be a substitute for a generous system of publicly funded childcare
164 Hadenius, 1997, p. 152.
165 Hadenius, 1997, p. 153.
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facilities and he also believed in both parents having a role in caring for children. So on 
the one hand, the result of the Liberal Party deal on the care allowance was that they 
agreed to support a policy which they (and Westerberg in particular) disagreed with. On 
the other hand, they gained agreement to implement a number of childcare policies that 
they favoured including the so-called ‘Daddy month’ whereby a month of paid parental 
leave is reserved for fathers and a law giving working parents the right to public 
childcare. Although these measures were implemented, it was as a result of a deal with 
the Liberal Party rather than due to the influence of the deputy-leader that they gained 
support within the coalition government. So, Westerberg only had influence over these 
policies insofar as he was party-leader of the Liberals.
A policy area where Westerberg was prominent was his opposition to the New 
Democracy party. During the 1991 elections he criticised the party for its anti-immigrant 
policies. He refused to enter government with them despite the four-party coalition of 
which he was part not having a majority in parliament. The currency crisis of 1992 put 
pressure on the government parties to gain the support of the opposition parties for 
austerity packages to restore confidence in the Swedish economy. While the Prime 
Minister was willing to contemplate seeking the support of New Democracy if agreement 
could not be reached with the main opposition party, the Social Democrats, these 
suggestions were ‘firmly resisted by Westerberg and any thoughts of involving New 
Democracy were soon abandoned’ (Widfeldt, 2001, p. 13). As the 1994 General Election 
approached the Social Democrats were less inclined to do deals with the government and 
so the government was forced to come to an agreement on an ad-hoc basis with New
165 Information on this issue taken from  Bergqvist (2003).
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Democracy at the level of parliamentary committees. While the government had options 
in terms of who it could seek the support of from amongst the opposition parties, it did 
not choose New Democracy; however the government had no alternative but to attempt 
to negotiate with New Democracy once the Social Democrats reverted to a policy of 
opposition. Westerberg was the most vocal and visible opponent of doing a deal with 
New Democracy, but can the initial decision of the government to avoid such a deal be 
attributed to Westerberg’s position as deputy-leader rather than party-leader? Prior to the 
formation of the government, when Westerberg stated that he would not serve in a 
government that required the support of New Democracy, ‘other influential liberals’167 
did not agree with him, so his party was not united on the issue. That is not to say that his 
party opposed his position on the matter. Indeed, his stance only had credibility if his 
party were to withdraw from government in the event of New Democracy joining the 
coalition. If he were to resign on his own then it would not undermine the government. 
The chairman of the Centre Party and Minister for the Environment resigned in June
1994 over the building of a bridge over the Oresund straits between Denmark and 
Sweden, yet the Centre Party remained in government and relations between the 
governing parties were unaffected.168 Furthermore, it must also be remembered that 
Westerberg remained in the government when it was supported by New Democracy, 
albeit support that was not underpinned by a formal deal between New Democracy and 
the governing parties. So, when the coalition government initially refused to deal with 
New Democracy as a result of Westerberg’s stance, it is unclear if this was due to his
167 The Economist, September 21, 1991, p. 60.
168 Hadenius, 1997, p. 154.
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party position or his position as deputy-leader. Ultimately circumstances forced the 
government and Westerberg to deal with New Democracy.
Overall, while Westerberg found himself on a number of occasions taking positions on 
policy issues that were at odds with his coalition partners, his record in terms of bringing 
the government into line with his views is mixed. He did not succeed in halting the 
implementation of the care allowance. However, proposed tax cuts were shelved in line 
with his change of mind on the issue and his attitude towards New Democracy led to 
them initially being kept at arms length by the governing coalition until circumstances 
left the governing parties with no option but to deal with them. Even in those cases where 
the government changed its position in line with his policy objections, Westerberg does 
not appear to have had an influence on government policy that can be directly attributed 
to his role as deputy-leader rather than his being party leader or Minister or indeed due to 
external circumstances.
6.2.5 United Kingdom - Anthony Eden
Anthony Eden was UK Deputy-Prime Minister for one term from 1951 to 1955. During 
this term he was also Foreign Secretary. He took over as Foreign Secretary in 1951 with a 
very full in-tray. Adamthwaite describes the position as ‘the most demanding job in the 
cabinet’ and lists the issues confronting Eden in this posting: ‘The cold war was at its 
height... Germany and Austria were dismembered and occupied with no sign of peace 
treaties. In Iran Prime Minister Mossadeq had nationalized the oil industry and thrown 
out the Anglo-Iranian Oil Company. The Egyptian government had denounced the 1936
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treaty with Britain which allowed the stationing of British forces in the Suez Canal zone 
until 1956. Early in 1952 the whole of the strategic reserve was sent to Egypt to deal with 
terrorism in the Canal zone. In Korea, a full-scale war raged between North and South... 
In Indochina France fought Viet Minh nationalists aided by communist China. Britain 
had its own colonial wars -  from 1950 the emergency in Malaya, and in 1952 the Mau 
Mau rebellion in Kenya. Nearer home Italy and Yugoslavia clashed over their claims to 
the city of Trieste’ (Adamthwaite, 1988, pp. 242-243).169 This was all in addition to 
trying to maintain Britain’s role as a world power while recovering from World War 
Two. There were more countries and international organizations to deal with and
1 7 0paperwork had increased exponentially since the pre-war years. This workload was 
borne by a Foreign Office which was reduced in staff by economy drives and had its 
morale shaken by the defection of two senior diplomats (Burgess and Maclean) to the 
Soviet Union in May 1951. Furthermore, foreign policy was no longer the preserve of the 
Foreign Office with many matters involving the Commonwealth Relations Office, the 
Colonial Office, the Treasury, the Board of Trade and the Ministry of Defence amongst 
others.171 This situation was not helped by the Eden’s ill-health which dogged him until 
well into 1953.172
In addition to the workload as Foreign Secretary, Eden as Deputy-Prime Minister faced a 
further significant constraint on his ability to influence policy. His relationship with 
Prime Minister Churchill has been described as ‘uneasy’ and ‘acrimonious’
169 Adamthwaite, 1988, p. 253.
170 Adamthwaite, 1988, p. 254.
171 Adamthwaite, 1988, p. 256.
172 Adamthwaite, 1988, p. 250.
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(Adamthwaite, 1988, p. 241) and ‘an increasingly difficult partnership’ (Dutton, 1997, p. 
239). The main reason for this was that policy-making suffered from ‘two men acting as 
Foreign Secretary at the same time’ (Shuckburgh, 1986, p. 126). This was a result of 
Churchill’s determination to ‘concentrate on his principle interests, defence and foreign 
policy ... whenever Eden was away -  even for his honeymoon in 1952 -  Churchill 
assumed control of the Foreign Office and launched policy initiatives’ (Adamthwaite, 
1988, p. 251). Rothwell (1992) agrees, describing how ‘Eden’s power was restricted by 
Churchill... [due to the]... many intrusions which Churchill attempted to make in foreign 
policy’ (Rothwell, 1992, pp. 105-106). The difficulties that Churchill’s interest in Eden’s 
portfolio created were exacerbated by the fact that Churchill disagreed with Eden on a 
number of policy issues such as withdrawal from Sudan and Egypt and a proposed 
summit with the Soviet Foreign Minister (Adamthwaite, 1988, p. 251). As Eden hoped to 
succeed Churchill, he could ill afford to cross him and was thus forced ‘to swallow 
policies which he disliked’ (Adamthwaite, 1988, p. 251). Given this situation, it would 
appear that there was little scope for Eden to either implement policies that he favoured 
or stifle policies that he opposed.
This view is in many ways supported by Young (1985) who challenges the perception 
that Eden ruled out British involvement in the development of European supranational 
institutions in late November 1951 at a press conference in Rome despite the supposedly 
pro-European position of Churchill and the cabinet. Young argues that ‘Churchill’s 
commitment to European unity was limited’ (Young, 1985, p. 924) and, thus, contrary to 
some perceptions, Eden had the support of the Prime Minister when he rejected moves
208
towards supranational European institutions and that the cabinet also supported him on 
this issue. Dutton (1997) agrees, arguing that ‘The problem was that too much attention 
had been paid to the grand flourishes of Churchill’s earlier pronouncements and too little 
to the small p rin t... the question of European unity did not figure high on the new Prime 
Minister’s list of priorities’ (Dutton , 1997, p. 292). That is not to say that Eden and 
Churchill were totally at one on European policy, as Young (1985) points out that Eden 
later found himself having to confront proposals which Churchill put to the cabinet 
dealing with the development of a European Defence Community (EDC). Churchill 
argued that the moves to create a supranational European army be watered down so that 
the separate identities of each national army could be maintained within the EDC. Eden 
countered that such a proposal might be seen as an attempt by Britain to sabotage the 
existing supranational proposals, which were vital to address French concerns over 
German re-armament, and, as a result, the cabinet did not adopt Churchill’s proposals. 
So, it would appear that on European policy Eden was able to halt some proposals where 
he found himself in disagreement with Churchill but that the disagreement was not as 
great as was widely perceived.
A further area where the perception of influence on the part of Eden fails to hold up is the 
dispute with Churchill on the holding an Anglo-Soviet summit following the death of 
Stalin. Rothwell (1992) points out that ‘Eden played only a limited part in the immense 
struggle in the Cabinet’ over the issue, so the outcome cannot be attributed to Eden,
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An area where there was open dispute between Churchill and Eden was Sudan and Egypt. 
Eden’s policies advocating withdrawal from Egypt and Sudan were undermined at every 
step by Churchill -  ‘Each time Eden seemed to have won his point, Churchill -  ever 
ready to take advantage of the Foreign Secretary’s absence through illness or diplomatic 
business -  was inclined to step in to undo what had been achieved.’ (Dutton, 1997, p. 
358). Furthermore ‘few in the cabinet offered Eden much support’ (Dutton, 1997, p. 358). 
This view is challenged by Rhodes James (1987) who contends that ‘Eden had virtually 
the complete support of the Cabinet’ (Rhodes James, 1987, p. 379) on the matter. It is 
clear however that Eden and Churchill were at odds on the issue -  ‘In February 1952 
Eden stood up vigorously to Churchill in Cabinet when the latter indicated that he 
thought that the Foreign Secretary was ready to be overhasty about handing over Suez’ 
(Rothwell, 1992, p. 122). There was also considerable backbench opposition to Eden’s 
proposals. The issue was only resolved when Churchill changed his mind as a result of 
the realization that the development of the hydrogen bomb, Greece and Turkey’s entry 
into NATO and a lessening of attacks on British bases in the region lessened the strategic 
value of Egypt and Sudan to Britain. ‘Churchill having changed his mind, now put his 
formidable influence into supporting Eden’ (Rhodes James, 1987, p. 383) against a 
backbench revolt.
Adamthwaite (1988) highlights a more positive policy influence by Eden albeit a minor 
one. This relates to Eden’s efforts to expand the overseas information services despite 
efforts by the Chancellor to halt any increase on expenditure in the area. A Ministerial 
Review Committee recommended that there be no immediate increase in expenditure and
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this view appeared to have the support of the Prime-Minister. After over a year of 
stalemate, Eden was able to gain a more gradual expansion in the funding of the service.
It was not all a battle with Churchill over foreign policy. Eden also achieved a number of 
foreign policy successes during this period: the Korean armistice of 1953, the agreement 
between Italy and Yugoslavia over Trieste, the oil agreement with Iran and the 1954 
Geneva Conference which ended the war between the French and the Viet-Minh in 
Vietnam as well as ending the diplomatic isolation of the People’s Republic of China. 
The later achievement being viewed as a major triumph by Eden -  ‘Eden and British 
diplomacy have been justly feted for their performance at Geneva in 1954 in ending the 
fighting (albeit temporarily) in Viet-Nam and in defusing a major international crisis’ 
(Ruane, 1994, p. 171).
So far, all of this policy influence can be attributed to Eden’s position as Foreign 
Secretary rather than Deputy-Prime Minister. In order to clarify the extent of Eden’s 
policy influence as Deputy-Prime Minister his influence beyond foreign policy must be 
examined. Rothwell (1992), Thorpe (2003), Carlton (1981) and Dutton (1997) all 
highlight the intervention from Eden that led to the halting of proposals to float the pound 
in 1952 (known as Operation Robot). However, again commentators on the matter 
disagree as to the closeness of the debate within cabinet. Dutton (1997) states that ‘the 
majority of the cabinet had more or less accepted that Robot was necessary’ (Dutton,
1997, p. 267). Thorpe agrees, stating that without Eden’s intervention the proposal would 
have been ‘nodded through’ (Thorpe, 2003, p.373) the cabinet. On the other hand, while
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Shuckburgh states that ‘the plan was strongly favoured by the Prime Minister’ (quoted in 
Carlton, 1981, p. 296) he goes on to state that ‘the position in the cabinet, we were told, 
turned entirely on what A.E. would do’ (quoted in Carlton, 1981, p. 297). Rothwell
(1992) takes a similar view, contending that ‘the Cabinet was deadlocked over Robot and 
they asked Eden to exercise a sort of casting vote’ (Rothwell, 1992, p. 107). This has led 
to confusion as to the exact role of Eden in the decision not to proceed with the plan. Was 
his the casting vote or did the decision come about as a result of the more difficult effort 
of Eden having to reverse what was an almost fait accompli? While views diverge on the 
precise role of Eden in halting a proposal he disagreed with, there is agreement however 
that Eden’s intervention on the matter was ‘decisive’, indeed this is the word used by 
Thorpe (2003, p. 373), Burnham (2002, p. 85), Dutton (1997, p. 267) and Carlton (1981, 
p. 296) to describe Eden’s intervention.
This influential intervention can it appears be attributed to Eden’s position as deputy- 
leader rather than his position as Foreign Secretary as it related to an issue outside his 
policy brief. Although some of his arguments at cabinet against the proposal related to its 
potential impact on foreign affairs, he also ‘attacked the plan vehemently on social 
grounds, particularly in view of the serious impact it would have on unemployment’ 
(Dutton, 1997, p. 267). Thorpe (2003) sees it as an intervention ‘into the field of 
economic policy’ (Thorpe, 2003, p. 373), while Carlton (1981) describes it as an 
intervention in ‘domestic affairs’ (Carlton, 1981, p. 296) as does Rothwell (1992). 
Neither can his success in halting this policy proposal be attributed to his standing in the 
Conservative Party at the time as the confrontation over the issue brought him into
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conflict with Rab Butler, the Chancellor, who would have had equal standing in the party. 
Shuckburgh, for example, writes of the press viewing Butler as ‘a serious rival [of 
Eden’s] for the succession to Winston [Churchill]’ (quoted in Carlton, 1981, p. 296). The 
defeat of the proposed Operation Robot provides a clear example of Eden having the 
ability to undermine policies he disagreed with and also indicates that some of this 
influence extended beyond his remit as Foreign Secretary. Can it thus be concluded that 
this was due to his being deputy-leader rather than due to his being Foreign Secretary or 
his standing in the Conservative Party? Such a conclusion does not rule out other factors 
as contributing to Eden’s influential role in this decision (factors such as Eden’s 
reputation, experience or the strength of his arguments). However, the elimination of 
Eden's additional cabinet responsibilities and standing in the party as contributory factors 
to his influence on this issue leaves his position as deputy-leader as a major contributing 
factor. While it is not possible to account for every factor, and indeed different factors 
may have played a role in influencing different members of the cabinet in reaching their 
decision, what can be said is that there is good evidence to suggest that Eden’s position as 
deputy-leader, was a contributory factor in the cabinet rejecting Operation Robot.
So, in conclusion, while Eden faced considerable opposition from his Prime Minister, 
and his influence on certain policies areas has been exaggerated (such as on Europe), it is 
still possible to identify policies which he favoured that he was able to push through 
cabinet despite opposition (Egypt, Sudan and the expansion of the budget for the overseas 
information services) and policy proposals beyond his area of direct responsibility that he
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disagreed with which he was able to stifle (the Robot plan). It is however difficult to 
state clearly that this influence was due solely to his being deputy-leader.
6.2.6 United States -  Walter Mondale
Walter Mondale was Vice-President of the United States from 1977 to 1981. In contrast 
with Anthony Eden, Walter Mondale enjoyed a good working relationship with his 
immediate superior -  President Carter. Cronin and Genovese (1998) point out that ‘Most 
students of the vice presidency agree that Mondale enjoyed a closer relationship with his 
boss, President Jimmy Carter, than any previous vice president ... he tried in earnest to 
make the vice president as close as one can get to a full working partner.’ (Cronin and 
Genovese, 1998, p. 329). Hatfield (1997) in his study of Vice-Presidents echoes this 
view, as he describes Carter and Mondale as forming ‘a remarkably close team’ and that 
Carter was ‘determined to make Mondale more of a partner’.173 Mondale had an open 
invitation to attend all the president’s meetings and to bring his staff along as well as 
access to reports and weekly lunch meetings with the President. He was given an office 
close to the President’s and the Vice-President’s staff were treated as part of the 
President’s staff. These factors combined to give Mondale influence within the White 
House, as Hatfield notes: ‘The vice president’s free access to the Oval Office gave him 
considerable leverage over the administration’s agenda’.174 That he did not have cabinet 
responsibilities beyond being Vice-President or a formal position within his party is not 
to say that there were not plenty of possibilities for the Vice-President to fill his time
173 Available from: htm://wwvv.senate.gov/arlandhistorv/historv/common/briefmg/Vicc PresideiU.htm 
[accessed 3 June 2003],
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with, and indeed distract him from substantive policy influence. Mondale avoided many 
such possibilities, which actually increased his influence, because he was thus able to 
avoid becoming bogged down with specific tasks. ‘Some 75 percent of the two staffs 
[Presidential and Vice-Presidential] suggested that Mondale’s avoidance of line 
assignments increased his influence. In refusing such assignments, Mondale avoided 
bureaucratic infighting, while saving considerable time and energy for substantive policy 
interests’ (Light, 1984, p. 628). Having studied the track records of previous Vice- 
Presidents, Mondale realized that many of his predecessors took on minor or ceremonial
1 nc
functions ‘in order to appear that their role was significant’ yet ended up too busy to 
have a real impact on policy. Indeed, this was one of the key pieces of advice he gave his 
successor as Vice President, ‘if such an assignment is important, it will then cut across 
the responsibilities of one or two cabinet officers or others and embroil you in a 
bureaucratic fight that would be disastrous. If it is meaningless or trivial, it will 
undermine your reputation and squander your time.’ (quoted in Cronin and Genovese, 
1998, p. 332). He rejected acting as Chief of Staff for similar reasons -  ‘it would have 
consumed vast amounts of my time with staff work and distracted me from important 
work’ (quoted in Cronin and Genovese, 1998, p. 330). As a result, ‘Vice-President 
Mondale is credited with being perhaps the first in that job who regularly exercised 
substantive policy influence rather than merely an occasional input of ideas.’ (Cronin and 
Genovese, 1998, p. 330). This view is shared by Felzenberg (2001) who holds that 
Mondale ‘was the first vice president to command major influence within and without the
174 Available from: http://www.senate.gov/artandhistorv/historv/comffloii/bnefing/Vice President.htm 
[accessed 3 June 2003].
175 Available from: http://www.senatc.gov/artandhistoiy/historv/common/bnering/Vice President.htm 
[accessed 3 June 2003].
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administration in which he served’176 and by Lewis (1984) who talks of Mondale’s 
‘success at overcoming the job’s historic limitations’ (Lewis, 1984, p. 208). The US 
Vice-President, while a member of cabinet, does not have additional cabinet 
responsibilities in the way that deputy-1 eaders in the other states in this study do. 
Furthermore, in the specific case of Mondale, he did not have any formal party-leadership 
role. So, his policy influence (if any) during his term as Vice-President would seem to 
flow from his being Vice-President.
Light (1984) has conducted a major study of the nature and extent of Mondale’s 
influence, interviewing eighteen top Mondale aides and twenty-six Carter aides. He 
found that Mondale was involved in a considerable number of decisions made by Carter 
such as the establishment of the Department of Education, the Camp David Summit, 
welfare reform, enactment of the Panama Canal treaties, the SALT II treaties, urban 
assistance programs and electoral reform, however he acknowledges that ‘whether 
Mondale was the swing vote on all decisions is doubtful’ (Light, 1984, p. 621). 
Nonetheless, Mondale was able to exert influence as he was in charge of the agenda- 
setting process for Carter’s legislative program, he was thus able to ‘win support for 
electoral reform and the establishment of the Department of Education as administration 
priorities’ (Light, 1984, p. 638). From his survey of the Presidential and Vice- 
Presidential staff, Light (1984) found that ‘100 percent of the Mondale staff and over 80 
percent of the Carter staff said that Mondale influenced Carter’s agenda. Though there 
was predictable overstating of the importance among the vice-president’s staff, ... if staff 
perceptions are accepted as an indicator of influence, Mondale emerges as a key player in
176 Available from: http://www.policy review.org/feb01/felzenberg_print.html [accessed 14 March 2002],
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the White House policy process’ (Light, 1984, 621). Cronin and Genovese’s (1998) view 
of Mondale as a limited initiator of policy is not inconsistent with this, insofar as 
Mondale was able to prioritise those policies initiated by others which he was in favour 
of. That is not to say that Mondale always got what he wanted. As Lewis points out, ‘By 
the end of the first year in office, it had become clear that there were limits to Mondale’s 
ability to influence Carter’s policies... He fought to salvage the fifty-dollar tax rebate as 
the centerpiece of Carter’s economic-stimulus package -  and lost. He fought for a higher 
minimum wage -  and lost. He fought for higher farm prices -  and lost.’ (Lewis, 1984, pp. 
202-203). Having said that, Lewis (1984) also points to a number of areas where 
Mondale did have real influence, such as persuading the President to order the Navy to 
rescue boat people in the South China Sea over the objections of the State Department, 
the Department of Justice and the Navy. So, Mondale, while not always successful at 
influencing policy, did have a number of successes to his name.
However, towards the end of his Vice-Presidency, as the election loomed, Mondale was 
‘forced into a rather unbecoming “cheerleader-in-chief’ role’ (Cronin and Genovese,
1998, p. 318) as on the one hand he battled liberal Democrats during the renomination 
process and conservative Republicans during the Presidential election. During the later 
half of his term as Vice-President, as the public’s support for the Carter administration 
fell as a result of inflation, recession, the energy crisis and a number of foreign policy 
crises such as the Iran hostages and the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan, Mondale’s 
influence was perceived to wane somewhat. As Light acknowledges Mondale had ‘his 
share of internal defeats’ (Light, 1984, p. 618), citing for example that Mondale advised
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against the cabinet firings of 1979 which Carter went ahead with. That is not to say that 
Mondale went from having considerable influence at the start of his term as Vice- 
President to having none towards the end of the term. Light (1984) indicates that 
Mondale adapted his strategy to address the changed circumstances in which he found 
himself, moving to a more defensive approach which he summarises as:
‘First he tried to stop competing programs completely. If he could not win, perhaps 
he could stalemate the opposition. Second, after failing to stop the competition, 
Mondale tried to modify competing programs. By amending and adjusting 
opposition programs, Mondale could still gain a measure of influence ... Third, 
after failing to stop or modify, Mondale tried to delay competing programs. As 
Mondale had learned in the Senate, delays of weeks or months could mean the 
difference between legislative success of failure.’ (Light, 1984, p. 638).
Thus Mondale was still able to exert influence over Middle East policy by toning it down 
rather than removing it from the agenda. Light (1984) quotes a Mondale aide with 
another example of this approach -  ‘We didn’t have the edge on the budget after 1978 ... 
the only choice was to work to keep the cuts from going too deep. We couldn’t stop the 
cuts from happening ... the best way to go was to keep some of the amounts down’ 
(Light, 1984, p. 638). Cronin and Genovese (1998) also agree that Mondale ‘succeeded in 
blocking some bad initiatives’ (Cronin and Genovese, 1998, p. 330), while pointing out 
that ‘he also failed on a number of occasions’ (Cronin and Genovese, 1998, p. 330). 
However, for the purposes of the current research, it is sufficient to show that Mondale
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succeeded in influencing policy outcomes (even if in a negative sense of undermining 
policies that he disagreed with) on some occasions.
So, the ability of Mondale to determine policy outcomes varied over the course of his 
term as Vice-President. Early in his term it is possible to identify policies with which he 
agreed that he was able to push through (electoral reform and the establishment of the 
Department of Education). While his policy influence was reduced as he ‘had trouble 
getting good things on [the agenda] later in the term’ (Light, 1984, p. 638). He adapted to 
this situation by focusing on stifling policies proposals that he disagreed with (the budget 
and the Middle East for example). Mondale exerted influence over policy outcomes 
during his entire term as Vice-President to such an extent that Lewis (1984) argues that 
‘Mondale was a contributing member of the Carter administration, no question. The 
Carter record, to a significant degree is Mondale’s.’ (Lewis, 1984, p. 217). This was a 
not inconsiderable level of policy influence.
As Mondale did not hold any cabinet position other than Vice-President, his influence on 
policy can it appears be directly attributed to his being Vice-President. However, while 
not holding a formal position of leadership within his party, his position as a leading 
liberal within the Democratic Party may have given him some influence with the 
President, particularly later in his term when Carter faced a liberal challenge for his 
party’s nomination from Senator Edward Kennedy. Light’s survey of Presidential and 
Vice-Presidential staff found that Mondale’s ties to the liberal wing of the Democratic 
Party were a factor in his influence with over half of Mondale and Carter’s staffs
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highlighting this as a factor in Mondale’s influence,177 with Mondale’s liberal 
connections being ‘of some worth to Carter in rebuilding his electoral coalition to defeat 
Kennedy for the 1980 Democratic nomination’ (Light, 1984, p. 628). While not having a 
formal role in the party, Hatfield (1997) observes that ‘As a senator, vice president and 
presidential candidate, Mondale played a transitional role in the Democratic party, 
seeking to bridge the generational and ideological divisions that racked the party during 
and after the 1960s.’178 While Mondale’s liberal connections helped Carter’s bid to be 
renominated at the end of his term, his party connections were also useful at the start of 
his term as Vice-President. With a long political track record and extensive network of 
contacts in Congress, Mondale’s ‘longstanding friendships on Capital Hill, formed during 
a dozen years as a senator, remained intact and were of great help at moments of high 
controversy, such as ratification of the Panama Canal treaties’ (Lewis, 1984, p. 217). 
Mondale also had strong ties to the Trade Unions, which he was able to use, for example, 
to help get support for the White House plan to bail out Chrysler.179 Indeed, Cronin and 
Genovese (1998) highlight the view that ‘Mondale’s influence stemmed from Carter’s 
dependence on him to explain how Congress worked and to maintain close ties with the 
labor movement’ (Cronin and Genovese, 1998, p. 332). Such a dependence was 
exacerbated, it is argued, by the fact that Carter was a Washington outsider, whose 
political experience as a Governor left him ill-equipped to deal with Congress. A task for 
which Mondale was well suited given his political experience. Light agrees with this 
assessment: ‘In the Carter White House, Mondale held some advantage simply from the
177 Light, 1984, p. 628.
178 Available from: http://ww w. senate, go v/artandhistorv/historv/common/briefing/V ice President.him 
[accessed 3 June 2003].
179 Lewis, 1984, p. 216.
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lack of Washington experience among members of the president’s staff (Light, 1984, p. 
630). A Mondale aide described what happened: ‘Knowledge was power in the Carter 
administration, especially in the first year. There were so many areas where Carter and 
his staff had little background that we had a number of vacuums. No one knew too much 
about electoral reform, so Mondale’s chief counsel Michael Berman got involved. No one 
knew too much about handling Congress, so Mondale’s chief of staff Richard Moe got 
involved’ (Light, 1984, pp. 635-636). So informally, Mondale had a party role and his 
party experience was an invaluable asset to the White House. To what extent were these 
factors responsible for his influence over policy while he was Vice-President? While it is 
impossible to quantify the precise role that individual factors had in determining 
Mondale’s influence, a number of observations can be made with respect to the role of 
his party connections in determining his influence on policy in the White House. While 
on certain issues, Mondale’s party connections may have been useful, they were not 
always utilised by Carter. As Hatfield (1997) points out, ‘Mondale cringed at Carter’s 
inept handling of Congress and tried unsuccessfully to stop actions that might alienate the
♦ « 1  anadministration from its erstwhile supporters on Capitol Hill.’ Furthermore, as Carter 
and his team gained experience in the ways of Washington, what reliance there was on 
Mondale lessened. Secondly, being in the White House weakened Mondale’s party 
connections as he pursued a separate agenda from his party in Congress. In the words of 
Lewis (1984) - ‘many liberals... questioned whether Mondale stood up for their values 
or was just a weak reed bending in a strong conservative wind’ (Lewis, 1984, p. 217). 
Mondale’s party connections may also have caused difficulties for him with the Carter
180 Available from: l)ttp://www.senate.t>ov/artandhistoi‘v/liistorv/common/briefine/Vice Presidcnl.htm 
[accessed 3 June 2003],
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White House in that Carter’s political background and those of his inner circle would 
have been more conservative than Mondale’s. According to Light (1984), Mondale faced 
‘ideological opposition’ (Light, 1984, p. 628) within the White House, particularly later 
in the term when ‘Mondale and his liberal allies were frequently in the minority’ (Light, 
1984, p. 638) as Carter faced a conservative Republican challenge for re-election. So 
while Mondale may have had a party-related role during his term as Vice-President and 
this may account for some of his influence, it does not account for it all.
Lewis (1984) talks of Mondale’s ‘unprecedented influence as vice president’ (Lewis, 
1984, p. 278). While there may be other factors that contributed to Mondale being able to 
exert policy influence, being Vice-President was key. For example, Light (1984) makes 
the point that ‘among recent presidents, Carter was the most persuadable across the 
widest range of issues’, however, no matter how persuadable Carter was, Mondale would 
not have been able to persuade him if he didn’t have the access provided by being Vice- 
President. Similarly, while much has been made of the rapport that developed between 
Carter and Mondale, it would not have occurred if Mondale had not been chosen by 
Carter to be his Vice-President. However, as Light points out that ‘much of Mondale’s 
influence [over policy] came from the fact that he was appointed to operate the White 
House agenda-setting process, by canvassing ideas and setting priorities for the Carter 
legislative program’ (Light, 1984, pp 634-635), can it be said that his influence over 
policy derived from his being Vice-President rather than his being granted charge of the 
policy agenda-setting process by the President? What can be said is that if Mondale had 
not been Vice-President he would not have been given such a role. So, there is a strong
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case to show that Mondale influenced policy while he was Vice-President and that his 
being Vice-President was the main contributing factor to the level of influence that he 
was able to exert over policy.
6 .3  C o n c lu s io n
Having examined the qualitative observable implication relating to the hypothesis that if 
deputy-leaders matter, then they will seek to influence policies that they believe to be 
important while in the office, it was found that results varied for the deputy-leaders who 
were the subject of case-studies. Only in the case of the United States was strong and 
clear evidence found that the deputy leader could influence policy outcomes and that this 
was not due to factors such as their status within their party or their cabinet 
responsibilities. While in the case of the UK, evidence was found that the deputy-leader 
was able to influence policy outcomes beyond their ministerial brief, however it could not 
be clearly concluded that this was solely due to his being deputy-leader. In the case of 
Irish deputy-leader, Dick Spring, there exists plenty of evidence of policy influence 
beyond his cabinet brief during both his terms in office as Deputy-Leader. However, 
during the first term, this influence may have been attributable to his role as party-leader 
rather than Deputy-Leader. In his second term, evidence was found of a case where he 
could have exerted influence but did not. Nonetheless, a further case was found where his 
opposition to changes in the tax legislation led to abandonment of the proposal and it 
appears that this was due to his opposition rather than that of his party. Thus there is a 
plausible case to be made that during Spring’s tenure as Tanaiste the office mattered 
insofar as he could influence policy outcomes beyond his ministerial brief, but it is
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impossible to prove that this influence was due to his being deputy-leader rather than 
being due to his being leader of a party in a multi-party coalition government. In the case 
of the Dutch deputy-leader, Borst-Eilers, she was able to push through a controversial 
policy within her own department when she had the additional position of deputy-leader. 
However, again it is not possible to state with certainty that this success in policy 
implementation was solely due to her being a deputy-leader rather than her party role. 
Similarly, in the case of Swedish deputy-leader, Bengt Westerberg, the government 
changed direction on a number of policy fronts in line with his views. The difficulty that 
arises is that these changes cannot clearly be attributed to Westerberg’s influence as 
deputy-leader and are more likely to be the result of changing circumstances and pressure 
from Westerberg’s party. So, while it is possible to show that those who were deputy- 
leaders have influenced policy, and in many cases policy beyond the remit of any 
additional ministerial responsibilities that they may have had, there is a difficulty in most 
cases in attributing that policy influence solely to the fact that they were deputy-leaders 
(as distinct from party-leaders or members of cabinet). In the case-studies of the deputy- 
leaders examined in this chapter, it can be said that the US deputy-leader was able to use 
his position as deputy-leader to influence policy, while the UK and Irish deputy-leaders 
may have used their positions as deputy-leaders to influence policy. In the Swedish and 
Dutch cases, the evidence is less clearcut as it is unclear whether or not their influence on 
policy was due to their being deputy-leaders or party-leaders.
224
7  H Y P O T H E S E S  A N D  Q U A N T IT A T IV E  O B S E R V A B L E  
I M P L I C A T I O N S  R E L A T I N G  T O  D E P U T Y - L E A D E R S
L E A V IN G  O F F I C E
7.1 I n t r o d u c t io n
This chapter will focus on the activities of deputy-leaders as they leave office and 
afterwards. It will involve the testing of hypotheses six and seven via two observable 
implications. Hypothesis six is concerned with the capacity of deputy-leaders to influence 
policy while hypotheses seven deals with the motivation of deputy-leaders.
7 .2  H y p o th e s i s  s ix
7.2.1 Introduction
The sixth hypothesis states that:
If deputy-leaders matter then, where they are involved in significant policy 
disagreement outside the area of any additional cabinet portfolio that they 
hold, their removal from office will be sought.
In order to test this hypothesis the exact circumstances in which each of the deputy- 
leaders in this study left office will be examined in order to determine if a policy 
disagreement was the main reason for their departure from office. The number of deputy- 
leaders in the five states in this study who left office early due to policy disagreements
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will be compared to the total number of deputy-leaders who left office early to determine 
if it is a significant reason for leaving office early.
The deputy-leaders’ reason for leaving office will be categorised in six ways: the 
government was not re-elected; they resigned; they were sacked; they were not re­
appointed; they had to take the place of the leader or they died in office. For the purposes 
of testing this hypothesis, focus will be placed on those leaders who left office through 
either resigning, being sacked or not being re-appointed. Each such case will be 
examined to determine if policy differences played a role in the deputy-leader leaving 
office.
One issue needs to be addressed before this can be done. There is a practical issue of how 
to identify the reason for a deputy-leader leaving office. Often the reason given may not 
be the real reason. Someone resigning for ‘personal reasons’ or ‘wishing to spend more 
time with their family’ may in fact be resigning out of frustration with a policy impasse. 
In order to address this difficulty, focus will be placed not only on the public statements 
relating to the departure of the deputy-leaders in question, but also on media analysis of 
the departure as these will tend to identify any additional issues that led to the 
resignation.
7.2.2 Policy-related reasons for deputy-leaders leaving office
Full details of the circumstances under which the deputy-leaders in this study left office 
are given in Appendix 6 and are summarised in Table 7.1. Three deputy-leaders in this
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study are still in office and a number of deputy-leaders held the office more than once 
and left it under different circumstances so in some cases the totals under the separate 
headings are less than the total number of deputy-leaders for that state and in others they 
exceed the number of deputy-leaders for that state. From Table 7.1, it can be seen that the 
majority (65 per cent) of deputy-leaders left the office when their government left office 
after either losing an election or resigning. A further 17 per cent left the position by 
retiring or resigning. Four (six per cent) were not reappointed. Only one deputy-leader 
was sacked and none died in office.
Table 7-1 Reasons for deputy-leaders leaving office.
No. of 
depu ty - 
leaders 
(1946- 
2002)
G ovt
left
office
R e tired /
R esigned
N ot
R e­
ap p o in ted
Sacked Becam e
lead e r
Died
Ire lan d 14 10 2 1 1 1 0
N etherlands 24 20 4 0 0 0 0
Sweden 7 3 2 1 0 1 0
U nited
Kingdom
7 2 2 1 0 1 0
U nited S tates 12 7 1 1 0 2 0
T O T A L 64 42 11 4 1 5 0
(%  o f to tal) (65%) (17%) (6% ) (2%) (7%) (0%)
In terms of testing the hypothesis via the observable implication, the reason why deputy- 
leaders were removed from office will need to be examined. The deputy-leaders who 
resigned, retired, were sacked or not reappointed will be focussed on. The total figures 
for deputy-leaders in these categories across all five states are summarised in Table 7.2. 
From this it can be seen that four Irish, four Dutch, three Swedish, three British and two 
US deputy-leaders either resigned, retired, were sacked or were not reappointed. In other 
words just a quarter (or under a third on the basis of the average of the averages) of the
deputy-leaders in this study left office prematurely. Each of these individual cases will 
now be briefly examined to determine what role policy differences played in these 
deputy-leaders leaving office.
Table 7-2 Number of deputy-leaders who left office early.
Number of 
deputy-leaders 
(1946-2002)
Number of deputy-leaders who left office 
early (percentage of total number of 
deputy-leaders)
Ireland 14 4 (29%)
Netherlands 24 4 (17%)
Sweden 7 3 (43%)
United Kingdom 7 3 (43%)
United States 12 2(17%)
TOTAL 64 16(25%)
Average of the 
Averages
30%
In the case of the Irish deputy-leaders, both Sean MacEntee and Frank Aiken were at the
181 ■end of long political careers when they ceased being deputy-leaders. Both retired as 
members of parliament at the general election following their stepping down from 
ministerial office. Their stepping down as deputy-leader was not the result of policy 
disagreements but the conclusion of long political careers. The first of the Irish deputy- 
leaders to resign from office was Dick Spring in 1987. He, along with his Labour Party 
colleagues, left government due to ‘rows over the budget figures for 1987’ (Ryan, 1993, 
p. 80). While this clearly was a policy-related reason, the Labour Party members of 
government resigned as a whole rather than the deputy-leader specifically. The 
resignation was due to Spring’s status as a minister from the Labour Party rather than his 
being deputy-leader. The policy difference that led to the resignation was between his
181 Coakley and Gallagher, 1999, pp. 379-382.
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party and their coalition partners rather than between the deputy-leader and his fellow 
ministers. Thus he cannot be considered to be a deputy-leader who resigned in the sense 
in which this observable implication applies. In the case the Irish deputy-leader sacked 
from office - Brian Lenihan -  ‘he was a casualty of an incident during the 1990 
presidential election campaign in which he appeared to be giving contradictory versions 
of an event in 1982 involving an alleged attempt to bring undue pressure to bear on the 
President... it brought about his dismissal as Tanaiste.’ (Coakley and Gallagher, 1999, p. 
382). This is not policy related. So none of the Irish deputy-1 eaders can be said to have 
resigned due to policy differences.
As for the Dutch deputy-leaders, Louis Beel resigned so as to serve on the commission of
i on
enquiry into the so-called ‘Greet Hofmans Affair’ and thus his reason for leaving 
office was not policy-related.183 Hendrik Korthals withdrew his nomination as a 
candidate for parliament for the VVD in 1963 and so did not contest the following 
election. The reason for this was personal.184 Andreas Van Agt’s KVP party left 
government in 1977 due to a disagreement over legislation dealing with land 
speculation.185 Similarly, Johannes den Uyl’s PvdA party left the government in June 
1982 ‘in protest over cuts in public spending’ (Ellis, 1982, p. 2). So, two out of the four 
Dutch deputy-leaders to leave office prematurely did so as a result of policy issues. 
However, as with the case of Spring, in both these instances it was the party of the
182 Greet Hofmans was a friend and advisor of the Queen who was viewed as having excessive influence 
over the Queen. The Beel Commission was set up to investigate the matter. While its report remains secret 
to this day, contact between Hofmans and the Royal court ended. Information taken from: 
http://en.wikipedia.orii/wiki/Greet Hofmans [accessed 13 April 2004],
183 Available from www.parlement.com [accessed 8 April 2003].
184 Available from www.parlement.com [accessed 8 April 2003],
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deputy-leader rather than the deputy-leader specifically which had the policy  
disagreement, therefore none o f  the Dutch deputy-leaders can be considered to have 
resigned due to personal policy disagreements.
As for the Swedish deputy-leaders, while Per Ahlmark resigned for ‘strictly personal
i o/r
reasons’, his resignation was preceded by a number o f  disputes over policy issues with 
his coalition partners. He ‘found it hard to muffle his distaste for som e o f  his ... 
[coalition partners]... favourite p olic ies’ 87. A  month before his resignation he had his 
‘biggest dispute’188 with the Centre Party over nuclear energy policy (he was deputy- 
leader and Minister for Labour at the time). So, while his publicly stated reason for 
resigning was personal, it must be seen against a background o f  policy  disputes with his 
coalition partners. The case o f  Mona Sahlin is more clear cut in that she resigned 
following ‘allegations o f  financial impropriety’ 189 arising from her m isuse o f  a 
government credit card. Lena Hjelm-W allen was not reappointed as deputy-leader 
following the general election o f  2002 which returned the Social Democrats to power. 
However, she is described as having ‘retired without controversy...having served in 
Social Democratic governments for many years’ (W idfeldt, 2003, p .1098). So in the case 
o f Swedish deputy-leaders who resigned from office or were not re-appointed, policy  
disagreements were a factor in only one o f  the three cases. In this case it was 
disagreement over a broad range o f  policies, so it can clearly be stated that one Swedish
185 Available from www.parlement.com [accessed 8 April 2003],
186 The Economist, February 4, 1978, p. 51
187 The Economist, February 4, 1978, p. 51
188 The Economist, February 4, 1978, p. 51
189 The G uardian, N o ve m b e r 11, 1995, p. 16.
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deputy-leader involved in significant policy disagreement outside the area o f  any 
additional cabinet portfolio that they held, resigned from office.
In the case o f  the UK, there were three deputy-leaders who either resigned or were not 
reappointed. ‘Rah’ Butler went from being deputy-leader to being Foreign Secretary in 
1963 following the change in party leader (and Prime M inister) from M acmillan to 
Douglas-Home. This was in many respects a promotion as his previous cabinet 
responsibility had been for the Central African Office. Furthermore, it was his ‘w ish’ 
(Butler, 1971, p .251) to be Foreign Secretary. W illiam W hitelaw retired as deputy-leader 
in 1988 as ‘he suffered a stroke in 1987 which led to him cutting back on his political 
activity’190. The case o f  Geoffrey H owe is a clear-cut case o f  policy differences resulting 
in the resignation o f  a deputy-leader. In his letter o f  resignation to the Prime-Minister he 
stated: ‘Our conduct o f  policy on the crucial monetary issue in Europe - first on ERM and 
now on EM U - has given me increasing grounds for concern... The need to find and 
maintain comm on ground on the European issue within our ow n party w ill be crucial to 
our electoral success, and the future o f  the nation. In all honesty I now  find m yself unable 
to share your v iew  o f  the right approach to this question. On that basis, I do not believe 
that I can any longer serve with honour as a member o f  your Governm ent.’191 So only 
one UK deputy-leader resigned over policy differences. As his only additional cabinet 
responsibility at the time was Leader o f  the House o f  Commons, he clearly was involved  
in a significant policy disagreement outside the area o f  his additional cabinet portfolio.
190 Available from http://news.bbc.co.Uk/l/hi/uk politics/382770.stm [accessed 26 March 2003],
191 Letter quoted in The Independent, November 2, 1990, p. 2.
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Two US deputy-leaders left office in circumstances where policy  disagreements may 
have been involved. In the case o f  Spiro Agnew, however, it was a straight-forward case 
o f  a financial scandal involving ‘illegal campaign contributions and kickbacks’192 from 
his time as Governor o f  Maryland. As for N elson Rockefeller, he was on the verge o f  
being dropped by President Ford as his Vice-Presidential nom inee for the 1976 
presidential elections when he announced that he would not be a candidate for the Vice- 
Presidency. President Ford him self provided an explanation as to why Rockefeller faced 
being dropped from the ticket; an opinion poll had shown that ‘25 per cent o f  
Republicans polled said they wouldn’t vote for me i f  Rockefeller remained on the ticket’ 
(quoted in Light, 1984, p. 627). So Rockefeller was to be dropped for electoral reasons. 
This begs the question -  why was Rockefeller an electoral liability? Ford’s campaign 
manager described Rockefeller as ‘too old, and too liberal, and too much o f  a detriment 
to the ticket.’193 Ford h im self stated that R ockefeller’s unpopularity ‘derived from things 
he’d said and stands h e’d taken earlier in his political career... h e ’d established a 
reputation as a liberal, and he had outraged many ultra-conservative Republicans’ (quoted 
in Light, 1984, p. 627). W hile Rockefeller’s lack o f  political popularity among 
Republicans may have resulted in his failure to gain the nomination, his age and policy  
positions were significant factors in determining his lack o f  popularity. From this 
evidence it is safe to say that R ockefeller’s policy positions played a role in his being 
viewed as an electoral liability and not being re-nominated for the position o f  Vice- 
President, however they were not the sole reason. W hile these policy positions were
192 Available at lmp://www.senate.gov/artandhislorv/historv/cominon/briefing/Vice Pre.sidenl.hlin 
[accessed 3 June 2003],
193 Available at hnp;//www.scnate.gov/artandhistorv/historv/cpinmon/briefiiWVice President.htm 
[accessed 3 June 2003],
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taken by Rockefeller before he became Vice-President, they only becam e an issue when  
he became Vice-President and so it can be argued that policy disagreements had some 
role in his not being re-appointed. A s he held no additional cabinet portfolios, failure to 
re-nominate him can in part be attributed to significant policy disagreement outside the 
area o f  any additional cabinet portfolio that he held. H owever, i f  we are to take a 
conservative approach to classifying the reason for his not being re-nominated, it is 
difficult to see this as a clear case o f  policy considerations impacting on Rockefeller re­
nomination. It could be argued that his lack o f  electoral appeal was the major factor in his 
not being re-nominated.
While only two deputy-leaders (three per cent) left office due to policy differences 
relating to issues beyond any additional cabinet responsibilities, these absolute figures do 
show that in som e cases, the hypothesis was found to be true. In order to show that 
deputy-leaders can matter, rather than always matter, this is sufficient. Furthermore, 
when the figure o f  two deputy-leaders leaving office due to policy  differences is seen in 
the context o f  a total o f  16 deputy-leaders leaving office early, it can be seen as a 
significant reason for why deputy-leaders leave office early.
How are these results affected by breaking them out in terms o f  deputy-leaders who were 
party-leaders and those who were not and deputy-leaders who had additional cabinet 
responsibilities and those who did not? Only four o f  the 16 deputy-leaders were party- 
leaders at the time o f  their removal from office (Spring, den U yl, van A gt and Ahlmark), 
all o f  whom resigned from office. Only two o f  the 16 did not have additional cabinet
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responsibilities (the two U S Vice-Presidents). These numbers are too small for any 
definitive conclusions to be drawn.
7.2.3 Conclusion
Having examined the reasons why deputy-leaders were forced from office (ie resigned, 
were sacked or were not reappointed), it was found that o f  the 64 deputy-leaders, only 
two (three per cent) left office due to policy differences relating to issues beyond any 
additional cabinet responsibilities that they had at the time. Another four retired as they 
were at the end o f  their political careers, while three were forced from office by scandals 
unrelated to policy matters. So while policy differences do not offer a comprehensive 
explanation for why deputy-leaders left office early, they are a major reason for deputy- 
leaders leaving office early in that o f  the two o f  the 16 deputy-leaders (13 per cent) who 
left office early did so as a result o f  policy differences outside their cabinet 
responsibilities.
7.3 Hypothesis seven
7.3.1 Introduction
The seventh hypothesis states that:
If deputy-leaders matter, then after their term of office as deputy-Ieader they 
will go on to  hold another significant political office.
2 3 4
This gives rise to one observable implication, namely that i f  deputy-leaders can influence 
policy (and thus matter), they w ill generally go on to other political positions where they 
can influence policy.
If the position is nothing more than a retirement hom e for politicians, then one would  
expect that, after leaving the position o f  deputy-leader, the former holder would leave 
politics altogether or m ove to another minor or cerem onial political position. 
Alternatively i f  the position o f  deputy-leader matters, then one would expect holders o f  
the office to be significant political actors who would go on to hold other significant 
political positions (i.e. positions which can influence policy such as ministers, chairs o f  
parliamentary comm ittees and directors o f  international governmental bodies). For 
present purposes, membership o f  parliament will not be considered a ‘significant’ 
political position as in itse lf such a position rarely provides policy  influence. O f course, 
there w ill be cases where deputy-leaders retire from political life or are demoted. 
However, in m ost cases, i f  it is a significant political office, then one would expect that 
holders o f  the office w ill go on to hold other significant positions.
7.3.2 Policy-related positions held after deputy-leaders left office
Table 7.3 shows the results o f  the search to identify what careers were pursued by 
deputy-leaders after they left the position o f  deputy-leader. Full details are given in 
Appendix 7. It includes the total figures for the number o f  deputy-leaders in each o f  the 
five states in this study who went on to hold further policy-related positions, as w ell as 
those who took up a career in business and those who went on to pursue other activities
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(such as writing or lecturing). It should be noted that these are not mutually exclusive  
categories as some deputy-leaders not only pursued further political careers but then 
found employment in the business world. There were also a number o f  deputy-leaders 
who simply retired and so did not pursue further careers either inside or outside o f  
politics.
T a b l e  7 - 3  C a r e e r  d i r e c t io n  o f  d e p u t y - l e a d e r s  a f t e r  b e in g  d e p u t y - l e a d e r .
Number
of
deputy-
leaders
(1946-
2002)
Number of 
deputy-leaders 
who held 
policy-related 
positions after 
being deputy- 
leader. 
(percentage of 
total number of 
deputy-leaders)
Number of 
deputy-leaders 
who held 
positions in 
business after 
being deputy- 
leader. 
(percentage of 
total number of 
deputy-leaders)
Number of 
deputy-leaders 
who held other 
positions after 
being deputy- 
leader. 
(percentage of 
total number of 
deputy-leaders)
Ireland 13 3 (23%) 3 (23%) 3 (23%)
Netherlands 24 12 (50%) 13 (54%) 4 (17%)
Sweden 7 5 (71%) 2 (29%) 2 (29%)
United Kingdom 6 3 (50%) 2 (33%) 1 (17%)
United States 11 6 (55%) 3 (27%) 4 (36%)
TOTAL 6 1 m 29 (48%) 23 (38%) 14 (23%)
Average of the 
Averages
50% 33% 24%
Excluding the deputy-leaders still in office reduces the Irish, U K  and U S deputy-leaders 
by one each. W hile just fewer than half o f  the deputy-leaders in this study went on to 
hold further policy-influencing positions after their terms as deputy-leaders, there is a 
wide variation in the results across the five states. In the case o f  Ireland only 23 per cent 
o f  deputy-leaders subsequently held policy-influencing positions; however in this 
instance it must be borne in mind that in four cases (31 per cent o f  the total) the deputy-
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leader was leader o f  a small party in coalition government (in this instance the Labour 
Party). For these deputy-leaders the deputy-leadership was the highest office they could 
aspire to and, after their last term as deputy-leader, they subsequently stepped down as 
party-leader and took a back seat in politics i f  not actually resigned from politics 
altogether. In other words, for a third o f  the Irish deputy-leaders their career options (in 
terms o f  policy-influence) were severely limited after their terms as deputy-leaders. In the 
cases o f  Dutch, and British deputy-leaders, exactly h a lf o f  the deputy-leaders went on to 
hold further policy-influencing positions. In contrast, in the case o f  US deputy-leaders a 
clear majority o f  them went on to hold such positions and in Sweden 71 per cent o f  
deputy-leaders went on to hold further policy-influencing positions. The holding o f  
policy-influencing office is the most common career m ove for former deputy-leaders, 
using the average o f  the average measure, exactly half o f  the deputy-leaders in this study 
took this route, compared to exactly a third who went on to take up careers in business 
and almost a quarter who took up some other career (such as lecturing or judgeships).
As for breaking out the results so as to determine i f  party-leadership or additional 
ministerial responsibilities had any effect on whether deputy-leaders went on to hold 
further policy-influencing positions, given that this hypothesis looks at the motivation o f  
the individuals involved, the distinction between party-leaders and deputy-leaders is not 
relevant to them.
194 Excluding  3 deputy-leaders s till in o ffice
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So do the findings regarding this observable implication support or undermine the 
hypothesis? The finding that using the average o f  the averages measure, 50 per cent o f  
deputy-leaders in the states in this study went on to hold other policy-influencing  
positions neither conclusively proves nor disproves the hypothesis. H owever, the fact that 
in some instances deputy-leaders do go on to hold such positions indicates that in some 
cases they have an interest in policy and that it is not just those at the end o f  their political 
careers who becom e deputy-leaders. This conclusion provides som e evidence suggesting 
that it is not correct to state that deputy-leaders do not matter.
7.4 Conclusion
Having examined hypotheses six  and seven which both relate to when deputy-leaders 
leave office, it was found that o f  the 64 deputy-leaders only two (three per cent) left 
office due to significant policy disagreements outside the areas o f  any additional cabinet 
portfolio that they held. So, policy differences were the reason for their departure in only 
a small minority o f  cases. In other words policy differences were not one o f  the major 
factors behind the departure o f  deputy-leaders from office, how ever there were some 
cases where deputy-leaders left office due to policy disagreements and these figures are 
broadly in line with those for leaders leaving office for similar reasons.
As for the career o f  deputy-leaders after their term o f  office as deputy-leader, a 
significant minority o f  deputy-leaders (50 per cent o f  the deputy-leaders in the states in 
this study) went on to hold other policy-influencing positions. This indicates that some
7.3.3 Conclusion
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deputy-leaders have an interest in policy and that it is not just those at the end o f their 
political careers who become deputy-leaders.
The findings that in som e cases (albeit a small minority) deputy-leaders leave office due 
to policy disagreements outside the area o f  any additional cabinet portfolio that they hold, 
and that in some cases they go on to hold other policy-influencing positions suggests that 
some deputy-leaders may matter (insofar as they may have influence over policy). The 
fact that such deputy-leaders were found in all five states (for hypotheses seven) suggests 
that deputy-leaders mattering may not be not confined to one or two states. In order to 
properly assess this, the results o f  all seven hypotheses will have to be examined. This 
will lake place in the next chapter.
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8  C O N C L U S I O N
In chapter two, it was found that the literature on deputy-leaders is extremely limited and 
what literature exists is dism issive o f  the position o f  deputy-leader. The aims o f  this PhD 
are therefore to expand on  the limited literature on deputy-leaders and to see whether they 
matter. In order to m eet the former aim, a global database on deputy-leaders was 
compiled. To the latter end, seven hypotheses were derived in order to test whether or not 
deputy-leaders mattered. Over the course o f  the last four chapters, nine resulting 
observable implications were tested against the experiences o f  64 deputy-leaders in five  
states over the period 1946-2002. If the observable implications can be found to occur, 
then they support the hypotheses. The more observable implications found to actually 
occur, the greater the likelihood that deputy-leaders matter.
N ow  that the hypotheses have been tested, it is the purpose o f  this chapter to bring 
together the findings w ith a v iew  to determining whether or not it is correct to say that 
deputy-leaders do not matter. First, the findings from the global database w ill be 
summarised. W hile the database does not determine whether or not deputy-leaders 
matter, it meets the first aim o f  this research which is to provide further information on 
the position o f  deputy-leader than is provided by the current literature. Once this is 
completed the results o f  the testing o f  the observable implications w ill be categorized in 
terms o f  how strongly they confirm or reject the hypotheses. These categorisations will
8 . 1  I n t r o d u c t i o n
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then be used to determine whether the deputy-leaders studied had an interest in policy  
and whether or not they could influence policy. It should then be possible to determine 
whether or not deputy-leaders matter.
8.2 The global database
The completion o f  the global database on deputy-leaders allow ed for a cursory analysis 
o f their role. This database looked at the 192 states that existed in Novem ber 2001 to 
clarify the role o f  deputy-leaders and the circumstances in w hich they are found. The 
majority o f  states (68 per cent) were found to have deputy-leaders with many having 
more than one, in total 191 deputy-leaders were identified. In terms o f  absolute numbers, 
most were appointed (168) rather than elected. On a state by state basis, again the vast 
majority o f  deputy-leaders (83 per cent) were appointed rather than elected. The majority 
(55 per cent) have additional ministerial positions. These ministerial positions are 
generally significant (19 per cent hold the M inister o f  Finance position for example).
Deputy-leaders are equally likely to be found in democratic and non-democratic states 
(both have a 68 per cent likelihood). Deputy-leaders are more likely to be found in 
single-party governments (78% have a deputy-leader) and in non-micro states (70% have 
a deputy-leader). Indeed, when categories o f  states with a small base are excluded, the 
greatest likelihood o f  finding a deputy-leader is among non-democratic non-micro-states 
with single party governments (86 per cent o f  such states have a deputy-leader).
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The most comm on constitutional functions o f  deputy-leaders are to replace the leader in 
the event o f  temporary or permanent vacancies arising (80 per cent o f  states with 
constitutionally-based deputy-leaders give them such a role); perform functions delegated  
by the leader (23 per cent); assist the leader (20 per cent) and chair the cabinet if  the 
leader is absent (19 per cent).
The findings that so many states have deputy-leaders gives som e indication that deputy- 
leaders may be significant political actors. The findings from the testing o f  the observable 
implications will clarify this.
8.3 Summary of findings
In order to facilitate an understanding o f  how w ell the results o f  the testing o f  the 
observable implications fit with the underlying hypotheses, the results w ill be categorised 
in terms o f  how  strongly they confirm or reject the hypotheses. Four categories w ill be 
used:
•  High: The vast majority o f  the results gathered support the hypothesis.
•  Medium: The results are sufficient to support the hypothesis although there is 
some evidence to contradict the hypothesis.
•  Inconclusive: The results are m ixed and it is not possible to conclude in favour or 
against the hypothesis
•  Low: There is little or no evidence to support the hypothesis.
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Table 8-lCategorisation of results of testing of observable implications arising from hypotheses.
High Medium Inconclusive Low
HI: Held policy posts beforehand Yes
H2: Had policy focus beforehand Yes
H3: Policy focus in office Yes
H4 -  Ob Imp 1: Have budget in line with 
other departments
Yes
H4 -  Ob Imp 2: Have policy staff Yes
H5 -  Ob Imp 1: Promote pet projects Yes
H5 -  Ob Imp 2: Chair policy committees 
in office
Yes
H6: Policy disagreement led to removal Yes
H7: Held policy related office after term Yes
8.4 Rational for categorisation of findings
8.4.1 Introduction
The rationale for categorization o f  the results o f  testing the observable implications will 
be given in this section. The categorization was conservative and erred on the side o f  
caution in that the results o f  each test were placed in the low est credible category. The 
results o f  the categorization are summarized in Table 8.1 above.
8.4.2 Hypothesis one
This hypothesis stated that deputy-leaders would have had a background o f  involvement 
in policy-related posts i f  the position o f  deputy-leader mattered. I f  the position matters, 
then the office o f  deputy-leader would not be given to political novices and i f  it is a 
policy influencing position, then it would attract those with an interest in policy. The 
results from the testing o f  the observable implication were categorized as having a high 
fit with the underlying hypothesis.
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All o f the deputy-leaders bar one held prominent elected office prior to becom ing deputy- 
leaders. Using the average o f  the averages, 86 per cent o f  the deputy-leaders in this study 
sat on legislative comm ittees prior to becom ing deputy-leaders, with the figures high 
across all five states. Just over 82 per cent held an opposition spokespersonship prior to 
becoming deputy-leader. Only in the case o f  the US was there a divergence from this 
high level, the U S figure was 42 per cent. There was also a low  level o f  previous cabinet 
experience among US deputy-leaders (eight per cent). N onetheless, 66 per cent o f  the 
deputy-leaders in this study had previous cabinet experience. On all measures o f  previous 
policy positions, a significant majority o f  those who went on to be deputy-leaders held 
such positions. Thus, the results indicate a high level o f  support for the hypothesis. 
Looking at the individual states, it is only in the case o f  the U S that there is a divergence 
from this result, with the US results indicating a medium level o f  support for the 
hypothesis.
8.4.3 Hypothesis two
The second hypothesis stated that deputy-leaders would have had a background o f  
involvement in policy-related activity i f  the position o f  deputy-leader mattered. All the 
deputy-leaders, bar ten o f  the Dutch deputy-leaders for whom  data was not available, 
were found to have engaged with policy issues in one form or another outside o f  
parliament (policy-docum ents, speeches on policy or contributions to policy debates in 
the media). Excluding one Dutch deputy-leader for whom  data was not available, 97 per 
cent o f  deputy-leaders were found to have engaged with policy issues in one form or
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another in parliament (proposing legislation and speeches on legislation and policy  
motions). So, using all the measures o f  previous policy activity show s that the vast 
majority o f  deputy-leaders in this study engaged in policy activity prior to becoming  
deputy-leader. This indicates a high fit with the hypothesis. There is also a high fit at the 
level o f  each o f  the individual states in this study.
8.4.4 Hypothesis three
This hypothesis stated that deputy-leaders would have a policy focus w hile in office as 
deputy-leader. It was found that 89 per cent o f  deputy-leaders issued policy documents, 
made policy-related speeches or proposed legislation w hile deputy-leaders. This high 
level strongly supports the hypothesis and is consistent among the deputy-leaders across 
all five states.
8.4.5 Hypothesis four
The fourth hypothesis states that i f  deputy-leaders can influence policy, then they will 
have policy developm ent and implementation resources available to them. This 
hypothesis gave rise to two observable implications. The first is that deputy-leaders 
would have a total budget in line with other policy-m aking departments, w hile the second 
is that deputy-leaders would have a number o f  staff with policy responsibilities. In terms 
o f the first hypothesis, it was found that there is significant variation in terms o f  the 
deputy-leaders’ budgets, not just across states but also over time within states. It is only 
in the case o f  the U S Vice-President that budgetary resources have consistently been
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available to the office-holder. In the case o f  the Swedish and U K  deputy-leaders the 
situation has varied significantly depending on what role the deputy-leader has been 
given. In Ireland, with the exception o f  the years 1993-1997, the Tanaiste has not had a 
budget available to them, while the Dutch deputy-leader has consistently not had a 
budget. For this reason the global evidence is inconclusive w ith regards to the results o f  
testing the hypothesis. W hile at the level o f  the individual states, the U S evidence gives 
strong support to the hypothesis, in the UK and Sweden the evidence is inconclusive, 
while in Ireland and the Netherlands the results do not support the hypothesis.
A  similar situation arises in relation to staff with a policy-related role in that there is 
significant variation across states and over time within states. In Ireland (again with the 
exception o f  the years 1993-1997) and the Netherlands, the deputy-leader has no staff 
specifically assigned to them in their role as deputy-leader, while the Swedish, UK  and 
US deputy-leaders have staff with policy responsibilities to assist them  in their deputy- 
leader role but the number vary significantly over time. So, again the evidence is 
inconclusive with regards to the results o f  testing the hypothesis. The individual state 
results give levels o f  support for this observable implication similar to the last one.
8.4.6 Hypothesis five
This hypothesis states that i f  deputy-leaders matter, that they w ill influence policies 
which they believe to be important while they are deputy-leader. There are two 
observable implications associated with this hypothesis. The first one states that deputy- 
leaders w ill push for the implementation o f  policies in which they strongly believe and
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that they will also seek to undermine polices with which they strongly disagree. Such 
policies should be in an area outside any additional cabinet responsibilities o f  the deputy- 
leaders and also not result from any party role that the deputy-leaders might have so as to 
ensure that any influence identified can be attributed solely to their being deputy-leader. 
This observable implication was tested qualitatively via case studies o f  one deputy-leader 
per state due to constraints o f  space and time. The second observable implication is that 
the deputy-leader w ill chair a number o f  policy comm ittees w ith roles beyond their 
departmental responsibilities. This was tested quantitatively.
The test o f  the first observable implication found that that only in the case o f  the US was 
there clear evidence o f  a deputy-leader able to use his position as deputy-leader to 
influence policy. W hile the UK  deputy-leader influenced policy  in areas beyond their 
cabinet responsibilities, there was som e evidence that this was due to their being deputy- 
leader but it was not absolutely clear that this was the case. In the Dutch case there was 
evidence o f  being able to push controversial policies through in the M inister’s own 
portfolio area. However, it was less clear that being deputy-leader helped achieve this 
result. Similarly, there were policy changes initiated by the Irish deputy-leader, but it was 
not possible to attribute these solely to their being deputy-leader. In the Swedish case it 
was even less clear as to whether or not their influence on policy was due to their being 
deputy-leader or party-leader. So there was a high level o f  proof in the case o f  the US 
deputy-leader examined, a medium level in the case o f  the British deputy-leader, an 
inconclusive level in the case o f  the Irish and Dutch deputy-leaders and a low  level in the
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case o f  the Swedish deputy-leaders. Overall there would appear to be an inconclusive 
level o f  evidence with regard to this observable implication.
As for the test o f  the second observable implication, it was found that 57 per cent o f  
deputy-leaders chaired policy comm ittees while in office. This is due to the fact that all 
the US and 72 per cent o f  the U K  deputy-leaders in this study for whom  data was 
available were found to have chaired some policy-related com m ittees in contrast with the 
Netherlands where none did, while neither Ireland nor Sweden has cabinet committees.
On the basis o f  these findings, there would appear to be a m edium  fit o f  the findings with 
the hypothesis insofar as the findings in two o f  the three states where the hypothesis can 
be tested strongly support the hypothesis and using an average o f  the average measure 
across all five states shows that 57 per cent support for the hypothesis.
8.4.7 Hypothesis six
The sixth hypothesis states that i f  deputy-leaders can influence policy, then their removal 
from office w ill be sought where they are involved in significant policy disagreement 
outside the area o f  any cabinet portfolio that they might hold. This hypothesis was tested 
by examining the circumstances in which the deputy-leaders in this study left office and 
comparing the results with the figures for leaders who left office due to policy  
differences. Out o f  the 64 deputy-leaders, only two (three per cent) left office due to 
policy differences relating to issues beyond any additional cabinet responsibilities that 
they had at the time. However, policy differences are a major reason for deputy-leaders
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being forced from office as 16 deputy-leaders were forced from office and the two who  
left as a result o f  policy differences outside their cabinet responsibilities constitute 13 per 
cent o f  these. Adopting a conservative approach in terms o f  categorising to what extent 
this result supports the hypothesis, it must be concluded that the results o f  the test give a 
low  level o f  support for the hypothesis in question. The results give a similar level o f  low  
support for the hypothesis across all five states.
8.4.8 Hypothesis seven
The final hypothesis states that i f  deputy-leaders matter, then they would go on to hold 
other significant political positions after they completed their term(s) as deputy-leader. In 
other words they would go on to hold other political positions where they could influence 
policy outcomes. U sing the average o f  the averages measure, it was found that exactly 50 
per cent o f  deputy-leaders in the states in this study who have left the office went on to 
hold other policy-influencing positions. The holding o f  policy-influencing office is the 
most common career m ove for former deputy-leaders; half took this option compared to 
exactly a third who went on to take up careers in business and almost a quarter who took 
up some other career (such as lecturing or judgeships). It should be noted that there is a 
wide variation in the results across the five states. Only 23 per cent o f  Irish deputy- 
leaders went on to hold policy-influencing positions. Exactly half the Dutch, and British 
deputy-leaders hold policy-influencing positions after their terms as deputy-leaders. In 
the US 55 per cent o f  Vice-Presidents went on to hold such positions, while 71 per cent 
o f Swedish deputy-leaders did so. On a global level, these results would indicate a 
medium level o f  support for the hypothesis. In the case o f  Ireland, the results indicate a
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low  level o f  support for the hypothesis; in the UK  and Netherlands they indicate a 
medium level o f  support; and in the cases o f  the US and Sweden, they indicate a high 
level o f  support.
8.5 Conclusions arising from findings
8.5.1 Introduction
Taking the categorization o f  the findings arising from the testing o f  the nine observable 
implications together what conclusions can be reached regarding deputy-leaders? A s was 
outlined in chapter two, hypotheses one, two, three and seven are more concerned with 
the motivation o f  deputy-leaders. These hypotheses contend that deputy-leaders want to 
influence policy. If  the deputy-leader wants to influence policy, then it is reasonable to 
assume that in office they w ill at least try to do so and w ill seek offices that allow  them to 
do so. The remaining three hypotheses (four, five and six) deal more directly with the 
ability o f  deputy-leaders to influence policy.
8.5.2 Deputy-leaders’ interest in policy
What does the categorization o f  the results o f  the testing o f  the observable implications 
arising from the first, second, third and seventh hypotheses say about the level o f  interest 
o f  deputy-leaders in policy? From Table 8.1 it can be seen that the results from the testing 
o f  the observable implications from the first, second and third hypotheses each show  a 
high level o f  support for the hypothesis in question. In the case o f  the seventh hypotheses, 
the results o f  the test show  a medium level o f  support for the hypothesis. These results
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indicate a high level o f  proof that deputy-leaders have an interest in policy as they tend to 
have held policy-related posts and had a policy focus before they became deputy-leaders. 
They also had a policy focus while deputy-leaders and tended to hold policy-related 
office afterwards.
These findings indicate that those who became deputy-leaders were significant political 
actors prior to com ing to office and most continued to be so after leaving office as 
deputy-leader. This can be concluded from the findings that they held policy-related posts 
before they became deputy-leaders. From hypothesis one it can be seen that they held 
positions on legislative comm ittees, were opposition spokespersons and had previous 
cabinet experience prior to becom ing deputy-leader, M any also went on to hold political 
positions where they could influence policy after they left office as deputy-leader as can 
be seen from hypothesis seven. This is not to say that deputy-leaders are able to exercise 
a significant influence over the policy-making process, but that the people who held the 
position o f  deputy-leader in the states under study were significant political actors on the 
basis o f  their political activity before and after they were deputy-leaders. This in itself 
should at least provoke som e interest in further research into the position o f  deputy-leader 
insofar as it can be reasonably asked why do so many significant political actors hold the 
position o f  deputy-leader at som e stage in their political careers? Given that those who 
were deputy-leaders went on to hold significant political positions after they were deputy- 
leaders, it cannot be argued that the position o f  deputy-leader was a dead-end position at 
the end o f  the holders’ careers.
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Table 8-2 Categorisation of results of testing of observable implications relating to policy interest of
deputy-leaders on a state by state basis.
Ireland Netherlands UK US Sweden
HI: Held policy posts 
beforehand
High High High Medium High
H2: Had policy focus 
beforehand
H igh High H igh High High
H3: Policy focus in 
office
H igh High High High High
H7: Held policy office 
after term
L ow Medium M edium High High
Overall M edium High High High High
When the findings from these four hypotheses are examined on a state-by-state basis, are 
there any divergences from the global position? From Table 8.2 it can be seen that the 
results o f  the tests o f  the first three observable implications in each o f  the states all show  
a high level o f  support for the hypotheses, with the one exception being the testing o f  the 
observable implication arising from the first hypothesis in the US where a medium level 
o f support arises for the hypothesis. In the case o f  the seventh hypothesis, the results at 
the individual state level are more varied, with a low  level o f  support for the hypothesis 
among Irish deputy-leaders, a medium level o f  support among British and Dutch deputy- 
leaders and a high level o f  support among American and Swedish deputy-leaders. Only in 
Sweden is there a consistently high level o f  support for all the hypotheses relating to the 
policy interest o f  deputy-leaders. There are high levels o f  support for three out o f  the four 
hypotheses with a medium level in the remaining hypothesis in the cases o f  the US, 
British and Dutch deputy-leaders. On this basis, all four states would be considered to 
show a high overall level o f  support for observable implications based on the hypotheses 
relating to deputy-leaders having an interest in policy. In the case o f  the remaining state, 
Ireland, where there were high levels o f  support for three out o f  the four hypothesis with
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a low level in the remaining hypothesis, this would indicate an overall medium level o f  
support for the hypotheses relating to deputy-leaders having an interest in policy.
8.5.3 Deputy-leaders’ ability to influence policy
Do the results o f  the testing o f  the observable implications arising from the fourth, fifth 
and sixth hypotheses indicate that deputy-leaders can influence policy? From Table 8.1 it 
can be seen that the results show one medium level o f  support for the hypotheses in 
question, three inconclusive tests and one low  level o f  support for the hypotheses. On 
balance, controlling for ministerial portfolios and party positions, these results would 
appear to provide an inconclusive level o f  proof for the v iew  that deputy-leaders can 
influence policy.
This inconclusive level o f  proof indicates that there is not a sufficient level o f  proof to 
support or undermine the v iew  that deputy-leaders can influence policy. In other words 
the results are not clear-cut. W hile this is not the m ost satisfactory conclusion imaginable, 
it is somewhat at odds with the current perceived w isdom  which clearly holds that 
deputy-leaders do not matter. That there is no clear-cut conclusion to the tests suggests 
that there are insufficient grounds for stating that deputy-leaders matter but equally that 
those who state that deputy-leaders do not matter do not have strong evidence for making 
such claims.
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Table 8-3 Categorisation of results of testing of observable implications relating to policy influence of
deputy-leaders on a state by state basis.
Ireland Netherlands UK US Sweden
H4 -  Ob Imp 1: Budget 
in line with other depts
Low Low Inc H igh Inc.
H4 -  Ob Imp 2: Have 
policy staff
Low Low Inc High Inc.
H5 -  Ob Imp 1: 
Promote pet projects
Inc Inc M edium H igh Low
H5 -  Ob Imp 2: Chair 
policy committees
N /A Low High High N /A
H6: Policy 
disagreement led to 
removal
Low Low Low Low Low
Overall Low Low Inc High Inc
Is there any variation in the results from the testing o f  the five observable implications 
when they are looked at on a state by state basis? The results are given in Table 8.3. 
Testing o f  the first o f  the two observable implications associated with the fourth 
hypothesis at the individual state level shows that there is high support for the hypothesis 
in the case o f  the U S, inconclusive results for the UK  and Sweden and low  levels o f  
support for the hypothesis in the case o f  Ireland and the Netherlands. The results are 
similar in the case o f  the second observable implication.
The fifth hypothesis also had two observable implications. The test o f  the first observable 
implication found high support for the hypothesis in the case o f  U S deputy-leaders but 
the results for the other four states were more varied, with medium levels o f  support in 
the UK, inconclusive findings in Ireland and the Netherlands and a low  level o f  support 
in Sweden. There was high levels o f  support for the second observable implication 
among the US and U K  deputy-leaders and a low  level o f  support in the case o f  Dutch 
deputy-leaders. Neither Ireland nor Sweden has cabinet com m ittees and so this
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observable implication could not be tested in these states. In the case o f  the sixth 
hypothesis, there was a low  level o f  support for the hypothesis across all five states
In contrast with the global result o f  the test, the evidence from the state by state analysis 
is more varied as can be seen from Table 8.3. The evidence from the US offers a high 
level o f  support for the hypothesis (four highs and a low). Results are at the low  level o f  
support in the Irish and Dutch cases and inconclusive in the Sw edish and British cases. 
So, it would appear that U S deputy-leaders can influence policy, while the evidence is 
divided on Swedish and UK deputy-leaders. In the Dutch and Irish cases it appears, on 
the basis o f  the evidence, that their deputy-leaders have little i f  any policy influence. This 
is to some extent reflected in the literature in that what literature there is on deputy- 
leaders focuses on the role o f  the US Vice-President. H owever, it is at odds with this 
literature insofar as m ost o f  the literature regards the US Vice-President as not having 
influence and thus not mattering. W hile requiring further research, the difference in the 
level o f  policy influence may be due to the differing roles o f  V ice Presidents and Deputy- 
Prime Ministers.
8.6 Do deputy-leaders matter?
Given that there is an overall high level o f  proof that deputy-leaders have an interest in 
policy and the inconclusive level o f  support for the hypotheses relating to whether or not 
deputy-leaders have an ability to influence policy, what can be said about deputy-leaders 
mattering?
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Looking at Table 8.1 again, five o f  the nine results from testing the observable 
implications fall into the high or medium categories o f  proof, w hile three fall into the 
inconclusive category and one into the low  category. So, while the evidence supports the 
view that deputy-leaders can influence policy, there is also som e evidence to the contrary. 
This reflects the differing levels o f  support for the view  across the five states where it was 
put to the test and also the fact that there is stronger evidence for the hypotheses relating 
to deputy-leaders interest in policy and an inconclusive results in terms o f  the hypotheses 
relating to deputy-leaders’ ability to influence policy.
Taking the overall results o f  the testing o f  the nine observable implications in each o f  the 
states in this study gives a different picture. For the Irish deputy-leaders tested there were 
three high levels o f  proof, one inconclusive and four low  levels with one test was not 
applicable, giving an overall inconclusive result. The testing o f  the Dutch deputy-leaders 
gave three high levels o f  proof, one medium, four low  levels o f  proof and one 
inconclusive test result which gives an overall inconclusive result. A s for the Swedish  
deputy-leaders, it was found that four tests gave high levels o f  proof, two tests gave 
inconclusive results and two gave a low  level o f  proof. One test was not applicable in the 
Swedish case. The aggregate Swedish result gave a medium level o f  support for the view  
that deputy-leaders matter. In the UK, four o f  the tests generated high levels o f  proof, two 
tests gave a medium level o f  proof, one test was inconclusive and one gave a low  level o f  
proof. In this case there was a medium overall level o f  proof. In the case o f  the US, seven  
o f  the tests resulted in high levels o f  proof, one resulted in a medium level o f  proof and
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one in a low  level o f  proof which indicate an overall high level o f  proof for the view  that 
deputy-leaders can influence policy.
While the overall global results o f  the tests are inconclusive on whether or not deputy- 
leaders matter, the results are more varied across the five states in this study. In the case 
o f  US deputy-leaders there was an high overall level o f  proof. A  m edium  level o f  proof 
was found in the cases Swedish and British deputy-leaders, w hile the results were 
inconclusive for Irish and Dutch deputy-leaders.
In terms o f  answering the question o f  whether or not deputy-leaders matter in so far as 
they can affect policy outcomes, the overall results are inconclusive, but the ability o f  
deputy-leaders to influence policy outcomes varies across states with a high level o f  
influence in the U S and a medium level o f  influence in Sw eden and the UK. So the 
perceived wisdom  regarding deputy-leaders appears to be wrong in certain states and the 
tendency o f  political science to ignore deputy-leaders in all states needs to be re-visited.
8.7 Areas for further research
In terms o f  suggesting areas for further research arising from this study, the first area 
would have to be deputy-leaders them selves. A s was outlined in Chapter Two, there is 
very little written on the subject o f  deputy-leaders, due in no small part to the perception 
that they do not matter. The results o f  this research indicate that for certain states that 
view  is mistaken and thus the subject o f  deputy-leaders is one that political science must 
revisit. Furthermore, in the case o f  those states where the results o f  the tests were
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inconclusive on whether or not deputy-leaders matter (ie Ireland and the Netherlands), 
more information should help provide a conclusion one way or the other.
This research looked at deputy-leaders from the point o f  v iew  o f  determining whether or 
not they mattered insofar as they could influence policy. H aving found that they can in 
some instances influence policy, the next logical step would appear to be to identify 
(where possible) those factors that determine the level o f  policy  influence o f  deputy- 
leaders. Do deputy-leaders in single or multi-party governments have more say? Given 
that two out o f  the three states where deputy-leaders were found to have som e degree o f  
influence have single-party governments, it would appear that deputy-leaders in this 
context have more influence. Such a finding is almost counter-intuitive insofar as one 
might expect deputy-leaders in multi-party governments to have more influence arising 
from the need for inclusive consensual decision-making to ensure the stability o f  the 
government. Given that there are very few  political offices w hich can be held by more 
than one person at any one time, does having more than one deputy-leader at any one 
time lessen their individual influence?
What effect do different system s o f  government have on the power o f  deputy-leaders? 
Given that Lijphart’s (1999) categories o f  majoritarian and consensual democracies were 
used to select the states for this study, to what extent do deputy-leaders have influence in 
majoritarian and consensual democracies? W hile this study found that deputy-leaders in 
the United States (a majoritarian democracy) had a high level o f  influence, it also found 
that deputy-leaders in Sweden (a consensual democracy) had a medium level o f
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influence. Furthermore the states where the least evidence o f  deputy-leaders having 
policy influence (Ireland and the Netherlands) would both tend to be on the consensual 
end o f  the spectrum. W hile these limited findings and intuition would suggest that one is 
more likely to find deputy-leaders with policy influence in states where politicians are 
less constrained in making decisions, further research is required to clarify this. A  related 
area o f  exploration, given the different levels o f  policy influence identified by this 
research would be comparing the roles o f  the US Vice-President and Deputy-Prime 
Ministers. D oes the apparent greater policy influence o f  the U S Vice-President result 
from specific aspects o f  the office itse lf or is it a function o f  broader factors in the US 
political system?
In short, the conclusion that deputy-leaders in some states can have som e influence on 
policy and thus matter implies that the subject o f  deputy-leaders is an area worthy o f  
research by political scientists. This study has identified a number o f  potentially fruitful 
avenues along which such research m ight progress.
8.8 Conclusion
Having summarised and categorised the findings from the testing o f  the nine observable 
implications derived from the hypothesis that deputy-leaders matter where ‘mattering’ 
was taken to mean having influence over policy outcomes, it was found that the overall 
results o f  the tests showed that deputy-leaders in some states can influence policy and 
thus matter. This conclusion is at odds with the perceived wisdom  that deputy-leaders in 
general do not matter.
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A P P E N D I X  1 -  G L O B A L  D A T A B A S E  O F  D E P U T Y -
L E A D E R S
Country Deputy
Leader
(Y/N)
Title of 
Deputy 
Leader
No. of 
Deputy 
Leaders
Elected/
Appointed
Constitutional 
Basis (Y/N)
Constitutional
Role
Ministerial
Potition(s)
Micro-State
(Y/N)
Democratic/
Non-democratic
Single/ Multi 
party Govt
Leadership
Structure
Comments
Afganistan Y Vice Chair 5 Appointed N Each Also It35 
Mini 4 try 
(Defence,
Finance,
Planning, Water 
f t  Electricity and 
Women'» Attaint)
N Non-dcniocrntic Multi-party Chair Grand Council J’loya 
juga') of tribes to 
determine govt.
Albania Y Dep PM l Appointed Y None Minister for 
Labour
N Democratic Single-party President A 
PM
Alge rin N N Non-dcrnocratic Multi-party President Ä 
PM
(Prciidcnt 
elected & 
appoints 
PM).
Andorra N Y Democratic Single-party Head of 
Govt &  2 
Head» o f
Suite
(including
French
Pics)
Ancola N * *T - * - • * N Non-dcmoctaiic Multi-party President A
PM
Antigua and 
Barbuda
N
'
*
' '
Y Non-democratic Smgkpam Governor 
General & 
PM
Argentina Y VP l Elected (with 
Pres)
Y Casting vote in 
Senate; See out 
term of Pres i f
dies/resigns/impea
ched; Act as Pres 
when Pres absent 
from the capital
Position vacant at 
present
N Democratic Single-party President
Armenia N * * ' * * N Democratic Multi-party Preside« A 
PM
Australia Y Dep PM l Appointed N Minister for 
Transport & 
Regional Services
N Democratic Multi-party Governor 
General & 
PM
Austria Y Vicc
Chancellor
l Appointed Y Entitled to 
deputise for the 
Chancellor in his 
entire sphere of 
competence' 
(Article 69)
No other
Ministerial
responsibilies.
N Democratic Multi-party President A 
Cliancellor
Azerbaijan Y Dep PM 1+4 Appointed Y None No other
Ministerial
responsibilies
N Non-democratic Singlc-patty President A 
PM (also 
Fust
Deputy PM 
and 4 Dep 
PM*)
Bahama», The Y Dep PM 1 Appointed N No other
Ministerial
responsibilies.
Y Democratic Single-party Governor 
General & 
PM
Bahrain N • * " * Y Non-dcmocratie Non-paiiy Amir & PM No parties allowed
Bangladesh N N Democratic Multi-paity President A 
PM
(President 
elected by 
pail lament)
Currently has caretaker 
govt
Barbado» Y Dep PM 1 Appointed N Minister For 
Foreign Affairs & 
Foreign Trade
Y Democratic Single-party Governor 
General & 
PM
Itrl in ii\ Y Dep PM 1+7 Appointed Y None No other
Ministerial
responsibilies
N Non-democratic Non-party President A 
PM (also 
First
Deputy PM 
and 6 Dep 
PMs>
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Belgium Y Dcp PM 4 Appointed N Bach also has 
Ministry (Budget, 
frnployment. 
Foreign Affaire 
and Transport)
N Democratic Multi-party King &  PM
Beliie Y Dcp PM 1 Appointed Y PM may depute 
function! to him; 
acU a* PM when 
PM abscnl/ili.
Minister for 
Natural Resources 
and Environment 
A Industry.
Y Democratic Single-pa ity Governor 
General & 
PM
Benin N * * • * ‘ N Democratic Multi-party President
Bhutan N
’
N Non-democratic Non-party King Only non-partisan 
candidate 1 are allowed 
contcst elect ton*»
Bolivii» Y VP I Electcd (with 
Pres)
Y President of 
Senate; See out 
term of Pres if  
dies/resigns/ 
impeached and 
acts as Pres when 
Pres absent
Position vacant at 
present
N Democratic Multi-party President
Bosnia mid 
llrftcispviiui
N N Democratic Multi-party Tripartite 
ptcsidency 
[1 Muslim,
1 Croat & 1
Scib)
Muslim A  Croat 
Federation and 
Republika Srpska both 
have VPs &  Dep PMs
Botswana Y VP 1 Appointed Y See out temi of 
Pres if
dies/resigns and 
acts as Pres when 
Pres absent
No other
MinisteriaJ
responsibilies
N Democratic Single* party President
Brazil Y VP 1 Elected (with 
Pres)
Y Replaces the Pres 
'in the event of 
impediment' and 
succeeds him in 
the event of 
vacancy (article 
79). Can be given 
'special missions' 
by the Pres. 
Member of 
Council of 
Republic & 
Council of 
National Defense
No other 
Ministerial
responsibility
N Democratic Multi-party President
Brunei N * * " " *
'
Y Non-democratic Non-party Sultan and 
PM (same 
person)
No parties allowed
Bulgarin Y Dcp PM 3 Dep PM Appointed Y None Each Dep PM 
also has a 
Ministry 
(Economy, 
Labour & Social 
Policy and 
Regional 
Development & 
Public Works)
N Democratic Multi-party President & 
PM
Burkina Faso N * " ■ * * * N Non-democratic Multi-party 1 lead of 
State & PM
Burma Y Dep PM 2 Appointed Constitution
Suspended
Each Dcp PM 
alio has a 
Mini ji iv 
(Livestock 
Breeding &
Fi shut ica and Dep 
Min for Energy).
N Non-dctnocratic Single-party PM & 
Chair State 
Peace and 
Devclopine
nt Council
Miltary Junta
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Burundi Y VP t+ l Appointed Y Countersigns 
cgislatkm with 
Pres. Pres names 
cabinet after 
consulting VPs 
Pres can delegate 
x>uw to VPs 
See out term of 
Pres if
dtcsta&igux/tnipcii
ched and acts as 
Pres when Pres 
absent or in event 
of temporary 
mpediement1 
[article 81). 1st 
VP coordinates 
admin & political 
affaire & 2nd VP 
economic & 
social affaire Can 
chair Council o f 
Ministers i f  Pres 
permits
Mo other
MiniUenal
responsibility
N Non-dcmuctatic Multi-party I’iCMlklll Current president 
assumed power 
following a coup on 25 
July 1996
Ctmbvdi« Y Dep PM 2 Appointed Y Assist PM at 
Council of Mins. 
PM can delegate 
his power to Dep 
PM
Each Dep PM 
also has a 
Ministry 
(Economy & 
Finance and Co- 
Minister of the 
Interior),
N Non-democmtic Multi-paiiy King.
President
National
Assembly
&  PM
Cameroon N • ' • * ' • N Non-democratic Multi-party President & 
PM
(.Ansila Y Dep PM 1 Appointed N No other
Ministerial
rcsponsibilies.
N Democratic Single-part v Governor 
General & 
PM
Cape Verde N * ■ * '
‘ '
Y Democratic Single-party Presideiu A 
PM
Centrai African 
Republic
N N Democratic Multi-party President A
PM
Chad N • * ' * * ‘ N Non-democrat ic Multi-party President A 
PM
Chile N - • ' • N Democratic Multi-party President
China Y VP 4 Appointed. Y Assist Pres. Pres 
can delegate his 
power to VP, See 
out term of Pres if  
office falls vacant.
No other
Ministerial
responsibilies
N Nou-dcmocralic Single-party President A
I'run^i
State
Council
{Also VP
and Vice
Prcwtof,
State
Council x
-»)
Onc-party state
Columbia Y VP \ Elected
separately
Y Replaces Pres in 
event of
lenipotnry
vacancy Si see out 
term of Pres i f  
office falls vacant 
Con be given 
‘missions or 
special duties' by 
the Pres. Cannot 
be elected VP or 
Pie* forlhe 
immediately 
subsequent term
Minister of 
National Defence
N Democratic Multi-party President
Comari» N Y Non-democratic Non-party Head of 
Stale & PM
Head of State is Arrny 
Chief of Staff following 
coup in 1999.
Parliament has been 
dissolved
Congo» 
Democratic 
Republic of
N N Noil-democratic Non-party President President succeeded 
father who seized power 
iu civil war The 
parliament and all other 
parlies have been 
dissolved
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Congo, Republic 
of the
Y Min of the 
Presidency
2 Appointed N Each Dep PM 
also has a 
Ministry'
[National Defence 
and Presidential 
Cabinet &  State 
Control).
N Non-democratic Non-party President President came to power 
by Rebellion
CoiU Rico Y VP 1+1 Fleeted (wilh 
Pres)
Y Replaces I'icj 111 
event of 
temporary or 
permanent 
vacancy. Cannot 
be elected VP or 
Pres if  VP was 
PrcJ for most of 
term or was VP 
for 12 months 
prior to election.
Each VP also has 
a Ministiy 
[Culture, Youth & 
Sports and 
Environment &
Energy)
N Democratic Single-party President 
(Also First 
VP and 
Second VP)
Cote B'ivflirc N ' ■ * * ' N Non-dcmoemtic Multi-party President Sc 
PM
Cronfui Y Dep PM 3 Appointed Y None Mo other 
Ministerial 
rcsponsibil ics.
N Democratic Multi-party President &
PM
Cuba Y VP of the 
Council of 
State
1+5 Appointed Y Pres can delegate 
receiving of 
credentials of 
ambassadors to 
VP. First VP 
replaces Pres if  
atoenl, ill or dies
First VP is also 
Minister of the 
Revolutionary1 
Armed Forces 
while one VP is 
also Sec of 
Council of 
Ministers
N Non-democratic Single-pally President of 
Council of 
Slate and 
Council of 
Ministers, 
(also First 
VP and 5 
VPs of the 
Council of 
State and of 
llic Council 
o f Ministers
Cyprui Y Dep Min to 
the Pres
1 Elected (with 
Pres)
Y Appoints 5 
Turkish Ministers; 
shares exec Power 
with Pres; right to 
veto or return to 
parliament any 
Law.
No other
Ministerial
responsibilies.
Y Democratic Multi-part) President Post of vice president is 
cunwntly vacant; under 
the 1960 constitution, 
the post is reserved for a 
Turkish Cypriot
Ciech Republic Y Dep Premier 4 Appointed Y Represents
Premier.
3 out of 4 have 
Ministries 
(Foreign Affairs, 
Industry & Trade 
and Labour & 
Social Relations)
N Democratic Single-party President & 
PM
Denmark Y Dep PM I Appointed N Minister of 
Economic Affaire 
and Nordic 
Cooperation
N Democratic Multi-party Head of 
Slate
(Monarch) 
Si PM
Djibouti N * - * ' * Y Democratic Multi-party President & 
PM
Dominic* N * " * Position vacant at 
present
Y Democratic Miilti-paity President Si 
PM
Dominican
republic
Y VP 1 Elected (with 
Pres)
Y Acts as Pres when 
Pres absent/ill & 
see out term of 
Pres i f  office falls 
vacant
Minister for 
Education, Fine 
Arts and Public 
Worship
N Democratic Singk-partv President
Kquador Y VP 1 Elected (with 
Pres)
Y Acts as Pres when 
Pres absent/ill & 
see out term of 
Pres if  office falls 
vacant
No other
Ministerial
responsibilies.
N Democratic Multi-part) President
Knypl Y Dep PM t Appointed Y Member of 
government
Minister for 
Agriculture & 
Land Reclamation
N Non* democratic Single-patty President & 
PM
El Salvador Y VP 1 Elccted (with 
Pres)
Y Acts as Pres when 
Pres absent/ill &  
see out term of 
Pres if  office falls 
vacant
No other
Ministerial
responsibilies,
N Démocratie Single-party President
O 
W I! Y Dep PM l+ l
Appointed Y Unable tu find 
constitution
Fust Dep PM Imj 
no other 
Ministerial 
responsibilities 
while Dep PM is 
also Minister for 
State for the 
Interior & Local 
Corporations
Y Non-dcmocratic Multi-party President Si 
I'M (also 
First Dep 
PM and 
Dep PM)
Although nominally a 
constitutional 
democracy since 1991, 
the 1996 presidential 
and 1999 legislative 
élections were widely 
seen as being flawed’ 
(CIA World Foctbook 
2001)
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Erilrci Y VP 1 Appointed N - Minister o f Local 
Government
N Non-democratic Single-party President One-party state
Estonia N * • • • * ■ N Democratic Multi-patty President &  
PM
Ethiopia Y Dep PM 2 Appointed Y Ad as PM when 
PM absent
Each Dcp PM 
alto has a 
Ministry 
(Infrastructure 
and Rural 
Development)
N Non-dcmocratic Multi-party President A 
PM
Fiji V DcpPM 1 Appointed Y Act M PM when 
PM absent/unable
Minister for Fijian 
Affaire
Y Democratic Multi-party President & 
PM
Intcnm Government 
foi lotting attempted 
coup
Finland N ' - * * * ' * N Democratic Multi-party President & 
PM
France N ’ ■* ’ * * N Democratic Multi-party President &
PM
(»Jill II11 Y VP 1 Appointed Y Duties assigned 
by Pres.
No other
Ministerial
responsibilies,
N Non-democratic Single-party President &
PM
Gambia, The Y VP 1 Appointed Y Leads Govt 
business in
Parliament
No other
Ministerial
responsibilies
N Non-democratic Single-party President
Georgia N ’ * ■ * * • N Democratic Smglc-partv President
Germany Y Vice
Chancellor
1 Appointed Y Chancellor 
appoints Min as 
his deputy.
Minister for 
Foreign Affaire
N Democratic Multi-party President & 
Chancellor
Ghana Y VP 1 Appointed Y Duties assigned 
by Pres; See out 
term of Pres if  
dies/resigns/impea 
ched; Act as Pres 
when Pres absent 
and Member 
National Security 
Council,
No other
Ministerial
responsibilies
N Democratic Single-party President
Greece N • “ ’ ‘ N Democratic Single-party President & 
PM
Grenada N *
‘
Y Democratic Singlc-potty Governor 
General & 
PM
Guatemala Y VP 1 Elected (with 
Pres)
Y See out term of 
Pres if
dies/rcsigns/impea 
ched, Act as Pres 
when Pres absent 
(both can't leave 
contry at same 
time); represent 
country abroad 
and coordinate the 
work on the 
ministers
No other
Ministerial
responsibilies.
N Democratic Singlc-parts President
Guinea N * ' * N Non-dcmocratic Single-party President & 
PM
Gtrinca-Oisiuu N * • ’ • ■ * N Democratic Multi-party President &
PM
Guyana Y VP l+ l Appointed Y Assist Pres; PM is 
first VP; PM takes 
over ifofficc 
vacant.
No other
Ministerial
responsibilies
Y Democratic Single-party President & 
PM (also 
Fiist VP & 
Sccond VP)
Haiti N ■ * ‘ * * N Democratic Single-party President & 
PM
Holy See 
(Vatican)
N * • * ■ • Y Non-democratic Non-party Head (The 
Pope)
No parties exist
Honduras Y VP 1+2 Appointed Y Replace Pres in 
temporary 
absence; Sec out 
term of Pres If  
permanent 
vacancy;
No other
Minister»!
responsibilies
N Democratic Single-party President 
(Also First 
VP,
Second VP 
&  Third 
VP)
Hungary N ■ * * * • N Democratic Multi-party President & 
PM
Iceland N ■ • - • • * N Democratic Multi-party President A 
PM
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Tildi« Y VP 1 Appointed Y Rccctvct 
resignation of 
Pres Si. pass onto 
Speaker of House; 
Actl as Pres until 
new one clected; 
Act as Pres when 
Pie» abscnlAll; 
Chiur Council of 
States
Mo other
Ministerial
responsible»
N Democratic Multi-party PivBidcni &
PM
Indonesia Y VP 1 Appointed Y Assist Pres in 
exercising his 
duty; See out tenn 
o f Pres if  
dies/resigns or 
unable to perform 
fiis duties
Mo other 
Ministerial 
respon sibil ie*
N Democratic Multi-party President
Iran Y VP 1+5 Appointed Y h i VP
administers affairs 
o f Council of 
Min* & 
coordinates 
function» of other 
VP*. Replaces 
Pres if
dia/dismisscd/ 
resigni/abicniy ill 
for more than 2 
months or i f  term 
over & new Pres 
not elected (new 
Pit* to be elected 
within 50 day»).
Vo other 
Ministerial 
responsible* for 
First VP but 
others have 
[Atomic Energy, 
Environmental 
Protection,, Legal 
& Parliamentary 
Affairs, Physical 
Training and 
Management & 
Planning).
N Mon-democratic Multi-party Supreme 
leader & 
President
I i «ì| Y VP 2 VPs Appointed Y Member 
Revolutionary 
Command 
Council; Replace 
Pic» in official 
absence or in case 
of the
impossibility of 
Pre» exercising 
hit constitutional 
competencies or 
any legitimate 
reason con call 
meeting o f&  
preside over 
Revolution»!) 
Command 
Council: Can 
attend National 
Council & 
participate m 
debates.
Two Dep PMs 
have Ministerial 
Responsibilities 
(Finance and 
Military
Industrialisation)
N Non-democratic Single-pan y President & 
PM (also 2 
Vp»and 4 
Dcp PMs)
Onc-paity stale
Ireland Y Dcp PM
(Taniste)
t Appointed Y Replace PM if  
dies or becomes 
permanently 
incapacitated & 
during temporaiy 
absences; member 
Council o f State.
Minister for 
Enterprise & 
Employment
N Democratic Multi-party President ft
PM
tirati Y Dep PM 2 Appointed No
Constitution
Each Dcp PM 
also has a 
Ministiy (Finance 
and Interior)
N Democratic Multi-party President ft  
PM (also 2 
VPs)
Italy Y Dep PM 1 Appointed N No other
Ministerial
responsibilies
N Democratic Multi-party President ft 
PM
Jamaica Y Dep PM 1 Appointed N Minister for Land 
&  the
Environment
N Democratic Single-potty Governor 
General & 
PM
Japan N “ - • • - * N Democratic Multi-party Empciot f t
PM
Jordan Y Dep PM 3 Appointed N Each Dep PM 
also has a 
Ministiy (Justicc, 
Interior and Min 
for State for 
Economic 
Affairs)
N Non-democratic Multi'pain King & PM 
(also 3 Dep 
PMs)
Kaiakluian Y Dep PM 1+3 Appointed N One Dep PM is 
Minister of 
Energy &  Natural 
Resources
N Non-democratic Smgle*party President ft 
PM (also 
First Dcp 
PM and 3 
Dcp PMs)
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Kenya Y VP 1 Appointed Y Replaces Pres if  
dics/icsigni/nol 
validly electcd to 
National 
As$cmbly(uow 
Pro* to be elected 
within 90 days) 
Act as Pres when 
Pros absent/ill or 
'any other cause' 
that Pres may 
appoint him Tor. 
Principal assistant 
of the Picsideirt in 
the discharge of 
liii functions; 
Need* Pres assent 
to leave counlty. 
cannot be speaker 
of National 
Assembly
No other
Ministerial
responsible*
N Nori-dcmocratic Single-party President
Kiribati Y VP
(Knnainan-rii-
Beretitenti)
1 Appointed Y If Pres vacant 
other than when 
Pres resign/loses 
confidence vote/ 
loses seat or 
incapable VP sees 
out term; Act as 
Pro» when Pres 
nbscnt/ill; must be 
member of 
parliament
Minister for 
Home Affairs and 
Minister o f Rural 
Development
Y Democratic Single-party President
Korea. North Y Vice Premier 2 Appointed Y Member of 
Cabinet
No other
Ministerial
responsibilies.
N Non-democratic Single-party Chairman
National
Defence
( 'ammi&sm
n. President
Supreme
People's
Assembly
Presidium
ft Premier
Korea, South Y DepPM 2 Appointed N Each Dep PM 
also has a 
Ministry (Finance 
& Economy and 
Education)
N Democratic Multi-party President & 
PM (also 2 
Dep PMs)
Kuwait Y Dcp PM 1+3 Appointed N Three have 
Ministerial 
responsibilities 
(Defence, Foreign 
Affairs, Interior 
and Min of State 
for Cabinet 
Affairs
N Non-dcmocratic Non-party Amie & PM 
(alio First 
Dcp PM 
and 3 Dep 
PMs)
Amir, PM and Dep PMs
nil 1 from Al Sabah 
Royal Family Only 
non-partisans allowed 
contest elections
Kyrgyzstan Y Dep PM l+ l Appointed N Dep PM is 
Minister of 
Foreign Trade & 
Industry
N Democratic Non-part\ President ft
PM (also 
First Dep 
PM & Dep 
PM)
l,aoi Y Dep PM 2 Appointed Y Assistants of the 
PM. PM may 
assign a particular 
Dep PM to carry 
out work on his 
behalf in case he 
is engaged.
Each Dep PM 
also has a 
Ministry (Foreign 
Affaire and 
Chairman of State 
Planning 
Committee).
N Noivdcntocxattc Sin^le-pam Piesident ft
PM (also 
VP and 2 
Dep Pms).
Latvia N - * * ■ N Democratic Multi-party I*iundent &PM
Lebanon Y Dep PM 1 Appointed N No other
Ministerial
responsibilies.
N Noivdemivemtic Multi-party President &
n i l
Lesotho Y Dep PM 1 Appointed Y Acts as PM when 
PM absent/ill
Minister of 
Human Rights, 
Law & 
Constitutional 
Affairs
N Non-dcmocratic Singlc-pai!> King f t  PM
2 6 6
Liberin Y VP 1 Elected (with 
Pres)
Y Assist Pres; Chair 
o f Senate with 
casting vote; Pres 
can delegate 
[unction» to VP; 
Replaces Pres if  
die« or* is 
otherwise 
incapacitated* 
[Article 63) and 
»cm out term but 
i f  pres dies before 
inauguration, this 
i l  a new term
Mo other
Kinistcnal
responsible*.
N Democratic Single-party President
Libya Y Dtp Seo for
the General 
Peoples 
Committee
1 Appointed Y None Mo otlwr 
Ministe nnl 
responsibility
N NoiwJcmocratic Non-party Leader ft 
Sec of the 
Gcneial 
People’s 
Committee
No parties allowed
Liechtenstein Y Deputy Head
of Govt
1 Appointed Y Act» as 1-lead of 
Govt if  Head is 
’prevented from 
attending to his 
duties1 (Article 
m
ilolds three 
Ministries 
(Indication, 
Justice and 
Transport & 
Communication)
Y Democratic Single-party Head of 
State
(Royalty) f t  
Head of 
Govt
Lithuania N - • • •- ' N Democratic Multi-party President ft
PM
Luxembourg Y Vice PM 1 Appointed N 1 folds two 
Ministries 
(Foreign AfFairs 
&  External 
Commerce and 
Ctvil Service & 
Administrative 
Reform).
Y Democratic Multi-party Grand 
Duke & 
PM
Macedonia, Y Dep PM 4 Appointed Y None One Dep PM is 
Minister Without 
Portfolio,
N Democratic Multi-party President & 
PM (also 4 
Dep PMs)
Mudavate ar Y Vice PM I Appointed N In Charge of 
Budget and 
Development of 
Autonomous 
Provinces
N Democratic Multi-party President ft  
PM
Malawi Y VP 1 Elected (with 
Pres)
Y Assist Pres; 2 
consecutive terms 
limit Act as Pres 
’whenever there is 
a vacancy in the 
office of the Pres1 
(article 83) for 
rest of term, i f  
Pres incapacitated 
teeks over 
temporarily; 
Preside over 
cabinet meetings 
if  Pres absent.
Minister for 
Privatisation
N Democratic Single-party President
Malaysia Y Dep PM 1 Appointed N Minister of Home 
AfFairs
N Non •democratic Multi-party Paramount 
Ruler &
PM (also 
Dep
Paramount 
Ruler & 
Dep PM)
Maldives N Y Noivdernocratre Non-party Pics idem ft 
Speaker of 
People's
Maim
No parties exist
Mall N • - • N Democratic Multi-party President & PM
Mulla Y Dep PM i Appointed N Minister for 
Social Justice
Y Democratic Single-pans President & 
PM
Marshall Islands N ' • * * • Y Democratic Non-party President No patties exist
Mauritania N * ■ ’ * N Non-democranc Single-party President ft PM
Mauritius Y Dep PM \ Appointed N Minister of 
Finance
N Non-democratic Multi-party President ft 
PM (also 
VP and 
Dep Pm)
Meiico N * ■ * • ' N Non'dcinocradc Single-party President
2 6 7
Mirronesin, 
Federated State» 
of
Y VP 1 Appointed Y Act as Pres if  
vacancy or Pres 
unable to perform 
hit duties,
No other 
M mister ial 
r esponili bilica.
Y Democratic Non-party President No parties exist
Moldova Y Dep I'M 1+4 Appointed Y None First Dep PM and 
one Dep PM hold 
Ministries
(Economy & 
Reform and 
Agriculture & 
Food Industry).
N Democratic Single-party President & 
PM
Monaco N Y Democratic Single-party Chief of 
State
[Royalty) ft 
Min of 
State
Molinoli» N ■ ” ’ * " N Democrnuc Single-party President A 
PM
Morocco N • ' ■ * ■ * N Non-dcmoeiatic Multi-party King &. PM
Mozambique N * * * * * N Democratic Single-party President A 
PM
Namibia Y Dep PM 1 Appointed Y Performs
functions assigned 
by Pres; can 
deputise for Pres 
in absence; next 
in line after PM if 
Pres vacant
No other
Ministerial
responsibilies.
N Democratic Single-party President &
PM
Nauru N * ‘ • • ■ * Y Democratic Non-party President No parties exist
Nepal Y Dep PM 1 Appointed Y Member Council 
of Minister*; King 
designates a* 
replacement PM t( 
vacancy until new 
PM appointed
Minister o f Local 
Development
N Dcmoeratrc Single-party King & PM
lSVi Ikm Inmh Y Dep PM 2 Appointed N Each Dep PM 
also has a 
Ministry 
(Economic 
Affaire and 
Welfare, Health & 
Sports).
N Democratic Multi-party Queen &
PM
New /«aland Y Dep PM 1 Appointed No
Constitution
Minister of
Economic
Development
N Democratic Multi-party Governor 
Gem: ml & 
PM
Nicaragua Y VP 1 Elected (with 
Pres)
Y Pi« can delegate 
functions to VP; 
Aclit as Pres if  
temporary or 
permanet vacancy 
& sees out term; if 
Pics leaves 
country for more 
than 15 days VP 
act* as Pres.
No other
Ministerial
responsibilies,
N Democratic Multi-party President
Niger N * ' * T * N Democratic Multi-party President 4 
PM
Nigeria Y VP 1 Fleeted {with 
Pres)
Y Act os Pres If Pres 
dies pre-
miuiguralionAilcs/
resign*
/impcachcd/pcrma 
nenlly incapable 
or removed from 
office for any 
other reason; Acts 
-is Pres i f  Pres on 
vacation or 
otherwise unable 
to discharge the 
functions of his 
ofRoc' (article 
145); meets with 
Pros to determine 
general direction 
of policy, 
coordinate 
acttviiet & advise 
Pro».
No other
Ministerial
reiponsibiltcs.
N Democratic Single-potty President
Norway N • • i * N Democratic Multi-party King & PM
Oman Y Dep PM 1 Apponiteli Y Chair Council of 
Mini if  PM 
absent, supervise 
the affaire o f their 
ministry & 
oigajusnlioui
Minister for 
Cabinet Affaire
N Non-democintic Non-party Stillali Si
PM
Sultan, PM & Dep PM 
all from AJ Said Royal 
Famdy No parties 
allotted
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Pakistan N • ■ ■' * • • N Son-democratic Non-party President Military coup in Oct 
1999
PftlMU Y VP 1 Elected
separately
Y Unable to find 
constitution
Minister of Health Y Democratic Noinpaity President No parties exist
Panama Y VP l+ l Elected (with 
Pres)
Y Act as Pres if  
temporary or 
Krmftflcnt 
vacancy (sec out 
term), attends but 
I.H no vote at 
cabinet; performs 
special missions 
for Pres & 
represent Pres in 
public acts, if  Pres 
leaves country for 
more than 10 days 
l i t  VP lakes over 
tempo rarilv
Mo other 
Ministerial 
responsi bilies.
N Democratic Mulii-pany President 
(also First 
VP and 
Second 
VP)
Papua New 
Guinea
Y Dep PM 1 Appointed Unable to find 
constitution
Minister o f 
Forestry
N Democratic Muiti-paity Governor 
General & 
PM
Paraguay Y VP 1 Elected (with 
Pres)
Y Acts as Pres i f  
Pres
disabled/tempo rar 
ily absent or 
permanent 
vacancy Cannot 
leave country i f  
Pres already out 
of country; to 
represent Pres 
domestically and 
internationally; 
coordinate 
relations between 
the executive and 
legislative 
branches
No other
Ministerial
rciponsibtlics.
N Democratic Mulii-parry President
Peru Y VP l+ I Elcctcd (with 
Prcj)
Y 1st VP sees out 
teim if  Pres dies/ 
mctalty or 
phsicolty 
incapadtatcd/rcsi 
gnj/removcd/lcAv 
es country without 
Congress's 
approval; 1st VP 
acts as Pres if  Pres 
on
trial/temporarily
incapacitated.
First VP is
Minister of
Industry,
Tourism,
Integration &
International
Trade
Negotiations
N Non-democratic Multi-party President A 
PM (also 
First and 
Second 
VP)
Philippine» Y VP 1 Elected (with 
Pres)
Y Can only serve 2 
consecutive 
terms; I f  pres not 
lia\e correct 
qualification then 
VP take over; if  
Pres-elcct dies/ 
permanently 
dii»blcd VP-elect 
ices out term as 
Pres; I f  Pres 
dics/rcmoved/resi 
gns/pcmtanctly 
disabled VP see 
out tenn as Pres;
If Pics unable to 
perform his duties 
VP act as Pres 
uadi Pres able.
Secretary of 
Foreign Affaire
N Democratic Singk-party President
Poland Y Dcp PM 3 Appointed Y Member Council 
of Ministers;
Each Dep PM 
also has a 
Ministry 
(Agriculture, 
Finance and 
Infrastructure)
N Democratic Multi-part)' President ft 
PM
Portugal N * * * * N Democratic Single-party President ft 
PM
Qatar Y Dcp PM 1 Appointed No
Constitution
Minister of State Y N'on-democratic Non-paity Amir ft  PM Amir, PM and Dcp PM 
alll from Al Thnui Royal 
Family No parties 
allowed. Constitution 
currently being drafted
Romania Y Dep PM 4 Appointed N Positions vacant 
at present
N Democratic Multi-party President ft 
PM
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Kiutitt Y Dep Premier 5 Appointed Y Vonc Three have 
Ministerial 
rcsportsibi lilies 
[Agriculture, 
Finance and 
Industry, Science 
A Technology).
N Democratic Multi-party President & 
PM (also 5 
Dep PMs)
Rwanda N " * ' ■ Position vacant at 
present
N Non-democratic Multi-party President ft
PM
Saint Kilt* and 
Nevis
Y DcpPM 1 Appointed Y Vone Minister of 
International 
Trade, Labor, 
Social Security. 
Telecommunicate 
on* &
Technology. & 
Coiicom A flans
Y Democratic Single-party Governor 
General & 
PM
Saint Lucia Y Dep PM 1 Appointed N Minister of 
Education, 
Human Resource 
Development, 
Youth &  Spoits-
Y Democratic Single-party Governor 
General & 
PM
Saint Vincent 
mid the 
Grenadines
Y Dep PM 1 Appointed N Minister of 
Foreign Affairs 
and Commerce & 
Trade.
Y Democratic Single-party Governor 
General & 
PM
Samoa N Y Democratic Single-party 1 lead of
Stoic
(Royally) A 
PM
Snn Murino N Y Democratic Multi-party Two 
Capitani 
Reggcnti 
(Ruling 
Captions) 
are elected 
every half 
year
SaoTomr and 
Principe
N Y Democratic Multiparty President A 
PM
There is a Dep Sec of 
Suite to the PM
Saudi Arabia Y Dep PM l + l Appointed Y Responsible. by 
expressing 
solidarity before 
the King, for 
implementing the 
Islamic Shan'nli A 
the state's general 
policy4 (articlc 
57).
No other
Ministerial
responsibiliesi
N Non-dcmocintic Non-party King &  PM 
(also First 
Dep PM & 
Second Dep 
PM}
King. PM and Dep PMs 
alll from A1 Saud Royal 
Family. No parties 
allowed
Senegal N • * * * N Non-democratic Multi-party Preaident A 
PM
SeycUelle» Y VP 1 Appointed Y Sees out term if  
Fee*
diet/rest gni/remo 
veil, Presides over 
cabinet meetings 
in Pres absence; 
exercises 
functions 
eonfeircd by Pres
No other
Mmnuertai
tcsponsibilies
Y Democratic Single-party President
Sierra leone Y VP I Elected (with 
Pres)
Y Principal assistant 
to the Pies'
(article 51). 
Assumes 
Presidency for 
rot of term i f  Pres 
dies, removed or 
resigns. Acts as 
Pres when Pres 
absent/i II/unable.
No other
Ministerial
ccsponiibilics
N Democratic Multi-party Presdtent
Singapore Y DcpPM 2 Appointed N Each Dep PM 
alio has a 
Ministry (Defence 
and Chair-The 
MoftClACy 
Authority of 
Singapore)
N Non-dcmocnnie Single-party President ft 
PM.
Slovakia Y DcpPM 4 Appointed Y None No other
Ministerial
tcsponxibdies.
N Democratic Multi-part> President f t
PM
Slovenia N * * • ■ • • N Democratic Multi-party Piesidcni f t  PM
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Solomon Islands Y Dep PM 1 Appointed Y Act« as PM when 
PM absent/ill.
No other
Ministerial
rcspcnsibilies-
Y Democratic Single-party Governor 
General & 
PM
There is also an 
Assistant PM
Somali* N • - • * ' ■ N Non-dcmoctatic Multiparty President & 
PM
Interim Govt
Simili Africa Y Executive 
Deputy Pres
1 Appointed Y Attend A speak 
»ut not vote in 
National
Assembly. Acts as 
Pres if  Pro*
absenl/olhciv.iw 
unable to fulfill 
the duties of Pres' 
(section 90); Pres 
assigns VP power 
& function«, 
assists Pres in the 
execution of Govt 
functions
No other
Ministerial
responsibilies
N Democratic Smglu-party President
Spain Y VP l + l Appointed Y None Both have 
Ministerial 
responsibilities 
(Economy and 
Interior)
N Democratic Single-party Chief of 
State
(Royalty) & 
President 
(also First 
VP and 
Second 
VP)
If Pres dies/resigns. 
Cost falls
Sri tunk* N * * " * N Democratic Single-pally President & 
PM
Sudan Y VP l + l Appointed Y If Pie* absent or
vacancy, VP acts 
as Pres until 
return or elections 
held within 60 
days.
No other
Ministerial
responsibilies,
N Non-democratic Single-party President 
and Chair 
Bureau of 
Federal
Rule
Suriname Y VP 1 Appointed Y VP acts as Pres if  
Pres unfit to hold 
office/temporarily 
gave up his 
powers/being 
prosecuted/absent/ 
*f there is no Pres; 
responsible to 
Pres for day to 
day management 
of Council o f 
Ministers & 
presides over its 
meetings; deputy- 
chair o f National 
Security Council
No other
Ministerial
responsibilies.
Y Democratic Single-party President
Swaziland Y Dep PM 1 Appointed No
Constitution
No other
Ministerial
responsibilies
N Non-democratic Non-party King & PM No parlies allowed
Sweden Y Dep PM 1 Appointed Y PM 'may 
nominate a 
M mi »ter to 
deputise for him 
if  Iw is 
unavoidably 
prevented from 
earn ing out his 
duties himself 
(Chaptci 7. 
Aftidc 8),
No other
Ministerial
responsibilies
N Democratic Single-party King & PM
Switzerland Y VP » Appointed Y One year term; 
cannot hold office 
following year;
Clucf Federal 
Department of 
Finance
N Democratic Multiparty The
president & 
VPs are 
olected for 
a year term 
by the 
parliament 
out of the 
ministers
Syrii Y Dep PM 3 Dep PM Appointed Y Responsible to 
Plus
All three Dep 
PMs have 
Ministries 
(Economic 
AfTaiit. Services 
Affairs and 
Dcfcnce).
N Non-democratic Single-party President & 
PM
Taiwan Y Vioc
President
Executive
Yuan
1 Appointed Y ITPres resigns or 
ofTicc vacant 
when legislature 
not in session VP 
takes over; 
member 
Executive Yuan 
Council;
Chanman,
Consumer
Protection
N Democratic Single-party President £ 
PM
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Tajikistan Y Dep PM 1+5 Appointed Y None Mo other
Ministerial
responstbilics
N Non-dcmocmtic Single-party President & 
F*M (also 
First Dep 
PM ft  5 
Dep PMs)
Tanzania Y VP 1 Elected with 
Pres
Y Assist Pies & 
perform duties 
assigned by Pres, 
VP acts a» Pies i f  
[‘its absent or 
unable to 
discharge the 
functions of his 
office, Sees out 
lerni if  Pres 
dies/iesigns/toss 
of
«juAlific.'monT/fails
to discharge his 
duties/under 
inquiry. Member 
of Cabinet & 
presides over 
meetings if  Pres 
Absent.
No other
Ministerial
icsponsibilies
N Mon-democratic Single-party President ft 
PM
Has no Dep PM so VP 
chooscn as Dep Leader 
[VP is a member of 
cabinet).
Thailand Y Dep PM 5 Appointed N Three hold 
Ministries 
[Defence, Finance 
and Labour & 
Social welfare)
N Democratic Multiport) King &  PM
Togg N * * * * * N Democratic Single-party President ft 
PM
Ton jib Y Dep PM t Appointed N Minister for 
Health and 
Attorney General
Y Non-democrcuic Non-party King &
PM.
Trinidad and 
Tobago
N • ' * * N Democratic Multi-parly President ft 
PM
Tunisia N * ■ * •
'
N Non-dcmocmtic Single-party President ft 
PM
Turkey Y Dep PM 3 Appointed N Two hold 
Ministries (Both 
Ministers of State)
N Democratic Multi-party President ft 
PM
Turkmenistan Y Dep Chair - 
Cabinet of 
Ministers
8 Appointed Y Pres can delegate 
management of 
meeting of 
Cabinet of 
Ministers to them 
(article 77),
All hold
Ministries 
(Agriculture & 
Business 
Development, 
Banking, 
Communications 
&  Transport, 
Construction, 
Economics & 
Finance, Energy, 
Healthcare and 
Textiles & 
Foreign Trade)
N Non-democratic Singlc-part) President
Tuvalu Y Dep PM 1 Appointed Y Acts as PM if  PM 
absent/unable to 
perfrom his 
functions. Sees 
out term if  PM 
dies/ceases to be 
member of 
IKUhrunuit/iesigns 
Presides at 
eabmct i f  PM 
absent
Position vacant at 
present
Y Democratic Non-party Governor 
General & 
PM
No parlies exist
Uganda Y Oqj PM 1+2 Appointed N All hold 
Ministries 
(Foreign Affairs, 
Internal Affairs 
and Disaster 
Preparedness ft 
Refugees),
N Non-democialic Multi-party President ft
PM
First, Second and Third 
Dep PMs Lection 
campaigning by party 
not allowed
Ukraine Y Dep PM 1+3 Appointed Y Member o f 
Cabinet of 
Minister*.
All three Dep 
PMs hold 
Ministncs 
(Agroindustia) 
Cumples., 
Economic Policy 
and Humanitarian 
Allans)
N Democratic Multi-part)' President ft 
PM
1 First Dep Pm f t  3 Dep 
PMs,
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United Arab 
Emirates
Y Dep PM 1 Appointed Y Member of 
Council of 
Minister*
No other
Ministerial
responsible*
N Noii’democratic Non-party Preside ni & 
PM
No parties allowed.
Untied Kingdom Y Dcp PM 1 Appointed No
Constitution
' * N Democratic Single-party
Hi
H
i
United Stale* of 
America
Y VP I Elected (with 
Pres)
Y Sees out term i f  
Pres
dies/resigns/remo 
vcd/unable to 
discharge powers 
o f office; VP is 
Pres o f Senate 
with casting vote,
No other
Ministerial
responsibilies,
N Democratic Single-party President
Uruguay Y VP 1 Elected (with 
Pres)
Y Pres o f Senate A 
General 
Assembly; See 
oul term of Pres if 
pcimancnt 
vacancy & act as 
Pres i f  temporary 
vacancy
No other
Ministerial
responsibilies,
N Democratic Multi-party President
Uzbekistan Y Dep PM 1+8 Appointed Y None Two Dep PMs 
hold Ministries 
(Agriculture & 
Water Resources 
and Energy & 
Fuel)
N Non-democratic Single-party President & 
PM
1 Firsl Dep Pm ft  8 Dep 
PMs
Vanuatu Y Dep PM 1 Appointed Y Acts as PM i f  PM 
dies until new one 
electcd.
Minister of Trade 
Development
Y Democratic Multi-party President ft 
PM
Veonudn Y VP I Appointed Y Presides over 
Federal Council 
of Government, 
See out term as 
Pres is Pres 
dies/renounces 
oiTlcc/rcmoved 
i^ncapable; Act as 
Pres in temporary 
absence of Pres; 
collaborate with 
Ptc* in sitting 
diccuon o f Govt; 
preside over 
Council of 
Ministers i f  
authorised by 
Prey, cooulinatcs 
relations with 
Nntmnul 
Assembly; 
cxccrcise 
function* given by 
Pres
No oilier 
Mini atcunl 
ictponsibilics
N Dcmocraiic Multi-party President
Vietnam Y Dep PM 1+3 Appointed Y Assist PM; direct 
work o f govt if  
PM absent
No other
Ministerial
responsibilies
N Non-democratic Single-party Cliaimion
Notional
Assembly.
president ft
PM
1 First Dep Pm &3 Dcp 
PM»
Yemen Y Dep PM 1 Appointed Y None Minister of 
Finance
N Non-democratic Single-party President ft 
PM
Yugoslavia Y Dep PM 1 Appointed Y None Minister of 
Foreign Trade
N Non-democratic Multi-party President ft 
PM
Includes Republic* of 
Serbia and Montenegro
Zambia Y VP 1 Apjwntcd Y Act as Prc* i f  Pres 
mcapableAJics'rcxl
gn until election 
within 6 months 
Act as Pres i f  Pres 
absent/ill;
Perform functions 
assigned by Pres. 
Preside at cabinet 
if  Pres absent; 
Relates messages 
from Pres to 
National 
Assembly.
No other
Ministerial
responsibilies.
N Non'democratic Single-party President
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Y VP 2 Appointed Y Assisi Pres, No other N Non «democratic Single-party President 2 VPs.
perform functions 
allocated by Pres. 
Act as Pro if 
absent/ position 
vacant/unable; 
read messages 
from Pres in 
parliament; can sit 
A speak in 
parliament but 
only vote if  
member
Ministerial
responsibility
2 7 4
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D cputy-
L eader
T erm
of
Office
195
Previously-held 
P ro m in en t 
E lected O ffice196
Previous 
m em bership  o f a 
policy-influencing 
legislative 
com m ittee
P rev ious O pposition
S pokespersonsh ips
Previously held cabinet
office
I. Sciin
Lemass
1945-
1948/
1951-
1954/
1957-
1959
TD (1923-1969) W orker’s
Compensation B il l1”
Party W hip1' 11 Industry &  Commerce 
(1932-1946) Supplies 
(1943-1944)
2 . William
Norton
1948-
1951/
1954-
1957
TD (1926-1927 &  
1932-1963)
Public Accounts Party Leader None
3. Seän
MacEntee
1959-
1965
TD (1919-1969) Public Accounts 
Game Preserrvation
Party Deputy-leader Finance (1932-19 37) 
Local Govt (1943-1948) 
Finance(1951-1954) 
Health (1957-1959) 
Social Welfare (1957- 
1959)
4. Frank
Aiken
1965-
1969
TD (1923-1973) Public Accounts Party W hip'” Defcncc (1932-1937) 
Coordination o f Defence 
(1943-1944)
Finance (1945-1948) 
External Affairs (1951- 
1954/ 1961-1965) 
Agriculture (1957)
5. Erskine
Childers
1969-
1973
TD (1938-1973) Factories B ill 
Public Accounts
Party Deputy-Leader Pari Sec for Local Govt 
(1944-1947)
Posts &  telegraphs (1951 - 
1954)
Lands (1957-1959) 
Transport &  Power 
(1965-1969)
6 . Brendan
Corish
1973-
1977
TD (1945-1982) None Party Leader Pari Sec for Local Govt &  
Defence (1948-1951) 
Social Welfare (1954- 
1957)
7. George
Colley
1977-
1981
TD (1961-1983) Corporation Tax Bill 
1975
VAT B ill 1971
Finance™ Industry &  Commerce 
(1966-1970)
Gaeltacht (1969-1970) 
Finance(1970-1973)
8. Michael
O'Loarv
1981-
1982
TD (1965-1987) VAT (Amendment) 
B ill 1977
Party Leader Labour (1973-1977)
9. Ray
MacSharry
1982 TD (1969-1989) Public Accounts 
Health Services 
Pubi ic Accounts
Office o f Public
Works,
Agriculture“ 1
Min o f State Public 
Service (1978-1979) 
Agriculture (1979-1981)
195 Coakley & Gallagher, 1999.
196 Data from: Coakley & Gallagher (1999); www.iikseaaen.se/folkvald/ledamotr/ [accessed 23 May 
2003]; Butler & Butler, 1994; http://gi.grolier.com/presidents/ea/vp/vprock.html [accessed 29 October 
2002];
197 Irish Data on committee membership from: www.oireachtas-debates.gov.ie[accessed 16 June 2002],
198 Horgan, 1997, p. 46.
'"Horgan, 1997, p. 46.
200 Collins, 2001, p. 108.
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10. Dick
Spring
1982-
1987/
1993-
1997
TD (1981-2002) Secondary
Legislation ofthe EC
Party Leader None
11. Peter Barry 1987 TD (1969-1997) VAT (Amendment) 
B ill 1977 
VAT B ill 1971
Economic Affairs Transport &  power 
(1973-1976)
Education (1976-1977) 
Environment (1981-1982) 
Foreign Affairs (1982- 
1987)
12. Brian
Lenihan
1987-
1990
TD (1961-73 & 
1977-1995) 
Senator (1973- 
1977)
Health Services Party Leader in
Senate2"2
Justice (1964-1969) 
Transport &  Power 
(1969-1973)
External Affairs (1973) 
Fisheries (1977-1979) 
Foreign Affairs (1979- 
1981)
13. John
Wilson
1990-
1993
TD (1973-1992) National Board for 
Science & 
Technology Bill 
1976
Communications 
Education &  Arts
Education (1977-1979) 
Transport &  Post &  
telegraphs (1982) 
Communications (1987) 
Tourism &  Transport 
(1987-1989)
14. Mary
Harney
1997-
2002
Senator (1977- 
1981), TD (1981- 
present)
Legislation & 
Security
Judicial Separation &  
Family Reform B ill 
1987
Crime, Lawlessness 
&  Vandalism 
Public Accounts
Party Leader,
Justice &  Education
None
15. J. van 
Schaik
1948-
1951
Member Lower 
House (1917- 
1933, 1937- 
1948)2'”
Internal Affairs 
Committee20-1
Leader o f Party in 
House o f 
Representatives
Justice
16. F. Teuiings 1951-
1952
Member Lower 
House (1929- 
1946)
Member Upper 
House (1948-1949 
&  1952-1957)
Taxation Committee Leader o f  Party in 
House o f 
Representatives
Interior.
17. L. Beel 1952-
1956
Member Lower 
House (1946 & 
1948)
None None Interior,
Prime Minister, 
General Affairs
18. A.
Struycken
1956-
1959
None. Justice Committee None Juslicc.
19. H. Korthals 1959-
1963
Member Lower 
House (1945- 
1959)
Foreign Affairs 
Committee
Spokesperson on EEC. None.
20. B.
Biesheuvel
1963-
1967
Member Lower 
House (1956- 
1963, 1967-1971 
&  1972-1973)
Committee on 
Agriculture & 
Fisheries
Agriculture 
Spokesperson in 
House o f 
Representatives
None.
21. A.
Vondeling
1965-
1966
Member Lower 
House (1946- 
1958, 1959-1965 
&  1965-1979)
Committee on Public 
Spending
Leader o f Party in 
House o f 
Representatives
Agriculture.
22. J. de Quay 1966- Member Upper None None War,
201 Trench, 1987, p. 160.
202 Trench, 1987, p. 103.
203 In the case of Dutch members of Parliament, they must give up their seat in parliament when they 
become Ministers, hence the gaps in their parliamentary career. A number of Dutch Vice-ministers 
President were members o f the European Parliament in the 1960s, this position has not been included as it 
was filled by appointment rather than election prior to 1979.
204 Data from www.parlement.com [accessed 8 April 2003],
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1967 House (1963-1966 
&  1967-1969)
Prime Minister, 
Defence.
23. H.
Wilteveen
1967-
1971
Member Upper 
House (1958-1963 
&  1971-1973), 
Member Lower 
House (1963 &  
1965-1967)
Finance Committee Finance Spokesperson 
in House o f 
Representatives
Finance.
24. J Bakker 1967-
1971
Member Lower 
House (1971- 
1972)
None None Economic AlTairs.
25. R Nelissen 1971-
1973
Member Lower 
House (1959-1971 
&  1973),
Member Upper 
House (1983- 
1987)
Enterprise
Committee
Finance Spokesperson 
in House o f 
Representatives
Economic Affairs
26. W.
Geertsema
1971-
1973
Member Lower 
House (1963- 
1970, 1971 & 
1972-1973)
Justice Committee Leader o f Party in 
House o f 
Representatives
None.
27. A. van Agt 1973-
1977
Member Lower 
House (1973, 
1977, 1981,& 
1982-1983)
None Leader o f Party in 
House o f 
Representatives
Justice.
28. W. De
Gaay
Fortman
1977 Member Upper
House (1960-1973 
&  1977-1981)
General Affairs 
Committee
Leader o f Party in 
Senate
Interior.
29. H. Wiegel 1977-
1981
Member Lower 
House (1967-1977 
&  1981-1982) 
Member Upper 
House (1995- 
2000)
General Affairs 
Committee
Leader o f Party in 
House o f 
Representatives
None.
30. J. den Uyl 1981-
1982
Member Lower 
House (1956- 
1963, 1967-1973, 
1978-1981 
&  1982-1987)
Security Services 
Committee
Leader o f Party in 
House o f 
Representatives
Economic Affairs, 
Prime Minister
31. J. Terlouw 1981-
1982
Member Lower 
House (1971- 
1981)
Member Upper 
House (1999)
Committee on 
Nuclear energy
Leader o f Party in 
House o f 
Representatives
None.
32. G. van 
Aardenne
1982-
1986
Member Lower 
House (1971-1977 
&  1981-1982) 
Member Upper 
House (1995)
Committee for Social 
Affairs
Finance Spokesperson 
in House o f 
Representatives
Economic Affairs
33. R de Korte 1986-
1989
Member Lower 
House (1977-1986 
&  1989-1995)
None Finance Spokesperson 
in House o f 
Representatives
Interior.
34. W. Kok 1989-
19942"5
Member Lower 
House (1986- 
1989, 1994 &  
1998)
None Leader o f Party in 
House o f 
Representatives
None.
35. H. Van 
Mierlo
1994-
19982°r,
Member Lower 
House (1967-1977 
, 1986-1994 &  
1998)
Member Upper 
House (1983- 
1986)
None Leader o f Party in 
House o f 
Representatives
Defence.
36. H Dijkslal 1994- Member Lower Committee for Leader o f Party in None
205 Available from: http://asem.inter.neUh/asem-info/netherlaiids/leacler.html [accessed 24 March 2003]
206 Available from: http://www.minaz.nl/ministeraad/ministers staat/html/cvs/mierlo.html [assessed 26 
March 2003].
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1 9 9 g ! " 1 House (1982-1994 
&  1998-2002)
Minorities 
Justice Committee
House o f 
Representatives
37. A.
Jorritsma-
Lebbink
1998 -  
2002
Member Lower 
House (1982-1994 
& 1998)
Committee on 
Alcohol
Spokesperson for 
Roads &  Waterways in 
House o f 
Representatives
Roads &  Waterways
38. E. Borst- 
Eilers
1998 -  
2002
Member Lower 
House (1998)
None Leader o f Party in 
House o f 
Representatives
Health, Welfare &  Sports
39. Per
Ah 1 mark2“8
1976-
1978
MP (1970-1979) Tax Committee
Constitution
Committee
Leader o f Party None
40. Ola
Ullsten209
1979-
1982
MP (1970-1985) Legal Committee
Banking Committee
Government
Committee
International
Committee
Leader o f  Party Foreign Affairs
41. Ingvar
Carlsson2"’
1982-
1986
MP (1964-1996) Manufacturing 
Committee 
International 
Committee 
Industry Committee
Party Deputy-Leader Education &  Cultural 
Affairs,
Housing.
42. Odd Erik 
EngstrOm2"
1990-
1991
MP (1991-1993) None Party Deputy-Leader Finance
43. Bengt Carl
Westerberg
212
1991-
1994
MP (1984-1994) Foreign Affairs 
Advisory Council
Leader o f Party Industry
44. Mona 
Ingeborg 
Sahi in21'1
1994-
1995
MP (1982-present) Justice Committee 
Culture Committee 
Labour Committee
Party Deputy-Leader Labour
45. Lena 
Hjelm- 
Walien 214
1998-
2002
MP (1968-2002) Culture Committee 
Labour Committee 
International 
Committee 
Education Committee
Party Deputy-Leader Education &  Cultural 
Affairs,
International
Development.
46. Herbert
Morrison
1946-
1951
MP (1923-1924, 
1929-1931 &  
1935-1959)
Standing Committee 
on the Rent 
Restriction B ill2'5
None Transport, 
Supply, 
Home Sec.
47. Anthony
Eden
1951-
1955
MP (1923-1957) All-Party Committee 
on Disarmament216
Deputy Leader 
Conservative Party
War,
Foreign Sec.
48. Richard
(Rab)
Butler
1962-
1963
MP (1929-1965) Franchise Committee
217
Member Shadow 
Cabinet
Education,
Labour,
Chancellor o f the 
Exchequer.
49. William
Whitelaw
1979-
1988
MP (1955-1983) Standing Committee 
on the Industrial 
Training B ill
Shadow Home 
Secretary
Northern Ireland,
50. Geoffrey
Howe
1989-
1990
MP (1964-1966 & 
1970-1992)
Standing Committee 
on the Fair Trading 
B ill
Social Services, 
Shadow Chancellor o f 
the Exchequer
Trade &  Consumer 
Affairs,
Chancellor o f the
207 Available from: http://www.ininaz.nl/inimstcraad/ministers staat/lnml/cvs/mierlo.html [assessed 26 
March 2003],
208 Available from: www.riksgagen.se/folkvald/ledamotr/ [accessed 23 May 2003].
209 Available from: www.riksgagen.se/foIk vald/ledamotr/ [accessed 23 May 2003],
210 Available from: www,riksgagen.se/folkvald/ledamotr/ [accessed 23 May 2003].
211 Available from: www.riksgagen.se/folkvald/ledamotr/ [accessed 23 May 2003].
212 Available from: www.riksgagen.se/folkvald/ledamotr/ [accessed 23 May 2003],
213 Available from: www.riksgagen.se/folkvald/ledamotr/ [accessed 23 May 2003].
2,4 Available from: www.riksgagen.se/folkvald/ledamotr/ [accessed 23 May 2003],
213 Donoughue, 1973.
216 Aster, 1976.
217 Butler, 1971.
278
Exchequer, 
Foreign Sec.
51. Michael
Heseltine
1995-
1997
MP (1966-2001) Standing Committee 
on the Transport
Act218
Environment,
Industry
Environment,
Defence.
52. John
Prescott
1997-
2002
MP (1970-present) Select Committee on 
Nationalised 
Industries219
Employment,
Transport
None
53. Alben W 
Barkley
1949-
1953
Congressman 
(1913-1927), 
Senator (1927- 
1949)
Committee on 
Finance220
Senate M inority 
Leader
Senate Majority leader
None
54. Richard M. 
Nixon
1953-
1961
Congressman 
(1947-1950), 
Senator (1951 - 
1953)
House Committee on 
Education &  Labor 
House Un-American 
Activities Committee
None None
55. Lyndon
Johnson
1961-
1963
Congressman 
(1937-1949), 
Senator (1949- 
1961)
Naval Affairs 
Committee 
Senate Armed 
Services Committee 
Special Committee 
on Astronautics and 
Space
Committee on 
Aeronautical and 
Space Sciences 
Committee on 
Finance
Senate Majority 
Leader
None
56. Hubert H. 
Humphrey
1965-
1969
Mayor o f 
Minneapolis 
(1945-1948), 
Senator (1949- 
1964)
Select Committee on
Disarmament
Appropriations
Committee
Assistant Senate 
Majority Leader
None
57. Spiro T. 
Agnew
1969-
1973
Goveror o f 
Maryland (1966- 
1968)
None None None
58. Gerald
Ford
1973-
1974
Congressman
(1949-1973)
Defence
Appropriations
Subcommittee
House
Appropriations
Committee
House M inority 
Leader
None
59. Nelson
Rockefeller
1974-
1977
Governor o f New 
York (1958-1973)
None None None
60. Walter F. 
Mondale
1977-
1981
Minnesota 
Attorney General 
(1960-1964), 
Senator (1964- 
1976)
Select Committee on 
Equal education 
Opportunity 
Committee on 
Finance
None None
61. George H. 
Bush
1981-
1989
Congressman
(1967-1971)
Ways and Means 
Committee
None None
62, J. Dan forih
Quayle
1989-
1993
Congressman 
(1977-1981), 
Senator (1981- 
1989)
Armed Services 
Committee
None None
63. Albert A. 
Gore
1993-
2001
Congressman 
(1977-1985), 
Senator (1985- 
1993)
House Intelligence 
Committee
None None
2,8 Heseltine, 2000.
219 Vacher Dod, 1979.
220 Data on US Vice-Presidents from:
http://www.senate.gov/ai tandhistorv/liistorv/comiTion/fanefing/Vice Presidenl.htm [accessed 3 June 2003]; 
http://gi.grolier.com/presidents/ea/vpconts.htnil [accessed 14 October 2002];
www.ford.iitexas.edu/grf/fordbiop.lilm [accessed 4 June 2003]; http://bushlibrarv.tamu.edu/ [accessed 4 
June 2003] and www.defencelink.mil/specials/secdef liistories/bios/chenev.hlm [accessed 4 June 2003],
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64. Richard B. 2001- Congressman House Intelligence House M inority Whip Sec. o f Defence (1989-
Cheney 2002 (1979-1989) Committee 
House Intelligence 
Budget 
Subcommittee
1993)
Note 1: This table is not comprehensive in that it does not include all the committees, 
spokespersonships or ministries on which the deputy-leaders served. For the purposes of 
this study, it is sufficient to show whether or not each deputy-leader served on at least 
one policy-influencing legislative committee or held at least one opposition 
spokespersonship or at least one ministry.
Note 2: In the case of spokespersonships, the positions do not exist as such in the United 
States system of government. The nearest equivalent - the Minority and Majority Leaders 
and Whips have been included. While Committee Chairs could have been included this 
overlaps with committee membership which has already been examined.
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A P P E N D I X  3  -  D A T A  R E L A T I N G  T O  H Y P O T H E S I S  T W O
P o l ic y  d o c u m e n t s ,  c o m m e n t a r ie s  o n  p o l ic y  p r o p o s a ls ,  c o n t r ib u t io n s  to  p o l ic y  d e b a t e s  in  t h e  m e d ia  
a n d  le g is la t io n  t h a t  w a s  p r o p o s e d  b y  th o s e  w h o  w e n t  o n  t o  b e  d e p u t y - l e a d e r s .
Deputy-
Leader
Term
of
Office
221
Outside parliam ent: Policy Documents/ 
speeches on policy/ Contributions to policy 
debates in the media
Inside Parliam ent: 
Legislation proposed/ speeches on 
legislation
1. Se&n
Lemass
1945-
1948/
1951-
1954/
1957-
1959
Address on fu ll employment, 1956.222 Conditions o f  Employment Act, 1936.
2. William
Norton
1948-
1951/
1954-
1957
Speech calling for unified Ireland (1947)i24 Speech on B ill on role o f King in foreign
Affairs(1936).225
3. Sean
MacEntee
1959-
1965
Memo to Taoiseach on Senate reform .226 Trade Union Act, 1941.227
4. Frank
Aiken
1965-
1969
Memo on wartime censorship (1940).228 Defences Forces (Temporary Provisions 
Act) 1933,22S
5. Erskine
Childers
1969-
1973
Speech on foreign policy, Trin ity College, 
November 1938.230
Telegraph Act, 1953.1,1
6. Brendan
Corish
1973-
1977
The New Republic232 Control o f Importation, Sale and 
Manufacture o f Contraceptives B ill 1974.233
7. George
Colley
1977-
1981
1977 Fianna Fail Manifesto."'1 Export Promotion (amendment) Act 
1967.23!
8. Michael
O ’Leary
1981-
1982
Speech on worker’s democracy policy 
documents (1969).23‘
Worker Participation Act 1977
9. Ray
MacSharry
1982 On committee that drafted ‘The Way 
Forward’238
Agriculture (amendment) Act, I980.2”
10. Dick
Spring
1982-
1987/
1993-
1997
Interview in Irish Times 1981 on Law 
Reform Commission proposals.240
Speech on Motion on Crime Prevention 18 
Nov 1981241
221 Coakley & Gallagher, 1999.
222 Lenihan, 1991, p. 215.
223 Horgan, 1997, p. 84.
224 Gallagher, 1982, p. 126.
225 Gallagher, 1982, p. 126.
226 Keogh, 1994, p. 103.
227 Horgan, 1997, p. 121.
228 Keogh, 1994, p. 124.
229 Available from: www.ii ishstatutebook.ie [accessed 9 July 2003].
230 Young, 1985, p. 90.
231 Available from: www.irishstatutebook.ie [accessed 9 July 2003],
232 Gallagher, 1982, p. 309.
233 Gallagher, 1982, p. 202.
234 Downey, 1998, p. 105.
235 Available from: www.ii ishstatutebook.ie [accessed 9 July 2003].
236 Gallagher, 1982, p. 80.
237 Gallagher, 1982, p. 201.
238 Joyce & Murtagh, 1983, p. 177.
239 Available from: www.irishstatutebook.ie [accessed 9 July 2003],
240 Ryan, 1993, p. 48.
241 Available from: www.oireachtas-debates.gov.ie[accessed 18 July 2003],
281
11. Peter Barry 1987 Ireland - our future together Electricity (Supply) (Amendment) Act, 
1974.242
12. Brian
Lenihan
1987-
1990
Article in Sunday Press on Administrative 
Reform.243
Censorship o f  Publications Act, 1967.244
13. John
Wilson
1990-
1993
On committee that drafted ‘The Way 
Forward’.2,15
A ir Navigation And Transport Act, 1988.24'’
14. Mary
Harney
1997-
2002
Justice for all: Progressive Democrats' policy 
on law reform and the administration o f 
justice (1987)
Environmental Protection Agency Act, 
1992.247
15. J. van 
Schaik
1948-
1951
N/A Policy on State Police (1935)24*
16. F. Teulings 1951-
1952
N/A Housing legislation (1950)24,1
17. L. Beel 1952-
1956
N/A N/A
18. A,
Struvcken
1956-
1959
N/A Official Secrets Act (1951)” "
19. H. Korthals 1959-
1963
N/A Contribution to debate on European policy
(1957)251
20. B.
Biesheuvel
1963-
1967
N/A Supported Lottery Act (I960).232
21. A.
Vondeling
1965-
1966
N /A Questions on NATO use o f nuclear 
weapons (1963)253
22. J. de Quay 1966-
1967
Speech to journalists on internationalization 
o f New Guinea (I960).254
Changes to Pay Policy (I960)2”
23. H
Witteveen
1967-
1971
N/A Act on Damage Insurance (1964)!5f’
24. J. Bakker 1967-
1971
N/A Introduced legislation on serving o f alcohol 
in hotels, restaurants and cafes (1964)257
25. R. Nelissen 1971-
1973
N /A Census Act (1970)2sa
26. W.
Geertsema
1971-
1973
Comments on Homosexual rights (1970).259 Contribution to debate on legalisation o f 
Homosexuality (1970),“ "
27. A. van Agt 1973-
1977
Comments to press on release o f Breda Three 
(1971).“ '
Changes to Act on Judicial Organisation 
(I972)2fj
28. W. De
Gaay
Fortman
1977 Justification o f response to South Moluccan 
terrorism (1977).2“
Change in Ballot Act (1976)2W
242 Available from: www.irishstatutebook.ie [accessed 9 July 2003].
243 Downey, 1998, p. 236.
244 Downey, 1998. p. 57.
245 Joyce & Murtagh, 1983, p. 177.
246 Available from: www.irishstatiitebook.ie [accessed 9 July 2003].
247 Available from: www.irishstatutebook.ie [accessed 9 July 2003].
248 Available from www.paiiement.com [accessed 8 April 2003].
249 Available from www.paiiement.com [accessed 8 April 2003].
250 Available from www.paiiement.com [accessed 8 April 2003],
251 Available from www.parlement.com [accessed 8 April 2003].
252 Available from www.paiiement.com [accessed 8 April 2003].
253 Available from www.parlement.com [accessed 8 April 2003],
254 Available from www.parlement.com [accessed 8 April 2003].
255 Available from www.parlement.com [accessed 8 April 2003].
256 Available from www.parlement.com [accessed 8 April 2003],
257 Available from www.parlement.com [accessed 8 April 2003].
258 Available from www.parlement.com [accessed 8 April 2003].
259 Available from www.parlement.com [accessed 8 April 2003],
260 Available from www.parleinent.com [accessed 8 April 2003],
261 Available from www.parlement.com [accessed 8 April 2003].
262 Available from www.parlement.com [accessed 8 April 2003],
263 The Associated Press, September 10* 1977.
282
29. H. Wiegel 1977-
1981
Comments on Lockheed A ffa ir (1976).2'’5 Speech on Prices policy (1974).2“
30. J. den Uyl 1981-
1982
Opposition to rejection o f ‘Nuclear tasks’ at 
PvdA Congress (1981).267
Policies dealing with oil crisis o f 1973,2M1
31. J. Terlouw 1981-
1982
Opposition to Nuclear Power (1981),2M Comments on Central Bureau o f Statistics 
( 1973)270
32. G. van 
Aarilenne
1982-
1986
Set up Broad Society Discusion on nuclear 
energy (1981).271
Act 011 Investments Account (I978).272
33. R de Korte 1986-
1989
Comments on economic policy (1983).271 Participation in debate on the Report o f the 
RSV Investigative Committee (1985)” 4
34. W Kok 1989-
! 994275
Proposals on job-sharing (1982).276 Spccch in response to Government 
legislative proogramme.277
35. H Van 
Mierlo
1994- 
199 8278
‘A  Reason to Be’ (1985) Proposals on NATO Nuclear policy 
(1981)*”
36. H. Dijkstal 1994-
199828"
Asylum reform proposals (1994).281 Comments on deportation o f immigrants.“ 1
37. A.
Jorritsma-
Lebbink
1998 -  
2002
Speech on Global in form iion Networks 
(1997)283
Speech to Lower Flouse on private 
participation in high speed rail network 
(1997)284
38. E. Borst- 
Eilers
1998 -  
2002
Speech on the use o f IT  in Medicine 
(1995)285
Heroin Maintenance Trial (1997).284
39. Per
Ahlmark
1976-
1978
Opposition to proposed Wage-Eamer Funds 
(1976).287
Energy Policy motion (1975).21“
40. Ola Ullsten 1979-
1982
Speech on Norwegian purchase o f 40% o f 
Volvo (1978).289
Motion on Department o f Foreign Affairs 
(1975).2,0
41. Ingvar
Carlsson
1982-
1986
Talks 011 international issues with CPSU 
Central Committee (1980)291
Transport Policy motion (1978)2J2
264 Available from www.parlement.com [accessed 8 April 2003].
265 World News Digest, September 4th 1976, p. 642.
266 Available from www.parlement.com [accessed 8 April 2003].
267 Available from www.parlement.com [accessed 8 April 2003].
268 Available from www.parlement.com [accessed 8 April 2003].
269 The Economist, May 30th 1981, p. 55.
270 Available from www.paiiement.com [accessed 8 April 2003].
271 Available from www.parlement.com [accessed 8 April 2003].
272 Available from www.parlement.com [accessed 8 April 2003],
273 The Financial Times, September 13th 1983. Section IV, p. 1.
274 Available from www.parlement.com [accessed 8 April 2003],
275 Available from: http://aseni.inter.net.th/aseni-info/iietherlands/leader.html [accessed 24 March 2003]
276 The Economist, March 20'1' 1982, p. 73.
277 The Financial Times, July 3 1st 1986, p. 2.
278 Available from: littp://www.minaz.n 1/ministeraad/ministers staat/htmI/cvs/mierlo.htm 1 [assessed 26 
March 2003].
279 Available from www.paiiement.com [accessed 8 April 2003].
280 Available from: http://www.minaz.nl/ministeraad/ministers staat/htinl/cvs/mierlo.html [accessed 26 
March 2003],
281 The Toronto Star, May 25* 1994. p. A 17.
282 The Financial Times, January l l 1' 1989, Section 1, p. 2.
283 Available from: http://europa.eii.int/lSPQ/bonn/Speeches/i iorritsma.html [accessed 22 August 2003],
284 Available from: http://www.ininvenw.nl/cend/dvo/intemational/english/summaries/eng0298.lilinl 
[accessed 22 August 2003].
285 Available from http://www.kb.nl/infolev/bmi/biomeditaties/bm34/amice.htiTil [accessed 21 August 
2003],
286 Available from: http://wwwdrcnet.org/rapid/1997/8-22-1 .htmI [accessed 21 August 2003].
287 US News & World Report, October 4" 1976, p. 40.
288 Available from: http://www.riksdagen.se/debatt/sakreg/sakreg7582.asp [accessed 26 August 2003].
289 The Washington Post, December 9" 1978.
290 Available from: http://www.riksdagen.se/debatt/sakreg/sakreg7582.asp [accessed 26 August 2003],
283
42. Odd Erik 
Engström
1990-
1991
Statement on term as Finance Minister 
(1990).™
Privatisation motion (1990)2'4
43. Bengt Carl 
Westerberg
1991-
1994
‘New Start for Sweden’ (1990)2” Motion on Labour Market Policy (1981 )291"
44. Mona
Ingeborg
Sahlin
1994-
1995
Speech in favour o f abolition o f ‘care day’ 
benefits for oft-work parents (1994).2’ 7
Motion On Property Tax (1985)Wb
45. Lena
Hjelm-
Wallön
1998-
2002
Speech in favour o f EU enlargement
(1997).25’
Motion on regional Policy (1978).
46. Herbert
Morrison
1946-
1951
‘The London Traffic Fraud’ (1928) 
‘The Citizens Charter’ (1921 )3111
Road Traffic Act 1920 ™
47. Anthony
Eden
1951-
1955
Speech on Western European Integration, 
Rome November 1951.303
Commons speech on NATO, February 
1952.304
48. Richard
(Rab)
Butler
1962-
1963
Speech on ‘Guidelines on future policy’ to 
Conservative Conference on Poliical 
Education 1946.305
Education A ct 19443'1’
49. W illiam
Whitelaw
1979-
1988
Criminal Justice System proposals ( 1977)’07 Criminal Justice A ct 1982.™
50. Geoffrey
Howe
1989-
1990
‘ In place o f Beveridge’ (1965)3™
‘The Right approach to the economy’ 
(1977)31"
Chancellor’s 1980 Autumn statement to 
House o f Commons3"
51. Michael
Heseltine
1995-
1997
The Challenge o f  Europe (1989).112 Opposed Ports B ill (1969).JI3
52. John
Prescott
1997-
2002
Alternative Regional Strategy. 
Planning for Full Employment.314
Opposition to privatisation o f British 
Airways.315
53. Alben W 
Barklev
1949-
1953
Keynote Speech 1932 Democratic 
Convention316
Specch opposing presidential veto o f 
Revenue B ill f  1944)
54. Richard M, 
Nixon
1953-
1961
Speaking tour o f 1951 Mundt-Nixon B ill 1947,3'7
291 BBC World Broadcasts, October 6th 1980.
292 Available from: http://www.riksdagen.se/debatt/sakreg/sakreo75S2.asp [accessed 26 August 2003],
293 The Financial Times , February 17'h 1990.
294 Available from: http://www.riksdagen.se/debatt/sakreg/index.asp [accessed 26 August 2003],
295 The Economist, September 21s1 1991, p. 60.
296 Available from: http://www.riksdagen.se/debatt/sakreg/sakreg7582.asp [accessed 26 August 2003].
297 The Sunday Times, September 18lh 1994.
298 Available from: http://www.riksdagen.se/debatt/sakreg/salcreg8287.asp [accessed 26 August 2003].
299 Deutsch Presse-Agentur, October 25th 1997.
300 Available from: http://www.riksdagen.se/debatt/sakreg/sakreg7582.asp [accessed 26 August 2003].
301 Donoughue & Jones, 1973, p. 122 & p. 108.
302 Donoughue & Jones, 1973, p. 137.
303 Rothwell, 1992, p. 108.
304 Rothwell, 1992, p. 108.
305 Butler, 1971, p. 133.
306 Butler, 1971, p. 95.
307 Whitelaw, 1990, p. 197.
308 Whitelaw, 1990, p. 227.
309 Howe, 1994, p. 39.
310 Howe, 1994, p. 104.
311 Howe, 1994, p. 192.
312 Heseltine, 2000, p. 343.
313 Heseltine, 2000, p. 119.
314 Anderson & Mann, 1997, pp. 153-154.
315 Anderson & Mann, 1997, p. 154.
316 Data on US Vice-Presidents from:
http://www.senate.gov/artandhistorv/historv/common/briering/Vice President.htm [accessed 3 June 2003]; 
http://gi.grolier.com/presidents/ea/vpconts.html [accessed 14 October 2002];
284
55. Lyndon
Johnson
1961-
1963
‘Our National Security’ -  speech to 
American Association o f School 
Administrators (1950).:'18
C ivil Rights B ill 1957
56. Hubert H. 
Humphrey
1965-
1969
Speech on C ivil Rights to 1948 Democratic 
Convention
Communist Control B ill (1954)3I‘J
57. Spiro T, 
Agnew
1969-
1973
Graduated Income Tax in Maryland 
(1967).320
None
58. Gerald
Ford
1973-
1974
State o f  Union proposals speech (1967).321 ‘Why we are pulling our best punches in 
Vietnam’ speech (1967).322
59. Nelson 
Rockefel ler
1974-
1977
Proposed setting up o f Department o f Health, 
Education and Welfare.
None
60. Walter F. 
Mondale
1977-
1981
Proposed right to free counsel for the poor 
charged with major crimes (1963).
Fair Warning Act 1966
61. George H. 
Bush
1981-
1989
Campaign speech in favour o f Fair Housing 
Act, 1968.323
Equal Rights Amendment Act324
62. J. Danforth 
Quayle
1989-
1993
Proposed term lim it B ill (1977) Job Training Partnership Act (1982)
63. Albert A.
Gore
1993-
2001
Earth in the Balance (1992) Computer Abuse Amendments Act 1990 
High Performance Computing Act 1991325
64. Richard B. 
Cheney
2001-
2002
Defence Planning Guide.326 M inority Report o f House Inteligence 
Committee on ‘Iran-Contragate’ (1986).327
3,7 Aitken, 1993, p. 240.
318 Steinberg, 1968, p. 300.
319 Steinberg, 1968, p. 389.
320 Available from: http://www.spartacus.schoolnet.co.uk/USAAgnew.htm [accessed 1 September 2003].
321 terHorst, 1975, p. 102.
322 terHorst, 1975, p. 105.
323 Evans, 1998, p. 651.
324 Drummey, 1991, p. 17.
325 Data from: www.firstmonday.dk/issues/issue5_10/wiggins/ [accessed 2 July 2003],
326 Data from: www.defencelink.mil/sDecials/secdef histories/bios/chenev.htm [accessed 4 June 2003],
327 Sunday Times Magazine, July ft"1 2002, p. 47.
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A P P E N D I X  4  -  D A T A  R E L A T I N G  T O  H Y P O T H E S I S
T H R E E
P o l ic y  d o c u m e n t s ,  s p e e c h e s  o r  le g is la t io n  o u t s id e  t h e i r  a r e a  o f  c a b in e t  r e s p o n s ib i l i t y  p r o p o s e d  b y  
d e p u t y - le a d e r s .
D eputy-
L eader
T erm  of 
Office
Policy docum ents, speeches o r legislation outside th e ir  a re a  o f cab inet responsibility  
proposed by d epu ty -leaders.
1. Se£n
Lemass
1945-1948/
1951-1954/
1957-1959
Radio address on Amendment to Constitution to change electoral system.” “
2 . William
Norton
1948-1951/
1954-1957
Comments on budget (1956).,!v
3. Se&n
MacEntee
1959-1965 Answer on parlinmeiHary question on Irish Langauge (1964y1511
4. Frank
Aiken
1965-1969 Answer on parliamentary question on Foot and Mouth Disease (1969)3"
5. Erskine
Childers
1969-1973 Answer on parliamentary question on Budget (1971).” J
6. Brendan
Corish
1973-1977 Taskforce on Childcare services (1974)313
7. George
Collev
1977-1981 Answer on parliamentary question on National Wage Agreement (1979).1,1
8 . Michael
O’Leary
1981-1982 Comments on Hunger Strike (198 l),si
9. Ray
MacSharrv
1982 None
10. Dick
Spring
1982-1987/
1993-1997
Opposition to changes in residency aspects o f tax law (I994)j,3r’
11. Peter Barry 1987 None.
12. Brian
Lenihan
1987-1990 Answer to parliamenlary question on Gallery o f  Modern A it (1988)’  '
13. John
Wilson
1990-1993 Speech to parliament on 11"' amendment to Constitution. (1992)"“
14. Mary
Harnev
1997-2002 Article on economicpolicy (1999),H
15. J. van 
Schaik
1948-1951 A ds on Surinam and the Dutch Antilles (1949).1-il>
16. F. Teulings 1951-1952 None’41
17. L. Beel 1952-1956 Greet Hofmans Affa ir11"’
328 Morgan, 1997, p. 181.
329 Available from: http://historical-debates.Oireachtas.ie/ [accessed 18 July 2003].
330 Available from: http://liistorical-debates.oireachtas.ie/ [accessedl8 July 2003].
331 Available from: http://hislorical-debates.oireachtas.ie/ [accessed 18 July 2003],
332 Available from: littp://historical-debates.oii'eachtas.ic/ [accessed 18 July 2003],
33j Desmond, 2000, p. 275.
334 Available from: http://historical-debates.Oireachtas.ie/ [accessed 18 July 2003].
335 New York Times, August 30, 1981, p. 4.
336 Finlay, 1998, p. 215.
337 Available from: littD://historical-debates,oireachtas.ie/ [accessed 18 July 2003].
338 Available from: http://historical-debates.oireachtas.ie/ [accessedl8 July 2003].
339 Irish Times, July, 28lli 1999.
340 Available from wwvv.parlement.com [accessed 8 April 2003],
341 Available from www.parlement.com [accessed 8 April 2003],
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18. A.
Struycken
1956-1959 None.343
19. H. Korthals 1959-1963 Motor Tax Act, ' '4
20. B.
Biesheuvel
1963-1967 Issues relating to marriage o f Princess Irene (1964J541
21. A.
Vondeling
1965- 1966 Re-organisation o f State Mining companies.” '1
22. J. de Quay 1966-1967 None
23. H.
Witteveen
1967-1971 None.
24. J. Bakker 1967-1971 South Africa (1970)’ "
25. R Nelissen 1971-1973 Act on Demesne o f Crown (1972)34'
26. W.
Geertsema
1971-1973 Financial status o f Royal Family (1972).W!>
27. A. van Agt 1973-1977 1976 Changes to Act on Opium.JM
28. W. De
Gaay
Fortman
1977 Act introducing Summer Time.
29. H. Wiegel 1977- 1981 1980 A ct setting up position o f National Ombudsperson.1*5
30. J. den Uyl 1981-1982 Nuclear Policy (1981)’”
31. J. Terlouw 1981-1982 Nuclear energy policy (1982)’54
32. G. van 
Aardenne
1982- 1986 Death Penalty (1982).” *
33. R de Korte 1986-1989 1986 Act aullioi i/.ing participation in Central Organisation on Radioactive Disposal 
(COVRA).356
34. W. Kok 1989-1994 Legislation on money laundering (1993-)’ ' '
35. H. Van 
Mierlo
1994-1998 Amsterdam Treaty.’
36. H. Dijkstal 1994-1998 Revision ofConstitution (1995).’^
37. A.
Jorritsma-
Lebbink
1998-2002 Decision to purchase o f Joint Strike I-ightcr (2001
38. E. Borst- 
Eilers
1998 -2002 None.
39. Per
Ahlmark
1976-1978 Speech in favour o f nuclear energy policy (197S)wi
40. Ola Ullsten 1979-1982 Tax Reform Proposals (1981).W!
342 Available from www.parlement.com [accessed 8 April 2003].
343 Available from www.parlement.com [accessed 8 April 2003],
344 Available from www.paiiement.com [accessed 8 April 2003].
345 Available from www.pariement.com [accessed 8 April 2003].
346 Available from www.paiiement.com [accessed 8 April 2003],
347 Available from www.parlement.com [accessed 8 April 2003].
348 Available from www.paiiement.com [accessed 8 April 2003],
349 Available from www.paiiement.com [accessed 8 April 2003],
350 Available from www.paiiemen1.com [accessed 8 April 2003],
351 Available from www.paiiement.com [accessed 8 April 2003],
352 Available from www.parlement.com [accessed 8 April 2003],
353 Available from www.paiiement.com [accessed 8 April 2003],
354 Available from www.parleinent.com [accessed 8 April 2003],
355 Available from www.parlement.com [accessed 8 April 2003],
356 Available from www.parlement.com [accessed 8 April 2003],
357 Available from www.paiiement.com [accessed 8 April 2003].
358 Economist, May 2nd 1998, p. 36.
359 Available from www.parlement.com [accessed 8 April 2003],
360 Available from www.parlement.com [accessed 8 April 2003],
361 Economist, February 4lh 1978, p. 51.
362:New York Times, May 9,h, 1981, p. 2.
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41. Ingvar
Carlsson
1982-1986 Proposal on verificition o f disarmament agreements (1985).
42. Odd Erik 
Engström
1990-1991 Talks on EC and EFTA cooperation..1*14
43. BengtCarl
Westerberg
1991-1994 Electoral strategy (1994)wi
44. Mona
Ingeborg
Sahlin
1994-1995 Opposition to proposed changes to legislation on prostitution“
45. Lena
Hjelm-
W allin
1998-2002 Speech on foreign policy at the Institute for International Relations in Kiev (May
2001).“ 7
46. Herbert
Morrison
1946-1951 Policy on Nationalisation o f steel industry (1947),iwl
47. Anthony
Eden
1951-1955 Intervention on Plan Robot (1952).î i ''
48. Richard
(Rab)
Butler
1962-1963 None.
49. W illiam
Whitelaw
1979-1988 Opposition to sending taskforee to Falklands,™
50. Geoffrey
Howe
1989-1990 European policy (1990).1,1
51. Michael
Heseltine
1995-1997 Speech to Party Conference (1996)?11
52. John
Prescott
1997-2002 Statement on Kosovo-(1999).
53. Alben W 
Barkley
1949-1953 Speech to Democratic Convention (1952).
54. Richard M.
Nixon
1953-1961 Proposal on Higher Education Subsidy.515
55. Lyndon
Johnson
1961-1963 Proposal to end discriminatory practices by government contractors.,7,‘
56. Hubert H. 
Humphrey
1965-1969 Head Start Program.117
57. Spiro T. 
Agnew
1969-1973 Proposal for Space shot to Mars, '7’1
58. Gerald
Ford
1973-1974 None.
363 New York Times, March 3rd, 1986, p. 15.
364 Xinhua News Agency, October 10th, 1990,
365 Hadenius, 1997, p. 158.
366 Agence France Presse, March 22nd, 1995.
367 Available from: littrc://www.regennt’en.se/galactica/service=imews/action-obi show?c obi id" 39789 
[accessed 12 September 2003].
368 Donoughue and Jones, 1973, p. 402.
369 Thorpe, 2003, p.373.
370 The Independent, July 2, 1999, p. 6.
371 The Independent, November 2, 1990, p. 2.
372 The Times, December 7th, 1996.
373 Available from: http://news.bbc.co.nk/l/hi/uk politics/302976.stm [accessed 12 January 2005].
374 Available from: http://wwvv.senale.gov/ariaiidliistorv/historv/common/briefing/Vice President,htm 
[accessed 3 June 2003].
375 Available at http://www.senate.gov/artandhistorv/historv/common/brieFing/Vice President.htm 
[accessed 3 June 2003].
376 Steinberg, 1968, p. 561.
377 Available at http://www.senate.gov/artandliistorv/histoi,v/common/briefing/Vice President.htm 
[accessed 3 June 2003],
378 Available at http://www.senate.gov/artandliistorv/historv/common/briefmg/Vice President.htm 
[accessed 3 June 2003].
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59. Nelson
Rockefeller
1974-1977 Energy Independence Authority.
60. Walter F,
Mondale
1977-1981 Establishment o f Department o f  Education.’ ^
61. George H. 
Bush
1981-1989 Recommendation of'Taskforcc on Federal Deregulation.381
62. J. Danforth 
Quayle
1989-1993 C iv il Litigation reform proposals.3*2
63. Albert A. 
Gore
1993-2001 Report o f the White House Commission on Aviation Safety and Security .,s)
64. Richard B 
Cheney
2001-2002 National Energy Policy '“4
379 Light, 1983, p. 620,
380 Light, 1983, p. 638.
381 Available at http://www.senate.aQv/artandhistorv/historv/coininon/brienim/Vice President.htm 
[accessed 3 June 2003],
382 Available from: http://www.ombwatch.orE/regs/archives/quavle.html [accessed 3 September 2003].
383 Available from: http://www.a-ten.com/biographies/al gore.html [accessed 3 June 2003].
384 Available from: http://www.whitehouse.gov/energy/Forward.pdf [accessed 3 September 2003].
2 8 9
A P P E N D I X  5  -  D A T A  R E L A T I N G  T O  H Y P O T H E S I S  F I V E
P o l ic y  c o m m it t e e s  c h a i r e d  b y  d e p u t y - l e a d e r s .
Deputy-
Leader
Term of 
Office
Policy Committees chaired by deputy-leaders
1. Seim
Lemass
1945-1948/
1951-1954/
1957-1959
None.
2. William
Norton
1948-1951/
1954-1957
None.
3. Sean
MacEntee
1959-1965 None.
4. Frank
Aiken
1965-1969 None.
5. Erskine
Childers
1969-1973 None.
6. Brendan
Corish
1973-1977 None.
7. George
Colley
1977-1981 None.
8. Michael
O’Learv
1981-1982 None.
9. Ray
MacSharry
1982 None.
10. Dick
Spring
1982-1987/
1993-1997
None.
11. Peter Barry 1987 None.
12. Brian
Lenihan
1987-1990 None.
13. John
Wilson
1990-1993 None.
14. Mary
Harney
1997-2002 None.
15. J. van 
Schaik
1948-1951 None.
16. F. Teulings 1951-1952 None.
17. L. Beel 1952-1956 None.
18. A.
Struycken
1956-1959 None.
19. H. Korthals 1959-1963 None.
20. B.
Biesheuvel
1963-1967 None.
21. A.
Vondeling
1965-1966 None.
22. J. de Quay 1966-1967 None.
23. H.
Witteveen
1967-1971 None.
24. J. Bakker 1967-1971 None.
25. R. Nelissen 1971-1973 None.
26. W.
Geertsema
1971-1973 None.
27. A. van Agt 1973-1977 None.
28. W. De
Gaay
Fortman
1977 None.
29. H. Wiegel 1977-1981 None.
30. J. den Uvl 1981-1982 None.
31. J. Terlouw 1981-1982 None.
32. G. van 1982-1986 None.
2 9 0
Aardennc
33. R de Korte 1986- 1989 None.
34. W. Kok 1989-1994 None.
35. H. Van 
Mierlo
1994-1998 None.
36. H. Di jkstal 1994-1998 None.
37. A.
Jorritsma-
Lebbink
1998-2002 None.
38. E. Borst- 
Eilers
1998-2002 None.
39. Per
Ahlinark
1976-1978 None.
40. Ola Ullsten 1979-1982 None.
41. Ingvar
Carlsson
1982-1986 None.
42. Odd Erik 
Engström
1990-1991 None.
43. Bengt Carl 
Westerberg
1991-1994 None.
44. Mona
Ingeborg
Sahlin
1994-1995 None.
45. Lena
Hjelm-
Wallön
1998-2002 None.
46. Herbert
Morrison
1946-1951 Fuel supplies for Industry for the Winter.1**
47, Anthony
Eden
1951-1955 None’86
48. Richard
(Rab)
Butler
1962-1963 None’”
49. W illiam
Whitelaw
1979-1988 Misc 62 Committee.3**
50. Geoffrey
Howe
1989-1990 Home Affairs Committee'1”
51. Michael
Heseltine
1995-1997 Cabinet committee on competitiveness.’'"1
52. John
Prescott
1997-2002 Ministerial Committee on Domestic Affa irs’1”
53. Alben W
Barkley
1949-1953 N/A
54. Richard M. 
Nixon
1953-1961 Cabinet Committee on Pricc Stability ,JH
55. Lyndon
Johnson
1961-1963 Space Council.
56. Hubert H. 1965-1969 Council on Native Americans',,,
385 Catterall, P. 1997.
386 Calterall, P. 1997.
387 Howard, 1988 and Butler, 1971.
388 Financial Times, October 4th 1985, p. 8.
389 The Times, July 30th 1989.
390 Financial Times, July 19* 1995, p. 16.
391 Available from: http://www.cabinet-office.gov.uk/cabsec/index/index.htm [accessed 15 March 2004],
392 Available at http://wwvv.senate.oov/artanclhistQrv/historv/comnion/briefing/Vice President.htin 
[accessed 3 June 2003].
393 Available at littp://www,senate.gov/aitandhistorv/liistory/commoii/briefing/Vice President.htm 
[accessed 3 June 2003],
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Humphrey
57. Spiro T 
Agnew
1969-1973 National Aeronautics and Space Council,™
58. Gerald
Ford
1973-1974 Domestic Council.356
59. Nelson
Rockefeller
1974-1977 Domestic Council
60. Walter F 
Mondale
1977-1981 White House Agenda Setting Committee.3Wl
61. George H. 
Bush
1981-1989 Task Force on Federal Deregulation.'44
62. J. Danforth 
Quayle
1989-1993 Council on Competitiveness.
63. Albert A. 
Gore
1993-2001 National Partners!! ip on Reinventing Government/“"
64. Richard B. 
Cheney
2001-2002 National Energy Policy Development Group
394 A vailab le  at ln tp ://w w w .sena tc .gov /a rtandh isto rv /liisto rv7com m on /b rie ring /V ice  P res iden t.h tm  
[accessed 3 June  2003].
395 A vailab le  a t h ttp ://w w w .sen a te .g o v /a rtan d h is to rv /h is to rv /co in m o n /b rie fin g /V iee  P residen t.h tm  
[accessed 3 June 2003].
396 T im e M agazine, D e cem b er 17th 1973, P. 27.
397 A vailab le  a t h tlp ;//w w w .sena te .g o v /a rtan d h isto rv /h is to rv /co m m o n /b rie fm g /V ice  P residen t.h tm  
[accessed 3 June 2003],
398 L ight, 1984, P. 634.
399 A vailab le  a t h ttp ://w w w .sen a te .g o v /a ita iu lh is to rv /h is to rv /co m m o n /b rie fin o /V ice  P residen t.h tm  
[accessed 3 June 200 3 ].
400 A vailab le  a t h ttp ://w w w .sen a te .g o v /a rta iid h is to rv /h is to rv /co in m o n /b rie rin a /V ice  P residen t.h tm  
[accessed 3 June 2003],
A vailab le  from : h ttp ://w w w .a -ten .co m /b io g rap h ies/a l go re .h tm l [accessed  3 Ju n e  2003],
402 A vailab le  from  h ttp ://w w w .w h iteh o u se .g o v /en e rg y / [accessed  12 M arch  2004],
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A P P E N D I X  6  -  D A T A  R E L A T I N G  T O  H Y P O T H E S I S  S I X
Reason for deputy-leaders leaving office
Deputy-
Leader
Term
of
Office
403
Governm ent 
left office
Retired/
Resigned
Not
Re-appointed
Sacked Became
leader
Died
1. Sedn
Lemass
1945-
1948/
1951-
1954/
1957-
1959
Government 
left office 
(1951)404
Became
Taoiseach
(1959)405
2. William
Norton
1948-
1951/
1954-
1957
Government 
left office406
3. Sein
MacEntee
1959-
1965
Not
reappointed.407
4. Frank
Aiken
1965-
1969
Retired4'’“
5. Erskine
Childers
1969-
1973
Government 
left office4™
6. Brendan
Corish
1973-
1977
Government 
left office410
7, George
Collev
1977-
1981
Government 
left office4"
8. Michael
O’Leary
1981-
1982
Government 
left office412
9. Ray
MacSharry
1982 Government 
left office413
10. Dick
Spring
1982-
1987/
1993-
1997
Government 
left office 
(1982)4'4
Party 
resigned from 
government 
(1987)415
11. Peter Barry 1987 Government 
left office416
12. Brian
Lenihan
1987-
1990
Sacked
over
scandal.417
13. John
Wilson
1990-
1993
Government 
left office41*
14. Mary 1997- Still in
403 C oakley  & G allagher, 1999.
404 C oakley &  G allagher, 1999, p. 375.
405 C oakley & G allagher, 1999, p. 375.
406 C oakley & G allagher, 1999, p. 375.
407 C oakley & G allagher, 1999, p. 375.
408 N ew  Y ork  T im es, M ay 19, 1983, p. 26.
409 C oakley  & G allagher, 1999, p. 375.
410 C oakley &  G allagher, 1999, p. 375.
411 C oakley &  G allagher, 1999, p. 375.
412 C oakley & G allagher, 1999, p. 375.
413 C oakley & G allaghe r, 1999, p. 375.
414 C oakley &  G allagher, 1999, p. 375.
415 R yan, 1993, p. 82.
416 C oakley &  G allagher, 1999, p. 375.
417 C oakley &  G allaghe r, 1999, p. 382.
418 C oakley &  G allagher, 1999, p. 375.
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Harney 2002 office419
15. J van 
Schaik
1948-
1951
Government 
left office'120
16. F. Teulings 1951-
1952
Government 
left office'12'
17. L. Bcel 1952-
1956
Resigned422
18. A.
Struycken
1956-
1959
Government 
left office"123
19. H. Korthals 1959-
1963
Retired from 
parliament.424
20. B
Biesheuvel
1963-
1967
Government 
left office425
21. A.
Vondeling
1965-
1966
Government 
left office420
22. J. de Quay 1966-
1967
Government 
left office427
23. H.
Witteveen
1967-
1971
Government 
left office428
24. J. Bakker 1967-
1971
Government 
left office429
25. R. Nelissen 1971-
1973
Government 
left office430
26. W
Oeertsenia
1971-
1973
Government 
left office431
27. A. van Agt 1973-
1977
Party 
resigned from 
government432
28. W. Dc 
Gaay 
Fortin an
1977 Government 
left office433
29. H. Wiegel 1977-
1981
Government 
left office434
30. J den Uyl 1981-
1982
Party 
resigned from 
government435
31. J. Terlouw 1981-
1982
Government 
left office436
32. G. van 
Aardenne
1982-
1986
Government 
left office437
33. R de Korte 1986-
1989
Government 
left office438
419 The Irish Times, June 21, 1997.
420 W oldendrop , Jaap , H ans K em an  &  Ian B udge, 1993, p . 87.
421 W oldendrop , Jaap, H ans K em an  &  Ian B udge, 1993, p. 87.
422 A vailab le  from  w w w .p a iiem en t.co m  [accessed  8 A pril 2003].
423 W oldendrop , Jaap, H ans K em an  &  Ian  B udge, 1993, p. 87.
424 A vailab le  from  w w w .p arlem en t.co m  [accessed  8 A pril 2003].
425 W oldendrop , Jaap, H ans K em an  & Ian B udge , 1993, p. 87.
426 W oldendrop , Jaap , H ans K em an &  Ian  B udge , 1993, p. 87.
427 W oldendrop , Jaap, H ans K em an  & Ian B udge, 1993, p. 87.
428 W oldendrop , Jaap , H ans K em an  &  Ian  B udge, 1993, p. 87.
429 W oldendrop , Jaap , H ans K em an  & Ian B udge, 1993, p. 87.
430 W oldendrop , Jaap, H ans K em an  &  Ian B udge , 1993, p. 87.
431 W oldendrop , Jaap , H ans K em an  & Ian B udge, 1993, p. 87.
432 A vailab le  from  w w w .p arlem en t.co m  [accessed  8 A pril 2003],
433 A vailab le  from  w w w .p arlem en t.com  [accessed  8 A pril 2003],
434 W oldendrop , Jaap , H an s  K em an  &  Ian  B udge , 1993, p. 87.
435 T he F inancia l T im es, Ju n e  24  1982, p. 2.
436 W oldendrop , Jaap , H an s  K em an  &  Ian B udge, 1993, p. 87.
437 W oldendrop , Jaap , H ans K em an  & Ian B udge, 1993, p. 87.
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34. W. Kok 1989-
1994-m
Government 
left office44'1
35. H. Van 
Mierlo
1994-
1998441
Government 
left office442
36. H Dijkstal 1994-
1998443
Government 
left office444
37. A.
Jorritsma-
Lebbink
1998 -  
2002
Government 
left office445
38. E. Borst- 
Eilers
1998 -  
2002
Government 
left office446
39. Per
Ahlmark
1976-
1978
Resigned
from
politics.447
40. Ola Ullsten 1979-
1982
Government 
left office448
41. Ingvar
Carlsson
1982-
1986
Became
Prime
Minister445
42. Odd Erik 
Engström
1990-
1991
Government 
left office450
43, Bengt Carl 
Westerberg
1991-
1994
Government 
left office451
44. Mona
Ingeborg
Sahlin
1994-
1995
Resigned 
over expences 
scandal452
45. Lena
Hjelm-
Wall6n
1998-
2002
Not Re­
appointed453
46. Herbert
Morrison
1946-
1951
Government 
left office454
47. Anthony
Eden
1951-
1955
Became
Prime
Minister455
48. Richard
(Rab)
Butler
1962-
1963
Not Re­
appointed456
438 W oldendrop , Jaap, H ans K em an & Ian B udge , 1993, p. 87.
439 A vailab le  from : h ttp ://a scm .in te r.n e t.tli/a sen v in fo /n e th c rlan d s/lead e r.h tm l [accessed  24  M arch 2003]
440 A vailab le  from  w w w .parlem en t.com  [accessed  8 A pril 2003].
441 A vailab le  from : h ttp ://w w w .in in az .n l/in in is te raad /m in is te rs  s ta a t/h tm l/cv s /m ie rlo .h tm I [assessed  26 
M arch 2003],
442 W oldendrop , Jaap , H ans K em an &  Ian B udge , 1993, p . 87.
443 A vailab le  from : h ttp ://w w w .m inaz .n l/m in is te raad /m in iste i s staa t/lilin l/cv s /in ie iio .h tm l [assessed  26 
M arch 2003].
444 W oldendrop , Jaap , H ans K em an  &  Ian B u d g e , 1993, p. 87.
445 W oldendrop , Jaap, H ans K em an  &  Ian B udge, 1993, p. 87.
446 W oldendrop , Jaap , H ans K em an  &  Ian B udge, 1993, p. 87.
447 The E conom ist, F eb ru a ry  4 1978, p. 51.
448 W oldendrop , Jaap, H ans K em an  &  Ian  B udge, 1993, p. 98.
449 T he G uard ian , M arch  3rd 1986.
450 W oldendrop , Jaap , H ans K em an  &  Ian  B udge, 1993, p. 98.
451 W oldendrop , Jaap, H ans K em an  &  Ian B udge , 1993, p. 98.
452 T he G uard ian , N o v em b er 11th 1995, p. 16.
453 G overnm en t o f  S w eden , 2 003 , p. 58.
454 B utler &  B utler, 1994, p. 52.
455 B utler &  B utler, 1994, p. 52.
456 B utler &  B utler, 1994, p. 52.
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49. William
Whitelaw
1979-
1988
Retired for 
health
reasons.457
50. Geoffrey
Howe
1989-
1990
Resigned
over
European
policy458
51. Michael
Heseltine
1995-
1997
Government 
left office459
52. John
Prescott
1997-
2002
Still in 
office460
53. AI ben W 
Barkley
1949-
1953
Government 
left office461
54. Richard M. 
Nixon
1953-
1961
Government 
left office462
55. Lyndon
Johnson
1961-
1963
Became
President46’
56. Hubert H. 
Humphrey
1965-
1969
Government 
left office464
57. Spiro T. 
Agnew
1969-
1973
Resigned 
over tax 
scandal465
58. Gerald
Ford
1973-
1974
Becamc
President466
59. Nelson
Rockefeller
1974-
1977
Did not seek to 
be re­
nominated467
60. Walter F. 
Mondale
1977-
1981
Government 
left office468
61. George H. 
Bush
1981-
1989
Government 
left office469
62. J Danforth 
Quayle
1989-
1993
Government 
left office470
63. Albert A. 
Gore
1993-
2001
Government 
left office471
437 A vailab le  from : h ttp ://n ew s.b b c .co .u k / 1/hi/uk p o litics/382770 .stm  [accessed  2 6  M arch  2003],
458 T he G uard ian , N o v em b er 3ul 1990.
459 A vailab le  from : h ttp ://w w w .n u m b er-10 .aov .uk /ou tpu t/P age 1376.asp  [accessed  12 N o v em b er 2003],
460 A vailab le  from :
h ttp ://w w w .odpm .gov .uk /stc llen t/g roups/odpm  abou t/d o cu m en ts/p ag e /o d p m  ab o u t 0 2 5 3 3 6 .p d f [accessed  
7 N ovem ber 2003],
461 A vailab le  a t h ttp ://w w w .sen a te .g o v /a itan d h isto rv /h is lo rv /co m m o n /b rie fin iV V ice  P rcsiden l.h tm  
[accessed 3 June 2003],
462 A vailab le  a t http:/Av w w .sena te .g o v /a rtan d h isto rv /h is to rv /eo m m o n /b ric fin g /V icc  P residen t.h tm  
[accessed 3 June 2003]
163 A vailable  a t h ttp ://w w w .sen a te .g o v /a rtan d h is to rv /h is to rv /co m m o n /b rie fin E /V ice  P residen t.h tm  
[accessed  3 June 2003],
464 A vailab le  at h u n ://w w w .senate .g o v /a rtan d h is to rv /h is to rv /co m iy io n /b ricn n a /V ice  P residen t.h tm  
[accessed  3 June 2003].
465 A vailab le  at h ttp ://w w w .sen a te .g o v /a rtan d h is to rv /h is to rv /co in m o n /b rie fm a /V ice  P residen t.h tm  
[accessed 3 June 2003].
466 A vailab le  at h ttp ://w w w .sen a te .g o v /a itan d h is to rv /h is to rv /co m m o n /b n cfin g /V ice  P residen t.h tm  
[accessed 3 June 2003].
ih l  A vailab le  at h ttp ://w w w .sen a te .g o v /a rtan d h is to rv /h is to rv /co m m o n /b rie fiiia /V ice  P residen t.h tm  
[accessed  3 June 2003].
*’68 A vailab le  at h ttp ://w w w .se iia te .g o v /a itan d h is to rv /h is to rv /co m m o ii/b rie fin g /V ice  P residen t.h tm  
[accessed 3 June 2003].
,|6!> A vailab le  at httD ://w w w .sen a te .g o v /a rtan d h isto rv /h is to rv /co m m o n /b rie fin g /V ice  P residen t.h tm  
[accessed 3 June 2003].
470 A vailab le  at h ttp ://w w w .sen a te .g o v /a rtan d h is to rv /h is to rv /co in in o n /b rie fiim /V ice  P residen t.h tm
[accessed 3 June 2003].
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64. Richard B. 2001- Still in
Cheney 2002 office472
471 A vailab le  from : h ttp ://w w w .a-ten .com /b iog raph ies/a l go re .h tm l [accessed  3 Ju n e  2003].
472 Sunday T im es M agaz ine , June  6 2003 , pp  42-49 .
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A P P E N D I X  7  -  D A T A  R E L A T I N G  T O  H Y P O T H E S I S  
S E V E N
Activities of deputy-leaders after their term as deputy-leaders.
Deputy-
Leader
Term  of 
Office
Full-time policy-influencing 
positions held by deputy-leaders 
after their term as deputy-leaders
Full-time business 
positions held by 
deputy-leaders after 
their term  as deputy- 
leaders
Other
I. Se4n
Lemass
1945-1948/
1951-1954/
1957-1959
Taoiseach.473 Board member o f 
Business474
2. William
Norton
1948-1951/
1954-1957
None.475
3. SeAn
MacEntee
1959-1965 None.4,i
4. Frank
Aiken
1965-1969 None.471
5. Erskine
Childers
1969-1973 President.47"
6. Brendan
Corish
1973-1977 N one47“
7. George
Colley
1977-1981 None.4“
8. Michael
O ’Leary
1981-1982 None,481 Judge.
9. Ray
MacSharry
1982 Minister for Financc and European 
Commissioner for Agriculture.482
Board member o f 
Business483
10. Dick
Spring
1982-1987/
1993-1997
None.-"14 Board member of 
Business485
11. Peter Barry 1987 None.486 Board member of 
Business487
12. Brian
Lenihan
1987-1990 None.“ 1 Unsuccessful 
Presidential candidate 4a'J
13. John
Wilson
1990-1993 None.4'-’" Chair, Independent 
Commission for the 
location o f Victims.491
473 C oakley & G allagher, 1999, p . 382.
474 Farrell, 1983, p . 124.
475 C oakley & G allagher, 1999, p. 383.
476 C oakley &  G allagher, 1999, p. 382.
477 C oakley  &  G allagher, 1999, p. 379.
478 C oakley &  G allagher, 1999, p. 379.
479 C oakley &  G allagher, 1999, p. 380.
480 C oakley  &  G allagher, 1999, p . 380.
481 C oakley & G allagher, 1999, p . 383.
482 C oakley  &  G allagher, 1999, p. 383.
483 A vailab le  from  h ttp ://w w w .rte .ie /cu ltu re /m illen n ia /p eo p le /m acsh arry ray .h tm l [accessed  2 February
2003].
484 C oakley  & G allagher, 1999, p. 384.
485 Irish T im es, M ay 4, 2 004 . p. 57.
486 C oakley  &  G allagher, 1999, p . 379.
487 Irish T im es, D ecem b er 24 , 2003 . p . 16.
488 C oakley & G allagher, 1999, p. 382.
489 C oakley &  G allagher, 1999, p. 382.
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14. Mary
Harnev
1997-2002 Still in office.™
15. J. van
Schaik
1948-1951 Minister for State.4” Board member o f 
Business 494
16. F. Teulings 1951-1952 None.495
17. L. Beel 1952-1956 Prime Minister.496 Board member of 
Business437
18. A.
Struvcken
1956-1959 Minister for Justice.498 Board member of 
Business41™
19. H. Korthals 1959-1963 None.500 Director o f Oxfnm 
Netherlands501
20. B.
Biesheuvel
1963-1967 Prime Minister.302 Board member of
Business503
21. A.
Vondeling
1965- 1966 Chair, Parliamentary committees.504 Member o f European 
Parliament5"5
22. J. de Quay 1966-1967 None.506 Board member o f 
Business507
23. H.
Witteveen
1967-1971 D irector-IM F.5"“ Board member of 
Business5“
24. J. Bakker 1967-1971 None.510 Board member o f 
Business511
25. R. Nelissen 1971- 1973 None.512 Board member of 
Business51'1
26. W
Geertsema
1971- 1973 None.514 Board member of 
Business515
27. A. van Agt 1973- 1977 Prime Minister.516 EU ambassador to Japan 
and US517
28. W. De 
Gaay
1977 Chair Justice Parliamentary 
Committee.518
490
491
492
493
494
495
496
497
498
499
500
501
502
503
504
505
506
507
508
509
510
511
512
513
514
515
516
517
Coakley & Gallagher, 1999, p. 384.
Irish Times, August 29, 2003, p. 8.
The Irish Times, June 21, 1997.
A vailab le  from  w w w .p a rlem en t. com  [accessed  8 A pril 2003].
A vailable  from  w w w .p arlem en t.co in  [accessed  8 A pril 2003].
A vailable  from  w w w .p arlem en t.co m  [accessed  8 A pril 2003],
A vailab le  from  w w w .p arlem en t.com  [accessed  8 A p ril 2003].
A vailab le  from  w w w .p arlem en t.co m  [accessed  8 A pril 2003].
A vailab le  from  w w w .p arlem en t.co m  [accessed  8 A pril 2003].
A vailab le  from  w w w .p arlem en t.co m  [accessed  8 A pril 2003].
A vailab le  from  w w w .p a iiem en t.co m  [accessed  8 A pril 2003],
A vailab le  from  w w w .p a iiem en t.co m  [accessed  8 A pril 2003].
A vailab le  from  w w w .p arlem en t.co m  [accessed  8 A pril 2003].
A vailable  from  w w w .p a iiem en t.co m  [accessed  8 A pril 2003],
A vailab le  from  w w w .p arlem en t.co m  [accessed  8 A pril 2003].
A vailab le  from  w w w .p a iiem en t.co m  [accessed  8 A pril 2003],
A vailab le  from w w w .p arlem en t.co m  [accessed  8 A p ril 2003].
A vailab le  from  w w w .p arlem en t.co m  [accessed  8 A p ril 2003],
A vailab le  from  w w w .p a iiem en t.co m  [accessed  8 A p ril 2003],
A vailab le  from  w w w .p arlem en t.co m  [accessed  8 A pril 2003].
A vailab le  from  w w w .p arlem en t.co m  [accessed  8 A pril 2003].
A vailable  from  w w w  .parlem en t, com  [accessed  8 A pril 2003],
A vailable  from  w w w .p a rlem en t.com  [accessed  8 A pril 2003],
A vailab le  from  w w w .p arlem en t.co m  [accessed  8 A p ril 2003].
A vailab le  from  w w w .p arlem en t.co m  [accessed  8 A p ril 2003],
A vailab le  from  w w w .p arle in en t.co m  [accessed  8 A pril 2003].
A vailab le  from  w w w .p arlem en t.co m  [accessed  8 A p ril 2003].
A vailab le  from  w w \v .parlem en t.com  [accessed  8 A p ril 2003],
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Fortman
29. H. Wiegel 1977-1981 None.5'1' Board member o f 
Business520
3 0 . J. den Uyl 1981- 1982 None.55' Chair, jury for AKO 
literature prize 1988522
31. J. Terlouw 1981-1982 None.523 Board member o f 
Business524
Chair government 
Commission on GM 
Foods525
3 2 . G. van 
Aardenne
1982-1986 None.51li Board member o f 
Business527
33. R de Korte 1986-1989 Vice-President - European 
Investment Bank.528
34. W. Kok 1989-1994 Prime Minister.52''' Board member o f 
Business530
35. H. Van 
Mierlo
1994-1998 Government representative to the 
European Convention.531
36. H, Dijkstal 1994-1998 None.53i Board member, 
Netherlands Film 
Fund533
37. A.
Jorritsma-
Lebbink
1998-2002 Chair Parliamentary Defence 
Committee.534
38. E. Borst- 
Eilers
1998-2002 None.5'5 Member o f the National 
4th and 5th May 
Committee (WW2 
commemoration).53''
39. Per
Ahlmark
1976-1978 None.537 Author” 1
40. Ola Ullsten 1979-1982 None.5" Ambassador to Canada, 
Bahamas, Italy and 
Albania.540
41 . lngvar
Carlsson
1982-1986 Prime Minister.341
42. Odd Erik 
Engström
1990-1991 Chair, Bank Support Authority*11 Board member of 
Business543
518 Available from w w w.parlem ent.com  [accessed 8 A pril 2003],
519 Available from w w w .parlem ent.com  [accessed 8 A pril 2003].
520 Available from w w w .parlem ent.com  [accessed 8 April 2003].
521 Available from w w w .paiiem ent.com  [accessed 8 A pril 2003].
522 Available from w w w .parlem ent.com  [accessed 8 A pril 2003],
523 Available from w w w .parlem ent.com [accessed 8 A pril 2003].
524 Available from w w w .paiiem ent.com  [accessed 8 April 2003].
525 Het Financieele Dagblad, January 10th 2002.
526 Available from w w w .paiiem ent.com  [accessed 8 A pril 2003],
327 Available from w w w .paiiem ent.com  [accessed 8 April 2003].
528 Available from w w w.parlem ent.com  [accessed 8 A pril 2003].
529 Available from w w w .paiiejnent.com  [accessed 8 April 2003],
530 Available from www.parleinent.com  [accessed 8 A pril 2003].
531 Available from w w w.parlem ent.com  [accessed 8 A pril 2003],
532 Available from w w w.parlem ent.com  [accessed 8 A pril 2003],
533 Available from w w w .paiiem ent.com  [accessed 8 A pril 2003].
534 Available from w w w .paiiem ent.com  [accessed 8 A pril 2003].
535 Available from w w w .paiiem ent.com  [accessed 8 A pril 2003].
536 Available from w w w .parlem ent.com [accessed 8 A pril 2003],
537 The Economist, February 4 1978, p. 51.
538 Available from: w w w .riksgagen.se/folkvald/ledam otr/ [accessed 23 M ay 2003],
539 Available from: w w w .iikseagen.se/folkvald/ledam otr/ [accessed 23 M ay 2003].
540 Available from: w w w .riksgagen.se/folkvald/ledam otr/ [accessed 23 M ay 2003].
541 The Guardian, M arch 1>A 1986.
542 Financial Times, D ecem ber 11 1993, p. 13.
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43. Bengt Carl 
Westcrberg
1991-1994 Vice-Chair Central Bank.344 Chairman, Telia.543
44. Mona
Ingeborg
Sahlin
1994-1995 Minister for Industry, employment 
and Communications.546
45. Lena
Hjelm-
Wall6n
1998-2002 Swedish Government 
Representative in the European 
Convention547
46. Herbert
Morrison
1946-1951 Foreign secretary.548
47. Anthony
Eden
1951-1955 Prime Minister.54’
48. Richard
(Rab)
Butler
1962-1963 Foreign Secretary.5i" Master o f Trinity 
College Cambridge” 1
49. William
Wliitelaw
1979-1988 None.552-
50. Geoffrey
Howe
1989-1990 N one55-’ Board member o f
Business554
51. Michael
Heseltine
1995-1997 None.555 Owner of Publishing 
company.556
52. John
Prescott
1997-2002 Still in office.” ''
53. Alben W 
Barkley
1949-1953 Senator.558
54. Richard M. 
Nixon
1953-1961 President.555*
55. Lyndon
Johnson
1961-1963 President.46"
56. Hubert H. 
Humphrey
1965-1969 Senator.561 Lecturer*“
57. Spiro T. 1969-1973 None.*141 Business Consultant1*4
543 Financial Times, June 13 1995, p. 14.
544 Available from: w w w .riksgagen.se/folkvald/ledam otr/ [accessed 23 M ay 2003],
545 AFX News, M ay 14, 1998.
546 Government o f  Sweden, 2003, p. 61.
547 Financial Times, April 9 2003, p. 20.
548 Butler & Butler, 1994, pp. 52-53
549 Butler & Butler, 1994, p. 73.
550 Butler & Butler, 1994, p. 72.
551 Available from: http://w w w .spartacus.schoolnet.co.nk/ED butler.htm  [accessed 4 M ay 2004],
552 Available from: http://new s.bbc.co.U k/l/hi/iik politics/382770.stm [accessed 26 M arch 2003],
553 Butler & Butler, 1994, p. 74.
554 Available from: http://w w w .academ v-experts.org/people/H O W E.H TM  [accessed 3 M ay 2004],
555 The Guardian, M arch 20 2001.
556 The Guardian, M arch 20 2001.
557 Available from:
lHtp://w w w .odpni.gov.uk/stellent/erouns/odpm  about/docum ents/page/odpin about 025336.pdf [accessed 
7 N ovem ber 2003].
558 Available from http://w w w .senate.gov/arlandhistorv/historv/com inon/brietm g/V ice President.htm  
[accessed 3 June 2003].
559 Available from http://w w w .senate.gov/artandhistorv/historv/com m on/briefm g/V ice President.htm  
[accessed 3 June 2003].
Available from http://w w w.senate.gov/artandhistorv/historv/com m on/brieFing/V ice President.htm  
[accessed 3 June 2003].
Available from http://vvw w .senate.gov/artandhistorv/historv/com m on/briering/V ice President.htm  
[accessed 3 June 2003].
562 Available from http://w w w.seiiate.gov/artandliistorv/historv/com m on/briefm g/Vice President.htm  
[accessed 3 June 2003].
301
Agnew
58. Gerald
Ford
1973-1974 President.5“ Lecturer5“ '
59. Nelson
Rockefeller
1974-1977 None.5“
60. Walter F. 
Mondale
1977-1981 N one.5is Ambassador to Japan5*’
61. George H. 
Bush
1981-1989 President.™ Business Consultant571
62. J Dan forth 
Quayle
1989-1993 None.™ Board member o f 
Business573
63. Albert A.
Gore
1993-2001 None.™ Lecturer5'5
64. Richard B. 
Cheney
2001-2002 Still in office.™
563 Available from http:/Avvvw.senate.gov/artandhistorv/liistorv/com m on/brienim /V ice President.htm  
[accessed 3 June 2003].
564 Available from http://w w w .senate.gov/artandhistorv/historv/com m on/briefing/V icc President.htm  
[accessed 3 June 2003].
565 Available from: w w w.ford.utexas.edu/grf/fordbiop.htm  [accessed 4 June 2003]
566 Available from: www.ford.utexas.edu/grt7fordbiop.htm  [accessed 4 June 2003]
567 Available from h 111): / /w w w . se n ate. go v/arta n d h i stor v/h i stor v/c o m n i o n/b r i e fin t»/ V i ce President.htm  
[accessed 3 June 2003].
568 Available from  http://w w w .senate.gov/artandhistorv/historv/com m on/briefing/V ice President.htm  
[accessed 3 June 2003].
569 Available from httR ://www.senate.°ov/artandhistorv/liistorv/com m on/briefing/V ice President.htm  
[accessed 3 June 2003],
570 Available from http://w w w .senate.aov/artandhistorv/historv/com m on/briefina/V ice President.htm  
[accessed 3 June 2003],
571 Available from: http://slate.m sn.com /id/2081572 [accessed 3 M ay 2004],
572 Available from http://www.senate.iiov/ai1aiidhistorv/historv/com m on/bi iennti/V ice President.htm  
[accessed 3 June 2003],
573 Available from: littD://www. travclgolf.com /departm ents/clubhouse/dan-quavle-profile.htm  [accessed 3 
May 2004],
574 Available from: http://w w w .a-ten.com /biographies/al gore.html [accessed 3 June 2003],
575 Available from: w w w.cbsnew s.coin/stories/2001/01/24/politics/m ain266853.slitm l [accessed 3 May
2004],
576 Sunday Times M agazine, June 6 2003, pp 42-49.
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B I B L I O G R A P H Y
C o n te n ts
a )  O r ig in a l  m a t e r ia l
( i )  I n t e r n e t
b )  S e c o n d a r y  s o u rc e s
( i )  B o o k s
( i i )  J o u r n a l  A r t i c le s
( i i i )  N e w s p a p e r / M a g a z in e  A r t i c le s
( i v )  C o n f e r e n c e  P a p e r s
a) Original material:
i) Internet
A c a d e m y  o f  E x p e r t s ,  2 0 0 4 .  ‘ G e o f f r e y  H o w e . ’ A v a i l a b l e  f r o m :  h t t p : / /w w w .a c a d e m y -  
e x p e r t s . o r g / p e o p l e / H O W E . H T M  [a c c e s s e d  3  M a y  2 0 0 4 ] .
A m a z o n ,  2 0 0 2 .  ‘ V i c e  P r e s id e n t  U n i t e d  S ta te s . ’ A v a i l a b l e  f r o m :  w w w . a m a z o n . c o m  [a c c e s s e d  11  
A u g u s t  2 0 0 2 ] ,
A s i a - E u r o p e  M e e t in g ,  1 9 9 6 a .  ‘ L e n a  H j e l m - W a l l e n  A v a i l a b l e  f r o m :
h t t p : / / a s e m . in t e r .n e t . t h /a s e m - in f o /s w e d e n / le a d e r .h t m l  [a c c e s s e d  2 4  M a r c h  2 0 0 3 ]
A s ia  -  E u r o p e  M e e t in g ,  1 9 9 6 b .  ‘ W i m  K o k ’ A v a i l a b l e  f r o m :  h t t p : / / a s e m . in t e r .n e t . t h /a s e m -
This contains only material actually used in the dissertation.
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A - T e n .c o m ,  1 9 9 7 .  ‘ A  B io g r a p h y :  A 1  G o r e , ’ A v a i l a b l e  f r o m :  h t t p : / / w w w .a -
t e n .c o m /b io g r a p h ie s /a l  g o r e .h t m l  [a c c e s s e d  3  J u n e  2 0 0 3 ] .
B B C  N e w s ,  1 9 9 9 .  ‘ W h i t e l a w :  T h e  a r c h e t y p a l  T o r y . ’ A v a i l a b l e  f r o m :
h t t p : / /n e w s .b b c .c o . u k / l / h i / u k  p o l i t i c s / 3 8 2 7 7 0 . s t m  [a c c e s s e d  2 6  M a r c h  2 0 0 3 ] .
B e u n ,  H e r m a n ,  2 0 0 1 .  ‘ S o c ia l - l i b e r a l i s m ,  p r a g m a t is m  a n d  r a d ic a l  d e m o c r a t i z a t io n :  th e  D 6 6 -  
d e b a t e . ’ A v a i l a b l e  f r o m :  h t t p : / /u s e r s .s k y n e t .b e /h e r m a n .b e u n /p a g e 9 .h t m l  [a c c e s s e d  2 2  
A u g u s t  2 0 0 3 ] ,
B o r s t - E i le r s ,  E ls e ,  1 9 9 5 .  ‘ O p e n in g  S p e e c h  a t  A m i c e  C o n f e r e n c e  1 9 9 5 ’ A v a i l a b l e  f r o m  
h t t p : / /w w w .k b . n l / i n f o l e v / b m i / b i o m e d i t a t i e s / b m 3 4 /a m i c e . h t m l  [a c c e s s e d  2 1  A u g u s t  2 0 0 3 ] .
B o w k e r ’ s G lo b a l  B o o k s  in  P r in t ,  2 0 0 2 .  ‘ V i c e  P r e s id e n t  U n i t e d  S ta te s . ’ A v a i l a b l e  f r o m :  
w w w . g lo b a lb o o k s in p r in t . c o m  [a c c e s s e d  11 A u g u s t  2 0 0 2 ] ,
C a b in e t  O f f i c e ,  1 9 9 7 .  ‘ L is t  o f  M i n i s t e r i a l  R e s p o n s ib i l i t i e s . ’ A v a i l a b l e  f r o m :  w w w .c a b in e t -  
o f f i c e .g o v . u k / c e n t r a l / 1 9 9 7 / l m r 9 7 . p d f  [a c c e s s e d  9  D e c e m b e r  2 0 0 2 ] ,
C a b in e t  O f f i c e ,  2 0 0 1 .  ‘ L is t  o f  M i n i s t e r i a l  R e s p o n s ib i l i t i e s . ’ A v a i l a b l e  f r o m :  w w w .  c a b  in e t -  
o f f ic e .  g o v . u k / c e n t r a l / 2 0 0 1 / l m r 0 7 . p d f  [a c c e s s e d  9  D e c e m b e r  2 0 0 2 ] ,
C a b in e t  O f f i c e ,  2 0 0 4 .  ‘ C a b in e t  C o m m it t e e s ’ A v a i l a b l e  f r o m :  h t t p : / /w w w .c a b in e t -
o f f i c e .g o v .u k /c a b s e c / in d e x / in d e x .h t m  [a c c e s s e d  1 5  M a r c h  2 0 0 4 ] .
C a n a d ia n  L i b r a r y  o f  P a r l ia m e n t ,  2 0 0 2 .  ‘ D e p u t y  P r im e  M i n i s t e r  o f  C a n a d a  -  1 9 7 7  to  D a t e . ’ 
A v a i l a b le  f r o m :
h t t p : / / w w w .D a r l .g c .c a . in f o r m a t io n /a b o u t /p c o p le /k e y /D e p P r i m e M i n . a s p ? L a n g u a g e = E & H i s t =
info/netherlands/leader.html [accessed 24 March 2003]
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C B S n e w s .c o m ,  2 0 0 1 .  ‘ L e a r n in g  f r o m  G o r e . ’ A v a i l a b l e  f r o m :  
w w w . c b s n e w s .c o m /s t o r ie s /2 0 0 1 /0 1 /2 4 /p o l i t i c s /m a in 2 6 6 8 5 3 .s h t m l  [a c c e s s e d  3 M a y  2 0 0 4 ] ,  
C e n t e r  f o r  B u s in e s s  a n d  P o l i c y  S tu d ie s ,  2 0 0 1 .  ‘ S w e d is h  g o v e r n m e n t s  s in c e  1 9 1 1 . ’ A v a i l a b l e  
f r o m :  w w w .  c o n s t , s n s . s e /s w e d is h p o l i t ic s /g o v t s .h t m  [a c c e s s e d  2 4  O c t o b e r  2 0 0 1 ] .
C e n t r a l  I n t e l l i g e n c e  A g e n c y ,  2 0 0 1 .  ‘ C h ie f s  o f  S ta te  a n d  C a b in e t  M e m b e r s  o f  F o r e ig n  
G o v e r n m e n t s . ’ A v a i l a b l e  f r o m  w w w .c ia .g o v /c ia /p u b l i c a t io n s /c h ie f s / in d e x .h t m l  [a c c e s s e d  1 
N o v e m b e r  2 0 0 1 ] ,
C e n t r a l  In t e l l i g e n c e  A g e n c y ,  2 0 0 1 .  ‘ T h e  W o r l d  F a c t b o o k . ’ A v a i l a b l e  f r o m :  
w w w .c ia .g o v /c ia /p u b l i c a t io n s / f a c t b o o k / f b h o m e .h t m l  [a c c e s s e d  1 N o v e m b e r  2 0 0 1 ] ,
C o e n ,  D a n ,  2 0 0 1 .  ‘ T h e  e v o lv in g  r o le  o f  th e  V i c e  P r e s id e n c y . ’ A v a i l a b l e  f r o m :  
h t t p : / /w w w .v ic e p r e s id e n t s .c o m /n e w  p a g e  1 5 .h t m  [a c c e s s e d  1 4  M a r c h  2 0 0 2 ] .
C o lo r a d o  S ta te  U n i v e r s i t y ,  2 0 0 2 .  ‘ C a s e  S t u d ie s . ’ A v a i l a b l e  f r o m :  
h l t p : / /w r i t in g .c o lo s t a le .e d u / r e f e r e n c e s / r e s e a r c h /c a s e s t u d y /  [a c c e s s e d  2 7  A u g u s t  2 0 0 2 ] .  
D e f e n c e l in k ,  2 0 0 3 .  ‘ D i c k  C h e n e y ’ A v a i l a b l e  f r o m :
w w w .d e f e n c e l in k .m i l /s p e c ia ls /s e c d e f  h is t o r ie s /b io s /c h e n e y .h t m  [a c c e s s e d  4  J u n e  2 0 0 3 ] ,  
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